Militant Groups Resurface in Armenia’s Struggle Against Radicalization

Militant Groups Resurface in Armenia’s Struggle Against Radicalization

On September 18, Armenian law enforcement announced the arrest of three individuals accused of forming an armed group to overthrow the government. Four others are currently wanted by the police for recruiting people for three months of training in Russia, with a payment of 220,000 rubles (approximately $2,360) for their participation in said training. Five of the men are Armenian citizens, while two are ethnic Armenians who were formerly residents of now-dissolved Karabakh. The Armenian Investigative Committee claimed that recruits were taken to a Russian military base outside of Rostov-on-Don dubbed “Arbat” for training. They were then allegedly informed that the purpose of this training was to help overthrow the current Armenian government in a coup. Several recruits refused and returned to Armenia, claiming they alerted the police. Media has reported that no such military base exists. There is, however, a Russian militia made up of ethnic Armenians named “Arbat” (“the Armenian Battalion”), which has been associated with Rostov-on-Don and has fought in Ukraine (FIP, September 18). Moreover, the Armenian Church blessed the militia in Moscow, once it was given orders to fight in Donbas against Ukraine. One of those detained was Serob Gasparyan, who is also known for leading another militant group, Black Panther. Gasparyan is a fierce critic of the Pashinyan government. The trend of militancy in Armenia and among the Armenian diaspora abroad over the past thirty years could inform the country’s authorities  how to deal with the rise in discontent with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s premiership.

On the same day as the report about this alleged coup, Andranik Kocharyan, an Armenian senior government lawmaker, told a conference in Yerevan that “internal and external enemies continue to seek ways to regain power, including through terrorism.” This was an implied reference to the former regimes of Armenian presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova denies that Moscow was behind the alleged coup, as does Serob Gasparyan.

 

In addition to many members of Arbat having fought in Karabakh, it is said to have been involved in the crackdown on Euromaidan protesters in Kyiv in 2014. In 2022, Putin awarded the Order of Courage to Arbat Commander Hayk Gasparyan, an MMA fighter and a former member of the Wagner Group, for his efforts in the Battle of Soledar in occupied Ukraine. Gasparyan is now under EU sanctions, following his early release from prison after having been recruited to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Gasparyan also recruited others from Russia’s penal colonies to fight in Ukraine with the Wagner Group. An anti-Pashinyan analyst alleges that ethnic Armenians and Armenian citizens have been actively recruited for deployment in Ukraine, but Pashinyan has denied such claims.

 

[…]

 

Ever since the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, security surrounding the Armenian Prime Minister has notably increased, while the risk of violent extremist and terrorist incidents is becoming more apparent. In January 2021, one British risk consultancy warned that Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war could lead to the emergence of informal groups launching insurgent-style attacks on the border and elsewhere in the future, especially important in the context of hotly debated transport link between Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan in the future and on the border. Two days before the outbreak of the 2020 war, Armenian media also expressed concerns that local militias posed a potential risk to the Pashinyan government, describing them as operating outside the Ministry of Defense’s control. In November, the government confirmed that one such group, VOMA (Art of Survival), has been constructing its own fortifications on the border with Azerbaijan.

 

An international watchdog warned just before the 2020 war that the “Armenian national identity is deeply rooted in historical grievances relating to persecution by external enemies, offering a rich material for militant radicalization.” The precedent of ASALA, a US-proscribed Armenian terrorist organization active in the 1970s and 1980s, is testament to that. Although the Armenian government is aware of the dangers posed by such groups and radicalized individuals with access to weapons, it is at least likely in communication with foreign intelligence services abroad. Until now, however, the issue has not been addressed directly using both soft and hard methods. It seems inevitable that sooner or later, it will have to embrace preventative approaches, too, including the possibility that those with military experience could engage in domestic attacks again as well as being in high demand in other conflict zones, such as Ukraine. The removal of Russian Federal Security Service Border Guards from Yerevan’s airport could be one first step in addressing the latter, demonstrating that the Pashinyan government is working toward prioritizing the Armenian people over foreign entities with that in mind.

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Yerevan and Baku at a crossroads

Yerevan and Baku at a crossroads

Four years after the start of the 44-day-war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and a year since the exodus of 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the separatist Nagorno Karabakh region, hopes that there could be another opportunity to resolve the conflict are fading.

Though Yerevan, supported by France and the United States, believe that one is possible before November, Baku maintains that no final agreement can be signed until what it considers to be territorial claims, albeit referenced indirectly, in the Armenian constitution are removed. Yerevan disputes this and instead alleges that it is Azerbaijan that makes such claims on its territory.

 

Regardless, this also makes November a pivotal month to finally hammer out a deal or at least make significant progress on one. On 5 November, the United States will hold presidential elections that could either lead to continuity or change in its policy towards the region.

 

[…]

 

What is clear, however, is that the coming weeks before November could demonstrate whether a peace agreement comes before Armenia enters its next election cycle starting next year.

 

Yerevan certainly seems restless in case Moscow attempts to interfere. On 18 September, Yerevan announced that it had prevented an attempted armed coup by Armenian citizens and former Karabakh residents allegedly trained in Russia. On 20 September, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova reminded Yerevan of how it benefits as a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.

 

“90 percent of grain that goes to Armenia […] comes from Russia. Perhaps then you can contact the Russian Federation […] to discuss your food security”, she stated. And with Armenia also reliant on Russia for its energy, former U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Daniel Baer and Senior Vice President at the Carnegie Endowment voiced an ominous note at a recent congressional hearing. “Armenians must be prepared to endure some cold winters”, he said.

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Pashinyan Press Conference Highlights Progress and Pitfalls in Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks

Pashinyan Press Conference Highlights Progress and Pitfalls in Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks

Toward the end of July, opposition media sent a written inquiry to the Office of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan asking whether Yerevan would send a delegation to the UN Climate Change Conference (COP-29) scheduled for November in Baku. The move came following an announcement from Azerbaijani presidential advisor Hikmet Hajiyev that such an invitation had been sent. There had also been speculation that Baku was seeking to initial the basic principles for any peace agreement by the time of the event. Pashinyan’s office replied, saying he would address these issues in a press conference after returning from a vacation in early August. Pashinyan has consistently used live press conferences to clarify and promote his policies, especially regarding normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the said press conference did occur, it did so only at the very end of August, during which Pashinyan did not rule out sending a high-level delegation to COP-29 . It took place one day after a regulatory document for the respective Armenian and Azerbaijani border commissions handling delimitation and demarcation was finalized and signed by both sides. The agreement is significant because it must also be approved by the constitutional court and ratified by parliament.

As domestic discontent grows in Armenia and geopolitical tensions between Armenia and Russia, Azerbaijan develop, however, how Pashinyan addresses the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan will determine his place in the future of Armenian politics.

 

The press conference also aimed to clarify Armenia’s stance on various issues related to an agreement on normalizing relations between the two countries before November. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has emphasized this deadline, while Pashinyan and senior officials, such as Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, have expressed hopes for an earlier resolution and a signed treaty. Although progress on border delimitation and demarcation has been notable, the press conference itself was more of a mixed bag. The event highlighted the  notable differences that remain between the sides and suggested that Pashinyan may be trying to balance multiple objectives simultaneously.   […]   On September 10, speaking at the first inaugural Yerevan Dialogue conference, Pashinyan reiterated that a peace treaty with Azerbaijan was realistic even though Baku has ruled out the signing of an incomplete agreement  with the constitutional impasse still unresolved. He also emphasized his own regional connectivity project, the Crossroads of Peace. Baku and Moscow consider this issue addressed in the trilateral ceasefire statement ending the Karabakh War in 2020. Pashinyan disagrees but has no intention of withdrawing his signature from the agreement. With Armenia due to enter another election cycle and a globally uncertain 2025, the next few months will be critical in shaping the future of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and Pashinyan’s political legacy.

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One Caucasus Festival in Georgia Bridges Regional Divides

One Caucasus Festival in Georgia Bridges Regional Divides

Armenian alternative rock band Altsight, One Caucasus, Tserakvi, Georgia ©
Onnik James Krikorian 2024

This month, against the backdrop of the Caucasus Mountains, a unique four-day festival in Georgia celebrated its tenth anniversary. Held annually in August, the multi-disciplinary One Caucasus festival aims to rediscover a spirit of unity and cooperation that once flourished among the diverse nations of the region. Located in the village of Tserakvi, a small Georgian village in the majority ethnic Azerbaijani region of Kvemo Kartli, which is also home to ethnic Armenian and Georgian minorities, this blend of cultures provides a rich context in which to foster mutual understanding and collaboration.

In the weeks leading up to the festival, volunteers transform the festival site on the grounds of the local school and organize cultural and educational workshops for children in nearby villages. Polish Director Witek Hebanowski, who has overseen the event since its inception, describes One Caucasus as a vibrant space where young people can connect, collaborate, and celebrate their shared heritage. Accompanying them on that journey are international volunteers from all seven continents.

 

By 2022, more than 420 volunteers from 40 countries have volunteered at One Caucasus, while 570 musicians from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as countries as diverse as Algeria and Barbados to Scotland and the US, have performed. In total, the organizers say, over 21,000 people have attended the event in the past decade. In addition to conducting workshops for over 1,600 children in the ethnic Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, and mixed communities in the Marneuli municipality of the Kvemo Kartli region, there have also been joint architectural and participatory budget projects.

 

[…]

 

On this, the tenth anniversary of the event, One Caucasus stands as a testament to the power of cultural exchange and the enduring hope for harmony in a region usually characterized by its complexities. In Tserakvi, where the echoes of history mingle with the rhythms of today, the festival remains a vibrant celebration of the region’s shared spirit and diverse heritage. “The Caucasus is known for mutual respect and diversity, says Hebanowski. “We wanted to do something that could unite the whole South Caucasus.”

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End of an Era: Russian Border Guards Depart Yerevan’s Airport

End of an Era: Russian Border Guards Depart Yerevan’s Airport

Russian border guards left Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport last week, concluding their nearly 32-year presence. The first point of contact for many citizens and tourists arriving by air in Armenia, their exact duties and numbers were never formally announced. The 1992 agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia instead only refers to the Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service (FSB) ensuring the protection of the border with Turkiye and Iran. The Armenian National Security Service (NSS) only briefly mentions that the Russian Border Guard Service was stationed at Zvartnots alongside its own Border Guard Troops.

In lieu of a formal agreement, the decision to deploy at the airport had been made verbally. This explains why the Armenian Prime Minister simply announced in February that he had asked Moscow to withdraw them. Though Moscow had warned that this would cause “irreparable damage” to relations between the two countries, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan later agreed in May that they would leave by August 1. Their last day of service on July 31 was cordial, marked by a protocol signed by Edgar Hunanyan, Commander of Armenia’s NSS Border Troops, and Roman Golubitsky, head of Russia’s FSB Border Directorate in Armenia. Hunanyan thanked his Russian counterpart for over three decades of joint service. Golubitsky in turn expressed hope that the country’s security “will be ensured at the same high level by our Armenian colleagues.”

 

Meanwhile, Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov further stated that Russian border guards would remain on the Iranian and Turkish borders as per the 1992 agreement. However, Pashinyan has requested the Russian Border Guard Service to leave the Azerbaijan border area. That had been solely, the responsibility of the Armenian Ministry of Defence until 2020 but Armenian guards had been temporarily and informally reinforced by Moscow after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan. The Russian stand-down has already happened in some locations and the NSS Border Guard Troops recently replaced the Armenian military on the border’s newly demarcated Tavush-Gazakh section of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

 

[…]

 

For now, however, many in Armenia have welcomed the move, which some hope is just the start. “The next step in the process should be the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Armenian-Iranian border,” political scientist Areg Kochinyan told media. Such hopes might be premature, however. Four days after ending their deployment at the airport, local media remained unsure whether they will instead serve elsewhere in the country. Moreover, given that their presence on the border with Iran is determined by the same formal agreement that includes the border with Turkiye, that might not prove as straightforward as simply asking them to leave Zvartnots.

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