Expectations, Hopes, and Fears accompany new European Union Mission in Armenia
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has published a report on the potential role of the new European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) once it is deployed to patrol the country’s sometimes volatile border with Azerbaijan later this month. The mission, a dedicated deployment, is more on par with the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia than the temporary and much shorter-term European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) that ended on 19 December last year.
The ICG rightly notes that EUMA could significantly reduce the chances of major incidents on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border but cannot prevent them. This has also been seen in Georgia where an alleged policy by Russia of ‘creeping annexation’ on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with the breakaway region of South Ossetia often makes the news. Nonetheless, and although the Georgian separatist conflicts, which also includes that over Abkhazia, are low intensity in comparison, EUMM has nonetheless contributed to reducing tensions.
The hope is that EUMA’s deployment, like EUMCAP’s before it, can do the same.
Indeed, I have personally been calling for such a mission for seven years now and last year, when nobody knew that Armenia had even reached out to the European Union for such a mission, even put this question to ICG’s Zaur Shiriyev in a webinar held on 27 September. At that time, he said, Baku had been resisting such a development given that it did not want to ‘internationalise’ the shared border with Armenia. This is also why the decision taken nine days later in Prague to deploy EUMCAP had come as such a surprise.
27 September Webinar 2022 Excerpt
However, as a two-month mission, and quite unlike the two-year deployment of EUMA which could well be renewed just as EUMM’s has been in Georgia consistently since late 2008, it also carries with it some potential risks and concerns that need to be addressed very carefully indeed. Though EUMA can do little other than ‘monitor, analyse, and report,’ as EUMM in Georgia’s remit also dictates, whether it can contribute to or set back a floundering peace process, stalled since early December, still remains unknown.
As the ICG noted about the EUMCAP deployment:
[…] Its movements were confined to the Armenian side of the border, as Azerbaijan refused them entry. Due to security concerns, the observers could not travel without giving their itinerary to both Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities in advance. Armenian soldiers were asked to escort them everywhere they went.
Even as EU diplomats sought acceptance of the proposed mission with regional leaders, EU officials worked to overcome reservations in Brussels. […] As one diplomat put it: “If we send a mission only to the Armenian side without Baku’s consent, it may create the wrong impression. … Baku may see it as ‘the EU is against it’.” […]
[…]
[…] If Azerbaijan does not allow monitors cross-border access, it would be suboptimal from both a deterrence and awareness standpoint. In addition to being confined to Armenian territory, absent an arrangement with Baku, the mission would have to steer clear of border areas that could be dangerous. But the mission could still be beneficial, especially if Azerbaijan supports official contacts with monitors. Still, influential actors such as the U.S. should work through their channels to Baku to encourage full cooperation with the mission, including access to its side of the border.
Another question is whether Russia will cooperate. In December, Russian officials declined to comment on the EU proposal, stressing only that they consider any EU involvement as aimed at pushing Russia out of the South Caucasus. […] That said, Moscow does engage with EU missions elsewhere, including in Georgia, where Russian border guards control lines of separation in two conflict zones monitored by the EU unarmed observers.
Such concerns are valid and some of us pointed them out as soon as there were calls at the beginning of December for EUMCAP to be extended or transformed. There are other issues as I detailed in one post made on this site on 10 December, less than a week and half before EUMCAP ended its short mission in Armenia:
Increasingly, some analysts in Yerevan openly argue that the continued deployment of EUMCAP in Armenia can be seen as a way to delay a peace agreement or even buy time in order for the country to re-arm ahead of what they see as an inevitable new conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it is unlikely that the European Union would want to be used with that goal in mind. Moreover, warn some Azerbaijani analysts, as EUMCAP is deployed only on the Armenian side of the border, there are other concerns too.
First, they argue, any inkling that EUMCAP could inadvertently delay the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly and adversely affect the standing and credibility of the European Union just as it has the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group. The optics of EUMCAP monitors standing side by side with Armenian soldiers focusing military-grade binoculars on Azerbaijani military positions would also not be positive, they argue, creating the impression that the EU has taken sides in the 30-year-old conflict.
Given the EU’s stated aim to assist and support both Armenia and Azerbaijan as a neutral facilitator and mediator, this would be counterproductive unless Yerevan and Baku are clearly on the path to peace and both sides view the presence of monitors as contributing to that.
And it is this need for the new EUMA to support a genuine peace process between Yerevan and Baku that is the most pressing. That was the stated aim behind the EUMCAP deployment late last year after all. Others, such as Yerevan based political scientist and regional analyst Benyamin Poghosyan also warn that if the EU fails to reinvigorate its stalled peace process, as facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel, then the door could be opened to direct US-Russian competition and confrontation, even if only politically, as a result.
[…] The EU views the potential deployment of a new observer mission from a different angle. It is meaningful only if Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged in serious peace negotiations, where the EU plays a significant role. In this context, the de-facto collapse of the Brussels format of negotiations may pull the EU to the margins of the negotiation process, making any future deployment of an EU observer mission less attractive and meaningful for the EU. The failure of the Brussels format may leave Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations being conducted under either Washington or Moscow platforms, which will insert the process fully into the context of ongoing Russia – US animosity, with no benefits for anyone.
Poghosyan continues to call for a resumption of the EU’s Brussels process for the same reasons, most recently in this piece published on 30 January, including reference to what appears to be attempts by Yerevan to change the format to include French President Emmanuel Macron. It was this last demand that appears to have stalled the Brussels Process and it can only be hoped that the EU understands its monitoring mission can achieve nothing other than to delay, rather than prevent, a new war unless such demands are prevented.
Armenia should not make the mistake of thinking that deploying the new EU mission excludes the possibility of new Azerbaijani aggression and opens the way for freezing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for years, if not for decades, without any negotiation process. Azerbaijan has made it very clear that it will not allow the establishment of the new frozen conflict. In the absence of negotiations, the likelihood of new Azerbaijani aggression is relatively high, and even the presence of the EU mission will not prevent this. Armenia should take all necessary steps to restart the negotiation process with Azerbaijan. One realistic option is to reinvigorate the Brussels format, and Yerevan should take all necessary steps to reach this goal, dropping any demands which may create obstacles on that path.
For now, however, the EU has been quite clear that EUMA should create a ‘safe and stable environment […] within which improved human security and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the ground will allow for further progress towards a potential peace process,” read European Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162. It also stresses that the EU delegations in both Yerevan and Baku will communicate with each other over any mutual issues arising from the EUMA deployment. This is positive.
Moreover, assuming that EUMA does gain the trust of Baku as well as Yerevan, it can only be hoped that something similar to an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) can be established between the sides just as one has long been in place in Georgia for its internal conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Again, the text of the European Council’s decision does allow for such a hope even if it currently seem far-fetched today. Ultimately, EUMA’s success will lie in bridging the Armenia-Azerbaijan divide and not widening it.
It will also have to tiptoe lightly around any potential concerns from Russia and possibly even Iran given some of the locations that EUMA will likely patrol and establish a visible presence in. Other issues such as its eventual budget are arguably secondary. Even so, the ICG report is well worth a read for what could happen with EUMA. Meanwhile, as an aside, EUMCAP left Armenia on 19 December and EUMA will not deploy, it is said, until 20 February. Despite the absence of either, there have not been any major incidents on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.
Meanwhile, for my previous commentary on both the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) and the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) see all my posts here.
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