Assault on Yerevan Police Station Underlines Risk of Violent Opposition to Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace

Assault on Yerevan Police Station Underlines Risk of Violent Opposition to Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace

by | Mar 28, 2024 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Commonspace, PCVE

For many, the news of the assault on a police station in Yerevan over the weekend brought back memories of the two-week siege of another station back in 2016. The reasons were similar too. Eight years ago, just a few months after the four-day war, rumours spread throughout Armenia that then President Serzh Sargsyan was under pressure to accept the so-called Lavrov Plan in which five out of seven regions then occupied by Armenian forces would be handed back to Azerbaijan as part of an anticipated peace deal.  The remaining two would follow later without any guarantees that the status of Nagorno Karabakh would be resolved to the satisfaction of Yerevan and Stepanakert (now usually referred to as Khankendi).

There were also calls for the release of Lebanese-Armenian Jirair Sefilyan, the then-imprisoned former military commander and ultra-nationalist. Last weekend, in another deja vu moment, what sparked the violence concerned recent statements from Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan that four Azerbaijani villages located in what he recognised as de jure Azerbaijani territory outside Armenia’s own border would be returned.

  

This recent incident in the Nor Nork district of Yerevan came after 49 members of the “Combat Brotherhood” militia were detained by police on their way to Voskepar, an Armenian village on that same border with Azerbaijan in proximity to the now uncontested non-enclave villages. The similarities with the 2016 terrorist action that resulted in the murder of three policemen were even more striking when it became known that six supporters of the National Democratic Pole, a minor but radical ultra-nationalist extra-parliamentary coalition, had also been detained.

 

The National Democratic Pole is made up of several Armenian political parties but most notably includes Sasna Tsrer (Daredevils of Sassoun), the group that carried out the 2016 attack in Erebuni, and which has now transformed into a political party that claims to renounce violence as an operational tactic. Sefilyan is considered Sasna Tsrer’s de facto leader. Now no longer imprisoned, he again made headlines a week ago when he called on the Armenian military to disobey any orders from Pashinyan to withdraw from positions that could make such a handover possible.

 

[…]

 

Vulnerable individuals among current and future generations can still fall prey to nationalist and extremist militias or narratives that could again encourage real-life action. Once radicalised, such groups and individuals will also represent a clear and present danger to a still fledgling process of democratisation over the coming years.

The full opinion piece can be read online here.

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Georgian-Azerbaijani Communities Embrace Novruz

Georgian-Azerbaijani Communities Embrace Novruz

by | Mar 27, 2024 | Azerbaijan, Caspian Post, Georgia, Minorities

Novruz festival in Tbilisi’s Old Town @ Onnik James Krikorian 2024

The weather this year was not the greatest for the annual Novruz celebration among Georgia’s ethnic Azerbaijani community. However, there was still no end of events to mark the occasion, which is also celebrated in Iran, Central Asia, Türkiye, the South Caucasus, and elsewhere, though traditions may vary. Perhaps it was global warming that disrupted the weather this year, but even if many events had to be moved indoors, some were more fortunate.

That was certainly the case for an event in the area around the Sulphur Baths in Tbilisi’s Old Town. Blessed with sunny weather, large crowds assembled in the Abanotubani area that featured a stage and tents and stalls representing Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Türkiye. The event was supported by the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Georgia, the Mirza Fatali Akhundzade Museum of Azerbaijani Culture, and the Council of Azerbaijani Elders in Georgia.

 

The Ambassadors of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, Faig Guliyev and Ali Kaan Orbay, were present, as were their counterparts from Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

The full piece with more photographs is here. 

Novruz in Georgia @ Onnik James Krikorian 2024

 

 

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The Challenges and Contradictions of Displacement in Armenia

The Challenges and Contradictions of Displacement in Armenia

by | Mar 18, 2024 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Commonspace, Nagorno Karabakh

Karabakh refugee sitting on her bed in a cohabited room in a dilapidated kindergarten building in Massis, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

Almost six months after the mass exodus of the Karabakh Armenians, their plight in Armenia remains as uncertain as ever. On Wednesday, some will even protest in Yerevan’s Freedom Square.  There had been no major humanitarian crisis, despite claims of mass starvation as they crossed into Armenia via the Lachin checkpoint in late September,  but the situation for many remains one of desperation or despair.  A recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) highlighted that clearly earlier this month.  

Malnourishment, insufficient medical assistance, and psychological trauma especially affected the most disadvantaged, previously inside Karabakh and now in Armenia. With limited financial support from the Armenian government, and trying to fit into an economy riding high mainly because of the re-export of EU goods to Russia, it was also hardly unexpected. Some of those problems were also borne out by my own visit last month to some of those refugees scattered across the country.

 

For a while, it was even uncertain how best to refer to the influx given that they simultaneously hold Armenian passports and are effectively considered as refugees inside Armenia itself. Some international non-governmental organisations internally used the term ‘displaced,’ while others such as the UN had their own – “persons in a refugee-like situation.” Now almost everyone calls them refugees.

 

Such ambiguities are not new and reminiscent of the situation I first encountered while documenting the plight of refugees in 1994 and then later from 2002 when terminology was dictated by the government. Those ethnic Armenians that fled Azerbaijan after the pogroms in Baku and Sumgait were “refugees,” but those from Karabakh were “displaced.”

 

[…] 

 

Today, while Yerevan makes it possible for those from Karabakh to register for year-long temporary refugee status, it is nonetheless otherwise largely silent on their right to return even though the international community mentions it often. The government also makes certain assistance subject to applying for citizenship, such as loans to buy homes, something that Karabakh Armenians allege is by design.

 

Accepting that, some fear, could nullify any right to return, permanently or temporarily, or even disqualify them from claiming potential compensation in the future. Such fears are understandable since few of the displaced see a stable future in Armenia, though Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan rejects such accusations against his administration.

 The full opinion piece can be read here.

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Armenia and Azerbaijan Ponder Return of Non-Enclave Gazakh Villages

Armenia and Azerbaijan Ponder Return of Non-Enclave Gazakh Villages

by | Mar 15, 2024 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caspian Post

It was almost comical at first but also unexpectedly symbolic. Known for his trademark populism and oratory skills honed to resonate with the masses, it was perhaps the most effective way for Armenia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, to illustrate to the population the actual borders of their country. Holding a golden cutout map of Armenia to one side and, at times, a minuscule representation of the tiny Armenian enclave of Artsvashen in Azerbaijan to the other, his live press conference on 12 March was direct and to the point.

For decades, many Armenians have viewed the country as encompassing not only the now-defunct Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan proper. In early 2020, Pashinyan even included the same irredentist map of a territorial area that had been taken back or returned during and immediately after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan later that same year. In September, the previously de facto but unrecognized Karabakh political entity dissolved itself following a military operation to disarm the local militia.  

 

For decades, many Armenians have viewed the country as encompassing not only the now-defunct Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan proper. In early 2020, Pashinyan even included the same irredentist map of a territorial area that had been taken back or returned during and immediately after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan later that same year. In September, the previously de facto but unrecognized Karabakh political entity dissolved itself following a military operation to disarm the local militia.

 

The situation has dramatically changed since and the press conference hinted at what might happen next in the complicated process of demarcating and delimiting the shared border. The press conference came just two days after Baku demanded the immediate return of four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages situated in its Gazakh region bordering Armenia that were occupied in the early 1990s. Previously, the focus had been on enclaves—territorial areas of both republics physically situated within and surrounded by the other.

 

On the other hand, non-enclave villages are simply those part of a country occupied by another. In his press conference, Pashinyan finally acknowledged that they are not part of the Republic of Armenia and cast some clarity on the issue.

 

[…] 

 

“In the near future, we must take action, and where, for example, our communications are beyond our borders, we must reconstruct our communications in those areas so that all communications of Armenia pass through the de jure territory of Armenia,” he noted. According to some unconfirmed reports, that process has already started, and Pashinyan has also said he will visit the area in question to address any concerns of the local community.

 The full Caspian Post article can be read here. 

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European Mission in Armenia Completes Its First Year Amid Regional Tensions

European Mission in Armenia Completes Its First Year Amid Regional Tensions

by | Mar 11, 2024 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Jamestown Foundation

On February 20, the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) marked the first anniversary of its deployment on the Armenian border with Azerbaijan. According to the European Union, its purpose is to aid in the normalization process between Yerevan and Baku and enhance stability in the South Caucasus. Last year, the EUMA was deployed following the end of a shorter-term European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP), which was deployed in October 2022. While Armenia supports the EUMA’s charge, Baku is wary of Brussels’ mediation in the ongoing peace negotiations between both countries. 

Yerevan requested EUMCAP to stabilize the situation on the border that escalated to armed clashes in September 2022. EUMCAP recruited 40 staff members from the 200-strong civilian and unarmed European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) to support the temporary two-month mission in Armenia. The operation was also funded from the EUMM budget. According to Brussels, the mission was additionally intended to support the border demarcation process and delimitation on both sides. It consisted of 40 unarmed civilian monitors, following an agreement reached at a quadrilateral meeting of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Council President Charles Michel at the first-ever European Political Community Summit held in Prague held earlier that same month.

 

The EUMA faces several challenges and controversies, further exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Azerbaijan and others, including Russia and Iran, assert that the European Union is seeking to embed itself further in an already volatile region. Baku argues that Yerevan can use the EUMA to delay the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement. From the outset, Russia saw the deployment as an effort by the European Union to challenge Moscow’s 30-year presence in the country, especially after Yerevan rejected a similar initiative by the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. “We see this as yet another attempt by the European Union to interfere by any means in the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan [and] to oust our country’s mediation efforts,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova.

 

The EUMCAP initiative ended on December 19, 2022. The plans were already in motion to replace EUMCAP with the larger and longer-term EUMA. On January 23, 2023, the EU Foreign Affairs Council scheduled the mission’s official deployment on February 20. According to many observers, France pushed strongly for the EUMA’s establishment, a country fast becoming Armenia’s main ally in the region. “Through border monitoring, this mission has really limited the danger of escalation,” French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna told the French Parliament on December 6, 2022. “This presence should continue as long as it is needed. This is our belief. This is also … the desire of the Armenians”.

 

[…]

 

In the future, if the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process stalls and/or if EUMA is extended in February 2025, it will be crucial to prevent local political interests and regional geopolitical tensions from undermining the original goal of the deployment: fostering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such efforts must also aim to avoid escalating the conflict.

The full analysis is available here. 

 

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