Earlier today, Armenian media reported that a pro-Russian Telegram channel had uploaded what it claims to be the text of what was agreed by Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev on 27 September in Washington D.C. when they met with U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.
At the beginning of April, LINKS Europe published its long awaited recommendations for confidence building measures (CBMs), drawn up by a Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group after six months of consultations in Baku, Yerevan, and Kakheti (Georgia). In its preamble, the authors particularly noted the need to build trust between the parties as well as promote dialogue in support of what appears to be a new peace process. The report was financed by the European Union’s EU4Peace project.
Yesterday, European Council President Charles Michel facilitated talks between the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, in Brussels. It was the third such meeting held in this format. Its structure was the same too, with Michel meeting with each leader separately before all three convened for another trilateral meeting.
Today marks the 28th anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire agreement that temporarily halted fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. Coming into force at 12.01 am on 12 May 1994, its terms, as dictated by the 5 May Bishkek Protocol were nonetheless left unimplemented for decades, ultimately leading to the 2020 second Karabakh war.
As expected, last Wednesday’s meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels was a serious endeavour. As early as 22 March, Armenian media had reported such a meeting was planned, and it might even have been arranged earlier. Publicly at least, and unlike previous meetings, senior Armenian and Azerbaijani officials also openly met in Brussels on 30 March to prepare.
In a Commonspace piece published last month, Johnny Melikian and Ramazan Samadov argue that the unblocking of regional economic and transport links represent an unprecedented opportunity for achieving peace and stability in the South Caucasus. Though the authors note that the wounds from the war will take time to heal, it is this connectivity that could prove to be the most significant development emerging from the 2020 ceasefire agreement.
The November 2020 Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan left many questions unanswered, not only in terms of its implementation but also in terms of whether the West has any role in any processes that might emerge. Not only were the US and European Union taken by surprise by last year’s war, but they have also largely remained marginalised or absent from developments since.
Eurovision, the international music competition for members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), has been no stranger to controversy ever since it was launched in Europe in 1956, but the inclusion in recent years of post-Soviet countries has taken international rivalry over what is otherwise considered by many to be a somewhat kitsch event, to new heights. The three countries making up the South Caucasus are no exception and especially since Armenia participated for the first time in 2006. Georgia followed in 2007, as did Azerbaijan the following year.
Last week’s decision by the European Commission to recommend Georgia receive European Union candidate status caught many by surprise. A survey conducted by the Tbilisi-based Caucasus Research Resource Centre (CRRC) in the previous days showed that, despite widespread support for EU membership, only 33% of respondents believed it would obtain it. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, which became candidates in June last year, Georgia had instead been required to address 12 priorities first.
Russian border guards left Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport last week, concluding their nearly 32-year presence. The first point of contact for many citizens and tourists arriving by air in Armenia, their exact duties and numbers were never formally announced. The 1992 agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia instead only refers to the Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service (FSB) ensuring the protection of the border with Turkiye and Iran.
Since the exodus last fall of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the once disputed but now dissolved territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, many have believed a resolution to the three-decade-long conflict to be within reach. Up until Azerbaijan’s operation to disarm the remnants of the breakaway region’s military last September, the region was internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but was governed and populated by ethnic Armenians.
At the beginning of July, Armenian National Security Secretary Armen Grigoryan announced that talks with the United States to replace Armenia’s aging Metsamor nuclear power plant were now at a “substantive phase.” The first of two reactors at the power plant started operating in 1976, and the plant has largely met Armenia’s energy needs since. Metsamor produces 30–40 percent of Armenia’s electricity, depending on fluctuations in demand.