It was almost comical at first but also unexpectedly symbolic. Known for his trademark populism and oratory skills honed to resonate with the masses, it was perhaps the most effective way for Armenia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, to illustrate to the population the actual borders of their country. Holding a golden cutout map of Armenia to one side and, at times, a minuscule representation of the tiny Armenian enclave of Artsvashen in Azerbaijan to the other, his live press conference on 12 March was direct and to the point.

For decades, many Armenians have viewed the country as encompassing not only the now-defunct Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan proper. In early 2020, Pashinyan even included the same irredentist map of a territorial area that had been taken back or returned during and immediately after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan later that same year. In September, the previously de facto but unrecognized Karabakh political entity dissolved itself following a military operation to disarm the local militia.  

 

For decades, many Armenians have viewed the country as encompassing not only the now-defunct Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan proper. In early 2020, Pashinyan even included the same irredentist map of a territorial area that had been taken back or returned during and immediately after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan later that same year. In September, the previously de facto but unrecognized Karabakh political entity dissolved itself following a military operation to disarm the local militia.

 

The situation has dramatically changed since and the press conference hinted at what might happen next in the complicated process of demarcating and delimiting the shared border. The press conference came just two days after Baku demanded the immediate return of four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages situated in its Gazakh region bordering Armenia that were occupied in the early 1990s. Previously, the focus had been on enclaves—territorial areas of both republics physically situated within and surrounded by the other.

 

On the other hand, non-enclave villages are simply those part of a country occupied by another. In his press conference, Pashinyan finally acknowledged that they are not part of the Republic of Armenia and cast some clarity on the issue.

 

[…] 

 

“In the near future, we must take action, and where, for example, our communications are beyond our borders, we must reconstruct our communications in those areas so that all communications of Armenia pass through the de jure territory of Armenia,” he noted. According to some unconfirmed reports, that process has already started, and Pashinyan has also said he will visit the area in question to address any concerns of the local community.

 The full Caspian Post article can be read here. 

On January 18, six years after the street protests that brought him to power in 2018, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan raised the issue of reforming the country’s constitution during a meeting with the Armenian Ministry of Justice. The constitution was originally introduced under Levon Ter-Petrosyan in 1995 and controversially amended under his successors, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. Pashinyan stated that constitutional reforms are needed to make Armenia “more competitive in the new geopolitical environment.” The opposition claims that talk of constitutional reform comes under pressure from Azerbaijan in the stalled peace talks. Earlier, the Armenian premier claimed that constitutional reforms would give Yerevan a more stable position in negotiations with Baku.

Pashinyan’s initial efforts to hold a referendum to amend the constitution in April 2020 were indefinitely postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the declaration of a state of emergency in Armenia (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, March 16, 2020). As a result, a crucial amendment to strip constitutional court judges appointed under previous governments passed with a two-thirds majority in the Armenian National Assembly without a popular referendum (JAMnews, June 3, 2020). The opposition charged that the move was unconstitutional as the referendum could have been rescheduled to a later date.

  

The push for extensive constitutional reforms has remained a priority for the current Armenian government. After the canceled referendum, Pashinyan noted that the population did not trust the existing constitution in July 2020. He argued that a new constitution should be drafted and released for public discussion, with a referendum scheduled for the following year (Azatutyun.am, July 5, 2020). Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War in late 2020, however, postponed the referendum again in favor of snap parliamentary elections (Azatutyun.am, June 24, 2021).

 

[…]

 

At the heart of the matter is the inclusion of a preamble in successive constitutions directly referring to the 1990 Armenian Declaration of Independence. That document emphasizes the 1989 joint declaration on the “Reunification of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh” (Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, accessed January 24). It also refers to “achieving international recognition of the 1915 genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”

 

[…]

 

The extensive reforms to the Armenian Constitution come with key geopolitical implications. On the one hand, removing some of the territorial claims could facilitate real progress in peace talks. On the other hand, potentially doing so at the behest of Baku would do little to infuse public confidence in the new constitution. The reforms that Yerevan does agree on and the way they are implemented will undoubtedly have a significant impact on prospects for peace and stability in the South Caucasus.

The full piece can be read online here.