20 Years After the 2003 Armenia Presidential Elections

20 Years After the 2003 Armenia Presidential Elections

 Opposition protest demonstration, Matendaran, Yerevan, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2003

This month marks the 20th anniversary of the Rose Revolution in Georgia that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Though Misha’s rule was to deteriorate rapidly by the time of demonstrations held in Tbilisi in 2007, there’s no doubt that the change of power four years earlier turned Georgia around. This was especially relevant given that earlier in the year, post-presidential election protests in Yerevan led to defeat for the opposition and even more authoritarianism in Armenia.

I remember vividly entering my local corner shop in the Komitas district of Yerevan during the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and watching the live broadcast on the television set. There was a sense of jealousy from the owners. “Wait until we do this,” said the wife of the owner. “We will dance in a way you’ve never seen before,” she said, the dislike of then President Robert Kocharyan was that much. But, of course, his main competitor in the elections that year in Armenia was the son of former Soviet-era boss Karen Demirchyan, who had been assassinated in the 1999 parliamentary shootings, the lacklustre Stepan.

Unlike Georgia, where Rustavi-2 live broadcast the revolution, there was no such use of technology during the 2003 presidential election in Armenia. There were few media outlets present and even fewer foreign journalists – just myself and one other. Indeed, during the period between the first and second rounds of the presidential elections I was called in to OVIR to ‘check my visa’ and also an interrogation by the Armenian National Security Service (NSS). To be fair, there was no pressure. Indeed, the NSS agent even told me he enjoyed the ‘interrogation’ so much, especially about Karabakh, that if I had time maybe I could pop by again to continue talking.

This later turned into an attempted bribe from the NSS, Armenian Foreign Ministry, and Yerevan State University  to discredit Georgia. Naturally, I refused.

Of course, the following year, encouraged by the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the opposition protested again and several journalists, including myself, were beaten by regime thugs that were mainly the bodyguards of Kocharyan’s oligarchs under the watchful eye of Chorni Gago. But I digress. I’ve been meaning to post some of the photos I took from the 2003 presidential elections that really marked the decline of Armenia into an authoritarian regime supported by a cadre of violent criminal oligarchs that would inevitably lead to violence and fatalities at the next elections in 2008, another I also covered.

Until I get those photos from 2008 online, here’s some from 2003.

2003 presidential elections, Yerevan/Akhurik/Gyumri, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2003

 

A worrying sense of deja-vu prevails in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations

A worrying sense of deja-vu prevails in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations

This month marked the third anniversary of the ceasefire statement that was meant to end the second Karabakh war. In retrospect, it might be more appropriately considered a continuation of the first conflict of the early 1990s given that the ceasefire then was hardly implemented too, leading to a new war 26 years later. Meanwhile, hopes that Baku and Yerevan could sign a peace agreement are fading.

A deal was possible by the end of the year, both sides pronounced in 2022 and again throughout 2023, but that sounded as vague and sometimes disingenuous then as it does now. Instead, an uncanny sense of deja vu hangs over the process, reminiscent of earlier failures by the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group. 

 

There is a possibility of a Karabakh settlement in the course of this year,” then U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group Steve Mann told journalists in 2005 before correcting himself. A peace deal could be signed this year or within the next hundred,” he said, perhaps sarcastically. That feeling has now returned with even the U.S. admitting that it is pointless to predict when an agreement might come.

 

Baku is concerned that Yerevan is playing for time while Armenia fears that Azerbaijan prefers to soldier on with its so far successful policy of coercive diplomacy. Both sides have consistently engaged in forum shopping.

 

[…] 

 

Yet, if there ever was ever a role for salaried NGOs in conflict resolution then this would be it. Unless they too have no real desire for peace, of course. Finally, Brussels should also be cognisant of the need to be considered a neutral mediator by all sides and avoid the temptation to engage in geopolitical confrontation and competition with regional powers that will surely react harshly in response.

 

With the 30th anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire also upon us next year, the stakes are high. Suffice to say, a tangible breakthrough by the end of 2023 remains vital for all hope going forwards. Otherwise, like much of the world, the mediators will instead be preoccupied by Ukraine, Gaza, the U.S. presidential vote, and any other cataclysmic global event that might unexpectedly appear out of nowhere.

 

Three years on, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in that situation before.

 The full opinion piece can be read here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Georgia: The Final Hurdle To EU Candidate Status

Georgia: The Final Hurdle To EU Candidate Status

Last week’s decision by the European Commission  to recommend Georgia receive European Union candidate status caught many by surprise. A survey conducted by the Tbilisi-based Caucasus Research Resource Centre (CRRC) in the previous days showed that, despite widespread support for EU membership, only 33% of respondents believed it would obtain it. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, which became candidates in June last year, Georgia had instead been required to address 12 priorities  first.  

Despite some progress towards those goals, only three satisfied Brussels to some extent and Georgia now needs to address nine areas of concern  . In an increasingly charged and polarised environment, with Tbilisi cautious about irking Moscow, there also remain allegations that the government instead sought rejection. Georgian President Salome Zurabashvili even urged the public to gather outside the presidential palace on the evening of the decision – possibly to celebrate if the status was granted or to protest if it was not.  

 

 Zurabashvili, now estranged from the very authorities that facilitated her presidency, narrowly survived an attempt to impeach  her last month over what were considered unauthorised trips to European capitals to lobby for candidate status. While the European Commission’s decision now alleviates concerns about political instability, it does not guarantee smooth sailing ahead. Last week’s recommendation is not the final decision; that will be determined by EU leaders next month.  

 

“[…] we should not forget that the recommendation to grant Georgia the candidate status is linked to fulfilling important steps”, EU Ambassador to Tbilisi Pawel Herczynski said in press remarks  , making specific references to the rule of law, media freedom, and holding democratic elections. “Addressing these steps will be crucial to move to the next stage. This is the nature of the enlargement process: constant reform […]”.  

 

Georgia is also expected to counter anti-EU disinformation and propaganda and align its policy with Brussels’ in terms of foreign affairs and security. Many consider this a direct reference to Moscow evading EU sanctions through its former satellites of Armenia and Georgia since last year’s invasion of Ukraine. Nonetheless, despite the EU acknowledging only ‘limited progress’ since June last year, the government hailed the decision as a success.

 

[…]

The full article can be read here.

Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian Prime Ministers address Tbilisi Silk Road Forum

Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian Prime Ministers address Tbilisi Silk Road Forum

The Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijan Prime Ministers meet for trilateral talks © Official Photo 

In recent days, Georgia once again hosted the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum, an event with an economic focus. What is new this year is that for the first time an Armenian leader spoke at such a high-level event in Tbilisi, and high-level officials from all three South Caucasus countries were also on the same stage

On 26-27 October, the Georgian capital once again hosted the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum, an event to discuss global economic challenges and international connectivity established by the Georgian government in 2015. The fourth edition was attended by around 2,000 delegates representing the governments and private sector from over 80 countries.

 

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili naturally opened the forum, but so did the Prime Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Montenegro. More significantly, however, not only was it the first time an Armenian leader spoke at such a high-level event in Tbilisi, but it was also the first time that high-level officials from all three countries gathered on the same stage to do so.

 

Though the main focus was economic, Garibashvili used the opportunity to offer Georgia’s assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan in facilitating or mediating talks. The last time Tbilisi had made this offer was alongside Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev on his visit to Georgia on 8 October. In recent weeks, Baku has increasingly pushed the narrative that the region’s problems should be resolved within and not outside the region.

  

During that visit, Aliyev even suggested that Armenia and Azerbaijan could hold meetings at various levels in Tbilisi “immediately” if Yerevan agreed. However, in an interview with Armenian Public Television two days later, the Armenian Prime Minister clearly seemed reluctant to so, wary that this could threaten the continuation of efforts by the European Union. Such concerns are not unfounded.

 

[…]

 

Though it is uncertain whether Armenia and Azerbaijan are now ready to sign a long-awaited agreement to normalise relations, statements by officials from both sides indicate that such a possibility remains within reach. Meanwhile, at a European Council summit held on 26-27 October in Brussels, EU leaders called “on the parties to engage in good faith and to finalise this process by the end of this year”. Tbilisi, incidentally, has already offered to host any signing ceremony.

 The full article can be read here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Brussels Meeting Cancelled as Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian PMs Share the Stage in Tbilisi

Brussels Meeting Cancelled as Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian PMs Share the Stage in Tbilisi

Azerbaijani Prime Minister at the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Georgian Prime Minister in the background © Official Photo 

Despite hopes that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev would meet in Brussels towards the end of the month, the European Union’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, yesterday said that it will now not take place. Giving the reason as “time constraints,” he made the announcement while participating remotely in a conference held in Yerevan.

Following the slightly unorthodox disclosure, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan was more specific at a joint press conference with his Canadian counterpart, Mélanie Joly. “I hope that the problem really is the specific dates and in the near future it will be possible to agree on new dates,” he said, naming Aliyev.

 

However, it comes after the Azerbaijani president had already pulled out of another EU-facilitated meeting in Granada earlier this month. “Baku does not see the need to discuss the problems of the region with countries far from the region,” an official source told media at the time. “Baku believes that these issues can be discussed and resolved in a regional framework.”

 

This was the same message that Aliyev conveyed during his visit to Georgia four days later, where it was announced that Tbilisi could also host bilateral and trilateral meetings between the sides. Many suspected this as a sign of increasing frustration with negotiations facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel. 

  

Baku is already irked by a statement adopted in Granada despite Aliyev’s absence. It charges that some provisions in the declaration signed by Pashinyan, Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz were its own internal matter and should not have been discussed. 

 

[…]

 The full article can be read here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian