Graphic © The Economist
After months of amassing his troops on the Ukrainian border, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the order to invade further into Ukrainian territory late last month. For the first time in two decades, full-scale war returned to the European continent, sending out shockwaves globally. Outrage was widespread and in a rare show of unity, even if unwilling or unable to directly intervene militarily, the vast majority of UN member states condemned the Russian action.
Nearly two weeks after the invasion, NATO has been tested to the limit, also resisting calls for direct military intervention, though offering other support, and the European Union did agree on a large package of sanctions aimed at isolating Russia and economically punishing Putin and his closest associates. Of course, the sanctions will also affect the global economy, and that also includes the economies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict will also test the three countries in the wake of arguably waning US and EU influence in the region over the past six years, and especially since the 2020 Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some analysts are already offering their take on how all three countries are responding to what is a constantly evolving situation.
In short, they are treading carefully.
Armenia
Armenia is arguably in the most difficult position of all three countries, with much of its economy and its almost all of its security dependent on Russia. It is the one country in the region that is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has already warned his country that the war in Ukraine will adversely affect the economy and that sanctions on Russia will hurt the EEU.
Speaking on Civilnet, Anna Ohanyan, a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Stonehill College in the US, says that supply chains, food prices, inflation, and remittances from abroad will be affected given the close integration between Armenia and Russia. The effects will be long-term because sanctions amount to the economic containment of Russia. “Because sanctions are so overwhelming, they amount to really crippling the Russian economy in order to eliminate its capacity to wage war,” she says.
What is Armenia’s economic policy going to be if Russia is going to remain under this extensive containment strategy? she asks. “Not only Russia will be thinking about this, but also all of the countries in Russia’s vicinity,” Ohanyan says. “If Russia suffers then Armenia, which is so dependent on Russia, will also suffer,” says Ronald Grigor Suny, speaking to Radio Free Europe’s Armenia Service, “and that is a regrettable fallout from this terrible event.”
Ethnic Armenians in what remains of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) also look to Moscow rather than Yerevan and even went as far as welcoming the 21 February recognition by Russia of Ukraine’s Donesk and Luhansk oblasts. Here, however, it is important to note that this does not represent Yerevan’s position, which has not recognised them and has remains relatively silent on the crisis in Ukraine compared to its neighbours.
While Russia is Armenia’s main trading power and the country is also reliant on remittances sent home by Armenians working abroad, mainly in Russia, but despite this reliance on Russia, Armenia has otherwise sought to maintain a balancing act between East and West. Benyamin Poghosyan, founder and chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan, calls Armenia’s modest cooperation with the US, EU, and NATO ‘positive.’
Nonetheless, Russia’s Ukraine invasion and worsened relations between the West and Russia will have consequences for Armenia, he believes. “Yerevan should do everything not to cancel its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community, but it will be challenging, if not impossible, to keep the same level of relations. Armenia will also suffer economically due to the West’s economic war against Russia,” Poghosyan wrote.
Armenia “cannot avoid the consequence of the Russia-Ukraine war entirely,” he concluded, predicting that Yerevan would abstain from the vote condemning Russia’s aggression in the UN General Assembly on 2 March. “No one should expect Armenia to vote for an anti-Russian resolution, as that vote will immediately put Armenian vital national interests under threat,” he believed, though he also recommended that it not to participate in the voting at all.
In fact, Armenia did abstain during the vote while Azerbaijan did not participate. “This step probably will not be perceived by Russia as betrayal and will not anger the Kremlin, while it will not destroy the few bridges with the West,” he says. Meanwhile, in the vote to suspend Russia’s representation in the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly in February, Armenia was the only country other than Russia to vote against.
Again, Azerbaijan did not participate.
Other analysts, however, are more concerned about what impact the Ukrainian-Russian war will have on attempts to find a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Some analysts such as Poghosyan have argued that Armenia and Russia should form even closer bonds, but others do not, viewing the situation one of great concern when previously the United States, the EU, and Russia could be considered to be roughly on the same page.
Civilnet analyst Tigran Grigoryan says that there is even more uncertainty over the future of the OSCE Minsk Group as a result. If past tensions between Russia and the West did not disrupt the OSCE Minsk process, any policy to “isolate Russia in all areas” by the West could see Russia further monopolise efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict, effectively rendering the OSCE Minsk Group irrelevant.
Writing in commonspace.eu, Vasif Huseynov also believes that practical cooperation between the US, French, and Russian Co-Chairs is hardly likely following the invasion of Ukraine, but also says that it might not be necessary given steps being taken to normalise both Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.” This offers a chance for Baku and Yerevan to promote bilateral contacts without any third-party mediation, he concludes.
Nonetheless, Grigoryan believes that the attitude of the West to the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh could negatively change over time. As Armenia seeks to normalise its relations with Turkey as well as find a lasting peace with Azerbaijan, in part to reduce its dependency on Moscow, Ukraine has shown that Russia will take radical steps to maintain control over what it considers its sphere of influence.
“The main threat to Armenia’s statehood may come from Moscow, not Baku or Ankara,” warns Grigoryan. “Russia, isolated from the West, will try to increase its influence in the regions it stills controls. This will significantly reduce Armenia’s sovereignty.”
“The outbreak of war in Ukraine was the worst-case scenario for Armenia and can create serious risks in our region, complicating the already difficult geopolitical situation of Armenia,” he concludes.
Azerbaijan
In a long thread on Twitter, International Crisis Group analyst Zaur Shiriyev believes that the assault on Ukraine is definitely perceived as a danger by Azerbaijan. Baku would therefore like to see the earliest resolution of the conflict and has attempted to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow. As an example of this, he points to President Aliyev’s visit to Ukraine on 14 January as tensions escalated. He also held a telephone call with President Vladimir Putin weeks before war broke out.
However, the signing of a Declaration on Allied Cooperation by Aliyev and Putin on 22 February, just two days before the start of the war, surprised many, even though Shiriyev says most of its content was simply a reaffirmation of existing bilateral and intergovernmental agreements or treaties already in force. But, he adds, there were some additional points on mutual support and military cooperation similar to those contained in the 2021 Shusha Declaration signed by Azerbaijan and Turkey last year.
“If in the 90s Azerbaijan maintained a balance with Russia through the West’s support,” tweeted Shiriyev, “the West’s political departure from the region, especially after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and Moscow’s growing influence in the region, forced Baku to correct its notion of balance.”
Nonetheless, Shiriyev says the Russian agreement lacks ratification by the Azerbaijani parliament so does not carry as much weight as the Shusha Declaration, which was.
“Though framed as an alliance, the new declaration is written in general language assuring Baku’s friendly attitude toward Russia, but falls short of outlining specific obligations for either party,” wrote Fuad Shahbazov in World Politics Review. “For Moscow, it was likely meant to ensure that Azerbaijan abstains from Western efforts to isolate Russia, including sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union, following the invasion of Ukraine.”
“Besides these more general points, there are also a few new articles in the document outlining closer defense and military cooperation,” Shahbazov concluded. “In practical terms, these mean that Baku will probably continue to import Russian arms, participate in joint modernization programs of certain types of Soviet-era weapons—particularly helicopters and aircraft—and cooperate with Moscow on issues related to regional security.”
“There are concerns that Russia will be the only hegemon in the South Caucasus and the region will remain isolated, and increasingly return to the Russian orbit,” believes Shiriyev. This also explains why Baku has not been vocal in criticising Russia for its actions despite strong condemnation from Azerbaijanis online. The Azerbaijani government has, however, stressed that the Ukraine-Russia conflict requires a diplomatic situation recognising territorial integrity and the sovereignty of states.
In this delicate balancing act, Azerbaijan has nonetheless delivered $5 million of humanitarian aid and SOCAR has instructed its petrol stations in Ukraine to provide free fuel to ambulances, fire engines, and other vehicles performing humanitarian duties. Moreover, believes Shiriyev, despite some pro-Ukrainian rallies in Baku, the authorities are unlikely to express any anti-Russian sentiment.
“In any case, one thing is crystal clear. Russia is losing any remaining positive image in the eyes of Azerbaijani public,” concludes Shiriyev. “In sum, Baku’s current strategy is to wait and watch, while providing humanitarian support to Ukraine, and to avoid antagonizing (Russia), but whatever will be end game in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, including all regional countries will share the economic and political costs that Russia incurs.”
Eurasianet also reports that the alliance agreement with Moscow will necessitate Azerbaijan coordinating with Russia any future potential exports of gas to Europe, though others disagree, citing how small the amount of gas exported from Azerbaijan would be compared to that from Russia. At any rate, and like its neighbours, a reduction in remittances from migrant workers in Russia will have a negative impact on Azerbaijan’s economy.
Georgia
Traditionally the most pro-Western country in the region, Georgia finds itself in a more immediately vulnerable situation. Having already been invaded by Russia in August 2008, the government, writes International Crisis Group Senior Analyst Olesya Vartanyan, “is treading carefully on the war in Ukraine, fearing that if it upsets the Kremlin, it may be left to face the consequences alone.” As a result, despite having pushed strongly for closer integration with the EU and NATO since the 2008 war, the Georgian government has “tiptoed around the crisis.”
Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili has already angered many by refusing to support sanctions against Russia, even going as far as calling them “unproductive,” also arguing that they would adversely affect remittances from Georgians working in Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in an unprecedented move, recalled Kyiv’s ambassador to Tbilisi in protest at what he called an “immoral position.” Attempts by the Georgian government to prevent volunteers from traveling to Ukraine to fight also provoked another diplomatic incident.
Nonetheless, the National Bank of Georgia did say it would not allow the evasion of sanctions and Georgia did vote in support of the 2 March UN General Assembly Resolution condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Tbilisi also voted in favour of Russia’s suspension from the Council of Europe.
Yet, says Vartanyan, and despite its commitment to both, Georgia remains frustrated by the lack of any real prospect of joining the EU and NATO. “These investments were not enough to overcome resistance among European and U.S. officials and politicians who see the downsides of Georgian membership in either organisation as outweighing any benefits,” she writes. “They argue that Georgian membership would anger the Kremlin and deepen its conflict with the West, reducing rather than increasing security for all.”
Perhaps as a last ditch effort to see its EU aspirations come true, when Ukraine announced that it was submitting its request for candidate status, Georgia along with Moldova did the same soon after. Previously, Georgia had planned to submit its application at the end of 2024. It remains to be seen if any or all applications for candidate status will be approved and even if they are, the EU has made it clear the road to actual membership remains long and difficult.
More importantly, at stake is Georgia’s security, says Vartanyan. With its own separatist regions controlled by Moscow, Russia can apply pressure on Tbilisi effectively and easily. The Russian military is already present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has spent years constructing fences, military bases, and observation points. Vartanyan says the authorities are worried that any small incident on the line of separation could be exploited by Moscow to invade even more of Georgia.
“As the war in Ukraine proceeds, countries all over the world will have to reassess policies toward Georgia and other countries where Russia seeks more influence, but which themselves have sought closer ties with the West,” she concludes.
This sentiment is also shared by Carnegie Senior Fellow Thomas de Waal. “Overnight the EU has to change a neighborhood policy focused on incremental reform into one that is about the survival of these countries as states,” he writes about the EU’s Eastern Partnership countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, in general. He also offers some conclusions and recommendations in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
For Armenia, he says, the EU should now move to support the Pashinyan government in more concrete ways. This should also be the position of diaspora organisations even though they have been critical of his handling of the 2020 war. As for Azerbaijan, though the recent agreement signed on 22 February carries with it risks, strategic alliance and cooperation with Turkey is “an insurance policy of sorts.”
Georgia, however, is most at risk with the government’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine exacerbating already deep polarisation and political instability at home.
“The EU talks a lot about resilience,” he concludes. “Now is the time to work quickly to strengthen it— not just in Georgia […], but in Armenia and Azerbaijan as well.”
