On 25th July, the Yerevan-based online news site Civilnet uploaded an interview in Russian with Armenian Political Scientist and Lehigh University Professor Arman Grigoryan. Below is a summary of what Grigoryan said and a rough translation. The full interview in Russian is embedded at the bottom of this post.
SUMMARY
Talk of new war could be to prepare the population for peace, but also because some things are already being decided that we have little or no information on.
Three strands of NK resolution
- Border delimitation
- Unblocking transport
- Nagorno Karabakh status
The issue of status cannot be decided now so quickly after 30 years of enmity and war. Russia favours a phased approach so that after economic linkages etc. some creative approaches to status can be found.
Without this, there will be no ethnic Armenians left in Karabakh. Feeling is that West favours package approach. This could also be driven by the hope that Russian peacekeepers will therefore not be needed in the conflict zone.
If all the issues are not resolved by the end of the first five-year term for the Russian peacekeeping mission, and it doesn’t look like they will be, then it will automatically be renewed for a second term.
Russia and Azerbaijan will likely find a common language and allow for the extension of the peacekeeping mission. Despite opposition to this in Azerbaijan, Baku won’t risk a crisis or direct confrontation with Moscow.
Armenia’s position is seen in the context of opposition criticism of what happened in 2020 and the belief that further concessions will be made. However, whoever is in power will have to make concessions after such a defeat.
To maintain such a position as before the 2020 war would be irrational. What concessions Armenia is ready to make is not clear because of domestic political considerations.
Whether the West and Russia can coordinate efforts remains unclear. There is already a different approach to status and this also depends on what happens to Russia in Ukraine.
Regardless of who mediates, everything is leading to the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan but the nature of this agreement can differ. What can disrupt this is serious destabilisation in the region.
Such a situation can occur if Russia faces such problems in Ukraine that it has to turn its attention only to there. A vacuum in the region could occur and the balance of power shift.
If this does not happen then with any scenario or any mediation format, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan will probably be signed. Nevertheless, the risk of destabilisation exists.
It is in everyone’s interest to unblock regional transportation and communication links in the region, but the question of who will benefit the most remains. Nevertheless, if both sides can gain, both are interested in this.
ROUGH TRANSLATION
On the situation of Armenia finds itself in following the November 2020 ceasefire and recent official warnings about a new war
Before answering this question it is necessary to answer another. What can happen now? What danger are we talking about compared to the situation in which Karabakh and Armenia fell on 9 November?
All we can think of is a large-scale attack on Karabakh and for the same purpose, to attack Armenia and take Syunik. Is that possible? And are they talking about it?
This can happen only in one case – if the Russian factor is weakened.
If Russia’s situation goes bad in Ukraine and Russia turns all its resources and attention to Ukraine. This is the only factor stopping Azerbaijan. If this factor were not present, perhaps such wishes from Azerbaijan would have arisen.
I do not exclude that such statements are made as a result of pessimist analysis (the situation in Ukraine. I think this is a very pessimistic analysis. I think the war will end soon and I think things will be easier for Russia.
It is impossible to speak prematurely about Russia’s defeat or say that Russia is in catastrophic situation.
I think that these statements of our officials are to prepare the people for certain political decisions and new agreements. In fact, these are not new concessions and decisions but simply the fulfilment of the responsibilities that Armenia took after 9 November.
What else can be said about our officials? They often do this after the fact and they don’t reveal all the information immediately. This is how the processing of public opinion is done artificially.
On the likelihood of a road connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through the Syunik region of Armenia
Maybe. There may be certain agreements regarding the Syunik road. The painful issue for our public right now is the road from Syunik and the status of Karabakh.
The confrontation between the West and Russia in Ukraine has increased the uncertainty in our region. How should Armenia behave in this situation?
This is a really difficult situation. I myself was worried for a long time that things would develop like this. Armenia has managed to maintain good relations with Russia and the West during all the governments since independence.
What should Armenia do?
The first question that should worry the Armenian government is the security of Armenia. I think it is too early to consider a sharp change in political orientation.
Sharp turns and orientations could result with disaster for Armenia. We have examples from Ukraine and Georgia.
I know people say Russia doing badly in Ukraine, Russia is losing in Ukraine, and there is the need to change political orientation and bet on another horse. I do not think that such talks and comments are the result of convincing analysis.
Regarding the question of why the Karabakh issue is not discussed
I do not think that the Karabakh issue has been left on the sidelines. The first reason why it is not actively discussed is that Azerbaijan does not accept that this problem exists.
Azerbaijan clearly and openly says that this problem has been resolved and should not be discussed. In other words, there will be no status for Karabakh, Karabakh will be integrated into Azerbaijan like other regions.
The Armenian authorities sometimes, somehow sluggishly remind us of the existence of the Minsk Group, within which the status of Karabakh should be determined.
And what is the minimum requirements of the Armenian side is not clear. That is, what content in these conversations is completely unclear.
As for Russia, it adheres to the position that it is not expedient to discuss this issue now. And that this will not contribute to the resolution of the conflict. I think, and probably it is not difficult to disagree with this, that it is not possible to find some kind of formula now that would satisfy the minimum requirements of the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides.
To achieve some kind of decision on the status is possible only through pressure and it is clear to everyone who will be the object of such pressure.
Probably it is in the interests of the Armenian side to also separate this issue and approach the settlement and determination of the status with such a staged logic.
Maybe after a certain period of normal relations, the establishment of economic and other ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia, after a certain time it will probably be easier to talk about the status, about some creative solutions.
We had enmity for 30 years, two wars and constant skirmishes. In such an atmosphere, to think that it is possible to reach some kind of agreement and think that the Karabakh Armenians will be able to feel comfortable as citizens of Azerbaijan, this is a myth. There will not even be one Armenian left.
I think that there are also disagreements between Russia and the West on this issue.
I have a feeling that the West is more inclined to a new package agreement where Karabakh will be left as part of Azerbaijan but will have some kind of autonomy status.
Will Baku raise the issue of the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh?
I do not think that Baku will take such a risk until all issues are resolved during this period. And I do not think that all issues will be resolved. If Russia insists on keeping the peacekeeping mission longer than this period I think Azerbaijan and Russia will find a common language and this peacekeeping mission will be extended.
The fact that such voices are heard in Baku, that such demands exist are probably not surprising. I think this should be considered in the context of Azerbaijan’s domestic policy as well. There are people in the opposition who criticise Aliyev. I think that if Russia harshly insists on the extension of the peacekeeping mission, from the Azerbaijani side to insist on the withdrawal of peacekeepers, this will lead to a confrontation with Russia.
The actions of Ilham Aliyev give no reason to think he would adopt such a sharp and risky policy.
What are Armenia’s red lines on Karabakh?
This is a matter of internal policy of Armenia. The opposition sharply criticises Pashinyan because of what happened in 2020 and that he is ready to make some concessions.
Pashinyan has to make some concessions, and for whoever is in power in Armenia after defeat in a war, concessions are inevitable. And it would not be rational to keep the same position that existed in Armenia before the 2020 war.
But what concessions is Armenia ready to make? They also do not talk about this for obvious reasons.
Firstly, this is a matter of domestic policy, and secondly, they do not yet want to finally clarify their position on what concessions they are ready to make. The third point is, of course, very sad – to realise that the role of Armenia, if not to say that it has disappeared from the negotiation process, but the role of Armenia has been weakened, and this is very tangible.
Red lines they are not defined by words. Red lines are determined by resources, diplomatic international support. It’s just not serious to make a statement that is not backed up by such resources.
We had very well defined red lines before the war. I remember even in 2016, some cultural and diplomatic figures signed under this “Shushi Declaration” that people who talk about territorial compromises should be subjected to criminal liability. We had such red lines.
Are negotiations in two formats unproductive?
This is not only ineffective, it creates very obvious barriers, obvious problems and uncertainties. It is already a fact that they do not have coordination on the Minsk Group. Sergei Lavrov has made repeated statements about this. And there is no coordination and cooperation between the West and Russia on this matter.
Secondly, I have already mentioned the different logic and different approaches to any solution. If they do not coordinate which way Armenia and Azerbaijan will go, it is unclear. This also depends on the outcome of hostilities in Ukraine and what status quo will be created after that.
Will Armenia and Azerbaijan sign a peace agreement?
In any case, if it is Russian mediation or Western mediation, it is obvious that there will be some kind of agreement. The nature of these agreements may differ from each other, but a peace agreement within some framework, in some format, will probably be reached.
What can prevent this is a serious destabilisation in the region and such a destabilisation can occur if Russia loses the war in Ukraine. That is, the balance may change, the balance of power may change.
If things do not go according to a catastrophic scenario, I think that in any mediation format, a peace agreement will be reached.
Why are Russia and the West simultaneously lobbying for the unblocking of communications in the region?
I think the unblocking of these communications, the solution of the conflict is beneficial to everyone. The question is who will guarantee this, who will have more opportunities for economic cooperation with the region, more opportunities for investment, economic cooperation.
There will be some differences in the approaches to these issues, but the fact that everyone is interested in unblocking, establishing normal economic ties, I think that this is clear.
Both sides are interested in a settlement. And both sides will be the guarantors of this settlement if it strengthens their influence and creates the ground for close cooperation in the region, of course they are interested in this.
You can watch the entire video below. There is also a 20 February 2022 podcast that I held with Arman Grigoryan, who can be followed on Twitter at @AGContrapunctus, in the Karabakh Podcast section of this site.
