Duisi, Pankisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2015
The text of my presentation for a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Expert Group Meeting on Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Vienna, Austria, 16-18 November 2015.
The day before heading off to Vienna was quite depressing. The Paris Attacks were shocking enough, and my condolences of course go out to the families of those that died or suffered injuries, but what has also been alarming has been the amount of anti-Moslem rhetoric and postings appearing on my FB and Twitter feeds.
Even friends who I thought should be educated enough to know better were posting comments and / or material that appears to come from an inherent Islamophobia that had otherwise been dormant. Paris brought that to the surface, and regardless of the other ISIS bombing in Lebanon that had occurred just a day earlier.
Hence the photograph on the screen.
It’s from the Pankisi Gorge, a small area in Georgia, a former Soviet Republic in the South Caucasus. Many of you might not have heard of Pankisi, but the delegation from the Russian Federation certainly has. Others might simply know of Tarkhan Batirashvili, aka Abu Omar al-Shishani, a senior military commander in ISIS.
Perhaps not surprisingly, when the media does cover the situation in Pankisi, photographs of al-Shishani or other Islamic State-related images accompany the pieces. Yet, despite the problem of anywhere between 50-100 or more of the region’s 8,000 inhabitants leaving for Syria, this is actually how tranquil Pankisi looks.
Nevertheless, from reading material in the media or elsewhere on the Internet, the image of Pankisi as a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism persists instead. And it’s true, there is a problem. In June on a visit with IWPR, for example, one local teenager said that he supported ISIS because they were saving Moslem lives in Syria.
Given that the opposite is true, it’s clear that ISIS propaganda spread over the Internet has had its intended effect. Pankisi’s Council of Elders also says the same, noting with alarm that downloaded extremist propaganda is shared by some teens from phone to phone. Even an active Internet connection isn’t necessary.
It was also evident there was an chasm, determined by age, between the elders and those teenagers affected not only by ISIS propaganda, but also by a more radical ideology that has emerged in the region. It’s difficult to put a number on those affected, but the Pankisi Council of Elders believe it’s predominant.
The problem is that nobody seems to be countering the propaganda. Moreover, even if they were to, as Humera Khan, a prominent specialist in the area of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) said to me recently, any counter narratives would likely fall on deaf ears. Millennials need to communicate with millennials.
But why do I mention both Paris and Pankisi?
Simply because, given recent events, when we talk about counter narratives or the use of the Internet to recruit, we should also realise that how larger society reacts to the phenomena of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) contributes not only to increased Islamophobia and marginalisation, but to radicalisation itself.
This no doubt fits in with one of the main terrorist narratives.
That is, that the West is at war with Islam.
On the other hand, it also highlights how important it is to counter the narratives that do gain traction among youth susceptible to extremist propaganda. Even if ISIS propaganda can be slicker than any counter-narrative I’ve seen so far, it’s worth remembering what J.M Berger wrote for The Atlantic last week.
“[…] millions of people are fleeing ISIS territories, while mere thousands have traveled to join the group. […] the Islamic State’s ideological sympathisers make up less than one percent of the world’s population, even using the most hysterically alarmist estimates, and […] active, voluntary participants in its caliphate project certainly make up less than a tenth of a percent.”
Alas, one of the problems we face when it comes to counter-narratives is that messengers must be credible. We also know what that means. It means local communities, religious and educational leaders, women, victims of terrorism, disillusioned former fighters, and especially youth.
That’s also why I’m pleased to see the ICT sector sit alongside law enforcement and civil society in this room. J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan’s ISIS Twitter Census is one example of how new tools can monitor and analyse the online networks that are vital for groups such as ISIS.
It’s also possible that the same network analysis could identify those moving along in the online radicalisation process and conversely, when they move away from recruiters and propagandists after targeted interventions. Henry Tuck, from the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISD) will no doubt mention help from YouTube.
But to end, I’d like to quote Bennett Clifford, an American researcher who I recently interviewed on radicalisation in Georgia. “If counter-radicalisation programs are intended only for Muslims, a perception of being “singled out” and receiving unfair treatment can arise.”
It is imperative that we avoid this.
UNODC Counterterrorism Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, Austria © Onnik James Krikorian 2015
