In my first piece for The Jamestown Foundation, I again look at the continuing geopolitical impasse on attempts to restore economic and transport links in the region following the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war as per the trilateral ceasefire statement that ended it. This is a topic that I’ve covered consistently since the beginning of 2021 but it has particularly come to a head now as hopes for a framework agreement between Baku and Yerevan persist.
On January 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed frustration about the endless delays in peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia during his annual press conference in Moscow (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 18). Despite hopes that an agreement to normalize relations could be within reach, progress remains stunted by several outstanding issues increasingly entangled in competing geopolitical interests (see EDM, December 18, 2022). This is most evident in the failure to unblock regional economic and transit ties following the Second Karabakh War in 2020. Harsh rhetoric from both Yerevan and Baku shows no sign of abating and threatens to derail the peace process (see EDM, January 24).
Key differences remain between Azerbaijan and Armenia on implementing the trilateral agreement ending the Second Karabakh War. According to the ninth point of the November 2020 ceasefire statement signed by Yerevan, Baku, and Moscow, “all economic and transport connections in the region” should be unblocked, including those between the “western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic” (Kremlin.ru, November 10, 2020). The agreement also states that the transit of people, vehicles, and cargo should be “unhindered,” while Russian border guards would be “responsible for overseeing the transport connections.” As Yerevan increasingly turns its gaze toward the West and the European Union and the United States seek to diminish Russia’s role in the South Caucasus, Armenia continues to show reluctance in fulfilling its commitments. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is growing increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress since 2020, specifically concerning the restoration of its Soviet-era connection via Armenian territory to the Nakhchivan exclave.
This is a far cry from more recent trilateral statements signed by the three countries in 2021. Those agreements initially reaffirmed a commitment to unblocking transit corridors, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan openly declaring that there was a “common understanding of how the routes will operate” (Kremlin.ru, November 26, 2021). Not one route, however, has been restored, and no reinstitution of the Soviet-era Nakhchivan line running through Armenia’s Syunik region (also known as Zangezur) has taken place.
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Concrete details on unblocking regional transit routes could be omitted from any framework agreement to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The danger here, however, is that further delays could lead to future conflict if transportation issues are left unresolved. Azerbaijan hopes to complete its section of the Zangezur Corridor by the end of 2024. Baku has warned that, until the direct link to Nakhchivan is established, it will not unblock any other passages between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Trend, January 10).
The full analysis is available here.
