Armenia-Azerbaijan Dialogue – Flogging a Dead Horse?

Armenia-Azerbaijan Dialogue – Flogging a Dead Horse?

Even though many believed a second Trump presidency was unlikely or even impossible, his re-election last November demonstrated how many people prefer to favour dreams over reality, transforming fears into self-fulfilling prophecies. This is a situation that can best describe how Track II diplomacy in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has been conducted over time. As a result, there is little to no agreement between the sides, the blatantly obvious is ignored, and meetings become performative at best or simply a continuation of the conflict at worst.

In many cases, participants are not even inclined to work towards solutions but to instead articulate partisan positions that shut down all possibility for real discussion. In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, any resolution of the three-decades-long conflict thus remains the sole preserve of governments. Instead, what civil society initiatives exist simply regurgitate the same approaches of old even if they hardly succeeded then let alone would fare differently today. Few are willing to think out of the box or even ask the right questions.

 

[…]

 

This is perilous and has proven counter-productive in the past. Since the November 2020 ceasefire agreement, both the region and the world have undergone significant changes. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. highlights this perfectly, underscoring the need for more problem-solving and risk-aware approaches. Track II dialogue should focus on developing a range of short, medium, and long-term recommendations to decision makers taking into account potential challenges and scenarios along the way, allowing adaptability and scalability with that in mind.

 

Arguably, only this can arguably prevent continued disappointment and its likely consequences. Moreover, a genuine discussion that is public, transparent, and inclusive, including among the populations, must start. It is already late. 

The full piece is available here.

 

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Can Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” Satisfy both Baku and Armenian voters?

Can Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” Satisfy both Baku and Armenian voters?

Graphic: Various Media. Original Source Unknown.

The Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR) has just published my latest on the continuing impasse and discussion on Baku’s demand to remove the current preamble to Armenia’s Constitution that I’ve been consistently covering since January last year. This has also includes pieces quoting commentators in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, including AIR Centers’s Farid Shafiyev.

Although Armenia’s next parliamentary elections are not scheduled to take place until mid-2026, many analysts and political commentators believe the pre-election campaign period has already started. The first sign was arguably in November when Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reprimanded and replaced several officials. A month earlier, a survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) indicated that only 16 percent of respondents trusted his leadership. Only 20 percent said they would vote for his Civil Contract party if elections were held that weekend.

 

[…] 

 

In an unexpected move, Pashinyan also shaved off his beard as if trying to return to his revolutionary heyday in 2018 when he led protests forcing his predecessor, Serzh Sargsyan, to resign. Not only did Pashinyan grow his beard then but also donned a camouflage t-shirt, adopting the look of a fighter from the First Karabakh war. Many argue that along with other populist behavior this made the outbreak of full- scale war in September 2020 all but inevitable.

 

[…] 

 

That same day he had already stirred controversy by equating the 1990 Declaration of Independence with the “non-existence of Armenia” itself. He was referring to how it called for the “Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh” and is referenced in the preamble to the country’s constitution. This issue has been raised by Baku in the past and many calls were made last year for it to be removed if an overdue agreement on normalizing relations was to be signed.

 

[…] 

 

Though Pashinyan counters that no such claims exist in the constitution, he has anyway said similarly, criticizing the 1990 declaration for keeping Armenia in conflict with Azerbaijan and Türkiye for the foreseeable future. His critics maintain that this confirms he plans to remove preamble in any constitutional changes,something that he has been planning since coming to power. When last changed in 2015, the President Sargsyan did so only to extend his rule past a two-term limit by switching from a semi-presidential to parliamentary system of government.

 

[…] 

 

But that was then and this is now. Following the 2020 defeat, there has instead been speculation that Pashinyan plans to forge a fourth republic to replace the third established in 1991. For Pashinyan, this would mark a new chapter in the country’s history, relegating the Kocharyan and Sargsyan era from 1998 to 2018 to history. It could also help the country move on from its defeat in 2020 and absolve Pashinyan from any blame for it. Earlier this year, Pashinyan even equated that defeat to an opportunity to now form an “independent and sovereign state.” In what he has also termed a transformation from “Historical Armenia” to “Real Armenia,” Pashinyan continues to stress the necessity of forging peaceful neighbourly relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

The full analysis is available here.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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New Armenia-U.S. Partnership On Pause

New Armenia-U.S. Partnership On Pause

Image: Grok 

During a visit to Washington, D.C. on February 5, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed that Armenia hopes “to open a new page in relations with the United States.” This hope was in reference to the Charter of Strategic Partnership between Armenia and the United States signed on January 14 to strengthen bilateral relations. The signing of the charter occurred just days before the last administration left the White House.

Although Armenia’s next parliamentary elections are not scheduled to take place until mid-2026, many analysts and political commentators believe the pre-election campaign period has already started. The first sign was arguably in November when Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reprimanded and replaced several officials. A month earlier, a survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) indicated that only 16 percent of respondents trusted his leadership. Only 20 percent said they would vote for his Civil Contract party if elections were held that weekend.

 

The areas covered in the charter include economic and energy cooperation, defense and security, democracy and human rights, and cultural and education exchanges. It also came soon after the Biden administration decided to suspend a Strategic Partnership Charter between the United States and Georgia signed in 2009. This followed the contested parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024, and ongoing protests in Tbilisi.

 

[…] 

 

No sooner had the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter been signed than Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that his Armenian counterpart, Ararat Mirzoyan, would visit Moscow for talks for the first time since November 2023. Armenian analysts considered this a response to the charter. They believed Moscow sought clarification on Yerevan’s intentions. Mirzoyan called the talks with Lavrov “frank and constructive.”

 

[…] 

 

For the Armenian government, further improving ties with the European Union and the United States could boost Pashinyan’s chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections next year. Even if Iran says it is not concerned by the new agreement, Tehran’s ambassador to Yerevan, Mehdi Sobhani, has since announced that Armenia and Iran are also working on a comprehensive strategic partnership. Pashinyan recently met with U.S. Vice President JD Vance, which, according to one Armenian political analyst, left a “bleak impression.”

 

At the end of February, Armenian media stressed the precariousness surrounding the new administration in the United States by noting that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection team had still not arrived. Officials claim it has not been canceled. However, plans for a cyber-security laboratory have been suspended in the current 90-day freeze of USAID assistance worldwide. Armenia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that “no program or action stemming from the partnership is currently envisaged”. While the new charter has provided conditions for positive bilateral relations between Armenia and the United States, Armenian officials appear uncertain about the next steps in bilateral relations.

The full analysis is available here.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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In Armenia, Strategic Diversification Clashes With Geographic Realities

In Armenia, Strategic Diversification Clashes With Geographic Realities

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has signalled plans to seek European Union (EU) membership. Though framed as an attempt to diversify away from decades of dependency on Russia, Moscow instead sees it as a western attempt to simply oust it from the region. Such a move is supported by some in Armenia amid disillusionment with Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) following the 2020 war with Azerbaijan and a 2022 incursion into Armenia itself.

Nonetheless, diversification is long overdue in the country though it hardly had any choice. Only in the area of security has Yerevan found itself desperate to seek alternative partners given Russia’s beleaguered situation in Ukraine. It has always been Armenia’s geography that obstructs diversification in general, especially economically, but also in terms of security. Indian weapons are presumably transported through Iran.

 

[…]

 

Regardless, in lieu of a peace agreement, support from the EU for Pashinyan, whose ratings have been in decline, could help ensure victory. The same is true if support comes from the United States as well. Earlier this month, Yerevan signed a historic Strategic Partnership Commission Charter with Washington D.C.. This institutionalised framework for cooperation between the two countries is also important in terms of diversification in the area of nuclear energy.

 

But diversification should not be mistaken for replacing Russian hegemony for that from the West. In the midst of this web of geopolitical interests, Pashinyan noted at last week’s World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos that equilibrium in Armenias foreign relations is vital for both national and regional stability. Deviation from balance can have very serious consequences,” he warned, while also acknowledging that Armenia’s economic future depends on normalising relations with neighbours Azerbaijan and Turkey and deepening those with Iran and Georgia.

The full piece is available here.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise

Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise

Photo: European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) 

On December 30, 2024, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards left Armenia’s Agarak border checkpoint with Iran at the end of December 2024 . This follows the FSB border guard’s withdrawal from Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport at the end of July 2024. The move had been anticipated by several pro-government activists in Armenia who had already called for their removal to cut off Russian access to the country’s Border Electronic Management Information System. This applies, however, only to the checkpoint and not the entire length of the Armenia-Iran border. Instead, FSB border guards will now be joined by an unknown number of Armenian National Security Service (NSS) border guards to jointly perform duties. Until now, the FSB guards have been solely responsible for guarding Armenia’s borders with Iran and Türkiye, as stipulated in a 1992 agreement between Yerevan and Moscow. Their withdrawal from the checkpoint represents a symbolic reduction in Armenia’s reliance on Russia for its security needs and a gradual diversification away from Moscow in general.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan can tout the development as a successful move in  exerting gradual control of its sovereign territory in a pre-election year, but another development relating to a different border could prove more difficult and perhaps even more sensitive. Following clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in September 2022, the European Union deployed a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) civilian observation mission to reduce tensions between the sides. That decision stemmed from the October 6, 2022 meeting between Pashinyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, alongside the presidents of the European Council and France, Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron, at the first-ever European Political Community (EPC) summit in Prague. The temporary mission was able to deploy quickly because it was made up of 40 monitors already in neighboring Georgia as part of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) on the Administrative Boundary Lines with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

 

[…] 

 

Responding to renewed demands from Baku that EUMA be withdrawn from the Armenian side of the shared border, Pashinyan said in November that he has instead offered to withdraw it only from those parts of the border that have been demarcated. It is implied, however, that this would include other parts once they are demarcated in the future.

 

[…] 

  

The demand for EUMA to withdraw is also just one of many conditions from Baku for an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, including on the constitution. Failure to agree on all demands might lead to continued deadlock throughout 2025. For now, Yerevan has not publicly stated whether it has officially requested EUMA extend its mission next month even though the European Union has offered to do so.

The full analysis is available here.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian