EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar meeting with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili in Tbilisi, May 2022 © Official Photo
In an interview with the Georgian Public Broadcaster, the European Union’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, has stressed the importance of Tbilisi’s role in bridging the divide between its immediate regional neighbours, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is highly welcomed and not least because some of us have long argued for the emergence of some kind of “Tbilisi Process” given that it would be both logical and practical.
“It is very important that the three countries of the South Caucasus work together and contribute to peace, and here the role of Georgia as a bridge between Armenia and Azerbaijan is very important,” Interfax Azerbaijan quoted Klaar as saying. Indeed, Tbilisi has already played a role in the pursuit of a long-overdue settlement to the Karabakh conflict. In June 2021, Georgia facilitated the return of 15 Armenian detainees held by Baku, for example.
And on 16 July 2022, Georgian Foreign Minister Ilia Darchiashvili hosted his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, for talks in Tbilisi. The Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, has also played a role in what has appeared to be at times some first steps towards shuttle diplomacy between the sides and once again offered the Georgian capital as a venue or format during this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos.
Sadly, however, while Klaar’s words are welcome, many EU funded meetings still take place outside the South Caucasus, usually in European capitals and mostly in secret, thus inadvertently or purposely limiting participation to a small and arguably unrepresentative group of the ‘usual suspects’ meeting behind ‘closed doors.’ As a result, civil society activity under such conditions has long been unconstructive, unproductive, and definitely ineffective.
Klaar’s words therefore offer some hope that a Tbilisi Platform could change that – and especially if it can nurture a genuine top-down approach from the governments supported by bottom-up civil society and grassroots initiatives. Moreover, the often politicised nature of previous Track II meetings would also have to change, especially as efforts should be focused only on cross-border cooperation and genuine people-people contact with peace in mind.
On that, I am always reminded of the late Georgi Vanyan’s attempts to do this in the ethnic Azerbaijani village of Tekali close to Georgia’s borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
“In this regard, Georgia is geographically very convenient, you can quickly and easily come here from neighbouring countries. Finally, it is logical that three countries located in the same space, in the South Caucasus, should try to find areas of cooperation. For example, in transport, energy, environmental protection and others. I see great potential both now and in the future,” Klaar said.
Of course, Tbilisi has long been a venue for cross-border Track II meetings prior to the COVID 19 pandemic, but it has been slow in resuming such meetings or making them more inclusive. Further, it is vital that it now becomes a venue for Armenian and Azerbaijani officials to meet, with or without their Georgian counterparts. Klaar also noted that the Georgian capital “could still be used for meetings of the highest level in different formats.”
Indeed, and though a little premature for now, but as some have also speculated, Tbilisi would arguably make for an appropriate, relevant, and symbolic venue for the signing of any Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal when one is on the table. All going well, it can only be hoped that 2023 will prove to be the year that it finally is.
Agenda.ge also carries a report in English on Klaar’s interview.
