Gerard Libaridian
Arguably one of the most independent and unique voices on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades, Gerard Jirair Libaridian has been particularly on point since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war. Not only was he among the few of us that foresaw a new conflict between the two breaking out in the days and weeks preceding hostilities, but Libaridian was particularly concerned about such an eventuality, though it has to be said that such fears had been growing with each passing year since 2011.
Senior Advisor to the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, Libaridian has also held the position of director of the Armenian Studies Program at the University of Michigan, and most recently was the co-author of a white paper, The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies. In his recent online presentation for the Cambridge-Yerevan Sister City Association, Libaridian offered his opinion on where things stand and what lies ahead.
He starts the presentation, however, on a pessimistic note, having recently returned from a seven-week visit to Armenia earlier this year.
If you had told me in November of 2020 that there would be sadder days than November 9 when Armenia had to sign a very humiliating ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan after the second Karabakh war, I would not have believed it, but I think we are there now.
Libaridian later explains that what he means by this is that there now what he terms an assault on democracy in Armenia, with opposition forces close to the former regimes of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan taking to the streets despite last year’s parliamentary elections that saw Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract retain power despite defeat in the 2020 war. Moving on, however, he identifies those questions that are now being asked today.
The first of those is with regards to responsibility for the the 2020 war and its aftermath? There are different answers to this, he says.
One belief is that Pashinyan is responsible and another is that Pashinyan and the previous 25 years of leadership and state-imposed mentality under the presidencies of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan are. These two answers, he says, can be combined by adding that Azerbaijan and Turkey are are responsible. “Any answer,” he says, alluding to the unfortunate tendency to scapegoat and overlook the mistakes of the past, “but me.”
Another question being asked in Armenia is what is the meaning of the 2020 war? There are three answers here, he says.
The first, and which might be held by a good part of the population, is that people are no longer interested and that it doesn’t matter. Then there is the opposition that spreads existential narratives involving Azerbaijan and Turkey while also pushing the idea that there is no point in negotiating with either. Some even go so far as t say that Armenia should move closer to Russia.
Opposing this, however, is another that recognizes that Azerbaijan had specific issues to resolve with Armenia related to Karabakh and that, after decades of registering no progress in negotiations, were resolved through war. Armenia lost and now has to face a new reality that includes the diminished capabilities of the army as well as the state and also the reality that the country was and remains alone.
No-one helped us, and in fact Russia colluded with Azerbaijan, and therefore we have to think now of what we can save of what’s left our sovereignty and the state – that there is no alternative to negotiations and that we have to find ways to diminish the threat.
In his opinion, Libaridian believes that the newer generation in particular acknowledge that Armenia’s defeat after decades of nationalist narratives and thinking were probably to blame. Now, he says, the government is negotiating to secure Armenia’s sovereignty and borders, to achieve the best possible result for Karabakh, and to decrease any dangers and threats.
There is also the question of the role of Russia and the West. “We know the Minsk Group is finished,” says Libaridian. “In my opinion, it was in a coma for a long time, and now it is basically finished as Russia has said the West doesn’t want to work with them.” He also points to the change in titles for the three co-chairs, something that I have also pointed out in the past, including how they are prohibited from acting independently.
There are also questions in in people’s minds, says Libaridian, as to how much Armenia can rely on Russia. Some even hope that Europe and the US can act as counterbalances to Russia, though this isn’t, however, the majority of Armenians. Regardless, he says, another question then arises. What options does Armenia have?
It is clear that the loss of the war has minimized the options Armenia has and these options have been narrowing down for the past 25 years. The longer we postponed the peaceful resolution, the less options we had, and the war made it clear that we had lost those options.
Armenia has little left to say on the future of Karabakh, he believes. Instead, it will primarily be Russia and Azerbaijan that decides what shape and form it will survive as in the future. Internationally, he says, the situation is obvious. “Karabakh was and is now more clearly recognized as part of Azerbaijan,” he says.
When Aliyev and Azerbaijan started the war and took one third of Karabakh I don’t know of one country that said, no, you can’t do that. And Putin, during and after the war, specified many times that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. Now, there may be other issues to resolve but that’s it – and neither the US, nor France, or anyone else has disagreed.
Libaridian also turns his attention to the small opposition demonstrations occurring in Yerevan. The issue, he says, is less about Karabakh but more about who should rule and govern Armenia. The vast majority of Armenians remain unconvinced by those political forces linked to or directly representing the previous regimes.
Personally, I think Pashinyan should have resigned, personally I don’t think he’s the best person to guide these new negotiations, but still the fact is that the whole question of his responsibility for the war, and for the loss, and for the unwise decisions, all of those questions were adjudicated by the 2021 elections.
Well, the outcome is that those who voted for him voted to keep him and that means quite a bit. They preferred to keep a leader who lost the war, who made those very bad decisions, to keep him rather than to have Kocharyan, who represents other problems.
The situation has, he admits, also been complicated by the war in Ukraine and the question of how Putin will behave depending on whether he wins or loses arises. Is he more dangerous in the first case or the second? Azerbaijan has also become a more significant player in the region because of Ukraine, but as it is likely there will be more limited options for the South Caucasus it remains unclear how that will play out.
This has also brought up two painful questions in Armenia, he says.
That is, there is what seems to be an orchestrated campaign to dismiss the significance of sovereignty. It is as simple as that. That it is not so simple for Armenia to be independent, there are very significant players in Armenia who think that Armenia should simply become de facto a province of Russia. This is very real. I don’t think most people in Armenia agree, but there are powerful forces inside and outside Armenia that are working on this, that are talking about this, and one way of doing it is to exaggerate and abuse the question of genocide and to create and intensify fear of a new genocide when in fact the threat Armenia faces is not genocide, in my view, but the threat of not acting on the realities that surround it.
This failure to adjust to the situation Armenia faces is perhaps best exemplified by the campaign to remove Pashinyan from power. An opposition that failed to come to power through elections is now saying that democracy is unnecessary and that a strong leader is required instead, he says. It even goes so far as to suggest that had a strong leader been in power during the war, then Armenia would not have lost.
There are also those who hide under cover of a call for national unity, he continues, and who argue that Pashinyan is not the person who can achieve this. These forces also propose removing Pashinyan through unconstitutional and undemocratic means if necessary. For now, however, says Libiridian, and whether one likes Pashinyan or not, he is the only legitimately elected leader of Armenia.
Besides, he adds, there is not any opposition party or leader proposing any solution markedly different to what Pashinyan is doing. Ending his opening remarks, Libaridian describes the domestic political situation as one that is very dangerous for Armenia, and in the question and answer session that followed, he offered more of his impressions from his recent visit, including how those he met felt.
They want to have hope, they feel that they are in a very difficult situation, and some of them see some hope in the negotiations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. That is, one thing is clear. They don’t want more wars and they think that the continuation of the hard line that was before the war, that made war inevitable, that that hard line is not helping and that is evident from the lack of full support of the opposition.
That was evident with the parliamentary elections, it is evident now, even today when [the opposition] are trying to create a popular wave to bring down Pashinyan, I don’t see the numbers there, [people] are tired of the rhetoric, and they’re not buying the narrative. […]
[…]
They’re waiting to see, but they are supporting negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and I am quite sure that if Pashinyan and his government were not sure [about support] then they would not do it. Pashinyan is a populist [even though] he’s become much more serious since the war, unlike others who have learned no lessons. I can’t say he’s the best negotiator, but I can say he’s on the right path and he would not do it if he thought the majority of Armenians oppose him.
I have no problem in understanding that we have fears, I have no problem in seeing a threat, but […] those who oppose negotiations, in my view, [rely on these fears] to ask people not to think specifically, strategically, and politically.
In response to another question, Libaridian also referred to the issue of border tensions and past incursions by Azerbaijan. When Armenians consider the enemy they make the mistake of not viewing the situation from their perspective too. If there is an incorrect interpretation of any actions by Azerbaijan and why they are occuring, he believes, then Armenia will not be able to respond correctly.
So we really have to understand, [Aliyev] was trying to put pressure on Armenia saying look, you signed the November 9 agreement but you haven’t really respected it fully. Now, if we decide that the enemy is whatever we want it to be, then we’re not merely debating, we’re not developing policy, [and] we are negotiating with ourselves. This is the problem. We need to negotiate with the other. We have to understand the other […], otherwise whatever policy we have will not be the right one.
We also don’t think about what we say and do [and how it] impacts the other. Now, when Karabakh leaders today say that we want independence or better yet, we want to be part of Russia […], shouldn’t we think about what that means to Aliyev and the Azerbaijani government and to the [Azerbaijani] people? We always talk about what Aliyev has done wrong, and he’s done so many things wrong, but we have to look if there’s anything that we could have said or done differently in order not to provoke, at least.
This is a fundamental flaw in how Armenia formulates its questions and responses, Libaridian believes, but also notes that the same can be said to be true for Azerbaijan as well.
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The white paper, The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies, co-authored by Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian, and Taline Papazian, can be read here. Libaridian’s Cambridge-Yerevan Sister City Association presentation can be viewed below.
