Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (left), U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan (right) yesterday at Blair House in Washington D.C.. It was the second such meeting in this trilateral format. via Armenian MFA
Less than a month and a half before the end of the year, hopes remain high for the normalisation of relations between Yerevan and Baku, especially since the last round of negotiations held in the United States. “I urged Prime Minister Pashinyan to sustain momentum on peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia following the foreign ministers’ talks in Washington on 7 November,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted on 16 November after a follow-up call to the Armenian leader. Hours later he tweeted the same message, but this time addressed to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.
Though many remain skeptical about the timescale, Blinken’s comments followed what appears to have been a productive bilateral meeting between the Armenian Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov, in Washington D.C.. A trilateral meeting with Blinken followed and, according to U.S. accounts, Mirzoyan and Bayramov agreed on a post-meeting statement in just 40 minutes. Their previous bilateral meeting in Geneva saw separate and different press releases published afterwards.
The same day, in an otherwise poorly attended Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting on “Assessing U.S. Policy in the Caucasus,” such hopes were clearly articulated by senior U.S. officials. “The sides are at a historic crossroads,” said U.S. State Department Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Philip Reeker. “We’re encouraging them to choose a future of prosperity and demonstrate the wisdom of working together on a peace that will benefit the people of the region for generations to come.”
Though little new was said by Reeker and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried at the hearing, they did at least confirm some of what is known, including indirectly confirming the veracity of a leaked document summarising key points from a meeting between Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev held on 27 September. The notes indicated that it is hoped sufficient progress on border limitation and a peace deal is possibly by the end of the year.
The deployment of a temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia for a two-month period from late October also hints at this.
During the Senate Foreign Committee meeting that lasted not much longer than an hour, both Reeker and Donfried in particular commended the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, for his 13 April speech in the Armenian National Assembly admitting that the international community believes Yerevan should ‘lower the benchmark’ on Nagorno Karabakh, a comment interpreted by many to mean that Yerevan should drop its support for independence of the mainly ethnic Armenian-populated territory situated within Azerbaijan.
This had always been the stumbling block in previous negotiations along with the occupation of the seven regions surrounding Karabakh that are now back under Baku’s control. Moreover, it is also clear that the issue of the normalisation of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations will be considered as a separate issue apart from that of Nagorno Karabakh, which many consider is now an internal matter for Azerbaijan, though not one away from the watchful eyes of the international community.
Not unexpectedly, of course, the issue remains highly sensitive and whether formally or informally linked, it also still lies at the heart of the conflict. Somehow, however, separating the two appears to be the only way forwards. This also became apparent on 27 September at the meeting between Grigoryan and Hajiyev in Washington D.C., as well as in the official Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press statement following a 2 October meeting of the foreign ministers in Geneva. The necessity to create a ‘discussion mechanism’ to allow Baku to communicate with the ethnic Armenian population of Karabakh was discussed.
Again, this was mentioned in the 27 September leaked document.
The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The details contained within the document, incidentally, were also effectively confirmed in an interview with Armenian National Security Secretary Armen Grigoryan days after it surfaced. However, in response, on 13 October, his Azerbaijani counterpart, Hikmet Hajiyev, responded to Grigoryan’s comments by saying there can be no question of an international mechanism being introduced. It should be pointed out, however, that this could mean simply that Baku does not want a format such as the OSCE Minsk Group resurrected or introduced given its failure to achieve any results prior to the 2020 war.
Regardless, given the increasingly precarious situation Karabakh Armenians now find themselves in, living within an area now stripped of much of its natural resources and unable to produce the types of goods and services it once exported to Armenia, such a mechanism would be both logical and necessary in the current circumstances that do not seem likely to change in the future apart from for the worse. It should also be remembered that some cooperation and communication has already occurred in terms of roads and water.
The need for this to be expanded upon is supported by both the US and EU.
“While the resolution of contentious issues remains the responsibility of Armenia and Azerbaijan, I have made it clear the international community and the United States has a specific responsibility to ensure that the rights and security of ethnic Armenians are addressed credibly and in line with a peace settlement,” said Reeker at this week’s hearing. […] I have repeatedly encouraged the leaders in both countries to consider an international mechanism or construct to ensure, monitor, and report on any agreement involving Nagorno Karabakh.”
Indeed, it was this issue that Reeker focused on most.
“That’s important and to do that fully, […] they need to consider how they can engage a mechanism, an international effort to support, to monitor, to offer help, and it can have an economic component and capacity as well, to make sure those people have an opportunity to define what security and rights means and to see that it is implemented […],” he continued while also implying in additional comments that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had acknowledged this in private discussions.
What shape or form such a mechanism might take remains unclear, but Azerbaijan has indeed stated that it will engage in direct discussions with the ethnic Armenian population of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). On 17 November, for example, Aliyev confirmed this even if did also rule out any negotiations with the newly installed defacto Minister of State for Nagorno Karabakh, Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan. On 18 November, the defacto Karabakh authorities rejected this and further demanded that such talks must be internationally mediated.
The OSCE Minsk Group was even mentioned.
But for most observers, the OSCE Minsk Group lies dormant without any chance of revival following Russia’s 24 February invasion of Ukraine. Even forgetting Azerbaijan’s refusal to engage within this format since the 2020 war, and the OSCE’s own internal problems as an organisation operating on consensus, it also seems unlikely that the three co-chair countries of the U.S., France, and Russia can cooperate in this format. Speaking at the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Reeker also acknowledged that while its mandate remains active, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship now doesn’t function at all.
Even so, unconfirmed rumours continue to spread, including from former MP Arman Babajanyan who said in an interview on Armenian Public TV that during the talks in Washington D.C. on 7 November the creation of a UN Security Council-endorsed format comprising the U.S, EU, and Russia was discussed. There has been no other mention of this and it should be treated as unconfirmed and speculation only, but given the risk of multiple peace formats colliding, such an idea would at least makes sense. Moreover, unlike the Minsk Group, it notably excludes France, an unreliable international mediator in the eyes of Baku.
As for Moscow, Reeker also admitted that Russia still remains an actor, especially in Armenia.
Bringing the disparate sides together does admittedly sound impossible in the wake of Ukraine. but it is notable that after a pause for almost a year, the 56th round of the Geneva International Discussions, a forum created after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war was held on 5 October. Originally scheduled for March, it is co-chaired by the OSCE, EU, and UN with the involvement of Georgia, Russia, the U.S., and also the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the West and Russia can engage there, why not in another conflict zone in the same region?
Nonetheless, charge some Armenian analysts, Brussels and D.C. hope to see the Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh leave when its first term expires in 2025, something that Azerbaijan also says it wants. Some others, however, believe that Moscow and Baku might strike a deal to extend the mission for one more 5-year term in exchange for integrating Karabakh more fully into Azerbaijan proper. Interestingly, on 10 November, Pashinyan also proposed establishing a demilitarised zone with international guarantees during his trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Aliyev in Sochi on 31 October.
Moreover, he has since once more declared that Armenia is ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, though stressing it will likely take the form of a framework rather than a comprehensive agreement. Given the short window until the end of the year, this sounds logical considering all the complexities arising after over three decades of enmity and conflict. However, warn some analysts, it is also important that such an agreement not prove to be as ambiguous and open to interpretation as some points in the 9-10 November ceasefire statement that have created numerous problems in the two years since it was signed.
The issue of border and customs controls on any route connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhichevan has been a particularly thorny issue and unless it too is resolved it is now quite possible that Azerbaijan will demand its own checks on the Lachin corridor, the route connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh through sovereign Azerbaijani territory currently under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers but only for as long as they remain. It is difficult to imagine a peace treaty being signed without addressing this issue, but noteworthy that unblocking regional communications has always been an integral part of any peace deal.
As always, what happens next relies on there being the sufficient political will in both Yerevan and Baku to finally turn the page on a conflict that should have been resolved decades ago.
