Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, European Council President Charles Michel, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Brussels on 22 May 2022 © European Union
Yesterday, European Council President Charles Michel facilitated talks between the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, in Brussels. It was the third such meeting held in this format. Its structure was the same too, with Michel meeting with each leader separately before all three convened for another trilateral meeting.
It remains unclear whether Michel left the two leaders alone at any point as he has done before, but what matters is the statement that was issued afterwards.
Today I hosted President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia again. This was our third discussion in this format. We focused on the situation in the South Caucasus and the development of EU relations with both countries as well as the broader region.
The discussion was frank and productive. We reviewed the entire set of issues. We had a detailed discussion on humanitarian issues, including demining, and efforts to free detainees and address the fate of missing persons.
The statement further detailed the outcomes of the meeting and the results that should now be expected in the coming days, weeks, months, and years.
Border issues
The first joint meeting of the Border Commissions will take place on the inter-state border in the coming days. It will address all questions related to the delimitation of the border and how best to ensure a stable situation.
This was originally announced following the last Michel-facilitated talks but was never forthcoming, with Yerevan reportedly canceling at the last minute and also rejecting another proposed meeting on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, much to Baku’s frustration. With this further announcement of a meeting to be held in the “coming days,” suffice to say that it really must happen if there is to be any progress and trust in the process.
Nonetheless, it should also be pointed out that border delimitation and demarcation will take years if not longer. The Armenian and Azerbaijani borders with neighbouring Georgia, for example, are still not fully demarcated some 31 years after independence. Regardless, that such a meeting takes place on the interstate border rather than in Brussels or Moscow isn’t just important but also highly symbolic.
Such border meetings have happened in the past, with then Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan meeting two decades ago, albeit on the Armenia-Nakhichevan border, and there were also reports of at least one happening between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials following the November 2020 ceasefire agreement. It can only be hoped that such a meeting will happen this week and that it is adequately covered by the media.
Connectivity
The leaders agreed on the need to proceed with unblocking the transport links. They agreed on the principles governing transit between western Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, and between different parts of Armenia via Azerbaijan, as well as international transport through communications infrastructure of both countries. Notably they agreed on principles of border administration, security, land fees but also customs in the context of international transport. The Deputy Prime Ministers will take this work forward in the coming days.
This is another anticipated meeting that never materialised following Brussels in April but must now. However, it should be noted that while the border commission meeting will be bilateral, this one should theoretically be in the trilateral format of the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian Deputy Prime Ministers.
That said, there is no reference to the trilateral working group in Michel’s statement. It seems unlikely Russia would want to have its thunder stolen, though it’s also true that it failed not only to announce the results of its work after the December 2021 Sochi Summit of the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian leaders but that it hasn’t met for several months now.
However this work is undertaken, Michel mentions agreement between Aliyev and Pashinyan on points that have so far frustrated progress in this area, in particular the issue of transit fees and customs duties. On Moscow, its worth noting that not only does Russia own the Armenian rail network but its border guards will also oversee it as per the 2020 ceasefire agreement.
Peace Agreement
The leaders agreed to advance discussions on the future peace treaty governing inter-state relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Teams led by the Foreign Ministers will take forward this process in the coming weeks. In addition to this track, I also stressed to both leaders that it was necessary that the rights and security of the ethnic Armenian population in Karabakh be addressed.
This is another potentially long process and one that could involve the normalisation of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations as part of a final peace deal or preferably as two separate processes that are nonetheless connected. However, Michel’s words seem to imply that there is a package approach on these two issues – the normalisation of relations in an actual peace deal.
Reference to the rights of the ethnic Armenian population in Karabakh is also there and further indication that independence is off the table and the OSCE Minsk process is dead while war in Ukraine rages. Moreover, and as I’ve said since the November 2020 ceasefire agreement, including at a meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society actors in January, this appears to be now centered on the issue of human security and minority rights.
How that is addressed, of course, is anybody’s guess, but it’s certainly necessary to examine what potential arrangements can be elaborated. For now, I know only of academics such as Kamal Makili-Aliyev working in this area. Indeed, so daunting is this task that still think it’s more likely that Armenia and Azerbaijan will normalise relations, relinquishing territorial claims on each other, while the actual issue of Karabakh becomes a second, connected process.
In essence, this becomes ostensibly an internal matter to Azerbaijan, but with international involvement, including from Yerevan, whose participation might also prove vital for any solution to work. Moreover, it is high time to facilitate communication between ethnic Armenians in what remains of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and Baku. Some would add the representatives of the displaced ethnic Azerbaijani population too.
This is particularly important given how the ethnic Armenian community in Karabakh is now almost entirely reliant on Baku for resources and infrastructure running through Azerbaijani controlled territory which, incidentally, would also be the case even if Karabakh was independent. And while human security and minority rights must be at the fore of any peace agreement, that Michel said it probably means that the sides are still far apart on this issue.
Yet, whether Baku is ready to accept it or not, failure to understand or address this issue could well derail normalisation and also further contribute to the bitter resentment that has already existed for decades now and would therefore continue.
Socio-economic development
The EU will take forward with both parties the work of the Economic Advisory Group, which seeks to advance economic development for the benefit of both countries and their populations.
As already confirmed, the EU financial assistance packages for Armenia and Azerbaijan are going to be vital for taking things forward. Almost the entirety of the seven regions held by Armenia but returned or taken back as a result of the 2020 Karabakh war lie in ruins with whole villages, towns, and cities razed to the ground after they were initially captured in the war of the 1990s. However, for funds to be dispersed there needs to be projects submitted.
Another example could be the estimated $200 million necessary to rebuild the railway line connecting Azerbaijan through Armenia to the exclave of Nakhichevan as per the 2020 ceasefire agreement. This was reportedly raised in the Brussels meeting held in April and apparently well received by Michel though the technical and surveying work on making this a reality is currently at the stage of final consideration in Yerevan.
But with Azerbaijan reportedly set to complete its part of the railway by the end of the year, the work certainly needs to start soon. The issue of road access and even the construction of new ones is another matter, but both would go a long way in providing economic incentives for peace, first by creating jobs during the construction stage and secondly by encouraging interdependency and even people-to-people contact and trade.
I also stressed the importance of preparing the populations for long-term sustainable peace. The EU is ready to step up its support.
An issue for decades, there is now the possibility for this to happen in earnest and the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have already started to dial back their rhetoric. The role of civil society, however, remains an issue with many actors politicised and even maximalist in their approaches. Moreover, for well over a decade I’ve argued that a more holistic, inclusive, and open approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution needs to be adopted.
That, sadly, still does not exist and really must change.
And while at least one NGO has embarked on some soul searching, most others have not. Donors must therefore be more demanding and critically assess whether civil society is supporting steps towards peace or if some are actually attempting to frustrate and even derail them. This has happened in the past with the OSCE Minsk Group’s Madrid Principles and Armenia-Turkey normalisation, for example.
It cannot, however, be ruled out that failure to change might mean the need to shift focus away from existing international conflict resolution projects and local NGOs that have limited reach and sometimes ulterior motives. The same is true for the media, with mainstream broadcast companies, in particular Public TV and Radio, having a more significant role to play than minor web-based platforms that reach hardly anyone.
We agreed to remain in close contact and will meet again in the same format by July/August. Thank you.
In conclusion, there is much to be hopeful for following yesterday’s meeting between Aliyev, Pashinyan, and Michel in Brussels, but it is also true that a long and difficult road still lies ahead. And while Michel should be strongly applauded for his efforts to date, it ultimately boils down to whether the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders are genuine in theirs to finally resolve the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh.
Three decades later, they certainly should be. To begin with, however, the border commission must meet, and preferably this week.
