Last week’s decision by the European Commission to recommend Georgia receive European Union candidate status caught many by surprise. A survey conducted by the Tbilisi-based Caucasus Research Resource Centre (CRRC) in the previous days showed that, despite widespread support for EU membership, only 33% of respondents believed it would obtain it. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, which became candidates in June last year, Georgia had instead been required to address 12 priorities first.
Despite some progress towards those goals, only three satisfied Brussels to some extent and Georgia now needs to address nine areas of concern . In an increasingly charged and polarised environment, with Tbilisi cautious about irking Moscow, there also remain allegations that the government instead sought rejection. Georgian President Salome Zurabashvili even urged the public to gather outside the presidential palace on the evening of the decision – possibly to celebrate if the status was granted or to protest if it was not.
Zurabashvili, now estranged from the very authorities that facilitated her presidency, narrowly survived an attempt to impeach her last month over what were considered unauthorised trips to European capitals to lobby for candidate status. While the European Commission’s decision now alleviates concerns about political instability, it does not guarantee smooth sailing ahead. Last week’s recommendation is not the final decision; that will be determined by EU leaders next month.
“[…] we should not forget that the recommendation to grant Georgia the candidate status is linked to fulfilling important steps”, EU Ambassador to Tbilisi Pawel Herczynski said in press remarks , making specific references to the rule of law, media freedom, and holding democratic elections. “Addressing these steps will be crucial to move to the next stage. This is the nature of the enlargement process: constant reform […]”.
Georgia is also expected to counter anti-EU disinformation and propaganda and align its policy with Brussels’ in terms of foreign affairs and security. Many consider this a direct reference to Moscow evading EU sanctions through its former satellites of Armenia and Georgia since last year’s invasion of Ukraine. Nonetheless, despite the EU acknowledging only ‘limited progress’ since June last year, the government hailed the decision as a success.
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