Declassified US Documents summarised on 25th Anniversary of Ter-Petrosyan Resignation

Declassified US Documents summarised on 25th Anniversary of Ter-Petrosyan Resignation

by | Feb 4, 2023 | Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Yerevan, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2007

To mark the 25th anniversary of the resignation of Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty’s Yerevan Bureau on 3 February published a summary of a batch of declassified documents relating to attempts in 1997 to end the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh.

Though some allege that the documents have only been declassified now because of the current parallel negotiation platforms established by the European Union, with the support of the United States, and Russia, they appear to have been made public between 2018 and 2021 with the bulk surfacing in 2019.

Nevertheless, this appears to be the first time that any media outlet became aware of their existence, so kudos to RFE/RL for that.

Regardless, as we know, two proposals were eventually on the table – the package and phased or step-by-step approaches. It is believed that Ter-Petrosyan was ready to accept either, though the de facto authorities of Nagorno Karabakh were not. Moreover, and leading to his resignation, there was also severe disagreement and dissent within his inner circle.

Some still maintain that Ter-Petrosyan stepped down to avoid internal unrest at best or something akin to civil war at worst.

“If I accepted the decision to resign, believe me, it means that I considered the alternative more dangerous for our state,” he said.

 

In his 4-minute resignation speech, Ter-Petrosyan did not clarify who these famous forces are, why and how they made such a demand to the President. He hinted that time will give the answers to those questions.

 

Now, declassified documents are appearing in the archives of the United States State Department, which testify not only to Armenian internal political differences, but also to the demands made by the international community behind closed doors.

There’s a lot to unpack in the documents that RFE/RL summarises which I’ll do if time permits as an update to this post or as a separate one, but until then some brief excerpts with the links to the full versions below. Suffice to say, there’s a lot we knew that can be considered pretty much confirmed, but also an unnerving sense of deja vu when compared to the situation today.

Of course, Armenia is now a lot weaker than it was in 1997 and Nagorno Karabakh untenable as any sustainable entity without a peace deal. However, that is precisely the point. Arguably, Ter-Petrosyan rightly saw the dark clouds looming on the horizon while others did not or simply convinced themselves otherwise. 

Certainly, the warning signs remain, and became particularly noticeable once Pashinyan took power in the 2018 “Velvet Revolution.” And while there were signs that geopolitics started to influence the OSCE Minsk Group even in 1997, new geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia following last year’s invasion of Ukraine risks upsetting any new hopes for peace.

Anyway, some excerpts below with links. Bold for emphasis my own.

DEPUTY SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ARZOUMANYAN
02/28/97

 

The Deputy Secretary, and later S/NIS Ambassador Collins, met with Armenian FM Arzoumanyan February 28. The Deputy Secretary hoped that with three strong countries in the chair, we could make progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peace this year. He sought Arzoumanyan’s views on next steps. Arzoumanyan asserted that the bilateral channel was no longer usable and proposed a “three plus three” format, but backtracked quickly when the Deputy Secretary and Amb. Collins objected; he fell back to a position of waiting to see whether the Azerbaijanis could come up with peace proposals. Arzoumanyan sought U.S. help in opening the Turkish-Armenian border; he was concerned that plans for regional transportation links might bypass Armenia. The Deputy Secretary declared U.S. willingness to use our good offices to help Armenia and Turkey improve relations. End Summary

 

[…] 

 

6. Arzoumanyan backtracked. He stressed the need for an Azerbaijani interlocutor who had a “100 percent mandate” from Aliyev, “But shuttling around to European capitals to exchange general ideas is no longer acceptable.” He noted that the Armenian MFA would be more active on NK under his stewardship, and that he was ready to meet “my good friend” Azerbaijani FM Hasanov to discuss the issue. Later, with Collins, Arzoumanyan said that an Azerbaijani paper would help revitalise the bilateral channel; Yerevan could consult closely with Stepanakert on it.

 

7. Arzoumanyan did not, however, rule out a renewal of the demands that NK participate. In the Collins meeting he said the NK Armenians, having occupied so much of Azerbaijan’s territory, felt it was up to Azerbaijan to come to them and talk before they would compromise. In Armenia, too, it was felt that if Azerbaijan considers NK to be part of itself and the NK Armenians to be rebellious Azerbaijani citizens, Azerbaijan should sit down and talk with them, as governments did all over the world.

 

[…]

 

14. Arzoumanyan said that although Armenia could work with the Russian paper, it put Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity first, and “If you show that to Robert (Kocharyan), he’ll throw the whole paper out. In engaging NK, you must be careful not to give them things immediately that they will reject; you must save them, until later.” He suggested that the best elements with which to start off involved the security of NK.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-23de-08db0559d6f7.pdf

MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BORIS YELTSIN AND BILL CLINTON, 1997

 

YEL: Many questions have been resolved. We also managed to resolve the Transdniester problem in Moldova after I invited the , parties to come to Moscow. We are also working in the Minsk conference process, with our troika. I ask you to be more energetic on Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

POTUS: I agree with that. We’ve discussed this many times. We finally have a process in place. You and I and Chirac need to persevere. Settling Nagorno-Karabakh would solve a lot of problems today and save us from a number of problems in the future.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-326a-08db055c3133.pdf

RUSSIAN FM PRIMAKOV, MAY 1, 1997, MFA GUEST HOUSE, MOSCOW

 

2. Summary: At a hastily summoned meeting of Minsk Process co-chairs during Secretary Albright’s visit to Moscow, Russian FM Primakov called for written U.S. and French comments to the 21-point Russian peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh. He hoped to make the 21-point plan, heretofore a strictly Russian document, into a joint co-chair plan and the basis for their approach to the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and asked for French and U.S. suggestions. Primakov also emphasised that the co-chairs will have to apply pressure to the parties to secure acceptance of any peace plan. The Secretary sought French and Russian comments on the recent U.S. paper on Nagorno Karabakh. The three co-chairs agreed to meet again in Washington around the middle of May. They also agreed to treat both the Russian paper and the U.S. interim agreement proposal on an equal basis. They agreed to look toward a co-chairmanship trip to the region as soon as possible after reaching agreement on a text. End Summary.

 

8. Saying that he did not intend to denigrate the U.S. paper, Primakov nevertheless argued against seeking an interim agreement. “Without the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and a determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status, we will not get any agreement,” he asserted. Primakov urged the co-chairs to come to closure on the outlines of a settlement and on their approach to the parties. Primakov said the co-chairs should stop referring to an “American” and a “Russian” plan. They both needed to be joint. It is important to arrange as soon as possible a trip to the Caucasus by the co-chairs to present a plan, and impose it. The cease-fire, paradoxically, has caused the Armenians and Azeris to be complacent and increasingly disinclined to compromise. The parties, Primakov emphasised, must be shown that their stubbornness will produce unwelcome consequences. […].

 

12. Primakov noted that time was working against Yerevan. While it stagnated, Azerbaijan was becoming rich. […] Paradoxically this made the parties less eager for compromise. Primakov observed that he had been brought up in the Caucasus and knew their peoples. Pressure was needed.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/03/08550000-0a00-0242-54e9-08db05f6c0b6.pdf

SUBJECT: SECRETARY’S CONVERSATION WITH TURKISH MFA UNDERSECRETARY OYMEN
05/02/97


5. Oymen continued that if the Armenians could be convinced to start evacuating the occupied territories in Azerbaijan and let the refugees return, Turkey would be able to open roads and railroads. Oymen said that if Ivanov felt Moscow could do something, he thought it worth trying. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov would visit Ankara in June. If the U.S. could pressure the Russians and Armenians, it could be possible to move ahead. 

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/03/006c0000-0aff-0242-8de4-08db05f72840.pdf

OSCE MINSK CONFERENCE CO-CHAIRS PRESENT COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT PLAN TO TER-PETROSSIAN, JUNE 1997

 

3. Ter-Petrossian began by welcoming the delegation and noting that he had been “waiting a long time” for such a visit. He stated that he hoped the co-chairs brought good news, as there had been almost no progress in the negotiations on Karabakh for more than a year. The only thing we have is the cease-fire which is still holding, he commented. Referring to the recent border incidents on the Armenian-Azeri border, Ter-Petrossian assured the delegation that these incidents were not serious. President Aliyev had also said they were not serious, and since the two rarely agreed on anything, in this case it must be true, Ter-Petrossian quipped. He stressed the importance of maintaining the cease-fire; “The rest depends on what you’ve decided,” he said. 

 

[…]

 

7. Russian Ambassador Lozinsky similarly stressed co-chair unity. Everything mentioned by the other co-chairs is supported by Russia, he emphasised. In the past, there was a tendency to forum-shop, but now that three interested Minsk Group members were leading the negotiating effort, there was a new impetus to the process. The co-chairs had drafted a comprehensive agreement, which would be the basis for the united approach.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/006c0000-0aff-0242-d64b-08db055c2604.pdf

MEMCON OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT/RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV DINNER AT THE G-8 DENVER SUMMIT, BUCKHORN EXCHANGE, JUNE 19, 1997

 

Primakov: I would like to open our discussions first and foremost with a very serious problem — Nagorno-Karabakh. We are concerned, I’m afraid, all three sides responding to us officially and rejecting everything. The Armenians stepped back from their previous position. This may be a big negative in that it reflects how they feel about us being together — the U.S. & Russia. I think we should act because if we don’t, we will be nothing more than paper tigers.

 

 Talbott: I saw the text of the three Presidents regarding N-K.

 

Primakov: Yes, I saw it also, and showed it to Yeltsin and I think it is a plan of great importance. However, we should do something else. I think we should agree on a course of action. This should be confidential, but has to show teeth. You, the U.S., can do something with the Azeris vis-a-vis the oil weapon. You can say something like this: you will not encourage your companies to help on oil if things are not settled. With respect to Armenia, we could use the “weapons weapon.” In other words, Russia could give them weapons while the U.S. could play the oil thing.

 

Naturally, we have to do something on both sides. The Armenians did not even try to analyze our proposal — they only went for full N-K independence. The Azeris insisted on autonomy for N-K, but only in Azerbaijan. It was what I call a rigid vertical solution. They made a definite step backward with respect to the 21-point document that we put together for them. Ter-Petrosian said to me earlier in my discussions with him that this could be a good basis for a solution and now he has backed off.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-6a76-08db055c261c.pdf

TALBOTT—PRIMAKOV OCTOBER 8, 1997, PRIMAKOV’S OFFICE, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY…. MEMCON

 

22. The Deputy Secretary then asked about the Minister’s trip to Baku. Primakov said that he got back very late. He had gone to Baku to push the Azerbaijanis to respond to the Minsk Group. He had a commitment from the Aliyev to provide his proposals in written form. Primakov commented that Aliyev is basically pointed in the right direction. The group around him – ForMin Hasanov and Presidential Advisor Qualazade – want to break out of the Minsk Group framework. Primakov expects to get an answer from Yerevan today (Wednesday). That will cover the problem with Stepanakert (Primakov noted in a general back and forth that the problem in Baku involved, among other matters, efforts by Hasanov to move the issue of Shusha, to part one of the Minsk Group draft). Primakov continued that there had been some good news from the Armenian side when Ter-Petrossian gave a press conference September 30 (Check Date). It was a good statement, Primakov said, that the status quo is not good for anyone, that Karabakh will not get independence from Azerbaijan or annexation to Armenia, that there is no package solution, and that we will have to proceed step by step. Primakov said the thought this was a courageous statement. It would be a help if the U.S. would encourage the diaspora to be more supportive.

 

24. The Deputy Secretary acknowledged the problem of difficult pressure on Ter Petrossian, including from outside. He also said that he shared Primakov’s positive assessment of Ter Petrossian’s recent public statements. […] Primakov commented that if we can get step one of the Minsk Project, that will break the ties to Iran and will lift blockades at the Turkish border. […] He thought sooner or later it was going to come down to having to push Nagorno-Karabakh as the party to the process with the most unacceptable, unworkable positions.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-a799-08db055c3054.pdf

SUBJECT: ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT’S CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY POLITICAL DIRECTOR JACQUES BLOT (OCTOBER 1997)

 

7. Blot said Ter Petrossian told Chirac there was no possibility of a new confrontation; Now was the time for a compromise and Armenia was ready to negotiate a solution. According to Ter Petrossian, there was no possibility of economic development without peace and it was in Armenia’s interest to reach an agreement. It was necessary to convince Nagorno Karabakh and there would have to be more guarantees. […]

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-b232-08db055c30f3.pdf

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR JACQUES BLOT, JANUARY 8, 1998

 

5. The discussion then turned to NAGORNO-KARABAKH. Blot reported that during Armenian PM Kocharian’s recent visit to Paris the French perceived no real change his position and no prospect for a real start to negotiations. Blot wondered whether PM KOCHARIAN and President Ter-Petrossian really have different positions, or whether perhaps they have informally agreed that Ter-Petrossian will emphasize one message for us while KOCHARIAN will EMPHASIZE another for Nagorno-Karabakh. The French do not see any real means of pressure on NAGORNO-KARABAKH: the Russians are informally allied with the Armenians and the U.S. and France are constrained by domestic political sensitivities from the diaspora. Therefore, the best approach may be to propose additional incentives, both in economic and security areas, to make the package that is currently on the table more attractive to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Deputy Secretary agreed there is a real possibility that Ter-Petrossian and Kocharian could close their positions in a way we would not want. Pascoe noted that while the Armenian-American community still strongly supports Nagorno-Karabakh, it seems to be increasingly aware that time is not on Armenia’s or Nagorno-Karabakh’ s side.

 

6. The Deputy Secretary asked for clarification: Did Blot believe we should concentrate on adding incentives for Nagorno-Karabakh to our step-by-step proposal or open the way to a comprehensive proposal? Blot responded that we had to stay firm on the step-by-step approach, but we could be flexible on the timing of the discussions on the two parts. But there could be no link holding implementation of one hostage to the other. If agreement could be reached within six months on the cessation of the armed conflict, that phase could proceed to implementation while negotiations continued on status.

 

7. […] Blot replied that, frankly, he thought Russia viewed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue more in the context of its relations with the United States than with Armenia. In his view, the Russians believe our overall strategy in this part of the world is to reduce Russian influence, and therefore they would be seeking above all to consolidate and protect that influence. Indeed, Blot felt that the Russians perceive the U.S. proposal for an East-West energy corridor from central Asia as a new attempt to isolate Russia, and that this has spilled over into a deterioration of the’climate within which the MINSK Group works. To head this off, he suggested that he, the Deputy Secretary, and Russian Deputy FM Pastukhov discuss not only NAGORNO-KARABAKH, but general policy toward the Caucusus in their next MEETING.

 

8. The Deputy Secretary replied that we are aware that the Russians are suspicious of our intentions, particularly regarding energy development in Central Asia. However, it is by no means our policy to exclude Russia from energy development. The one country we seek to isolate in this region is Iran. […]

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/006c0000-0aff-0242-ce2e-08db055c256e.pdf

January  1998
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH PRIMAKOV IN SWEDEN

 

YMP: Okay, start in Paris if you like. But, once you have flown all the way across the Atlantic you are only a couple of hours from Stepanakert. You might as well keep going. You really should. We are doing everything we can to support President Ter-Petrosslan. I have sent him Ietters and spoken with him by telephone to give him the message that we think he did something smart and courageous when he wrote his article endorsing a package settlement. But, you know, he has very serious opposition. We are trying to support him. Aliyev knows this and has not problem, but the N-K Armenians are a big problem. If the Conference Co-Chairs representing the U.S., France and Russia, were to come to Stepanakert they would come as the representative of three, well I would say, three very serious countries. It would have some effect. It would indicate that if they oppose a peace settlement they are flouting the will of the entire world.

 

[…]

 

ST: […] With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Conference Co-Chairs will meet in Paris in early February. You should send Boris Pastukhov there armed with all of the arguments you can muster for having the Co-Chairs visit Stepanakert. I am ready to go back, but only if I am convinced it will do some good. Perhaps Pastukhov did not report to you all the details of our last visit when Ghoukasian compared the cochairs to the notorious “troikas” durtng Stalin’s purges and accused of us of plotting the elimination of the N-K Armenians. I’m in no great hurry to be treated to another reception like that. We agree that we’ve got to support Ter-Petrossian. We understand that there is a real struggle going on between Ter-Petrossian and Kocharian right now.

 

YMP: Yes, I can tell you that Kocharlan wants to be President of Armenia. Look, the N-K Armenians are an obstacle. Let’s not beat about the bush about that. But what can we do? I have been for a package agreement all along. Stepanakert was against it. Then we I proposed a step-by-step approach both Baku and Stepanakert were opposed. 

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-9da8-08db055c2589.pdf

SUBJECT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH: ACTING SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH ARMENIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR LIBARIDIAN

 

3. The Acting Secretary led off, after courtesies, by saying the U.S. counted on Armenia to have intense exchanges with the NK Armenians. Delivering them would be the toughest task in achieving peace. Libaridian replied that when “we have a paper we can accept” (from the Co-Chairs), “Ter-Petrossian will fight for it in Yerevan, including publicly, and he will fight for it in Stepanakert.”

 

[…]

 

5. In the second of two long meetings with the NK leadership, Libaridian continued, the Armenians had brought the NK leadership to the point of saying, “Maybe we don’t need to discuss status now.” Libaridian cautioned, however, that reaching an agreement would not be easy. He said he was encouraged by some of the things Aliyev had said during his U.S. visit — which seemed to indicate Azerbaijan was on board with the step-by-step approach — while excoriating Aliyev’s breaches of the process’ confidentiality. In a fresh Armenian interpretation of the OSCE Lisbon Summit, Libaridian suggested that the international community’s public endorsement of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity may have given Aliyev political cover for putting off dealing with status now in the Minsk process.

 

6. Talbott said he was encouraged by Libaridian’s analysis and positive interpretation of Aliyev’s visit. We had worked hard to get Aliyev to be forthcoming in public. Talbott continued that after meeting the NK leadership, he had a palpable sense of their admirable qualities, but no illusions about how tough a job the Armenians would have in making them understand that this process is about the art of the possible. He asked Libaridian for his thoughts on how to proceed. Libaridian, who had just come from a meeting with Rep. Gilman and other representatives, stressed the role of post-conflict assistance, as well as the importance of how it was presented. The NK Armenians would react badly if assistance appeared to them as a bribe for compromise; but they should be made to realize that a solution will help in the financing of reconstruction.

 

[…]

 

14. Talbott concluded by stressing the interest with which President Clinton followed the NK issue, seeing it as part of the larger strategic and economic puzzle. The President, he said, stresses the need to make Armenia part of the coming boom in the region — a desire Talbott seconded, having choppered over the vast, dead Nairit synthetic rubber factory. It was, he said, an advertisement for what is not happening and what could happen. But nothing will happen without peace.

 LINK: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/03/006c0000-0aff-0242-7d79-08db05fa90f6.pdf

As I said, there’s a lot to go through in these documents, but it is interesting to see how many of the same issues have surfaced again today when time is once again not on Armenia or Karabakh’s side, although, to be frank, it never was. Moreover, some argue, Ter-Petrosyan’s acceptance of the step-by-step approach was perhaps the last chance for peace prior to today.

For 28 years, however, both the Armenian government and even the main civil society players ignored this reality and marginalised or ostracised anyone that sought to remind them of Ter-Petrosyan’s warnings. Incidentally, many also did the same with any mention of the OSCE Minsk Group’s Madrid Principles too or subsequent variations on that basic framework.

“After the resignation of the first president, for more than two decades, all three leaders of Armenia adopted the policy of maintaining the status quo. All three accused Ter-Petrosyan of defeatism and betrayal at different stages of their rule,” RFE/RL concludes. Though Baku has at times rejected certain peace proposals in the past, many have also implied that Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and Pashinyan have too, effectively making the 2020 Karabakh war inevitable. 

 You can read RFE/RL’s summary in Armenian here. It is also available in Russian here.  

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Expectations, Hopes, and Fears accompany new European Union Mission in Armenia

Expectations, Hopes, and Fears accompany new European Union Mission in Armenia

by | Feb 1, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh, Russia

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has published a report on the potential role of the new European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) once it is deployed to patrol the country’s sometimes volatile border with Azerbaijan later this month. The mission, a dedicated deployment, is more on par with the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia than the temporary and much shorter-term European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) that ended on 19 December last year.

The ICG rightly notes that EUMA could significantly reduce the chances of major incidents on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border but cannot prevent them. This has also been seen in Georgia where an alleged policy by Russia of ‘creeping annexation’ on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with the breakaway region of South Ossetia often makes the news. Nonetheless, and although the Georgian separatist conflicts, which also includes that over Abkhazia, are low intensity in comparison, EUMM has nonetheless contributed to reducing tensions.

The hope is that EUMA’s deployment, like EUMCAP’s before it, can do the same. 

Indeed, I have personally been calling for such a mission for seven years now and last year, when nobody knew that Armenia had even reached out to the European Union for such a mission, even put this question to ICG’s Zaur Shiriyev in a webinar held on 27 September. At that time, he said, Baku had been resisting such a development given that it did not want to ‘internationalise’ the shared border with Armenia. This is also why the decision taken nine days later in Prague to deploy EUMCAP had come as such a surprise. 

27 September Webinar 2022 Excerpt

However, as a two-month mission, and quite unlike the two-year deployment of EUMA which could well be renewed just as EUMM’s has been in Georgia consistently since late 2008, it also carries with it some potential risks and concerns that need to be addressed very carefully indeed. Though EUMA can do little other than ‘monitor, analyse, and report,’ as EUMM in Georgia’s remit also dictates, whether it can contribute to or set back a floundering peace process, stalled since early December, still remains unknown.

As the ICG noted about the EUMCAP deployment:

 […] Its movements were confined to the Armenian side of the border, as Azerbaijan refused them entry. Due to security concerns, the observers could not travel without giving their itinerary to both Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities in advance. Armenian soldiers were asked to escort them everywhere they went.

 

Even as EU diplomats sought acceptance of the proposed mission with regional leaders, EU officials worked to overcome reservations in Brussels. […] As one diplomat put it: “If we send a mission only to the Armenian side without Baku’s consent, it may create the wrong impression. … Baku may see it as ‘the EU is against it’.” […]

  

[…]

  

[…] If Azerbaijan does not allow monitors cross-border access, it would be suboptimal from both a deterrence and awareness standpoint. In addition to being confined to Armenian territory, absent an arrangement with Baku, the mission would have to steer clear of border areas that could be dangerous. But the mission could still be beneficial, especially if Azerbaijan supports official contacts with monitors. Still, influential actors such as the U.S. should work through their channels to Baku to encourage full cooperation with the mission, including access to its side of the border.

 

Another question is whether Russia will cooperate. In December, Russian officials declined to comment on the EU proposal, stressing only that they consider any EU involvement as aimed at pushing Russia out of the South Caucasus. […] That said, Moscow does engage with EU missions elsewhere, including in Georgia, where Russian border guards control lines of separation in two conflict zones monitored by the EU unarmed observers.

Such concerns are valid and some of us pointed them out as soon as there were calls at the beginning of December for EUMCAP to be extended or transformed. There are other issues as I detailed in one post made on this site on 10 December, less than a week and half before EUMCAP ended its short mission in Armenia:

 Increasingly, some analysts in Yerevan openly argue that the continued deployment of EUMCAP in Armenia can be seen as a way to delay a peace agreement or even buy time in order for the country to re-arm ahead of what they see as an inevitable new conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it is unlikely that the European Union would want to be used with that goal in mind. Moreover, warn some Azerbaijani analysts, as EUMCAP is deployed only on the Armenian side of the border, there are other concerns too.

 

First, they argue, any inkling that EUMCAP could inadvertently delay the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly and adversely affect the standing and credibility of the European Union just as it has the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group. The optics of EUMCAP monitors standing side by side with Armenian soldiers focusing military-grade binoculars on Azerbaijani military positions would also not be positive, they argue, creating the impression that the EU has taken sides in the 30-year-old conflict.

 

Given the EU’s stated aim to assist and support both Armenia and Azerbaijan as a neutral facilitator and mediator, this would be counterproductive unless Yerevan and Baku are clearly on the path to peace and both sides view the presence of monitors as contributing to that. 

And it is this need for the new EUMA to support a genuine peace process between Yerevan and Baku that is the most pressing. That was the stated aim behind the EUMCAP deployment late last year after all. Others, such as Yerevan based political scientist and regional analyst Benyamin Poghosyan also warn that if the EU fails to reinvigorate its stalled peace process, as facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel, then the door could be opened to direct US-Russian competition and confrontation, even if only politically, as a result.

[…] The EU views the potential deployment of a new observer mission from a different angle. It is meaningful only if Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged in serious peace negotiations, where the EU plays a significant role. In this context, the de-facto collapse of the Brussels format of negotiations may pull the EU to the margins of the negotiation process, making any future deployment of an EU observer mission less attractive and meaningful for the EU. The failure of the Brussels format may leave Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations being conducted under either Washington or Moscow platforms, which will insert the process fully into the context of ongoing Russia – US animosity, with no benefits for anyone. 

Poghosyan continues to call for a resumption of the EU’s Brussels process for the same reasons, most recently in this piece published on 30 January, including reference to what appears to be attempts by Yerevan to change the format to include French President Emmanuel Macron. It was this last demand that appears to have stalled the Brussels Process and it can only be hoped that the EU understands its monitoring mission can achieve nothing other than to delay, rather than prevent, a new war unless such demands are prevented.

Armenia should not make the mistake of thinking that deploying the new EU mission excludes the possibility of new Azerbaijani aggression and opens the way for freezing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for years, if not for decades, without any negotiation process. Azerbaijan has made it very clear that it will not allow the establishment of the new frozen conflict. In the absence of negotiations, the likelihood of new Azerbaijani aggression is relatively high, and even the presence of the EU mission will not prevent this. Armenia should take all necessary steps to restart the negotiation process with Azerbaijan. One realistic option is to reinvigorate the Brussels format, and Yerevan should take all necessary steps to reach this goal, dropping any demands which may create obstacles on that path.

 For now, however, the EU has been quite clear that EUMA should create a ‘safe and stable environment […] within which improved human security and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the ground will allow for further progress towards a potential peace process,” read European Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162. It also stresses that the EU delegations in both Yerevan and Baku will communicate with each other over any mutual issues arising from the EUMA deployment. This is positive.

Moreover, assuming that EUMA does gain the trust of Baku as well as Yerevan, it can only be hoped that something similar to an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) can be established between the sides just as one has long been in place in Georgia for its internal conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Again, the text of the European Council’s decision does allow for such a hope even if it currently seem far-fetched today. Ultimately, EUMA’s success will lie in bridging the Armenia-Azerbaijan divide and not widening it.

It will also have to tiptoe lightly around any potential concerns from Russia and possibly even Iran given some of the locations that EUMA will likely patrol and establish a visible presence in. Other issues such as its eventual budget are arguably secondary. Even so, the ICG report is well worth a read for what could happen with EUMA. Meanwhile, as an aside, EUMCAP left Armenia on 19 December and EUMA will not deploy, it is said, until 20 February. Despite the absence of either, there have not been any major incidents on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

Meanwhile, for my previous commentary on both the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) and the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) see all my posts here.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to contribute to normalising relations with Azerbaijan

European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to contribute to normalising relations with Azerbaijan

by | Jan 25, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh

Trilateral Nikol Pashinyan, Charles Michel, and Ilham Aliyev meeting in Brussels © EU

Despite Baku’s concerns with this week’s decision to deploy a dedicated two-year European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), and with political tensions still heightened over the continuing impasse on the strategic Lachin Corridor, there could be some hope on the not too distant horizon. Possibly.

Prior to the announcement of the establishment of EUMA, in private conversation and public posts, one concern of mine was that there had to be an underlying purpose to the civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission just as there had been for the temporary two-month long European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) late last year.

EUMCAP had very definitely been deployed to assist with the European Union’s Charles Michel-facilitated trilateral talks with the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Brussels as well as the pressing need to demarcate the fragile and often volatile Armenia-Azerbaijan border. It was therefore imperative that EUMA be deployed for a similar purpose.

As I mentioned here and here, this was especially important given calls by some to use the deployment of EUMA to delay the signing of a long overdue peace treaty rather than to create an environment conducive to the signing of one. Judging from European Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162, however, it would appear that the EU is also well aware of this.

The preamble to the decision, for example, specifically mentions agreements that were reached in Prague last year that coincidentally also gave birth to the earlier EUMCAP.

On 6 October 2022, on the occasion of the meeting of the European Political Community held in Prague, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan confirmed their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Declaration agreed in Alma Ata on 21 December 1991, in which both States recognised each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Furthermore, the Council Decision also makes specific reference to the shaky normalisation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the need to negotiate and sign a peace treaty. It is anyone’s guess when the Michel-facilitated process can resume, but the EU Special Representative of the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, was in Yerevan on 23 January.

Anyway, some more key points from Decision 2023/162:

EUMA shall be part of the contribution by the Union, as an impartial and credible actor, in creating a safe and stable environment in conflict-affected areas in Armenia, within which improved human security and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the ground will allow for further progress towards a potential peace agreement.

 

[…]

 

The strategic objective of EUMA shall be to contribute to decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas in Armenia, to reduce the level of risks for the population living in such areas and thereby to contribute to the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the ground.

 

(a) For that purpose, the Mission shall contribute to confidence-building between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in ways that uphold its credibility as an impartial actor, by:

 

(b) contributing to human security in conflict-affected areas, inter alia by gathering information through ad hoc patrolling and reporting on situations where, due to direct or indirect consequences of the conflict, life and basic human rights are endangered;

 

(c) based on its activities under subparagraphs (a) and (b) and through its permanent and visible presence on the ground, contributing to building confidence between the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan and, where possible, between the authorities of those countries, in support of peace and stability in the region.

 

[…]

 

Without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall act in close coordination with the Union’s delegation to Armenia and with the EUSR to ensure the consistency of Union action in Armenia; in particular, the Head of Mission shall receive political guidance from the Head of the Union’s Delegation to Armenia regarding relations with the authorities of Armenia and from the EUSR with respect to relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

 

[…]

 

In addition, without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall keep the Head of Delegation in Azerbaijan informed on the activities of the Mission and shall consult him or her on matters of relevance to Azerbaijan.

 

[…] 

None of which means, of course, that the Charles Michel-facilitated talks between the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, will resume so soon after they broke down in early December, but it also seems unlikely that the European Union would want to be dragged into a quagmire it might eventually regret.

Though the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia has been operating since late 2008, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is considerably more volatile as recent events have demonstrated, and while the ‘status quo’ there is clearly in place, it most definitely is not sustainable when it comes to relations between Yerevan and Baku. 

Meanwhile, as an aside, the full budget for EUMA remain unknown with only the  figure of €8,103,590 announced for the first four months of its two year deployment. In contrast, EUMM in Georgia, had a budget of €44.8 million for its two year operation 2020-2022, but it also did not have the initial procurement costs associated with launching EUMA. 

Update: 26 February 2023:

Writing for Euraktiv, Maili Negi and Tobias Pietz say that Dr Markus Ritter, head of the German Federal Police Headquarters in Stuttgart and former Head of the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Iraq, looks set to be the Head of Mission for the new European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) due to start next month on 20 February.

Also of note, EUMA will be headquartered in Yeghegnadzor, Vayots Dzor region, and not Yerevan. There’ll naturally be field offices in Kapan, Goris, Jermuk, Martuni, and Ijevan. Meanwhile, it seems Azerbaijan did apparently, albeit reluctantly, ‘accept’ the mission. What’s most interesting from the Euroaktiv piece, however, is the following.

“In addition to patrolling, it is tasked with establishing (similar to EUMM Georgia) local communication channels and de-escalation mechanisms between the parties to the conflict. It will also support border demarcation and trilateral dialogue between the EU, Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the conflict.”

It’s still unclear if this could extend to an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) as is the case for EUMM in Georgia, but it’s something I’ve hoped for these past six or seven years or so. Anyway, for background on the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) and the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), see my previous posts here.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

European Union Establishes Longer-Term Monitoring Mission in Armenia

European Union Establishes Longer-Term Monitoring Mission in Armenia

by | Jan 25, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Balcani Caucaso, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh

European Union Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP) © EU

Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso has today published my piece on the new European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), a longer-term monitoring mission that will take over from the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) on the country’s border with Azerbaijan that ended its two-month deployment late last month.

On 23 January, the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) gave the final green light for the deployment of a dedicated long-term European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) that will monitor the country’s border with Azerbaijan. It will follow the temporary two-month temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia that ended on 19 December last year.

 

“In response to Armenia’s request, EUMA […] will conduct routine patrolling and report on the situation, which will strengthen the EU’s understanding of the situation on the ground,” the EU said in a statement following the decision. It had already been preliminarily decided by the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 10 January.

 

[…]

 

But though the original EUMCAP had been agreed with Azerbaijan, even if it would only informally cooperate with the mission when necessary, Baku was not of the same opinion when it came to EUMA. Instead, Azerbaijan especially raised concerns that the EU had not consulted it on any future deployment.

 

“It will not increase security,” Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said earlier this month. “On the contrary, it will undermine the format of negotiation [with Armenia]. France has in fact completely isolated itself from the process.”

 

[…]

 

Despite these concerns, however, Jospeh Borrell, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, had already stressed that EUMA’s main objective will be to “contribute to the mediation efforts in the framework of the [peace] process led by President of the European Council, Charles Michel.” Given the fragile and often volatile nature of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, such a clear statement of intent was both important and necessary.

 

Regardless, the 23 January FAC decision anyway appeared to be simply a matter a formality. On 4 January, the European External Action Service (EEAS) had already started to recruit staff from EU member countries for EUMA with a deadline of 19 January. The mission will last two years and will employ up to 100 personnel.

 

[…]

You can read the full article in English or Italian and for my previous pieces on European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) and the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) see here.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Corridors, Highways, and Revisiting Key West

Corridors, Highways, and Revisiting Key West

by | Jan 22, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, United States

Seven Mile Bridge, the longest on the Overseas Highway, Key West © PandoTrip

Eurasianet last week published a piece on what we anyway knew were long-standing disagreements over the construction of  a new highway that would connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan via Armenia as dictated by the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement. It also quoted an anonymous government official as saying that Baku expected a dedicated road in much the same way that the Lachin Corridor passes through Azerbaijan.

None of which is new, of course, but it did remind me of what was reportedly discussed at the meeting of then Armenian and Azerbaijan Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan in Key West, United States, in 2001. After seeing the Seven Mile Bridge, itself part of the 181-km Overseas Highway, both leaders appeared to have considered how technical solutions could resolve otherwise unassailable political problems.

“Key West is at the end of a very long bridge connecting it to the rest of Florida,” said Carey Cavanaugh, the former US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group also at the meeting, in an interview held several years ago. “It’s somewhat reminiscent, and President Aliyev remarked on this on his arrival, of the question of how do you connect Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia and the question of corridors?”

Kocharyan also considered allowing similar for linking Baku with its exclave – a 40 km overpass from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan. It is worth noting that in a podcast held in  October 2021, Richard Giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) also hinted at something similar. “[…] the link from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan may be a roadway and railway from point to point with no exit in Armenia proper,” he told me. 

That was then and this is now, of course, but the issue of how to prevent Armenia from being cut off from its own border with Iran remains a sensitive one, though there are clearly solutions. In the end, Kocharyan had considered an entire bridge to be too costly to construct at the time, but the idea of a combination of bridges, roads, and even tunnels, were considered as options instead.

Veteran journalist Tatul Hakobyan posted a piece on this in May 2021. 

“In the case of encountering settlements in the Meghri region, it would become an overpass before descending to the ground again,” Hakobyan wrote. “This minimised the possibility of contact between the Azerbaijanis traveling between Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan with the Armenians of Meghri who were moving in the opposite direction. […] The construction of overpasses […] solved another problem – the land connection between Armenia and Iran.”  

Given this recent history, such solutions are worth contemplating at least, and even though few seriously think it is actually this concern that is holding up progress on the ‘Zangezur Corridor,’ itself now arguably responsible for the current impasse on the Lachin Corridor. Concerns about extraterritoriality also seem doubtful given that it has been constantly stressed that sovereignty will remain with those countries through which the corridors pass.

The issue could more be the stipulation in the November 2020 ceasefire statement that border guards of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) would oversee it.

Nonetheless, whatever the reasons for the delay, the talks between Aliyev and Kocharyan at Key West did at least demonstrate that there were technical and engineering solutions available even over two decades ago. There are also, incidentally, technical solutions to allow for free or unimpeded transit, especially in this age of electronic scanning, as a September 2022 interview with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk detailed.

But, to end, back to Key West. In 1982, when the United States Border Patrol set up a checkpoint on the Overseas Highway leading to the island city, its mayor symbolically declared independence as the Conch Republic, even going as far to, albeit tongue-in-cheek, ‘declare war’ on the United States. The mayor, who appointed himself ‘Prime Minister,’ soon ‘surrendered ‘ and no further checkpoints were ever reportedly established.  

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian