The importance of reciprocity and interdependence in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations

The importance of reciprocity and interdependence in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations

Yerevan Train Station, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2011

On this, the third anniversary of the 44-day Karabakh War, it remains unclear whether attempts to normalise relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are close to collapse or nearing their conclusion. In just 24 hours of fighting in late September, the situation changed literally overnight. Depending on your point of view, in the wake of the decree to dissolve the de facto Karabakh Armenian administration, there is either now no urgency to sign a peace agreement, or there is arguably no longer any reason for further delay.

Even the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement appears inconsequential given the exodus of tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians from Karabakh, raising many questions about the utility of the Lachin Corridor and the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. This week’s news that Azerbaijan could now connect to its exclave of Nakhchivan via a rail connection through Iran also makes the prospect of doing so via Armenia either redundant, or at least less pressing.

 

Though such a link remains the subject of talks – whether through the trilateral working group established by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia in May 2021, or in negotiations facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels ongoing since late the same year, this development is both encouraging and disappointing. On the one hand, it had been an obstacle to progress in talks. On the other, this interdependency could have contributed to the durability of any negotiated peace.

 

True, interdependence failed to prevent full-scale war in the early 1990s, and could lead to manipulation by any stronger party, yet it would at least create mutual incentives for cooperation while potentially deterring conflict in the future. The idea was to create a win-win situation where Azerbaijan would not only connect to Nakhchivan but Armenia could potentially join the Middle Corridor transportation link from China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, ending its semi-isolation and exclusion from regional energy and transportation projects.

 

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Hopes Dashed for Armenia-Azerbaijan Meeting in Granada

Hopes Dashed for Armenia-Azerbaijan Meeting in Granada

Granada, Spain  © Official Photo

Following Azerbaijan’s 19 September military offensive that led to the dissolution of the breakaway but unrecognised mainly ethnic Armenian-inhabited entity of Nagorno Karabakh, there had been hopes Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev would meet again at the European Political Community summit in Granada, Spain. However, on the eve of the 5 October talks, Aliyev pulled out, citing the presence of French President Emmanuel Macron in the multilateral meeting that also included German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Council President Charles Michel.

Whether the meeting would take place was anyway in doubt. Although Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Assistant Hikmet Hajiyev met with the advisors to Macron, Michel, and Scholz on 26 September in Brussels, the European Council only spoke of a ‘possible meeting’ in Granada. Likely swaying Baku at the last minute was the visit to Armenia by French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna two days beforehand. Not only was she again critical of Azerbaijan but Colonna also announced that France would be ready to supply weapons, albeit of a defensive nature, to Armenia.

 

Colonna also said that France would seek to introduce a new resolution at the United Nations Security Council calling for an international mission in Karabakh now the region had come totally under Baku’s control and the exodus of almost all of its post-1994 population. Baku was also irked by the rejection by France and Germany to have President Erdogan of Turkiye join them in Granada as a counterbalance to France, which Azerbaijan considers pro-Armenian.

 

Both Aliyev and Erdogan did not attend the EPC summit with the latter excusing himself because he ‘had a cold.’ Their absence was enough to cast doubts the the EU-facilitated process and hinted that it might now be close to collapse. Russia has been increasingly concerned by what it sees as western interference in the region with the aim of driving it out. Similarly, several steps seen by Moscow as anti-Russian by Pashinyan, including ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, has further infuriated the Russian President.

 

[…] 

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Nagorno Karabakh, dissolution and new challenges ahead

Nagorno Karabakh, dissolution and new challenges ahead

Refugee from Nagorno Karabakh in Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

Last week, on 28 September, Samvel Shahramanyan, the de facto head of the self-declared and unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic, signed a decree on the dissolution of the separatist entity. Inhabited mainly by ethnic Armenians but situated within Azerbaijan, what remains of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) will cease to exist by the end of the year.

Baku had assured local ethnic Armenians that those who chose to remain would have their rights and security protected but, after three decades of conflict and as many wars, few believed them. In fact, following renewed fighting in late September, most of the population left.

 

The population had been put at 120,000 but, by the time the last few residents trickled out, the number of Karabakh’s residents arriving in Armenia stood much lower at 100,617. Marco Succi, Rapid Deployment Team Manager with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), told media that only a few hundred people remain – mainly the infirm and the elderly.

 

Armenia says that the exodus of the Karabakh Armenians amounts to ethnic cleansing, claims that Azerbaijan strongly denies. The head of UNHCR in Yerevan, Kavita Belani, also confirmed that “there were no recorded incidents or cases of mistreatment against the people on the move”.

 

[…] 

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Azerbaijani Authorities Detain Former Karabakh De Facto Leaders Amid Ongoing Tensions

Azerbaijani Authorities Detain Former Karabakh De Facto Leaders Amid Ongoing Tensions

Ruben Vardanyan via Twitter 

On 3 October, media reported that Arkhady Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, and Arayik Harutyunyan had been apprehended and transferred from Karabakh to Baku, where they face multiple charges stemming from crimes allegedly committed under their de facto leadership of the small separatist region situated within Azerbaijan.

Those reports were effectively confirmed today and follow last week’s detention of several other high-level de facto officials in the wake of Azerbaijan’s 19 September military operation in the region. Among them is Russian-Armenian businessman and former de facto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan.

 

On 28 September, a Baku court placed Vardanyan in pre-trial detention for four months. He faces charges of financing terrorism, illegally crossing the border, and membership of an illegal armed group.

 

Despite the significance of Vardanyan, Ghukasyan, and Sahakyan’s arrest, Arayik Harutyunyan was likely especially high-priority given his public admission of authorizing missile attacks on Ganja during the 2020 Karabakh war.

 

[…] 

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Is this how Karabakh was meant to end?

Is this how Karabakh was meant to end?

Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

By a decree of its de-facto leader, Samvel Sharamanyan, the self-declared and internationally unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) was dissolved and will cease to exist by the end of 2023. NKR was declared by the Karabakh Armenians in 1991 to replace the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which was established by the Soviets in 1923. Thus, the dissolution of NKR ends a hundred years during which Nagorno-Karabakh had its own political status and identity. No doubt, memories of these hundred years will linger on in the consciousness of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis for generations to come. Though the next 100 years remain uncertain, absorbed as it will be into the Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Economic Region, call it what you will – Nagorno Karabakh, Dağlıq Qarabağ, Karabakh, or Artsakh – the entity is gone and unlikely to return.

The pain and suffering experienced during three decades of conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the mountainous region is, however, unlikely to disappear. In the early 1990s, over 600,000 Azerbaijanis fled from advancing Armenian and local ethnic Armenian forces in the seven regions surrounding Karabakh, making the 2020 war inevitable. This time, however, it is reported that tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians left upon being presented with the difficult choice of either leaving their homes or living under Azerbaijani rule.

 

It had been hoped that the issue of the re/integration of Karabakh into Azerbaijan proper could have been resolved through albeit difficult negotiations, but attempts to bring Stepanakert and Baku together for talks failed. Despite many warnings, this left few prepared for Karabakh’s sudden dissolution let alone ready to cope with the consequences. Indeed, negotiations between Yerevan and Baku had appeared in deadlock on three major issues, with one concerning the rights and security of Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population and their re/integration into Azerbaijan.

 

It was only in the aftermath of Baku’s blitzkrieg that those talks are now beginning over the fate of a population that has all but disappeared, leaving their homes, possessions, and the graves of their loved ones behind. The same had been true for the Azerbaijani IDPs that had left before them, albeit with those homes and monuments later razed to the ground. It is imperative that Baku does not make the same mistake as Yerevan and Stepanakert before it. Though it seems unlikely for now, the prospect of Karabakh Armenians returning must also be considered.

 

[…] 

The full opinion piece can be read here.

 

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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