Nikol Pashinyan © Onnik James Krikorian 2008
Resolving the conflict in Karabakh requires a careful assessment of the roles of Russia, the EU, and the United States—states that have been involved as mediator, facilitator, and supporter of the peace process, respectively. Moscow believes two things: one, that the EU and the U.S. are hoping to edge Russia out of the region; and two, that there is a particular interest in removing the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh when its first and possibly last five‑year term expires at the end of 2025.
Ultimately, finding a solution to the conflict over Karabakh and the broader Armenia‑Azerbaijan conflict will require a delicate balancing act among the various stakeholders involved with a focus on promoting peace, stability, and security in the region. But in the absence of such an environment, there are concerns that competition between the actors involved could disrupt what progress has reportedly been made to date.
Regardless of that rivalry, however, it should be remembered that any peace deal will be signed by the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders—and nobody else. But here, too, the situation is unclear. Despite Azerbaijan’s decisive victory over Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war, a final peace treaty remains elusive nearly two and a half years after the trilateral Armenia‑Azerbaijan‑Russia ceasefire statement was announced on 10 November 2020.
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From a logical perspective, it appears unlikely that the deadlock between Armenia and Azerbaijan can continue beyond 2023, as time is running out. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, there is uncertainty over when the Russian peacekeeping force will withdraw from the ethnic‑Armenian Karabakh entity in 2025. Secondly, Armenia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in 2026 (as noted above). This implies that any peace agreement reached after 2023 may not allow sufficient time for the Armenian populace to experience any concrete advantages before the next election cycle, during which the issue of Karabakh could be a delicate matter.
On the one hand, Pashinyan has good reasons to wait and see if Baku will soften its demands. On the other, delaying a resolution could have disastrous consequences not only for Armenia but also for the ethnic‑Armenian population in Karabakh. Currently, the Armenian narrative claims that Baku aims to “ethnically cleanse” the region, though this is more accurately characterized as depopulation. The problem with such existential narratives, however, is that they can sometimes become self‑fulfilling.
Even before 2020, both Armenia and the ethnic‑Armenian Karabakh entity faced severe demographic problems and, in the case of the latter, such a tendency can only but increase in the absence of a peace deal and the loss of any resources that it once possessed outside the former NKAO.
Regardless, while most observers see resolution only through the prism of regional and other international actors, it should be remembered that, at the end of the day, it still comes down to a decision by Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this context and given his tendency to change his opinion and allegiances unexpectedly, as efforts to end a conflict that has lasted over three decades continue, Pashinyan’s predictably unpredictable and consistently inconsistent approach remains the most difficult conundrum to decipher of all.
The full approximately 5,000 word piece can be read here.
