Lachin © Onnik James Kikorian 2001
On 3 August, following the non-fatal shooting of an Armenian soldier and the death of an Azerbaijani conscript in an escalation that led to clashes, Baku launched military operations in Karabakh on a scale not seen since the November 2020 ceasefire statement. Two Armenian soldiers were killed and 19 wounded in multiple Azerbaijani mortar and drone attacks while key strategic heights overlooking Karabakh were also captured.
Russian Peacekeepers blamed Azerbaijan for violating the fragile armistice while Baku insisted that it acted within its right against ‘illegal armed groups’ that should have already been withdrawn according to the 2020 agreement. National Security Council President Armen Grigoryan admitted last month that Republic of Armenia forces were still operating in Karabakh but that they would be removed in September 2022.
As tensions boiled, on 2 August, Armenian media reported that Yerevan withdrew its remaining forces ahead of that date. Moreover, two days later, on 4 August, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed this in a cabinet meeting saying that there were now no longer any soldiers from the Republic of Armenia in Karabakh. Nevertheless, it was just one of many issues that had divided the sides.
Indeed, there are other reasons, say observers. “The incidents have to do with disagreements over provisions of the Russian-backed ceasefire that ended the 2020 war over this mountainous enclave,” wrote the International Crisis Group (ICG) in an 9 August update. “Baku has called the military operation a “revenge” for the death of its soldier […], but its actions appear to owe as well to dissatisfaction with the situation on the ground.”
The ICG specifically points to disagreement between the sides over the re-routing of the Lachin corridor, the main and only road now connecting Armenia with ethnic Armenians living in Karabakh. Though it is believed the route was agreed upon before construction, the timetable for its re-routing might not have been. According to the 2020 ceasefire statement this should have been ‘within’ three years from the signing of the agreement, but Azerbaijan had already almost completed its part.
“Baku believes Yerevan is stalling on laying its several-kilometre section of the new road, although Armenia issued a tender for beginning construction in August,” the ICG explained, while also noting that an Baku also accuses Yerevan of “trying to delay the commissioning of the new road this year, thereby purposely delaying the handover of the city of Lachin and a number of villages to Azerbaijan.”
After the clashes, and although Armenia stated its section of the road would be completed in Spring 2023, the ICG said that the de facto Karabakh authorities are now willing to use the new road “as soon as possible.” Instructions were given to Armenian settlers in Lachin and other villages on the route of the old road to evacuate by 25 August, which they did. However, the international community remains concerned.
The European Union’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, urged restraint, calling on both sides not to derail a “historic opportunity to turn the page on decades of strife.” “The recent increase in tensions underscores the need for a negotiated, comprehensive, and sustainable settlement of all remaining issues related to or resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,” the US State Department wrote in its statement.
Also aware of how the fragile the ceasefire has become, European Council President Charles Michel held calls with both the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, and the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan. On 5 August, Michel announced that it was still hoped that talks between the two could be facilitated. “Ahead of our next leaders meeting in Brussels, pursuing dialogue and achieving concrete progress on all items on the agenda is key,” he tweeted.
Notably, the Russian peacekeeping force did not intervene in the clashes, leading to condemnation from some Armenians in Armenia and Karabakh. Prime Minister Pashinyan also criticized its inaction, claiming that this issue had been raised with Moscow and specifically the need for a concrete mandate and terms of engagement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, however, denied that Moscow had received any such proposals, leading to additional claims from Yerevan to the contrary.
“The clashes have once again highlighted the challenges faced by the Russian peacekeeping mission without a clear mandate for how it can engage beyond its monitoring role – a problem made worse by Russia’s loss of standing following its invasion of Ukraine,” the ICG wrote. This is an issue, it believes, that needs to be addressed in the future and especially ahead of the first deadline for extending the Russian peacekeeping presence in the conflict zone past 2025.
The ICG nonetheless ended on a positive note.
Unlike previous escalations, it believed, there was less support for military operations within Azerbaijan. Representatives of the country’s civil society, it claimed, were now concerned that such incidents would undermine the EU-facilitated peace process and damage Baku’s relations with the EU, including in the area of energy. It could also derail the Armenia-Turkey normalisation process and the unblocking of regional connectivity.
Some progress was registered at the 31 August Brussels meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan with European Council President Charles Michel issuing a statement soon after. “Our exchanges were open and productive,” said Michel. “It is positive to see that quite a few steps have been taken to take forward the agreements reached during our last meeting.”
In addition to announcing that the leaders would meet again in November, Michel also said that the next meeting of the border commissions would be held in Brussels the same month. In the meantime, the two Foreign Ministers, Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan, would meet before the end of September to start work on drafting the text of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
“Public messaging is crucial,” Michel stressed, explaining the importance of preparing populations for a ‘long-term sustainable peace.’
Other issues discussed in Brussels concerned humanitarian issues and specifically demining, detainees, and the fate of the missing from both wars. However, relations between the sides, as well as the situation along the new Line of Contact (LoC), remains precarious and unpredictable.
“All the ingredients for peace exist in the South Caucasus,” Commonspace opined in an editorial on the August 3 military operation in Karabakh, adding that all the ingredients for war exist too. “What is in front of us is a choice.”
