Introduction
Nationalist and ultra-nationalist narratives increasingly resemble those disseminated by violent extremist groups. Not only can themes be similar, but so too are the ways in which they are amplified and disseminated online via different mediums and platforms. They also target specific demographic groups, but there are few if any attempts to address or effectively counter them. This is especially true in the South Caucasus.
Youth is particularly at risk, with many consuming information in short and easily digestible formats rather than lengthy articles or videos. An online generation is more familiar with mobile phone apps, memes, and 30-60 second videos rather than longer media reports, expert analysis, opinion pieces, documentaries, and blogs. That is not to dismiss such work, but to recommend it also be repurposed into more social media-friendly formats.
Moreover, lessons and best practices from Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) could be adapted and used in traditional conflict resolution initiatives. There is a particular need to elaborate concrete social media strategies to reach a wider audience. While many nationalists are unlikely to become radicalised enough to engage in violence, rather than simply support or rationalise it, there is the possibility that some will.
Indeed, nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups are already a significant threat and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. At the very least, harmonious relations between ethnic and religious groups are threatened.
The Rationale for a P/CVE Approach
Nationalism and ultra-nationalism are not new or unique to the South Caucasus. Following independence, attempts to construct distinct national identities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have not only divided the region, but have also led to war and the danger of renewed conflict. As the former Soviet Union imploded, ethnic rivalries quickly became territorial disputes that remain unresolved to this day.
“Ethno-nationalist violent extremism involves the dehumanisation of individuals who are of a different ethnic or national group. This form of extremism often emerges in response to an ethnic or religious group’s perception of oppression at the hands of a more powerful actor, such as the state or a colonial power or an authoritarian state. In such cases, adherents are often driven by a desire for self-determined and political autonomy from the actors they identify as their oppressors […].” – UNESCO
Deeply rooted in subjective and exclusive historical memories sustained by ethno-nationalist narratives, emotions surrounding these conflicts have not dissipated and are actually increasing. This has especially been the case with the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh. Even though an initial ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, war resumed in April 2016 and again in September- November 2020.
In parallel, violent extremist groups have emerged in the region. While most media coverage has mainly focused on Islamist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates, they are not the only ones. In 2012, for example, a LGBT-friendly cafe in central Yerevan was firebombed by Armenian ultra-nationalists, reportedly because one of its owners had taken part in a Gay Pride rally in Istanbul, Turkey. Media referred to the culprits as neo-Nazi.
The oldest neo-Nazi group in the post-Soviet era in the region, the Union of Armenian Aryans, was also established in Yerevan in 1993 and claimed to have 18,000 members in 2020. Meanwhile, the first known example of actual terrorism in the region occurred in Azerbaijan with the 1994 Baku metro bombings. More than 90 people were injured and 27 killed in two bomb attacks believed to have been orchestrated by a Lezgin separatist movement.
In the 1990s and 2000s, some of Armenia’s Yezidi minority also joined the ranks of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, and there have long been concerns regarding the recruitment of Muslim citizens from Azerbaijan and Georgia by Islamist violent extremist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda. Georgian Orthodox Christians still fight in the Ukrainian conflict.
Indeed, in Georgia there are similar trends. On 30 September 2018, Vitali Safarov, a Georgian human rights defender and civil society activist of Yezidi and Jewish descent, was murdered by neo-Nazis in Tbilisi. Earlier the same month, Giorgi Chelidze, the leader of another Georgian neo-Nazi group, National Unity, was arrested for the illegal possession of munitions following a weapons training video he posted on Facebook.
In the early 1990s, ethnic Armenians in Abkhazia formed the Baghramyan Battalion to fight against Georgia while Afghan mujahideen were enlisted by Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia. In the most recent Armenia-Azerbaijan fighting in 2020, claims from some governments, international organisations, and experts that Syrian mercenaries were recruited by Baku also surfaced.
In April 2016, some ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Georgia also announced that they were assembling informal militia units to supplement Armenian and Azerbaijani troops in that year’s short-lived fighting over Nagorno Karabakh. The same was true during the 2020 war, but because of the Coronavirus pandemic, closed borders made that difficult.
Further highlighting how the lines between nationalism and violent extremism are blurred, Sasna Tsrer took over a police station in Yerevan in July 2016. Three policemen were killed. The incident was an ultra-nationalist response to fears and suspicion that the Karabakh conflict would be resolved.
It was reminiscent of the 27 October 1999 storming of the Armenian Parliament that saw an armed group assassinate eight senior members of government. Though the actors in both events are unconnected, some continue to believe that the 1999 terrorist attack was also staged to prevent concessions to Azerbaijan to resolve the conflict.
One prominent Sasna Tsrer figure, incidentally, is a former member of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), a Marxist-Leninist ultra-nationalist terrorist group that targeted Turkish diplomats in the 1970s and 1980s. The group did not just assassinate diplomats, however. In 1983, for example, an ASALA bomb prematurely exploded at a Turkish Airlines desk at a French airport killing 5 people and injuring dozens more.
During the 2020 Karabakh War, some Armenian nationalists, especially from the Diaspora, also openly called for ASALA to resume operations, not only against Turkish, but also Azerbaijani targets. On 20 January 2021, Armenian news sites and social media accounts carried an announcement, purportedly from ASALA, that the group was considering resuming its operations.
Though it is unclear how serious this threat is, the same day an Armenian Archbishop held a
commemoration of the group at the Yerablur military cemetery in Yerevan to mark the 46th anniversary of its founding. Meanwhile, concerns that right-wing groups are becoming more active in Armenia persist, a situation that could well increase after the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire agreement.
This possibility is also exacerbated given the strong involvement of Turkey in support of Azerbaijan in the recent fighting. Even if not immediately manifesting as violence there are other warning signs for the future. One militia in Armenia, VOMA, is actively recruiting locally as well as from the Diaspora.
Though sanctioned by the Armenian government, VOMA is increasingly hostile towards the Pashinyan administration. “It is hard to regulate a body which is under and at the same time out of MoD control,” Eurasianet quoted one NGO head as saying. The group’s Facebook posts highlight Christianity and Garegin Nzdeh as driving ideologies, while openly preparing for a new war.
One security risk assessment published at the end of January 2021 warned that “Armenian informal groups may engage in insurgent-style attacks” on existing and future critical infrastructure. And on 25 January 2021, media carried reports that Armenian trucks had been attacked with stones as they traveled through Ponichala, Georgia. At time of writing, ethnic Azerbaijanis living in the area are considered likely responsible.
Another report also noted that linguistic barriers and a weak local media limits access to information by the ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijanis communities in Georgia that could lead to the “development of hostile attitudes between the mentioned groups.”
Moreover, Armenian nationalists have promoted separatism in Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti region, in turn leading to the reciprocal radicalisation of Georgian nationalists already active on the issue of border demarcation between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and especially the Davit Gareji monastery complex. The recent Armenia-Azerbaijan fighting also saw Armenian and Georgian nationalists clash online.
Writing in The Conversation, two senior researchers noted that “homeland conflicts can easily be transported to third-party countries – especially when they escalate, as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has recently. Tensions between communities can be rekindled within minutes and relations can quickly worsen.”
Scope of Focus
While part of a larger project monitoring extremist groups in Georgia, this report will examine the effect of alternative and counter-narrative campaigns on the national and regional level. Arguably, because the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict poses the most immediate threat to inter-ethnic relations in Georgia, it will be used as a case study to identify and address narratives in circulation.
It also attempts to use the example of ethnic Armenian-Azerbaijani coexistence in Georgia as a potential alternative narrative given that one of the key nationalist messages is that of ‘ethnic incompatibility’ between the two groups. This again resurfaced following the 9-point ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia in November 2020, though so far mainly evident on the Armenian side.
Moreover, a report published a month before the 2020 war by the Public Movement Multinational Georgia (PMMG) NGO had already identified “a steady rise of tensions” between the ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Georgia “that can be explained by the […] continuous ‘hate propaganda’ circulated by Armenian, Azerbaijanian, Turkish and Russian media.”
Nagorno Karabakh and Georgia
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh in the early 1990s claimed over 25,000 lives. An additional 3,000 were killed in ceasefire violations from 1994-2016 and double that are believed to have perished during the 44-day war in 2020. Nationalist narratives on both sides seek to dehumanise the other and are devoid of empathy, making conflict resolution difficult and co-existence unlikely.
Yet, in neighbouring Georgia, some ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani communities live side by side, sometimes co-inhabiting the same villages, towns, and cities. They might be the only example of what Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War author Thomas de Waal calls a “third narrative on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict – a narrative of peace.”
The situation, however, is not one guaranteed to last. Misinformation and disinformation targeted the ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Georgia while social media and other information wars launched from Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other also inadvertently reached their ethnic kin in Georgia – digital collateral damage so to speak.
This was the case in April 2016, but some analysts are concerned that the situation is much worse this time round. In particular, they warn that this risks radicalising some members of the two communities in Georgia, challenging stability in the country. This in turn could spread to adjacent groups and increased radicalisation among the Georgian far-right.
Indeed, notes Laurence Broers, Caucasus Programme Director at the UK-based Conciliation Resources, “today anyone anywhere can participate in a toxic, radicalising social media space on this conflict. Georgia’s hard-won civic nationhood is threatened by any radicalisation of its two largest minorities.”
According to the Public Movement Multinational Georgia (PMMG), these concerns were evident even before the 2020 44-day war. In its policy paper published a month earlier, PMMG warned that while coexistence and interaction has largely enabled a stable environment for the two communities, the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan increasingly affects relations.
Moreover, while there is economic interaction between the two communities, they remain ‘mentally isolated from each other.’ In addition to the dispute over Nagorno Karabakh, the potential for conflict especially exists in Samtskhe- Javakheti where ethnic Azerbaijani shepherds take their sheep in the summer, often resulting in tensions with the local ethnic Armenian community.
Stepanian also says that he is concerned that when tourists from Armenia and Azerbaijan visit Georgia once the borders are open after the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, there could be problems between some members of both groups. He has relayed these concerns to the Georgian government who will reportedly seek to address them.
Identity is also another factor, with many ethnic Armenians identifying with Armenia as their ‘homeland’ while religious belief is more characteristic for ethnic Azerbaijanis in the formation of theirs. However, says PMMG, and despite being ostensibly mainly Shia rather than Sunni, Azerbaijani identity is also being replaced by what it refers to as a ‘pan-Turkic’ one.
Both realities will irk Georgian nationalist and ultranationalist forces. Armenophobia, Islamophobia, and Turkophobia are already problems in the country and threaten social cohesion in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. In January 2021, ethnic Azerbaijani residents of the village of Kesalo in the Marneuli region were told to ‘go back to Azerbaijan’ by Georgian clerics.
Information Threats
Unfortunately, the amount of misinformation, disinformation, and extremist propaganda is significant. In addition to local sources, it also comes from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and elsewhere. Given the nature of the Internet, this should come as no surprise. Even during the Black Lives Matter and George Floyd Protests in the United States in 2020, American far-right propaganda made its way to Georgia too.
What was unexpected, however, was that white supremacist misinformation, disinformation, and racist propaganda was then amplified by right wing Georgians. That the Armenia- Azerbaijan information war would also spread to Georgia should therefore come as no surprise. However, along with it also came content specifically targeting the country and promoting allegations that it was not as neutral in the Karabakh conflict as Georgian officials had claimed.
This included allegations that the government was allowing arms shipments from Turkey to Azerbaijan, and to a lesser extent from Moscow to Yerevan, through Georgian airspace and also on its roads. While the claims about flights are impossible to verify, the claims of arms shipments via land have been debunked. Baykrakar, for example, is also the name of a freight company.
Additionally, there were claims that Georgia was blocking humanitarian assistance and other shipments from the country’s ethnic Armenian community to Armenia. The Armenian government and its Embassy in Tbilisi were quick to deny the allegations and also warn its compatriots abroad to be cautious when consuming information relating to the conflict online.
Fact-checking organisations in Tbilisi did attempt to counter much of it, but the reach of such efforts is limited compared to the wider spread of this disinformation via social media.
Twitter especially exploded, with thousands of new accounts opened. Many were individuals, but some were allegedly officials posing as normal citizens. “The episode highlighted the frequently fuzzy – or hidden – line between individual actors and coordinated or even official online efforts on both sides of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict,” remarked Radio Free Europe.
A study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) also found that users from India and Pakistan joined the conflict online, supporting Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. Most new accounts created, however, were from the Armenian side, but likely because of an official ban on social media use in Azerbaijan, though many users circumvented that with VPNs.
This activity appeared to be highly coordinated and directed. A study by the Media Initiatives Centre in Yerevan noted that Facebook groups run by digital marketing specialists were established that attracted tens of thousands of Armenians, and in one example over 140,000. Members of these groups were encouraged to target media and any ‘anti-Armenian’ content online.
These coordinated and targeted campaigns continue after the 10 November ceasefire and will likely do so for the foreseeable future.
A much publicised ruling in January 2021 by Facebook’s new Oversight Board supported the platform’s decision to remove a post by one user that contained hate speech towards Azerbaijanis.
Another feature of the conflict was the use of celebrities with large followings online. This particularly favoured Armenia because of its large Diaspora and famous individuals such as Kim Kardashian and Cher. The lead vocalist of Armenian-American band System of a Down, who also produced two new music videos supporting Armenia in the war, was particularly active.
Combined, those three users alone have tens of millions of followers.
Online Media
Some freelance journalists with little experience of the conflict also saw an opportunity to monetise hostilities by subjectively reporting from one side only in order to attract crowdfunding through platforms such as Patreon. Unfortunately, this type of business model meant rumour and speculation was more likely to boost user engagement a following than fact-checking and remaining neutral or objective online.
Confirmation bias was therefore a significant problem. Neutral and objective sources on the fighting were the least consumed by far. This is the way that most people consume media worldwide, of course, but was especially problematic in a region such as the South Caucasus at a time of war with local media largely relying only on official or unverified information.
A 2009 survey by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) concluded that the Armenian and Azerbaijani public were “inclined to consider their existing attitudes and beliefs to be true and filter the news through this lens. […] Thus, they accept messages in order to maintain their original perceptions. […] It also […] serves as a means to perpetuate hatred.”
“This is a role the media has and continues to play with regards to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh,” it concluded.
KvinnaTillKvina also notes that the media plays a key role in reporting on conflict in general. “[…] the choices journalists make when they are reporting about conflicts affect not only our understanding of the conflict – but also what we perceive to be the solution. This, in turn, affects the conflict and its outcome,” it remarked in one report.
While some media outlets based in Tbilisi did take a more neutral or objective position, reach was significantly limited compared to the amount of nationalist propaganda being shared on almost every social media platform. While they did attempt to amplify pro-peace voices, it was just a drop in the ocean in comparison. Many in Armenia and Azerbaijan relied on Telegram instead.
Nevertheless, such media does create valuable content. As with peace building and conflict resolution organisations, therefore, there is the need to complement it by adapting and repurposing existing materials into more social media friendly variants.
Trolling
Online trolling was of particular concern, with many users angrily attacking others. As a result, some Twitter users locked down their accounts to avoid being targeted. Doxxing, gaslighting, and shitposting were prevalent and sub-tweeting common, both again seeking to discredit and highlight dissenting voices to target both online and off. The language, narratives, and approaches taken to do this were very similar to how far-right and Antifa activists operate.
Psychologists have warned of these different types of trolling behaviour, but the common approach is simply to be aggressive. “By posting upsetting comments, instigating conflict, and provoking inflammatory discussions, trolls and passive-aggressive people capitalise on the fact that it is far easier to be cruel from behind a keyboard,” wrote Psychology Today.
Sadly, social media rewards such behaviour, favouring engagement over civility in order to attract increased advertising revenue. Cancel culture also featured highly, including targeting prominent experts on the Karabakh conflict such as Thomas de Waal and others. Unfounded allegations of foreign sponsorship and defamation of character combined with harassment was usually the modus operandi of online trolls rather than actual facts and reasoned argument.
This manifested itself in the offline world too. Two Azerbaijani activists were called in for questioning, for example, and one Armenian peace activist was visited by police and threatened with a fine if he continued to make social media updates. In the US, one user of Azerbaijani descent was doxxed and some American-Armenians allegedly organised an attempt to confront her physically. Police were called when a Canadian-Armenian privately tipped her off.
During skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in mid-2020, diaspora communities did engage in physical clashes abroad so while some might consider it a leap to consider nationalism and violent extremism as being linked, it should be pointed out that nationalist narratives from Armenia and Georgia were found in the manifestos written by the Norwegian far-right terrorist Anders Breivik and Christchurch mosque shooter Brenton Tarrant.
“[…] Armenian society has many of the characteristics that have proven to be fertile ground for budding far-right movements,” wrote Freedom House in a January 2020 report.” “[…] Furthermore, Armenian national identity is deeply rooted in historical grievances relating to persecution by external enemies, offering a rich material for militant radicalisation.”
Though Azerbaijan is a secular Muslim country, some Islamist extremists have
also at various times called for ‘jihad.’ Even if in a minority and considered a threat by the Azerbaijani government, those Islamist extremists nonetheless exist. Moreover, far-right Islamophobic hate figures such as Robert Spencer are already starting to use Karabakh to frame the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as a battle between Christians and Muslims. Armenian diplomats have openly shared this content while some diaspora Armenian groups use it as a strategy.
There are other similarities in terms of the types of narratives that nationalists on both sides shared, and the mediums through which they were disseminated, listed in the following sections. Understanding them is key to any successful attempt to counter the phenomena.
User Generated Content
Extremists have long been producing overwhelming amounts of materials to propagandise for their cause and drown out anything else. This isn’t simply through official channels, but also through their supporters. As terrorism researcher Charlie Winter notes, this is especially the case for groups such as ISIS whose ‘fanboys’ are proficient with online tools and incorporate elements of pop culture in order to reach and recruit other youth.
“They receive no reward for their activism other than gratification from within [their] echo chamber,” he wrote. “By saturating the online jihadist marketplace of ideas with official content, it also provides an abundance of raw material for ‘jihobbyists’ to produce their own unofficial propaganda.”
In doing so, the organisation is able to constantly direct the trajectory of its online narrative from afar and without direct involvement.” This was the same role that Armenian and Azerbaijani ‘keyboard warriors’ took upon themselves during the 2016 and 2020 wars.
The sheer amount of videos depicting executions, torture, and battlefield footage, often resembling computer video games, shared by both sides was similar to that from Iraq and Syria. And like that material, it was repackaged and amplified extensively.
Peace-building projects and conflict resolution organisations failed to respond adequately to this new propaganda war being fought online. Few used social media to convince Armenians and Azerbaijanis of the need for peace, or even to address nationalist narratives and counter mis/disinformation, something once again highlighting the need to develop robust social media strategies in the future.
Moreover, while most are using Facebook and Twitter, albeit in a limited way, they were noticeably absent from other mediums where misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda was rampant and extensively spread. This included Telegram, Instagram, and TikTok. For many in peace-building used to issuing wordy reports and papers, these must have seemed alien and somewhat simplistic environments.
Nevertheless, this was how most information was consumed. It was also particularly effective in reaching a younger audience through memes.
“According to social media specialists, political memetic content can make one more susceptible to hardliner arguments. Political or nationalistic memes often use humor to make their message more palatable because however distasteful, “it’s comfortable, it speaks to peoples’ values and also their cultural upbringing.
In an entrenched conflict such as the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, memes help to normalise uncompromising positions.”
The purpose of ‘memetic warfare’ is to appeal to the cultural identity of media consumers in a way that is easily replicable and shared. US Marine Corps Major Michael B. Prosser even suggested setting up a Meme Warfare Centre (MWC) and especially noted the importance of involving cognitive scientists, cultural anthropologists, behavioural scientists and game theory experts.
“Memes influence ideas, ideas influence and form beliefs. Beliefs generate and influence political positions combined with feelings and emotions, eventually producing actions, which inform and influence behaviour.”
Social media also ‘evens out the playing field’ when it comes to content creation and consumption. Professional journalists are not the only ones creating ‘news.’ Instead,‘filter bubbles’ are created and different audiences choose to only consume content that supports and validates pre-existing beliefs “thereby polarising public opinion.”
User Generated Content (UGC) is particular effective because of its peer-to- peer nature and because it is easily spread in non-conflict related online networks, thus reaching a significantly wider audience.64 Much of it is also based on existing material.
“With regards to UGC, “there are many active creators and a large supply of content that can engage viewers, although of potentially lower or more diverse quality. Users are also inspired by, and build on, existing works as in the traditional media chain. Users select what does and does not work, for example, through recommending and rating, possibly leading to recognition of creators who would not be selected by traditional media publishers.”
Narratives are also “open-ended, branching, hyperlinked, cross-media, participatory, exploratory, and unpredictable.” Thus, it is no longer possible to talk of two narratives to the Karabakh or any conflict, in fact. Instead, there are many that change depending on circumstances and events. There is therefore the need to constantly monitor online activity to identify what current narratives are popular at any given moment and to respond to them immediately. Naturally, this is a time-intensive task.
“Social media is essentially about people and their relationships. Just as a psychologist needs a good understanding of the principles of human behaviours when seeking to understand how individuals relate to one another in the physical domain, so analysts need to understand the theory behind how humans make sense of the world when seeking to understand their communications and relationships in cyber-space.”
“[…] the ability to develop a convincing and all-encompassing narrative and to deploy it effectively using social media is likely to be an increasingly critical capability requirement. This can only be met by developing an understanding of how narratives spread and how they impact on the populations involved.”
Indeed, narratives are told and re-told. They are “central to understanding how all aspects of conflict are defined, constructed and understood” and “conclusions contained within the story become the social norm.” Not only do they exist online, but also offline, in literature, film, television, media, art, culture, and music. Most importantly, they are usually emotional.
Nevertheless, alternative and positive narratives to nationalist messaging that are intended to lead the conversation rather than simply respond to them, are arguably more effective. It should be noted that extremist groups are already more successful with simple yet emotive messaging, and often accompany them with a ‘call to action’ even if that’s simply to troll or ‘cancel’ someone. However, there is the danger that it could also manifest itself as violence.
Themes of Narratives
In his dissection of themes to be found in ISIS propaganda, Quilliam researcher Charlie Winter identified six main categories. These are similar to those found among other extremist groups, including white nationalists. They were also replicated during and after the recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh.
Brutality is one theme common to all, for example. The shocking nature of the content and its appeal is particularly effective while also serving many purposes. For some, it can highlight vengeance and supremacy, while for others such as an opponent or anyone who resists, it serves as a stark warning.
There were many such videos, including beheadings and executions as well as the desecration of corpses, circulated through Telegram and TikTok both during and after the Karabakh war. The same videos were also used by the other side to serve their own agenda, but inadvertently ensuring an even greater reach that contributed to reciprocal radicalisation on all sides.
A connected theme is Mercy and works on two levels. The first is to demonstrate to supporters that despite the reports of war crimes there is also a human side, validating claims that any atrocities were not systematic while also offering opponents a choice – resist and be killed or willingly submit and receive clemency.
Victimhood is another strong theme, validating the struggle for justice. This is a common theme for Armenians and Azerbaijanis who are able to call upon many incidents of massacre and ethnic cleansing over the past 100 years. This then allows nationalists to claim that conflict is an existential struggle to survive.
Even white supremacists and the far-right use this with their ‘Great Replacement’ narrative.
War as a theme naturally exists among Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Military successes and victories are predominant here, especially those based on actual footage of fighting. Given that one key audience is youth, the more footage resembles gameplay from a computer game the better it appeals to the gaming generation.
The looting of enemy weapons and munitions is also a component and perhaps best exemplified by the post-war victory parade in Baku where captured Armenian military equipment was put out for display. However, both sides did the same when given the opportunity. This was also evident in the opening of the controversial ‘Trophy Park” in Baku.
Belonging is perhaps one of the two most important themes, offering supporters a sense of identity. This especially resonates among those born or based abroad. It also allows anyone who speaks out to be labeled as traitors. There were many such cases in 2020, with Armenians being told to remove the –ian/yan suffix from the end of their names and Azerbaijanis being accused of secretly having ‘Armenian blood.’
– Another of the most important themes is Utopia. For ISIS it was the so-called ‘caliphate,’ while for the far-right the idea of creating a homogenous white European ethno-state, something not dissimilar to the idea of an Armenian or pan-Turkic homeland. If a utopian homeland can be established, the narrative proposes, life will be perfect.
All of these themes contain multiple narratives that will widen over time and are targeted at different audiences. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy. The audience is also provided with an option to pick and choose a single or combination of themes to rationalise support for one side over the other. For example, as mentioned, the theme of victimhood can be used to ignore, justify, or invalidate any evidence of war crimes.
Winter also argues that these different audiences are also vital for propaganda and narratives to resonate effectively. Some are meant for existing supporters, others for potential supporters, and still more for a foreign audience that might share them globally to others not directly involved in the conflict. This was again something evident during the Karabakh fighting.
As has been mentioned previously, the inability to respond to such information threats and narratives has not yet been understood fully by international and domestic civil society organisations.
Mitigation is an urgent need in the short term, both in response to new organizational risks borne of weaponization, as well as threats of weaponized social media to populations of concern. Security and reputational hazards abound from weaponization and yet most global NGOs do not have policies, frameworks, protocols or response plans in place to respond appropriately and systematically. Until preventative measures are better developed, organizations in the peacebuilding space will be increasingly expected to respond to online threats to social cohesion or violence triggers.
In order to understand how these narratives spread, it must be first understood how social media works on both a technical and emotional level. Social media is both the medium and the message, and the narratives contained within allow for volume analysis to assist in identifying and addressing any information threat. Text-mining of narratives is essential.
Historical Narratives
When considering online narratives, it should be remembered that schools in Armenia and Azerbaijan have carried their own for decades. This means that such narratives are ‘hard-wired’ into the minds and identities of most Armenians and Azerbaijanis. While that might not affect schools in Georgia, these narratives are still disseminated via social media.
Moreover, “the media and the education systems […;] are actively engaged in ideological “war mongering,” carving out a narrative of eternal enmity, creating a positive image of the “self” and dehumanising “the other.” History is selectively framed, presented, and interpreted.
It is also, as Phil Ghamagelyan and Sergey Rumyantsev argue, ‘written backwards’ to promote and justify the separate positions held in Armenia and Azerbaijan today. This includes historical demographics which are selectively used to create a narrative of ethnic cleansing throughout history by the other. The same is true when massacres occur, with each side only presenting information about events that involved them as victims.
It seems impossible at present to consider changing textbooks in both countries, but the work of Jordanian entrepreneur Suleiman Bakhit in P/CVE shows that the use of comic books could at least change the narrative.
Similar narratives also exist with the tit-for-tat expulsion of ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijanis from the other’s territory. This became an issue on social media in the weeks following the 2020 war. Armenian nationalists presented the exodus of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia in the late 1980s as ‘out- migration’ while ethnic Armenians who fled Azerbaijan were portrayed as ‘deported.’ Ghamagelyan refers to the Turkish Cypriot academic Vamik Volkan and his description of this as ‘chosen traumas and chosen glories.’
The same narratives exist on the Azerbaijani side while most historians on both avoid any mention of longer periods of time when Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived side-by-side together in peace. Though some such as Thomas de Waal have called for a ‘history ceasefire’76 in the Karabakh conflict, that looks unlikely in the foreseeable future. Deeply contested claims and allegations will continue to be difficult to resolve, but must be addressed.
Religious Narratives
Although the Karabakh conflict is rooted in territorial claims, some argue that religion has played a role in the formation of identity at times of turmoil and is thus used by nationalists to develop an ‘us versus them’ reality. Moreover, because there are many similarities between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in terms of culture and cuisine, this is perhaps the main identifier through which both groups can be seen as different.
Images spread on social media often incorporated religious symbols, albeit sometimes unintentionally. There were explicit references, however, and even photos of priests holding guns. The situation was also not helped by allegations of Syrian mercenaries being used by Azerbaijan in the fighting or by the destruction of Azerbaijani religious sites, museums, and monuments in territories lost in the 1990s and the loss of Armenian monuments, museums, and churches in 2020.
Foreign Christian news sites particularly carried religious narratives in their coverage of the conflict. Indeed, in one podcast, an American-Armenian analyst based in Yerevan promoted the idea of using the Christian-Right in the US to further the ‘Armenian cause.’
In Georgia, where religious belief is particularly strong, such narratives have strong appeal. Apostolic Armenians and Orthodox Georgians have their own grievances with each other and there has long been Christian-Muslim tensions between even religiously different ethnic Georgian communities.
Alternative and Counter-Narratives
When considering addressing the problem of extremist and nationalist narratives there has to be a focus on flexibility. While there are some standard narratives that have already been identified, more will likely surface in the future based on current and future events. Moreover, the mediums through which they are disseminated could change too.
For example, Twitter and Telegram became particularly active spaces during and after the 2020 war while they were not beforehand. It is also not yet known whether other platforms will emerge and what demographic they will attract. Nevertheless, just as it is possible to categorise themes of narratives it is also possible to do the same for their type.
Strategic counter-narratives for broad audiences are best left to governments and large international organisations wishing to condemn acts of violence or call for a structured negotiated peace. Unfortunately, however, they are more likely to appeal to those who haven’t yet taken more extreme views or positions.
Tactical counter-narratives might simply seek to explain why violence in the long run is less effective when compared to more peaceful methods. They could also, for example, argue that economic growth is more likely in an environment of peace, stability, and regional integration and cooperation.
Even so, because counter-narratives usually respond and react to extremist and counter narratives the situation is also one where they are often a step behind. It would be better to instead focus more on creating more proactive positive and alternative narratives. When dealing with disputed historical facts, they should also be balanced narratives.
Ethical narratives point out that violent action is not a moral way of achieving the aims of a particular group. They might only work if the messenger has ethical or moral influence over the target audience, however. These arguments may not be religious in nature, but more talk about humanity.
Religious counter-narratives will resonate more if the messenger has religious authority in the target community.
Humour and sarcasm can sometimes be useful in delegitimising the narrative of violent extremists in certain instances. However, using humour may not reach the intended target audience, and could backfire among one side or both.
Messengers
One of the most daunting tasks in addressing extremist messaging is how to make any response resonate with the intended target audience. Those disseminating counter-narratives are also often accused of being traitors or in receipt of foreign funding and it is for this reason that messengers have to be seen as credible. As experience in the area of P/CVE shows, several different actors can take on this role.
Perhaps the most credible messengers of all are the victims of violent extremism and former violent extremists. The same is true for the victims of actual war, IDPs/refugees, and current or former soldiers as well as former nationalists. Victims can be those injured during the fighting or who lost family members.
Nevertheless, there is still need for caution. If former extremists have not truly deradicalised or disengaged, then some nationalist narratives might be present in their messages. That said, this could make them all the more credible. For example, acknowledging that the ‘other’ has committed crimes, but stressing that violence should not be the response.
Youth is also a key actor. In most cases, it is this group that extremists mainly target online for recruitment. Moreover, youth communicates in the same cultural language and exist in the same online space that other youth do. Gender is also important for the same reason. Women can also be effective and influential messengers in general. Moreover, while many view women almost solely as potential ‘peacemakers,’ their role in nationalist and extremis groups is often overlooked.
A whole-of-society approach is also necessary. Even local political, religious, and community leaders have a critical role to play. This is especially important if a conflict pits one community against another – for example, between border villages. This is especially necessary now given the close proximity that Armenians and Azerbaijanis find themselves in.
However, elaborating religious narratives are notoriously problematic and should be left to theologians, but there are some positive examples here. In 2010 and 2011 the Catholicos of All Armenians, Karekin II, visited Baku and Sheik Pashazade, Azerbaijan’s religious leader, visited Yerevan.79 Both articulated a message of peace.
And during the 2020 war, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Yezidi religious leaders from their respective Georgian communities held weekly interfaith prayers for peace in Tbilisi.
Sports and cultural figures can also be important even if both were instead active in the service of nationalism during the 2020 war. In Azerbaijan, for example, a football club spokesperson called for the killing of Armenian civilians while Serj Tankian and System of a Down produced nationalist music videos.
Again, there are also some positive examples. Tbilisi has seen many Armenian and Azerbaijani musicians assemble and perform together in genres from folk through jazz to rock. And in 2010, a peace orchestra of young Armenian and Azerbaijani classical musicians performed in Yerevan and Baku.
There have also been examples of Armenian and Azerbaijani athletes competing at international sporting events in each other’s countries. Nevertheless, art, music, and culture as well as sport has been ignored in peace-building projects despite nationalists embracing them. In January 2019, for example, the National Centre for Chamber Music even held a concert dedicated to the ASALA terrorist organisation in Yerevan.
The Case of Armenia
During the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, mis/disinformation was rampant with the media generally reliant on official information only, most of which was later found to be inaccurate or completely false. As in Azerbaijan, this pushed many Armenians to rely on Telegram as a primary source of information. Naturally, it also became another source of mis/disinformation. It is in the post-war situation, however, that this is of most concern.
Since the November ceasefire social media has been full of what one American Analyst called ‘garbage’ spread by ‘keyboard fedayis (freedom fighters).85 More alarmingly, there were many threats and calls for the assassination or torture of the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and also of his family. Leaflets declaring “Eliminate the Traitor” were also spread around Yerevan in January 2021. A local NGO alleges the far-right VETO movement was behind the Telegram channel that spread video of the leaflets.
Claims that Pashinyan were ceding parts of Armenia proper were false, but nonetheless led to more radicalisation online.
Some Armenian NGOs such as the Media Initiative Centre are compiling examples of the mis/disinformation being spread, including allegations that Pashinyan was bribed $5 billion to sign a peace deal, but their reach is even less than in Georgia and nowhere near as sophisticated. Moreover, it is quite clear that no amount of fact- checking or debunking mis/disinformation will be convincing enough for a large number of Armenians.
The Case of Azerbaijan
While the media space was strictly controlled by the government, official information on the war itself was more accurate than that from official Armenian sources. Nonetheless, and as is also the case in Armenia, the propaganda that has defined the rivalry between the two countries over Nagorno Karabakh since the late 1990s continues to spread and has been detailed in previous sections.
One area of concern to many observers is the labelling of what are believed to be Armenian churches and monuments in Azerbaijan as Caucasian Albanian. In many cases it was a mirror image of Armenia when it came to hate speech. According to conversations with Azerbaijani analysts, much of the disinformation targeted the Russian Peacekeeping forces.
The Case of Georgia
Researchers at the Tbilisi-based Media Development Foundation (MDF) monitored Karabakh-related mis/disinformation targeting Georgia throughout the war. While most conclude that the Georgian government took a neutral position, Georgian social media was a cause for concern. Not unexpectedly, some Georgian Facebook users again raised the issue of the Baghramyan Battalion in Abkhazia.
As in 2016, both government and opposition MPs also started to declare support for one side over the other based on their personal ethnic background. Two ethnic Azerbaijani MPs from Georgian Dream and the United National Movement expressed support for Azerbaijan while one ethnic Armenian candidate for UNM declared that the Armenian community in Georgia would fight alongside Armenian and Karabakh forces.
One ethnic Armenian MP from the Georgian Dream government, however, responded to such a possibility by urging the community not to interfere with the activities of the Armenian military. While supporting Armenia, he attempted to prevent ethnic Armenians from Georgia joining the conflict. Pro- Russian and ultra-conservative Georgian parties were more explicit.
Already engaged in an anti-Azerbaijani and anti-Turkey campaign, an ethnic Armenian candidate for the pro-Kremlin Alliance of Patriates declared that the main threat to Georgia came from Azerbaijan, specifically mentioning the Davit Gareji demarcation conflict.
Levan Vasadze, a significant extremist voice in Georgia, also stated that Russia was punishing Armenia through Azerbaijan for the 2018 ‘Velvet Revolution’ that brought Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power. Russian nationalist MP Vladimir Zhirinovsky was also extensively quoted by some Georgian media and Facebook pages.
Following the war, a journalist affiliated with the far-right Georgian March also suggested that George Soros was behind Pashinyan. Meanwhile, other far-right online personalities, such as Alt-Info’s Giorgi Kardava, did so as well. Raising the issue of the Baghramyan Battalion, another opined that Armenia also betrayed Georgia in the 1795 Battle of Krtanisi.
Other sponsored posts, likely by ethnic Armenians, in the Georgian language on Facebook also called for on Samtskhe-Javakheti to declare its independence and depicted it as part of part of Armenia. MDF quoted one Georgian analyst as saying that these information threats are now part of the everyday realities and that they must be countered.
Recommendations to International Organisations, Donors, and Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
– Social media is the main medium through which youth consume information and share opinions. While most NGOs focus on Facebook, mobile phone apps such as Instagram and TikTok are proving more popular. There are no cross-border media projects that reach a sizeable audience in the South Caucasus and virtually none engage with their audience. Donors must insist on more robust social media strategies.
– While social media can be used to bring Armenians and Azerbaijanis together (Bright Garden Voices is a particular example, though mostly via Twitter. Its Facebook following is very low), it can also be used to push them apart. Currently, the nationalists are in abundance and moderate voices are marginalised, harassed, and silenced. There is an urgent need for strategies and approaches that amplify positive voices.
– International and intergovernmental organisations should partner and collaborate with platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and TikTok to respond to all instances of hate speech in the context of Nagorno Karabakh. The platforms already have the necessary network analysis tools, but Armenian and Azerbaijani hate speech flies under their radar even though it radicalises both sides. This has already manifested itself as offline violence and this is likely to increase in the future.
– No civil society or international organisation working on Karabakh has harnessed new tools properly or even at all to reach a younger or sizeable audience. None of them have elaborated proper social media strategies and social media trainings in past Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict-resolution projects have been underwhelming and ineffective. Facebook pages, YouTube, and blogs are the platforms of the late 2000s and are increasingly losing their relevance as more and more youth turn to platforms such as TikTok.
Those organisations working in other areas such as Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), however, have been responding to extremist messaging online and offering alternatives for years. Their experience should be studied and, where appropriate, included in projects on Karabakh. The Internet has become a major information space for over a decade now and is even more so today. This does not, however, negate the importance of offline and other physical approaches. For example, the problem of school textbooks in Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain one for the foreseeable future so the work undertaken with comic books by P/CVE practitioners such as Suleiman Bakhit should be considered to counter nationalist narratives.
– Because most content is in English, this means diasporas have now become a major actor in the online war of words. While they should be engaged, this is a major obstacle to connecting Armenians and Azerbaijani citizens in the South Caucasus. Civil society should produce more content in Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani to exclude militant Diaspora groups where proficiency in such languages is often low or even non-existent. If that is impossible then peacebuilding organisations should attempt to engage with leaders in those communities. Many moderate Armenian and Azerbaijani academics and activists are already based in Europe and the US.
– Lessons from the world of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) highlight how counter-narratives rarely work and instead polarise or incite more conflict and division. While these still have a place in meetings of experts or academics, there should be more investment in elaborating alternative and positive narratives for the wider public. Even so, the likelihood is that nationalists online will seek to disrupt them. However, as part of many peacebuilding projects, those youth inclined towards communication should be encouraged to create their own messaging in collaboration with each other in the mediums and forms most accessible to their peers.
– Online and offline security needs to be factored in to all conflict-resolution projects. There is a process of further radicalisation occurring and violent offline clashes occurring since mid-2020. As elements of the 10 November ceasefire agreement are gradually implemented, and as the new reality sinks in, while some nationalists will disengage there is the danger that others will radicalise further, potentially towards even more online hate speech and violence in the offline world.
– This danger of radicalisation towards violence, even if only among a minority, highlights how important it is to incorporate elements of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) practices into new or standalone projects. This doesn’t just mean online, but also in terms of empowering youth, communities, and strengthening social cohesion. Some conflict-resolution organisations already take this holistic approach elsewhere in the world, but not in projects related to Karabakh.
– It is imperative to do more than simply engage Armenians and Azerbaijanis in direct discussions over Karabakh. While some such as international relations students, and journalists can do this, there is also the need for larger engagement with other actors such as businesspeople, musicians, artists, environmentalists and others. Unfortunately, religion as also started to become a significant factor in the conflict and risks turning this into a ‘clash of civilisations.’ Religious leaders must be engaged.
Basically, a whole of society approach must now be adopted with a particular focus on communities that now border each other to a much greater extent than before and also in languages and forms that are relevant. Here too, new tools can play a role and the effectiveness of early warning systems such as Elva94 should be examined.
One smaller and less sophisticated equivalent was trialed by Saferworld on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in the mid-2010s, but was very basic compared to Elva which was used on the South Ossetia ABL.
– In addition to bringing lessons learned from the world of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), others from the world of marketing, advertising, and public relations should be involved. Nearly every project concerning the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has failed to reach any significant audience at all.
This is especially true for online media projects which fail to attract a sufficient audience compared to partisan, nationalist, and extremist sites or social media accounts. Television and radio, including community radio, have an important role to play too, as long as there is the political will in Armenia and Azerbaijan to allow this to happen without censorship.
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Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, photojournalist and media consultant who has covered the Nagorno Karabakh since 1994 and also the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war.
He has developed curriculum and conducted or facilitated workshops for academics, journalists, community leaders, national minorities, and others in social media, conflict-sensitive journalism, and preventing and countering violent extremism for numerous international and intergovernmental organisations as well as local NGOs in Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
