Dec 10, 2022

Calls for the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia to be extended

According to the Armenian Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, the European Monitoring Mission Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia will end on 20 December 2022. Requested by Mirzoyan on 22 September following fierce fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the border a week earlier, the decision to deploy came out of the quadripartite meeting of the two leaders and European Council and French presidents, Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron, in Prague on 6 October. The decision was approved by EU member states on 17 October.

Initially deployed for up to two months, and despite an interview with EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar published on 29 October in which he said that it could not continue past that date, there are already calls for EUMCAP to be extended. The most vocal have come from France’s Foreign Minister, Catherine Colonna. “Through the monitoring of the border, this mission has really limited the danger of escalation,” she told the French Parliament on 6 December. 

“This presence should continue as long as it is needed. This is our belief. This is also […] the desire of the Armenians,” Colonna added.

However, it is uncertain whether EUMCAP can be extended. In order to deploy in such a short amount of time it was necessary to utilise the human and financial resources of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia. Deployed following the August 2008 war with Russia, staff from EUMM make up the 40-strong EUMCAP and were thus taken away from their normal duties monitoring the Abkhazia and South Ossetia Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs). Any  extension would require their continued absence.

It should also be noted that EUMM does not just monitor the ABLs. It also concerns itself with any security risks in Georgia from radicalisation to domestic political tensions that might erupt into violence. For the record, I’ve been called to meetings with EUMM to discuss both. Regardless, despite that and Klaar’s earlier comments about the temporary nature of the deployment made up of civilian monitors, European Council Decision 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 does at least provide for such a possibility.

Article 3a

 

1.   EUMM Georgia shall monitor, analyse and report on the situation in the region around the international border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, with a view to contributing to the restoration of peace and security in the area, to the building of confidence and to the delimitation of the international border between the two States.

 

2.   A strategic assessment, including on the possible continuation, adaptation or termination of that task, shall be conducted by the Political and Security Committee six weeks after deployment.

 

3.   That task shall end when the Council so decides.

With uncertainty still surrounding any extension of EUMCAP or its transformation into a dedicated European Monitoring Mission in Armenia rather than simply a Monitoring Capacity, there are certain issues to take into account. Firstly, on 7 December, Marek Szczygiel, Head of Mission for EUMM in Georgia, announced on Twitter that his term would end on 14 December. This naturally coincides with the 3 December 2020 decision by the European Council to prolong EUMM’s mission for two years until 14 December 2022 with a budget of €44.8 million.

This probably implies that another decision on EUMM’s continued deployment in Georgia has already been taken or is about to be.

It is therefore not beyond the realms of possibility that any decision to further prolong the deployment of EUMM in Georgia could also include an increase in budget and staffing to allow EUMCAP to continue its work in Armenia. Though it can not prevent any incidents, and though its role is not to publicly report on them, there is no doubt that EUMCAP, like EUMM, can at least contribute to the easing of tensions on the border to some extent. It should also be remembered that its role is clearly defined in the European Council decision.

On 6 October 2022, on the occasion of the meeting of the European Political Community held in Prague, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan confirmed their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Declaration agreed in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991, in which both States recognised each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The two States moreover agreed in principle to the deployment of an EU civilian CSDP Mission alongside their common international border with a view to contributing to the restoration of peace and security in the area, to the building of confidence and to the delimitation of the international border between the two States.

But there are dangers as well. Increasingly, some analysts in Yerevan openly argue that the continued deployment of EUMCAP in Armenia can be seen as a way to delay a peace agreement or even buy time in order for the country to re-arm ahead of what they see as an inevitable new conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it is unlikely that the European Union would want to be used with that goal in mind. Moreover, warn some Azerbaijani analysts, as EUMCAP is deployed only on the Armenian side of the border, there are other concerns too.

First, they argue, any inkling that EUMCAP could inadvertently delay the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly and adversely affect the standing and credibility of the European Union just as it has the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group. The optics of EUMCAP monitors standing side by side with Armenian soldiers focusing military grade binoculars on Azerbaijani military positions would also not be positive, they argue, creating the impression that the EU has taken sides in the 30-year-old conflict.

Given the EU’s stated aim to assist and support both Armenia and Azerbaijan as a neutral facilitator and mediator, this would be counterproductive unless Yerevan and Baku are clearly on the path to peace and both sides view the presence of monitors as contributing to that. 

Nevertheless, with the clock ticking down on EUMCAP and just a week and a half to go before its official termination unless extended or transformed, the answer to this question will soon be known. It might also reflect on whether the European Union believes, despite recent setbacks, that there is still life left in the Charles Michel-facilitated Brussels process to assist Armenia and Azerbaijan in finally negotiating and implementing a long overdue peace agreement. And it is this that might be the most important signal of all.  

As testimony to that, on his recent visit to Tbilisi, U.S. Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Philip Reeker lauded Georgia for EUMM’s role in establishing and deploying EUMCAP to assist in the western-led process. However, and although the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) did not deploy a monitoring mission despite requests to do so, the Russian and Iranian reaction to any continued EUMCAP or equivalent mission on Armenian soil will also be something to keep a watchful eye out for.

Update, 12 December 2022: “The Council reviewed the EU Monitoring Capacity to Armenia which will complete its activities on 19 December. In order to maintain the EU’s credibility as a facilitator of dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a team will be deployed to Armenia as of 20 December to contribute to the planning of a possible Civilian mission to be launched, in case of agreement, in 2023.” Link

 

 

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