Tbilisoba 2024

Tbilisoba 2024

Tbilisoba, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

Earlier this month, Tbilisi celebrated Tbilisoba, the city’s annual harvest festival. Over the years it has changed significantly and seems smaller than before. I first covered the event in 2011 but the best so far remains 2014 when there was more representation of traditional Georgian folk dance and music as well as by minorities such as the ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani communities. This year, that was held relatively far away from Tbilisi’s Old Town and Rike Park with very little publicity or in some media any at all. Nonetheless, those that attended appeared to enjoy themselves sufficiently and I put together two photo stories.

The first was for Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa.

Since 1979, Tbilisi has held the Tbilisoba Festival, an autumn celebration that has become a long-standing tradition. A joyful carnival, with street performances, music and dance, culinary specialties and much more. This year, Tbilisoba offered family fun despite the decline in attendance and size. Photo and text by Onnik James Krikorian, from the Festival held on October 5-6, 2024

 

Last weekend saw the annual Tbilisoba held once again in the Georgian capital. Held every October since 1979, the event celebrates Tbilisi’s history through agricultural markets, traditional folk and dance performances, and contemporary rock and pop events. The only time that it was not held was during significant civil and political unrest in the country in the early 1990s before resuming in 1995.

 

In recent years, however, the event has declined in both attendance and size and this year the trend was particularly noticeable as some events, such as one at the Tbilisi Open Air Museum of Ethnography, were not even announced. Instead, Tbilisi’s Orbeliani Square was almost entirely transformed into open barbecue areas. Nonetheless, the colourful event was especially welcomed by children.

 

Marching bands, characters from western animated and fantasy movies, and children’s concerts did at least make up for the lower-key staging of the event compared to previous years. It seems unlikely, however, that it will ever return to the prominence afforded to it in previous decades. It was at least a pleasant respite from what will likely prove bitterly contested parliamentary elections later this month.

A few photos below but you can see more here.

Tbilisoba, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

Near the sulphur baths in Old Tbilisi some of Georgia’s ethnic minorities had stands though there was no stage this year and no folk dance and music aside from a short display of less than five minutes from at least one of them. However, it is worth noting that they did perform at the Ethnographic open air museum but that was too far away and as mentioned before, not adequately publicised. Regardless, it was the second photo story for the Caspian Post.

The festival is held at multiple locations with family-style events such as marching bands, face-painting stalls for children, and a saturation of cafes and barbecue kiosks in central Orbeliani Square and Rike Park. Though hardly advertised this year, traditional Georgian folk music and dance shows were relocated 7 km out of the centre to the Open Air Museum of Ethnography. Far fewer events were centred on Abanotubani, the old town district famous for its sulphur baths. However, this was the place to come to see representation from Georgia’s national minorities. Taking pride of place, at the beginning of the event space here were two stalls serving Azerbaijani delicacies while two members of Tbilisi’s Azerbaijani dance group ‘Jeiran’ wearing traditional dress performed short dances and welcomed visitors. Also present were stalls run by the local ethnic Armenian, Greek, and other minority communities. 

Anyway, some more pics below. It was particularly welcome to run into Albert, and ethnic Armenian singer in Tbilisi who sings in Armenian and Azerbaijani. I first met him in 2010 at the same chaikhana I met him at this time.

Ethnic Azerbaijani Stand, Tbilisoba, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

Ethnic Armenian Stand, Tbilisoba, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

Ethnic Greek Stand, Tbilisoba, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

Ethnic Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians celebrate and toast Tbilisoba, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2024

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Can Armenia and Azerbaijan finally reach an agreement by COP29?

Can Armenia and Azerbaijan finally reach an agreement by COP29?

As this year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference in Baku draws closer, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be drifting further apart. Despite hopes that the opposite would be true, a lack of clarity and confusion instead continues to reign. Does the draft Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations contain 17 points or 16? Initially, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had announced that consensus had been reached on 13 points while 3 were partially agreed and there was no agreement at all on a fourth. Since then, official statements and media in Armenia instead refers to 16 points though Yerevan has reportedly ditched the three incomplete articles to make only 13.

Last week, like Pashinyan at the end of August, Elchin Amirbayov, Azerbaijani Presidential Representative on Special Assignments, also used 17 for the number of points in the draft treaty. Thus, confusion stemming from a lack of coherent statements, many of which have been contradicted as soon as the following day, continues. But true, maybe this doesn’t even matter.

 

Azerbaijan has anyway made it clear that no agreement can be signed until Armenia amends its constitution, a change that seems unlikely before 2027, though some reports suggest 2026. Last year, Armenian Prime Minister stated that the Declaration of Independence underpinning the constitution would keep Yerevan in a perpetual conflict with its neighbours, specifically Ankara and Baku. Now that narrative has also shifted again. It is Azerbaijans constitution that makes territorial claims on Armenia and not vice-versa, Pashinyan recently charged.

 

[…]

 

What is known, however, is that pressure for some kind of agreement to be reached by COP29 in Baku continues. This could even be a joint statement acknowledging the progress and agreements made to date even if the Armenian opposition continues to claim that Pashinyan is ready to concede to anything to remain in power. Even so, they also claim that Aliyev is not interested in peace and that a new war will break out after the climate change conference next month. At least one pro-opposition analyst warns that Pashinyan may be testing Aliyevs patience too far though others argue Azerbaijan has no interest in signing one anyway.

 

Whether an agreement is initialled or signed by or during COP29 matters little if the alternative is war or a new and untenable status quo. Until the 44-day war in 2020, Armenia imported some of its wheat from Karabakh harvested in the seven formerly occupied regions of Azerbaijan. Now, the country is almost entirely dependent on Russian imports, as Russian MFA spokesperson Zakharova recently cautioned, raising many questions as to the haste in which Pashinyan seeks to diversify away from Moscow. The same is especially true for Russian gas. Only last month, former U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Dan Baer caused quite a stir when he warned Armenian citizens that they should brace for cold winters ahead.

The full piece is available here

 

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Militant Groups Resurface in Armenia’s Struggle Against Radicalization

Militant Groups Resurface in Armenia’s Struggle Against Radicalization

On September 18, Armenian law enforcement announced the arrest of three individuals accused of forming an armed group to overthrow the government. Four others are currently wanted by the police for recruiting people for three months of training in Russia, with a payment of 220,000 rubles (approximately $2,360) for their participation in said training. Five of the men are Armenian citizens, while two are ethnic Armenians who were formerly residents of now-dissolved Karabakh. The Armenian Investigative Committee claimed that recruits were taken to a Russian military base outside of Rostov-on-Don dubbed “Arbat” for training. They were then allegedly informed that the purpose of this training was to help overthrow the current Armenian government in a coup. Several recruits refused and returned to Armenia, claiming they alerted the police. Media has reported that no such military base exists. There is, however, a Russian militia made up of ethnic Armenians named “Arbat” (“the Armenian Battalion”), which has been associated with Rostov-on-Don and has fought in Ukraine (FIP, September 18). Moreover, the Armenian Church blessed the militia in Moscow, once it was given orders to fight in Donbas against Ukraine. One of those detained was Serob Gasparyan, who is also known for leading another militant group, Black Panther. Gasparyan is a fierce critic of the Pashinyan government. The trend of militancy in Armenia and among the Armenian diaspora abroad over the past thirty years could inform the country’s authorities  how to deal with the rise in discontent with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s premiership.

On the same day as the report about this alleged coup, Andranik Kocharyan, an Armenian senior government lawmaker, told a conference in Yerevan that “internal and external enemies continue to seek ways to regain power, including through terrorism.” This was an implied reference to the former regimes of Armenian presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova denies that Moscow was behind the alleged coup, as does Serob Gasparyan.

 

In addition to many members of Arbat having fought in Karabakh, it is said to have been involved in the crackdown on Euromaidan protesters in Kyiv in 2014. In 2022, Putin awarded the Order of Courage to Arbat Commander Hayk Gasparyan, an MMA fighter and a former member of the Wagner Group, for his efforts in the Battle of Soledar in occupied Ukraine. Gasparyan is now under EU sanctions, following his early release from prison after having been recruited to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Gasparyan also recruited others from Russia’s penal colonies to fight in Ukraine with the Wagner Group. An anti-Pashinyan analyst alleges that ethnic Armenians and Armenian citizens have been actively recruited for deployment in Ukraine, but Pashinyan has denied such claims.

 

[…]

 

Ever since the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, security surrounding the Armenian Prime Minister has notably increased, while the risk of violent extremist and terrorist incidents is becoming more apparent. In January 2021, one British risk consultancy warned that Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war could lead to the emergence of informal groups launching insurgent-style attacks on the border and elsewhere in the future, especially important in the context of hotly debated transport link between Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan in the future and on the border. Two days before the outbreak of the 2020 war, Armenian media also expressed concerns that local militias posed a potential risk to the Pashinyan government, describing them as operating outside the Ministry of Defense’s control. In November, the government confirmed that one such group, VOMA (Art of Survival), has been constructing its own fortifications on the border with Azerbaijan.

 

An international watchdog warned just before the 2020 war that the “Armenian national identity is deeply rooted in historical grievances relating to persecution by external enemies, offering a rich material for militant radicalization.” The precedent of ASALA, a US-proscribed Armenian terrorist organization active in the 1970s and 1980s, is testament to that. Although the Armenian government is aware of the dangers posed by such groups and radicalized individuals with access to weapons, it is at least likely in communication with foreign intelligence services abroad. Until now, however, the issue has not been addressed directly using both soft and hard methods. It seems inevitable that sooner or later, it will have to embrace preventative approaches, too, including the possibility that those with military experience could engage in domestic attacks again as well as being in high demand in other conflict zones, such as Ukraine. The removal of Russian Federal Security Service Border Guards from Yerevan’s airport could be one first step in addressing the latter, demonstrating that the Pashinyan government is working toward prioritizing the Armenian people over foreign entities with that in mind.

The full piece is available here

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Yerevan and Baku at a crossroads

Yerevan and Baku at a crossroads

Four years after the start of the 44-day-war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and a year since the exodus of 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the separatist Nagorno Karabakh region, hopes that there could be another opportunity to resolve the conflict are fading.

Though Yerevan, supported by France and the United States, believe that one is possible before November, Baku maintains that no final agreement can be signed until what it considers to be territorial claims, albeit referenced indirectly, in the Armenian constitution are removed. Yerevan disputes this and instead alleges that it is Azerbaijan that makes such claims on its territory.

 

Regardless, this also makes November a pivotal month to finally hammer out a deal or at least make significant progress on one. On 5 November, the United States will hold presidential elections that could either lead to continuity or change in its policy towards the region.

 

[…]

 

What is clear, however, is that the coming weeks before November could demonstrate whether a peace agreement comes before Armenia enters its next election cycle starting next year.

 

Yerevan certainly seems restless in case Moscow attempts to interfere. On 18 September, Yerevan announced that it had prevented an attempted armed coup by Armenian citizens and former Karabakh residents allegedly trained in Russia. On 20 September, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova reminded Yerevan of how it benefits as a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.

 

“90 percent of grain that goes to Armenia […] comes from Russia. Perhaps then you can contact the Russian Federation […] to discuss your food security”, she stated. And with Armenia also reliant on Russia for its energy, former U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Daniel Baer and Senior Vice President at the Carnegie Endowment voiced an ominous note at a recent congressional hearing. “Armenians must be prepared to endure some cold winters”, he said.

The full piece is available here

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Pashinyan Press Conference Highlights Progress and Pitfalls in Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks

Pashinyan Press Conference Highlights Progress and Pitfalls in Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks

Toward the end of July, opposition media sent a written inquiry to the Office of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan asking whether Yerevan would send a delegation to the UN Climate Change Conference (COP-29) scheduled for November in Baku. The move came following an announcement from Azerbaijani presidential advisor Hikmet Hajiyev that such an invitation had been sent. There had also been speculation that Baku was seeking to initial the basic principles for any peace agreement by the time of the event. Pashinyan’s office replied, saying he would address these issues in a press conference after returning from a vacation in early August. Pashinyan has consistently used live press conferences to clarify and promote his policies, especially regarding normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the said press conference did occur, it did so only at the very end of August, during which Pashinyan did not rule out sending a high-level delegation to COP-29 . It took place one day after a regulatory document for the respective Armenian and Azerbaijani border commissions handling delimitation and demarcation was finalized and signed by both sides. The agreement is significant because it must also be approved by the constitutional court and ratified by parliament.

As domestic discontent grows in Armenia and geopolitical tensions between Armenia and Russia, Azerbaijan develop, however, how Pashinyan addresses the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan will determine his place in the future of Armenian politics.

 

The press conference also aimed to clarify Armenia’s stance on various issues related to an agreement on normalizing relations between the two countries before November. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has emphasized this deadline, while Pashinyan and senior officials, such as Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, have expressed hopes for an earlier resolution and a signed treaty. Although progress on border delimitation and demarcation has been notable, the press conference itself was more of a mixed bag. The event highlighted the  notable differences that remain between the sides and suggested that Pashinyan may be trying to balance multiple objectives simultaneously.   […]   On September 10, speaking at the first inaugural Yerevan Dialogue conference, Pashinyan reiterated that a peace treaty with Azerbaijan was realistic even though Baku has ruled out the signing of an incomplete agreement  with the constitutional impasse still unresolved. He also emphasized his own regional connectivity project, the Crossroads of Peace. Baku and Moscow consider this issue addressed in the trilateral ceasefire statement ending the Karabakh War in 2020. Pashinyan disagrees but has no intention of withdrawing his signature from the agreement. With Armenia due to enter another election cycle and a globally uncertain 2025, the next few months will be critical in shaping the future of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and Pashinyan’s political legacy.

The full piece is available here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian