AN INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS de Waal

 

Thomas de Waal is the Caucasus Editor and Project Coordinator for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) in London. Having covered the Caucasus for the BBC World Service, his book on the conflict in Nagorno Karabagh, “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War,” will be published by New York University Press in late 2002/early 2003.

 

This interview was held in Yerevan, Republic of Armenia, on 16 April 2002, by Onnik James Krikorian a day before de Waal presented a lecture on Western policy in the Caucasus at the American University of Armenia.

ONNIK JAMES KRIKORIAN: Congratulations on your new position with IWPR. In that capacity, what brings you back to Yerevan?

THOMAS DE WAAL: In collaboration with the new Caucasian Media Institute set up by Mark Grigorian and Vicken Cheterian, I’m here to take part in a training seminar for young journalists from Armenia and Karabagh.

Basically, I’ve been involved with that, talking to journalists, refreshing my impressions, and seeing my friends here.

 

OJK: Will you be doing the same in Georgia and Azerbaijan?

TDW: I was in Georgia and Abkhazia a couple of months ago and I’m off to Azerbaijan at the end of May.

 

OJK: Let’s talk about your book, Black Garden, which follows one on Chechnya co-authored with Carlotta Gall in 1997. Why Nagorno Karabagh?

TDW: Well, I suppose a flippant answer would be that as I was sitting in London working for the BBC and getting a bit bored, I decided to write a few grant proposals to see if anyone would fund me to research a book on Karabagh. The US Institute of Peace came up with the money.

However, why was I interested in writing a book on Karabagh? Well, I had been to the region a couple of times and was aware that there really was nothing in English, or in any language for that matter, that looked at the conflict from both sides. Instead, there were quite a few propagandist books, or one sided books to be kinder, which looked at the conflict from only one perspective.

Both sides were living in alternate realities and it was an intellectual and personal challenge to go back to the beginning of the conflict in 1988 to see if I could come up with an outsider’s view of why the conflict started and what’s happened since. I suppose that if you can understand the symptoms of the disease, you can possibly find a cure.

The problem with Karabagh has been that too many people have suggested solutions for the conflict without really understanding the symptoms.

 

OJK: Regarding partisan books, are you just referring to Armenian and Azeri authors or those by writers such as Thomas Goltz, for example, who really only presented “Azerbaijan Diaries” as an account of his experience on the other side of the contact line.

TDW: Thomas Goltz is a friend of mine and I think his book on Azerbaijan is absolutely tremendous. However, and I think he would admit this too, he saw the war from the other side which inevitably colours what he writes.

Despite this, I think that his book tells you an enormous amount about Azerbaijan and how society, corruption and everything else in the Caucasus operates. All of that is in the book but it doesn’t actually tell you that much about the war in Karabagh.

In my opinion, the conflict was all about a very fundamental misunderstanding between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It was about their own identity and fears vis-à-vis each other, and their own perceptions of history. To understand that, you need to talk to both sides, and that’s what I’ve done.

Interestingly enough, in that capacity I became a bit of an informal postman. I took messages back and forth between Azerbaijan and Karabagh and between friends living in Yerevan and Baku. I even managed to link up people who lost contact because of the war.

On a personal level, I was someone who was repairing a tiny bit of the damage done by this conflict, and I was constantly struck by how much Armenians and Azerbaijanis have in common. In fact, many would jokingly remark that they were on better terms with each other than with the Georgians.

As a result, many very good friendships were blown apart by the conflict including, bizarrely enough, a man who used to work in the Komsomol in Shusha [Shushi] who’s now in exile in Baku. He used to be a friend of Serzh Sarkisyan and Robert Kocharian and had fond memories of both.

He even produced a photograph taken with Robert Kocharian sitting at a café in Yalta in 1986, and he wasn’t bluffing either. After an interview with Serzh Sarkisyan I mentioned his name, and he had fond memories too. Even on that level there were friendships.

There’s another story that didn’t end up in the book because it’s such a complicated account, but the short of it is that there are still quite a lot of Armenian women, mainly the wives or widows of Azeris, living quietly in Baku. Most have Azeri names.

There was one [Armenian] woman who had all sorts of problems in Azerbaijan. Her [Azeri] husband died but she stayed in Baku because her children were effectively Azeri. After many problems, her daughter ended up losing her job in a bank when someone suspected her of being Armenian.

They fled to Iran and the Dashnaks helped them with money to get to Armenia. They had to leave Azerbaijan because the children were having problems, but when they arrived in Armenia the children had problems with neighbours and at school because they were accused of being Turkish.

They lost out both ways, even though they were cosmopolitan. Instead of it being a blessing it was a curse, and it’s almost as though you come up with this conundrum. If people were getting on so well, why did they end up fighting a war with each other?

This wasn’t a war imposed from above; it was a war that came from below. There are obviously many reasons for this, but I think that the intellectuals from the soviet era have a lot to answer for.

 

OJK: They say that there’s as many as 20,000 Armenians (mainly women that married Azeris or who are children of mixed marriages) in Baku, and the US State Department recently reported that there were something like 300 Azeris in Yerevan. They keep a low profile but are they more open about this in Baku?

TDW: The dynamics are different. I think that it’s a paradox on the one hand because Azerbaijan is more of a mixed, cosmopolitan society and Armenians can operate a bit more freely there. On the other hand, ethnic propaganda against the Armenians is stronger in Azerbaijan.

That might have something to do with Azerbaijan being the losing side in the war and that the wounds are still fresh, but it is true that there are Armenian women in Baku. However, I think that this has a lot to do with the nature of the city.

It’s always been international with many Russians, Jews and Armenians living there as well as Azerbaijanis. Russian was always the main language spoken but even that has been changing over the past few years, and Baku is becoming less cosmopolitan and more of an Azeri city.

 

OJK: Is your book also going to be full of stories like this, or is it just a chronological account of the conflict?

 TDW: I aim to tell the story from 1988 to the present day although it also includes snippets of personal reportage from people I’ve met along the way. It’s an attempt to be counter-factual so as to debug the myths in circulation on either side.

For example, I write about the role Armenians played in Baku and about how Yerevan used to be a largely Muslim city in the nineteenth century. I write about how Sayat Nova wrote many of his songs in Azeri even though there’s this misconception among Armenians that Azerbaijan didn’t exist before the twentieth century.

In fact, Sayat Nova wrote a lot of his songs in a language that’s now recognized as being Azerbaijani, it just wasn’t called that. It was called Turkish or whatever. However, it was Turkish of a Caucasian variety that wasn’t from Turkey.

It was basically what we now call Azeri so the book will write a different history of the Caucasus. Many people won’t like this but as I’m only one journalist, they can ignore me if they want to.

It’s a modest attempt on my part to suggest that things were different, that they didn’t have to be like this, and that they could be different again.

 

OJK: I would imagine that a journalist researching what is still a sensitive issue would be treated with some suspicion. Did you encounter any obstacles?

TDW: Surprisingly few. Unfortunately, I didn’t get to interview Heidar Aliyev, but apart from that, I interviewed pretty much all the major politicians such as Levon Ter Petrosian, Robert Kocharian, Arkhady Ghukasian, Serzh Sarkisyan and quite a lot of senior people on the Azeri side such as Ayaz Mutalibov.

I didn’t get to talk to Elchibey because he died just as I was about to interview him. Most were quite happy to be given the chance to put their side of the story across.

 

OJK: From speaking with you in the past, although I don’t know what you’ve written, I think it will be an interesting book. However, there will be references to events that are not widely spoken about and which are hotly disputed by one side or the other. For example, you refer to the death of two Azeris on the outskirts of Askeran before the pogroms in Azerbaijan started.

TDW: When did it all start? Both sides say it started with this before then going back and saying it started with that. In fact, there was actually violence in November 1987, three months before the demonstrations in Stepanakert, when some Azeris started leaving Kapan. It’s still not quite clear why they left but they turned up in Baku in a shocked and miserable state. However, it is well known that there was an incident in Askeran when a crowd moved from Aghdam to Stepanakert and two Azeris were killed.

What is less well written about is how 200,000 Azerbaijan left Armenia between 1988 and 1989. The majority of them left peacefully, but the rest were driven out in pretty much the clothes they were wearing. Then of course, 350,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan and everybody knows about the horrible things that happened in Baku and Sumgait and obviously, I go over that in my book.

There are no angels in this conflict and it is one of the symptoms of an ethnic dispute when both sides seek to portray themselves as the innocent victim. It justifies every act of aggression as being in self-defense, but I’m afraid that’s a bit of a myth.

 

OJK: When you say that some people won’t like the book you’re referring to both Armenians and Azeris?

TDW: Yes, and I think that a lot of the propaganda is repeated out of habit. However, if you speak seriously to both sides, they acknowledge that the whole conflict is a tragedy and that both sides committed acts of savagery.

 

OJK: Has any of your research for the book given you grounds for optimism?

TDW: Well, yes, in that the sense that Armenians and Azeris aren’t like the Israelis and Palestinians. For example, Armenians and Azerbaijanis have far more in common with each other than they do with me, and there is intermarriage and connections in terms of culture.

In that sense, there is optimism but unfortunately, what has happened is that the Karabagh dispute has taken a grasp of the soul of both nations in the past ten years, if I can put it like that. The authorities still repeat to their people in subtle ways that it is impossible to exist without Karabagh.

In Armenia, it’s a great victory, and in Azerbaijan, it’s a great wound. Somehow, there’s no sign of getting over that. There’s no attempt to see Karabagh as a bridge, as somewhere that can be shared, or as a crossroads. Were we to get into that position I can see that both Armenians and Azerbaijanis could get on quite well.

 

OJK: Let’s turn to the peace process. Researching your book happened to coincide with various new endeavours to resolve the Karabagh conflict and you even crossed the contact line with the OSCE mediators last year. After 11 September, do you think that there’s a new move by the US to find a solution to the Karabagh conflict?

TDW: I don’t actually. Basically, the Americans and the Russians have been working quite closely on this issue for the past two or three years. September 11 actually drew them closer together on other issues but on Karabagh they had already been cooperating.

Russia had been meddling, interfering and being difficult on the issue until 1998 but now it does not stand in the way of a settlement. Maybe there are some in the Russian military that would still like to obstruct the process, but the politicians want to see it resolved.

In a way, maybe the two conflicting sides are very lucky to have America, Russia and France so actively involved. The problem is that the internal pressures against a settlement are far greater than anything external.

Resolution of the conflict is something you just can’t impose because public opinion is still largely sceptical of an agreement. The two leaderships are too cautious and cynical to start talking peace when they can continue with the language of nationalism and propaganda.

That’s particularly true in Azerbaijan where the political process is now getting used to the idea of the end of the Aliyev regime. Last year, Russia, America and France were pushing very hard and so you can’t chide them with not being interested in peace. However, it all came to nothing when the two presidents started to consult with other political forces when they returned from Key West.

They just didn’t really have it in them to make the big push within their own societies for a peace settlement. Having not done that last year, we’re now entering a new political cycle where both leaders are more vulnerable. Presidential elections are coming up in the next year or two, and probably a change of regime in Azerbaijan.

Basically, I think that the whole thing is off the agenda for the next three or four years.

 

OJK: Although this is going off the topic of your book, when we speak about Russian and US friendship after 11 September, the Americans do seem to have ruffled a few feathers with an increased presence in the Caucasus. When we spoke about this recently, you suggested that any disagreements might emerge over Georgia rather than Karabagh.

The Americans have already established a small military presence in Georgia, and it could be argued that an even smaller presence has been established in Armenia with the opening of the demining center in Etchmiadzin. Azerbaijan also appears very eager to attract the United States into its territory.

TDW: There are several issues here. I think that Georgia is quite distinct in some ways from Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Russia, it is much more strategically important because they share a border, and Georgia is right next door to Chechnya.

There are Russian bases there, and Abkhazia is an issue that the Russian military cares a lot about. There’s also the issue of Shevardnadze which is one of the few issues that polarizes the Russians and Americans.

For many in America and also Germany, Shevardnadze can do no wrong. They like him for what he did at the end of the cold war and there are quite a few people in Moscow that dislike him for precisely the same reasons. That’s polarized the Russians and the Americans in such a way that they can’t really work together in Georgia.

The arrival of American military advisors in the Pankisi Gorge is a classic example of Russian and American ambitions particular to Georgia which I think is rather unhealthy and perhaps even childish. I think that in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Russians and the Americans can actually get along fine.

 

OJK: However, there is talk of US military assistance to Azerbaijan being spent on improving its naval capacity. The argument being put forward is that it’s a way to prevent possible confrontations with Iran in the Caspian. This suggests that there is an attempt to extend American influence in the Caucasus. Something seems to be afoot.

TDW: I think that there’s possibly something afoot after 11 September because Washington now thinks that they have carte blanche to do what they like. They’ve been acting with this breathtaking self-confidence, which some would call arrogance, all over the place.

However, because the strategic military alliance between Armenia and Russia is so strong, and because the Armenian economy is incredibly dependent on Russia, there’s no way that Armenia is going to turn its back on Russia.

The United States has its own interests in Armenia through the Diaspora and so on, and I think the two can get along fine. The same is true in Azerbaijan. There’s a thaw in relations between Aliyev and Putin, and Azerbaijan is quite strongly pro-American.

With Iran, there could be a problem but I think that the Americans understand that both Armenia and Azerbaijan will have to deal with Iran given that it’s their neighbour. I also think that there are many people in Washington who would like to deal with Iran and they thought that the moment had come after 11 September. However, it was taken away from them when Bush made his State of the Union address.

 

OJK: Let’s come back to the Karabagh negotiations. Many in the Diaspora don’t seem to think that there is conflict anymore. Therefore, this is peace. Why can’t it be like this?

TDW: You just have to visit Azerbaijan to realize that there are a lot of people who lost their homes in the Karabagh conflict. If we forget about those who left in the pre-soviet period, there are around half a million people who lost their homes in Karabagh and the seven regions surrounding it.

Some have assimilated into society and others have left for abroad, but an awful lot of them are living in very miserable conditions, either in tents or in schools, hostels and makeshift accommodation. You can argue that the Azerbaijani government is artificially keeping them there but in a sense, that’s missing the point.

These people have homes that they want to return to. Azerbaijan is a wounded nation and Armenians should really take that into account. These wounds won’ t heal and in order to deal with Azerbaijan in the future you have to understand that.

We’re talking about several generations of people who lived in one place, went to work, their children went to school, and they were driven out of their homes. It would be unreasonable to expect them to be reconciled to that situation.

It’s one thing about how you go about negotiations, but there are blind spots on both sides. Azerbaijan fails to understand the security and cultural concerns of Armenians living in Karabagh and Armenians tend to forget the hundreds of thousands of Azeris that fled their homes.

 

OJK: Some elderly refugees living in Armenia still hope to return to Baku although some would argue that it’s crazy for anyone to return to what might be a volatile situation. However, what we’re talking about is simply the right for refugees to return if they want to, isn’t it?

TDW: I think that it’s unrealistic to expect Armenians to return to Azerbaijan or the Azerbaijanis to return to Armenia. Both nations have filled the gap since they left, and certainly filled the houses. However, the right to return is more enforceable when we’re talking about people in and around Karabagh, and that also refers to Armenians from the Shahumian region.

I don’t think that anyone in Armenia expects to hold on to places like Fizuli, Aghdam and Jebrail. In every attempt at a settlement since 1994, these areas were negotiable and so yes, these people will have the right to return. The problem is that their homes are now completely levelled and even if they do get the opportunity, it might take ten or twenty years before they do actually return.

 

OJK: A phased approach for settling of the conflict has been mentioned on numerous occasions, although the Armenian side still favours a package agreement. This would include the return of some territory and the necessity to build up trust between the conflicting parties.

In a sense, I’ve begun to suspect that it’s already started with more international money being made available for confidence building measures. There’s more interaction between Armenian and Azerbaijani journalists, and politicians from both sides are visiting each other.

Another key area where people talk about everyone having something in common is business. It will be a very long process, but has it already started?

TDW: I think that it has started but that the signs are pretty discouraging in the sense that the media in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and particularly the latter, is still very intolerant. In Azerbaijan, there are some very aggressive calls for the liberation of Karabagh and the prosecution of Kocharian for war crimes.

There’s also concern in Azerbaijan that any contact with the Armenians might stabilize the status quo, but with regards to the issue of a phased agreement, I was speaking to Arkhady Ghukasian about this only yesterday. His response was simply that he had no confidence in Azerbaijan and that it was inconvenient to undermine Karabagh’s security by redrawing the frontline when nobody knows where it will lead.

I think that this is a circular argument and that both sides need to make a courageous step towards each other. While I can understand the scepticism, you have to start somewhere and it needn’t be that risky. You could, for example, open the road between Armenia and Nakhichevan, which is suffering more than Armenia. Nakhichevan talks about the blockade but in their case, it’s a blockade by Armenia.

If you opened up that road it would benefit both sides and then perhaps, a few Azeri villages on the frontline could be given back as a gesture of goodwill. We’re talking about something very small on the ground which would breathe a bit of life into the peace process and encourage a small amount of trust.

I met the mayor of Nakhichevan who used to go to Yerevan rather than Baku in order to fly to Moscow during the soviet years. He was one of the few Azerbaijani officials who spoke openly about the peace process because it would directly benefit Nakhichevan.

 

OJK: While you were researching of your book, you made friends on all sides of the conflict. In that context, are you depressed or optimistic about the future?

TDW: I do feel depressed in that I don’t really see a way out, and although many people do want to see a settlement, they still don’t really understand the need to compromise. They instead tend to talk about victory rather than peace.

They want a way out but they’re still rather naive about it. However, I don’ t necessarily blame them because there is the complete lack of public debate in society about what is realistic. On the other hand, and I constantly make this point, you can speak to one person and hear many contradictory views.

You can listen to one person speaking triumphantly or angrily about their land being taken by the Armenians, or the liberation of territory from the Azerbaijanis, but then they speak about their friends on the other side. They speak about the need for trade and business, and how they meet their friend Ashot or Aziz whenever they visit Moscow.

So, there are all sorts of layers of reaction in the same people and I think it’s important to keep those memories alive. While those aspects of humanity are still there, there’s still hope.

 

OJK: I think that your book will make interesting reading. When can we expect it?

TDW: I’m speaking to my publishers, New York University Press, at the moment and while I’d like it to come out tomorrow, it’s likely to be published towards the end of the year or at the beginning of 2003.