Few were surprised when just over 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled Karabakh in late September. Their departure followed Baku’s military operation to ostensibly take out the last remnants of local ethnic Armenian forces in the breakaway region. For almost three years since the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement, local analysts and political figures in Yerevan said that no-one would remain in Karabakh unless it received some kind of autonomy, independence, or security guarantees.
Baku rejected all three and Karabakh as an unrecognised ethnic Armenian political entity will cease to exist at the very beginning of next year. Even some foreign commentators called for the immediate exodus of the ethnic Armenians, though they could hardly impact the situation on the ground even if they had urged the opposite. The reason for the panicked departure was clear to everyone but it could have been avoided had there been genuine support throughout for the peace process. Without one, this was arguably always going to happen.
With the return of the seven surrounding regions to Azerbaijan in November–December 2020, Karabakh could never be sustainable without amicable mutual relations with Baku whatever its status. Though the Lachin Corridor was slated to be kept under the control of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, that would only be for as long as Moscow maintained a presence. Had Russia left in 2025 or even 2030, all utilities and infrastructure such as electricity, gas, and telecommunications, as well as trade and movement, would fall under Baku’s direct control.
Lacking a land border with a powerful neighbouring security patron as is the case with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, let alone a coastline and access to the sea as in Northern Cyprus, Karabakh’s fate was inextricably linked to Azerbaijan. Even Karabakh’s airport didn’t function. Yet there was the possibility to prepare the ground for a slow integration to take place over years or likely decades. Russia had foreseen the future as one where the sides were gradually brought together leaving the issue of status for sometime in the future.
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Coincidentally, a few days ago former Karabakh strongman Samvel Babayan claimed that the last de facto leader of the territory’s ethnic Armenian population, Samvel Shahramanyan, was still negotiating with Baku over the return of the population in absentia. Few believe this and there is certainly so far no evidence to support such claims, but this should at least be pursued despite the seemingly unsurmountable difficulties that it would entail.
That is, before it is too late.
The full opinion piece can be read online here.
