© Azerbaijani protest on the Lachin highway / Public Domain
At time of writing, the strategic Lachin corridor has been effectively blocked for twelve days by Azerbaijani protestors. Depending on whom you ask, this recent development either risks derailing an already precarious Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process or makes the signing of a treaty all the more urgent. Whatever your position, however, it was clear that Baku would apply pressure on the only connection between Armenia and what remains of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).
What was unknown was simply how.
Framed as an Azerbaijani environmental protest, what effectively amounts to a blockade highlights what only a few of us warned nearly two years ago – Karabakh is geographically isolated after the 2020 war and, while reliant on Russia for security, is almost totally dependent on Baku for its sustainability, especially in terms of essential resources and now, it seems, trade and transport. Paradoxically, this reality was ignored or inexplicably overlooked by most commentators in the two years since the 2020 ceasefire statement was signed.
In practical terms, Azerbaijan did not need to launch renewed military operations to coerce further concessions from Yerevan and Stepanakert. All it needed to do was tighten the screws.
Admittedly, some Armenian analysts did understood that pressure would be applied on Lachin, albeit only in the last month or so. Nonetheless, they understood that something was coming and not least since what was effectively a 3 December dress rehearsal with representatives of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Ecology and the AzerGold Joint Stock Company (JSC) blocking the highway for three hours and raising the issue of illegal mining and alleged environmental damage in Karabakh.
The Azerbaijani media had also been full of claims that Armenia was shipping munitions and landmines to Karabakh via the highway, though these appear to be so far unproven, while reports of precious metals being extracted and exported to Armenia also surfaced. In an attempt to defuse tensions on the road, the protestors entered into negotiations with the Russian peacekeeping command, reportedly also involving Karabakh Security Council Secretary Vitaly Balasanyan, and an agreement was reached.
Scanning machines would be introduced at one or more Russian checkpoints while Azerbaijani specialists would be granted access to the mines. However, on 10 December, Karabakh Armenians reportedly prevented the visit. The defacto authorities in Stepanakert claim that there was no official request sent to them and on 11 December, Baku sent a diplomatic note to Moscow demanding that access should be forthcoming. The following morning, the Lachin highway was again blocked by Azerbaijani protestors.
The particular mine in question, incidentally, has long been a matter of controversy. After the 2020 war, the enterprise ceased operations after its pumping station fell under Azerbaijani control, but it is unclear when it resumed operations. Ostensibly owned by Base Metals CJSC, the largest tax payer in Karabakh, the Anglo-Asian Mining company has also staked its claim on the mines. It bases this on the 1997 sale by Azerbaijan of the right to the mines even though it was situated in territory outside of Baku’s control.
Indeed, this development seems as much aimed at re-asserting Azerbaijan’s claims to what the international community views as its sovereign territory now in a new post-2020 conflict environment. In that sense, and with new obstacles emerging in the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process, Baku is using any means at its disposal to achieve that. However, there are several specific issues at the heart of this dispute other than simply mineral resources.
Certainly, few outside of Azerbaijan view the protestors blocking the Lachin highway as genuine environmental activists. First, it is not easy for Azerbaijani citizens to travel to Shusha, the strategic hilltop citadel that returned to Baku’s control in November 2020, and even fewer are able to travel from there down to where the Lachin road passes. Indeed, aside from military personnel, it is nigh on impossible, lending credence to claims that rather than organic, the demonstration was organised by the Azerbaijani authorities.
And as many have also pointed out, it would be unthinkable for any such demonstration or road closure to occur in Azerbaijan proper. .
Even so, while the issue of legal entitlement to the mines, as well as related environmental concerns, are certainly part of the unfolding drama, consensus among many views this as more a pretext. Also of significance, for example, is the recent arrival of Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan in Karabakh and his appointment as defacto State Minister. An outsider, Baku views him as “Moscow’s man,” an allegation that Vardanyan denies, but also an opinion shared by some, though not all, analysts in Armenia.
The latter, incidentally, charge that Vardanyan is using Karabakh as a stepping stone to pursue a political career in Armenia with an eventual aim to re-assert Moscow’s influence over the country. This, of course, is only speculation, but it is a view held by those admittedly in the pro-western camp in the country. Regardless, Vardanyan’s attempts to reinforce the status quo by exerting what increasingly appears to be considerable control over the breakaway region are not welcomed by Baku.
In particular, Azerbaijan says that it was engaged with the Karabakh Armenians, on water for example, but that such contacts allegedly stopped when Vardanyan took his position.
Irking Baku, on 17 November, Vardanyan even said that he considered himself as ‘qualified’ to enter into negotiations over the future of Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan reacted harshly to the statement, though the issue of some kind of mechanism for dialogue between with the Karabakh Armenians has increasingly come to the fore following the 27 September meeting of Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington D.C..
As part of those talks, it is believed that such a mechanism was discussed, though Yerevan and Baku are at odds over whether an international mechanism was agreed or not. A leaked document that appears to be genuine or at least credible, seems to be vague in terms of confirming whether this was decided or simply discussed..
The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Regardless, the Azerbaijani protests do appear as much targeted against Vardanyan, possibly to also erode his credibility over time, but there are other issues that indicate frustration with the peace process has set in. Indeed, the timing of the environmental protests also comes precisely after other developments that might well have frozen the European Union-facilitated Brussels process. Rightly or wrongly, Baku puts the blame for this firmly on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s shoulders.
Azerbaijan specifically claims that Pashinyan made last minute demands for French President Emmanuel Macron to be present at a scheduled meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels on 7 December that would be facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel. Armenia says that such a format was agreed at the Prague summit on 6 October that for the first did involve Macron. Prior to that, he had only been seen during an informal trilateral discussion and one teleconference with Aliyev, Pashinyan, and Michel.
Neither the European Union or France has clearly commented on either claim, leaving it unclear as to which side’s account is correct. Regardless, the meeting was cancelled and for all intents and purposes, Azerbaijani hopes for a peace treaty to be signed by the end of this year clearly dashed. Another grievance is also the failure to provide a link between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan even though Armenia has access to Karabakh via Lachin.
Both routes were key provisions of the 9-10 November 2020 tripartite ceasefire statement.
6. […] The Lachin Corridor (5 km wide), which will provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia while not passing through the territory of Shusha, shall remain under the control of the Russian Federation peacemaking forces.
[…]
The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.
[…]
9. All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections.
Subject to agreement between the Parties, the construction of new transport communications to link the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be ensured.
Though Pashinyan has instead offered three alternative crossing points on its borders with Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, Azerbaijan considers them unsuitable for a variety of reasons. First, they are significantly longer than the most direct route between Azerbaijan and its exclave and secondly, they would be impossible to secure unless Russia were to deploy additional forces elsewhere on Armenian territory. With regards to the route Baku wants, the Russian FSB already has a presence on the Armenia-Iran border.
There is also the issue of customs and border checks which Armenia appears reluctant to concede on. In response, Azerbaijan argues, if there are to be checks on what it terms the “Zangezur Corridor,” then so too should there be on the Lachin corridor. While both routes would remain under the sovereignty of each country, they would be anyway controlled by Moscow. The Lachin corridor is already temporarily under the control of Russian peacekeeping force while the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) would oversee the route via Armenia.
As a result, and despite setbacks with its invasion of Ukraine, as well as some disagreement between Yerevan and Moscow over inaction from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), some allege that the impasse on the Lachin Corridor suits Moscow and that it too seeks to force the issue of the route through Armenia to Nakhichevan. However, others believe that Baku is seeking to discredit the credibility of the Russian peacekeeping force which is responsible under the 2020 ceasefire statement for ensuring access.
But it isn’t just Azerbaijan. While Yerevan has been somewhat restrained in commenting on events in Lachin, it too has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping force for not preventing or intervening in the standoff. In reality, however, it was unlikely that Moscow would resort to force given that peacekeeping forces, even with a mandate, are more likely to remain neutral and facilitate negotiations, something that Moscow says is happening. For its part, the defacto Karabakh authorities say they instead want a Russian presence mandated and increased.
The mission has also sent convoys through the Azerbaijani protest camp during the standoff, though it is unclear whether they are ferrying foodstuffs or other humanitarian assistance. Stepanakert denies this, while Baku insists that it will allow Armenian civilian traffic to pass through the camp. Vardanyan has openly rejected this offer, citing security concerns, and confusing matters more, it also appears that Armenia has blocked access to the Lachin Corridor on its side of mutual border, presumably for the same reason.
Today it also appears that a group of journalists from Karabakh attempted to travel along the highway towards the Azerbaijani protest camp but were turned back by Russian peacekeeping forces, further muddying the waters as to who is blocking what.
Also at time of writing, only one Armenian ambulance ferrying a critically ill Karabakh resident to Yerevan has so far been escorted through the camp by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The following day, a second ambulance stranded in Armenia returned with it back to Stepanakert. Interestingly, on 21 December, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg ruled that it was unclear to what extent Azerbaijan had control on the road and instead highlighted the need to only guarantee such humanitarian access.
Noting that the extent to which the Government of Azerbaijan were currently in control of the situation in the “Lachin Corridor” was disputed and unclear at this stage, noting in addition the obligation of Azerbaijan under Article 6 of the Trilateral Statement signed on 9 November 2020 to “guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions” and reminding them of their obligations under the Convention, the Court decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before it, to indicate to the Government of Azerbaijan, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to take all measures that are within their jurisdiction to ensure safe passage through the “Lachin Corridor” of seriously ill persons in need of medical treatment in Armenia and others who were stranded on the road without shelter or means of subsistence.
Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch, while not demanding that the Azerbaijani protests stop, has also commented on the situation and suggested that the protest camp could at least be organised in such a way so as not to effectively disrupt traffic for whatever the reason..
Those in control of the road and the area around it – that is Azerbaijan authorities and the Russian peacekeeping force – should ensure that vehicles with humanitarian goods can pass and that freedom of movement is not stopped, Human Rights Watch said.
Whether the protesters have genuine environmental concerns or other grievances, Azerbaijan should facilitate the right to peaceful protest by interacting with the protesters in a way that ensures the road remains open and the protest does not deny Nagorno-Karabakh residents their rights of access to essential services and goods, and to freedom of movement.
Others have also called for the free movement of vehicles, but as credible reports of food and fuel running out for Karabakh residents emerge, many more are concerned that a humanitarian crisis is in the making. Stepanakert claims that 120,000 ethnic Armenians are at risk of starvation and inadequate medical treatment while Baku says all traffic is free to pass and that fewer people anyway reside in the area currently under the control of the Russian peacekeeping force.
In reality, nobody knows how many people live in Karabakh, but it is unlikely to be close to the claimed 120,000 but also certainly nowhere near to the 25,000 claimed by Baku. Regardless, the situation is not good to say the least.
Ultimately, however, one side will have to fold, but for now the standoff continues and however it does, one thing is clear. There is an urgent need for a peace agreement to be negotiated and signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan sooner rather than later. Time has never been on the side of peace in this conflict and as I’ve written many times before, and also said at a civil society meeting in Tbilisi in January, Stepanakert and Baku urgently need to talk.
