Refuelling close to the border with Azerbaijan en route between Yerevan and Khojali airport in Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 1994
Earlier this month I was briefly interviewed by Nazrin Babayeva from Report.Az. It was published in two parts so included below is the full text in whole.
How do you perceive the current trajectory of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalisation efforts?
It is difficult to say where Armenia and Azerbaijan are as the year draws to a close. After all, we’ve been in the exact same situation at the end of every year since late 2022. However, consensus among many analysts is that the two countries are the closest to an agreement than ever before.
What are the primary obstacles that both countries face in achieving sustainable peace?
Recently those obstacles were outlined by the AIR Centre’s Farid Shafiyev. That is, the need for Armenia to remove reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, the revocation of legal action pursued in international bodies, and the removal of international forces on Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.
They appear to have been implicitly confirmed by Pashinyan’s most recent press conference in late November.
The constitutional impasse is the most well known, of course, and despite criticising the 1990 Declaration of Independence many times since last year, Pashinyan still refuses to [remove the constitutional preamble] and instead now claims that Azerbaijan has territorial claims on Armenia referred to in its.
As for international forces, Pashinyan recently stated that he has offered Baku a solution by withdrawing the European Union Mission in Armenia from those parts of the shared border that are demarcated. For now that is only 12.7 km in total but it also implies that they would be removed in other later demarcated areas.
What compromises do you believe are necessary from both sides to reach a lasting agreement?
It is not for me to suggest what compromises are necessary. That is up to the leaders in their bilateral talks. However, I have been encouraged by some Azerbaijani analysts suggesting that reference to changing the constitution could be included in any agreement but with a deadline for doing so. This has been the case in other international examples of similar problems.
Pashinyan will anyway need to prepare the population and it would be good idea to have confidence and trust built up between the people before expecting them to vote on it.
What steps should be taken to rebuild trust between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities
People to people contact is absolutely vital. Yes, we do have meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani analysts, academics, and researchers, but often these are held in secret so not everyone knows they occur. Moreover, they do not represent the bulk of both societies. There are a few opportunities for youth to meet in Tbilisi but more need to be done in this area. This also means between Armenian and Azerbaijani musicians, artists, and writers, but especially farmers and businesspeople.
Maybe the newly demarcated part of the Tavush-Gazakh border can prove a relevant location to pilot projects designed to restore communication with close by adjacent but effectively distanced communities. At first this could perhaps happen in Georgia close to the Armenia-Azerbaijan borders but it is vital if you consider that at some point Azerbaijani IDP communities will return to their former homes adjacent to the Armenian border. There are many issues to resolve such as shared water resources but not only.
Do you think full normalization is achievable in the near future? If not, what timeline seems realistic to you?
Theoretically it is possible but a lot also depends on trust between the sides. Sadly that appears to be in short supply. However, full normalisation is not impossible if there is the political will. That said, there are some who believe that maybe a ‘cold peace’ will set in. There will be no fighting but communication and cooperation will be limited though eventually it will slowly improve. That could take a lot longer, however. For now the most important thing would even be partial normalisation.
On a personal note, however, I very much hope for it. I first started covering this conflict in 1994 when I first visited Karabakh. That was 30 years ago now so it is certainly well past time to resolve it. Sadly, however, I remember the words of then US Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group Steve Mann in 2005. When asked whether a peace deal would come soon he replied simply. “Either this year or within the next 100 years,” he said. Sadly, I am always reminded of that.
Again, there are many possibilities and we simply don’t know. This is especially true given that it seems both sides seem to be waiting for Donald Trump to move into the White House. Certainly, part of the reason why both Armenia and the Biden administration seem in a rush to get a peace deal signed by the end of the year is because soon Trump will be president. Nobody yet knows what his position might be or even if he will still see engagement on this necessary.
Perhaps when that is known we will have a much clearer picture. However, I do believe that Pashinyan needs an agreement by the time of the next elections due to be held no later than June 2026 in Armenia. There is also the issue of Pashinyan hoping to put a new constitution to a referendum most likely in 2027. If that referendum delays the process then I at least hope for some declaration to be signed next year by the two sides.
And if the talks still remain in deadlock then I hope that the 15 out of 17 points agreed so far can be initialled and even made public. It would certainly signal to the populations of both sides that an agreement is within reach. Moreover, when those points are kept secret it only encourages disinformation to spread which doesn’t help anyone or anything.
What is your perspective on the potential of the Zangezur Corridor in fostering economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and what challenges must be addressed to make this project mutually beneficial?
I don’t think there’s any doubt that open borders and mutual trade including acting as a transit route would be beneficial for both sides. Even in 2001, Pashinyan wrote in his newspaper that trade and transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan as well as by others wishing to use the route can only benefit Armenia.
For Pashinyan, however, the problem is control. As he seeks to diversify away, though not totally, from Russia, he doesn’t want Russian control. Nor too does the West as the US has openly stated. They also include China in this as well. Sadly, it has become a geopolitical football and that might continue for some time.
It should, however, be mentioned that it remains unclear what economic benefits it might bring. Nonetheless, even just the investment and jobs created to build the infrastructure would be something. That said, Baku sees importance and benefits in what it calls the Zangezur Corridor while Pashinyan appears to as well as part of his Crossroads of Peace initiative.
However, for Armenia, especially as it seeks to economically diversify away from Russia, it is an open border with Turkiye that it sees as most important. And that is probably why both Ankara and Baku consider both Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkiye normalisation as connected. Whatever it is called, the Zangezur Corridor will come at some point to complement the Aras Corridor.
