Wreckage of an Armenian Yak-40 passenger aircraft that was flying from Stepanakert to Yerevan and hit by fire from an Azerbaijani SU-25 on 9 May 1992, forcing it to crash close to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border near Sisian. Among the 30 or so passengers on board were wounded soldiers. There were no fatalities © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

Yesterday, Artur Tovmasyan, defacto Speaker of Karabakh’s National Assembly, issued a statement calling on the Russian, French and U.S. Presidents to force Azerbaijan to allow an airlift from Armenia to the isolated region’s airport situated outside of Stepanakert. The remarks came after over three weeks of what are claimed to be environmental protests effectively blocking access to and from Karabakh on the Lachin Corridor.

In words echoing those of defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan, Tovmasyan said that this was necessary to transport vital humanitarian assistance to the besieged ethnic Armenian residents of what remains of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). That, however, is unlikely to happen. Indeed, in a news item published today, Security and Policy Consultant Sossi Tatikyan explained why. 

“Unfortunately, this is not possible without the agreement of Azerbaijan or the resolution of the UN Security Council,” she told Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). “It was not even possible to adopt a statement of the UN Security Council, as we saw a few days ago, because there was no consensus. That is the main problem.”

Though other airlifts to Darfur and Zaire are mentioned in the piece, there are also major differences. “Now there is a lot of talk about humanitarian airlift – delivering aid by air,” Tatikyan said. “Azerbaijan can say that there is no need for it because the Red Cross trucks can already pass and bring aid, place emphasis on this and reject it with such a technical reason.” 

Nonetheless, this of course does not mean that Tatikyan is happy with the situation. “If we give the issue a purely humanitarian nature we can go for short-term solutions […] but the political and security issues will not be resolved,” she said. “That is, the blockade of Artsakh can be normalised and it said, here, some humanitarian aid is entering and people are not condemned to an extremely dire situation, so let it [Lachin] remain closed.” 

Of course, Stepanakert’s airport, located in Khojaly, now renamed Ivanyan by the defacto authorities following the war of the early 1990s, is no stranger to controversy. Though it was operational back then, and I personally landed there in an Armenian military helicopter when I travelled from Yerevan to Karabakh in 1994, it wasn’t until 2008 that steps were taken to make it actually operational in the post-war period.

Indeed, when the construction of what is now a new and modern airport was completed in 2011, then Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan announced that he would be on onboard the first inaugural flight from Yerevan. Azerbaijan responded angrily and threatened to shoot down any aircraft entering what is internationally recognised as its airspace, and even though the physical territory below was out of Baku’s control.

A month later, those threats were walked back following international condemnation, and Baku stated that it would never “use force against civilian forces.” Nonetheless, the inauguration of the new airport never took place and no flights were ever launched. Stepanakert clearly hopes that this time will be different. 

In the here and now, however, and though it is feasible that there could be international pressure on Azerbaijan to allow at least a humanitarian airlift given that supplies are reportedly running low, Baku will be reluctant to agree. As Tatikyan mentioned, Azerbaijan would simply point to the large number of Russian peacekeeping convoys and some International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicles that can still transit through Lachin.

Moreover, Baku claims that, in fact, the highway is already open to all vehicles.

But, of course, there’s also a caveat. Azerbaijan would also insist that all goods should be inspected, something that the defacto Karabakh authorities have already rejected and certainly do not want. Such stops, they argue, would then inevitably lead to the normalisation of border and customs controls on a highway that had previously been largely free of them prior to the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement and even until 12 December 2022.

And this, of course, is the crux of the matter. There still remains disagreement between Yerevan and Baku over the ‘unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions from Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan,’ as stipulated by the 2020 ceasefire statement. Azerbaijan therefore believes that if Armenia continues to insist on border and customs controls on that route, then it should have the same for the Lachin Corridor. 

Though the impasse on the Lachin Corridor continues to be framed as an environmental protest, most analysts understand that it is actually more than just that. Indeed, the opening of what Azerbaijan has termed the ‘Zangezur Corridor ‘ remains a key objective for Baku. Meanwhile, some social media accounts even allege that Armenia has blockaded Nakhichevan, though this is far from the truth.

While Armenia’s border with Nakhichevan is indeed closed, the exclave also has land borders with Iran and Turkey while Karabakh only has the Lachin Corridor. Moreover, and somewhat ironically given these new calls for Karabakh’s airport to be opened, Azerbaijani commercial aircraft still continue to fly from Baku to Nakhichevan via Armenian airspace and have done so since October 2021.

Even so, a solution to the standoff on the Lachin Corridor continues to remain elusive with neither side willing to budge and thus, no end in sight. Indeed, Vardanyan has already told Karabakh’s population to be ready for a long winter. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that the airport is going to open even for an airlift. 

Understanding the situation in Karabakh in the fourth week of what amounts to an effective blockade is increasingly difficult. Some social media accounts allege starvation is already upon the population while others say there are no problems at all. In reality, neither is correct and even though defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan says that the region, situated within Azerbaijan with only the narrow 5 km-wide Lachin corridor to connect it to Armenia, is able to last longer than the three weeks it already has even with imported product shortages.

Thankfully, however, and as the alleged environmental protest by Azerbaijani activists, presumably with the support of Baku, effectively blocking most road transportation other than that consisting of Russian peacekeeping or International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicles, one young Karabakh Armenian is updating her followers  on TikTok about life under siege. Her updates are down to earth and genuine, lending credence to the stereotype of Karabakh Armenians as being sturdy and resilient. Basically, life goes on.

Follow her here. 

Updated 5 January 2023.

© Azerbaijani protest on the Lachin highway / Public Domain

At time of writing, the strategic Lachin corridor has been effectively blocked for twelve days by Azerbaijani protestors. Depending on whom you ask, this recent development either risks derailing an already precarious Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process or makes the signing of a treaty all the more urgent. Whatever your position, however, it was clear that Baku would apply pressure on the only connection between Armenia and what remains of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).

What was unknown was simply how. 

Framed as an Azerbaijani environmental protest, what effectively amounts to a blockade highlights what only a few of us warned nearly two years ago – Karabakh is geographically isolated after the 2020 war and, while reliant on Russia for security, is almost totally dependent on Baku for its sustainability, especially in terms of essential resources and now, it seems, trade and transport. Paradoxically, this reality was ignored or inexplicably overlooked by most commentators in the two years since the 2020 ceasefire statement was signed.

In practical terms, Azerbaijan did not need to launch renewed military operations to coerce further concessions from Yerevan and Stepanakert. All it needed to do was tighten the screws. 

Admittedly, some Armenian analysts did understood that pressure would be applied on Lachin, albeit only in the last month or so. Nonetheless, they understood that something was coming and not least since what was effectively a 3 December dress rehearsal with representatives of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Ecology and the AzerGold Joint Stock Company (JSC) blocking the highway for three hours and raising the issue of illegal mining and alleged environmental damage in Karabakh. 

The Azerbaijani media had also been full of claims that Armenia was shipping munitions and landmines to Karabakh via the highway, though these appear to be so far unproven, while reports of precious metals being extracted and exported to Armenia also surfaced. In an attempt to defuse tensions on the road, the protestors entered into negotiations with the Russian peacekeeping command, reportedly also involving Karabakh Security Council Secretary Vitaly Balasanyan, and an agreement was reached.

Scanning machines would be introduced at one or more Russian checkpoints while Azerbaijani specialists would be granted access to the mines. However, on 10 December, Karabakh Armenians reportedly prevented the visit. The defacto authorities in Stepanakert claim that there was no official request sent to them and on 11 December, Baku sent a diplomatic note to Moscow demanding that access should be forthcoming. The following morning, the Lachin highway was again blocked by Azerbaijani protestors. 

The particular mine in question, incidentally, has long been a matter of controversy. After the 2020 war, the enterprise ceased operations after its pumping station fell under Azerbaijani control, but it is unclear when it resumed operations. Ostensibly owned by Base Metals CJSC, the largest tax payer in Karabakh, the Anglo-Asian Mining company has also staked its claim on the mines. It bases this on the 1997 sale by Azerbaijan of the right to the mines even though it was situated in territory outside of Baku’s control.

Indeed, this development seems as much aimed at re-asserting Azerbaijan’s claims to what the international community views as its sovereign territory now in a new post-2020 conflict environment. In that sense, and with new obstacles emerging in the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process, Baku is using any means at its disposal to achieve that. However, there are several specific issues at the heart of this dispute other than simply mineral resources. 

Certainly, few outside of Azerbaijan view the protestors blocking the Lachin highway as genuine environmental activists. First, it is not easy for Azerbaijani citizens to travel to Shusha, the strategic hilltop citadel that returned to Baku’s control in November 2020, and even fewer are able to travel from there down to where the Lachin road passes. Indeed, aside from military personnel, it is nigh on impossible, lending credence to claims that rather than organic, the demonstration was organised by the Azerbaijani authorities.

And as many have also pointed out, it would be unthinkable for any such demonstration or road closure to occur in Azerbaijan proper. . 

Even so, while the issue of legal entitlement to the mines, as well as related environmental concerns, are certainly part of the unfolding drama, consensus among many views this as more a pretext. Also of significance, for example, is the recent arrival of Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan in Karabakh and his appointment as defacto State Minister. An outsider, Baku views him as “Moscow’s man,” an allegation that Vardanyan denies, but also an opinion shared by some, though not all, analysts in Armenia.

The latter, incidentally, charge that Vardanyan is using Karabakh as a stepping stone to pursue a political career in Armenia with an eventual aim to re-assert Moscow’s influence over the country. This, of course, is only speculation, but it is a view held by those admittedly in the pro-western camp in the country. Regardless, Vardanyan’s attempts to reinforce the status quo by exerting what increasingly appears to be considerable control over the breakaway region are not welcomed by Baku.

In particular, Azerbaijan  says that it was engaged with the Karabakh Armenians, on water for example, but that such contacts allegedly stopped when Vardanyan took his position. 

Irking Baku, on 17 November, Vardanyan even said that he considered himself as ‘qualified’ to enter into negotiations over the future of Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan reacted harshly to the statement, though the issue of some kind of mechanism for dialogue between with the Karabakh Armenians has increasingly come to the fore following the 27 September meeting of Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington D.C..

As part of those talks, it is believed that such a mechanism was discussed, though Yerevan and Baku are at odds over whether an international mechanism was agreed or not. A leaked document that appears to be genuine or at least credible, seems to be vague in terms of confirming whether this was decided or simply discussed.. 

The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regardless, the Azerbaijani protests do appear as much targeted against Vardanyan, possibly to also erode his credibility over time, but there are other issues that indicate frustration with the peace process has set in. Indeed, the timing of the environmental protests also comes precisely after other developments that might well have frozen the European Union-facilitated Brussels process. Rightly or wrongly, Baku puts the blame for this firmly on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s shoulders. 

Azerbaijan specifically claims that Pashinyan made last minute demands for French President Emmanuel Macron to be present at a scheduled meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels on 7 December that would be facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel. Armenia says that such a format was agreed at the Prague summit on 6 October that for the first did involve Macron. Prior to that, he had only been seen during an informal trilateral discussion and one teleconference with Aliyev, Pashinyan, and Michel.

Neither the European Union or France has clearly commented on either claim, leaving it unclear as to which side’s account is correct. Regardless, the meeting was cancelled and for all intents and purposes, Azerbaijani hopes for a peace treaty to be signed by the end of this year clearly dashed. Another grievance is also the failure to provide a link between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan even though Armenia has access to Karabakh via Lachin. 

Both routes were key provisions of the 9-10 November 2020 tripartite ceasefire statement.

6. […] The Lachin Corridor (5 km wide), which will provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia while not passing through the territory of Shusha, shall remain under the control of the Russian Federation peacemaking forces.

 

[…]

 

The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.

 

[…]

 

9. All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections.

 

Subject to agreement between the Parties, the construction of new transport communications to link the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be ensured.

Though Pashinyan has instead offered three alternative crossing points on its borders with Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, Azerbaijan considers them unsuitable for a variety of reasons. First, they are significantly longer than the most direct route between Azerbaijan and its exclave and secondly, they would be impossible to secure unless Russia were to deploy additional forces elsewhere on Armenian territory. With regards to the route Baku wants, the Russian FSB already has a presence on the Armenia-Iran border.

There is also the issue of customs and border checks which Armenia appears reluctant to concede on. In response, Azerbaijan argues, if there are to be checks on what it terms the “Zangezur Corridor,” then so too should there be on the Lachin corridor.  While both routes would remain under the sovereignty of each country, they would be anyway controlled by Moscow. The Lachin corridor is already temporarily under the control of Russian peacekeeping force while the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) would oversee the route via Armenia. 

As a result, and despite setbacks with its invasion of Ukraine, as well as some disagreement between Yerevan and Moscow over inaction from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), some allege that the impasse on the Lachin Corridor suits Moscow and that it too seeks to force the issue of the route through Armenia to Nakhichevan. However, others believe that Baku is seeking to discredit the credibility of the Russian peacekeeping force which is responsible under the 2020 ceasefire statement for ensuring access. 

But it isn’t just Azerbaijan. While Yerevan has been somewhat restrained in commenting on events in Lachin, it too has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping force for not preventing or intervening in the standoff. In reality, however, it was unlikely that Moscow would resort to force given that peacekeeping forces, even with a mandate, are more likely to remain neutral and facilitate negotiations, something that Moscow says is happening. For its part, the defacto Karabakh authorities say they instead want a Russian presence mandated and increased.

The mission has also sent convoys through the Azerbaijani protest camp during the standoff, though it is unclear whether they are ferrying foodstuffs or other humanitarian assistance. Stepanakert denies this, while Baku insists that it will allow Armenian civilian traffic to pass through the camp. Vardanyan has openly rejected this offer, citing security concerns, and confusing matters more, it also appears that Armenia has blocked access to the Lachin Corridor on its side of mutual border, presumably for the same reason.

Today it also appears that a group of journalists from Karabakh attempted to travel along the highway towards the Azerbaijani protest camp but were turned back by Russian peacekeeping forces, further muddying the waters as to who is blocking what.

Also at time of writing, only one Armenian ambulance ferrying a critically ill Karabakh resident to Yerevan has so far been escorted through the camp by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The following day, a second ambulance stranded in Armenia returned with it back to Stepanakert. Interestingly, on 21 December, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg ruled that it was unclear to what extent Azerbaijan had control on the road and instead highlighted the need to only guarantee such humanitarian access.