Landmine Free South Caucasus 2022 Campaign

Landmine Free South Caucasus 2022 Campaign

Campaign Logo © Landmine Free South Caucasus

Late last month civil society in Azerbaijan and Georgia marked a day of solidarity for the victims of landmines and the communities that are affected by them. I attended the event held by LINKS Europe and its local partners in Tbilisi while another event was held simultaneously by my good friend Ahmad Alili, Director of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre (CPAC), in Baku. I was told a similar event was also held in Yerevan.

Personally speaking, this is particularly an issue of importance for me given my own work covering the problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Armenia, Karabakh, and the then Armenian-controlled seven regions surrounding the breakaway region from about 2000-2011. Therefore, in support of the Landmine Free South Caucasus campaign, I include the official statement from LINKS Europe below.

The South Caucasus remains one of the areas most infected with contamination by landmines and other unexploded remnants of war in the world. Apart from the thou- sands of casualties caused directly or indirectly by landmines and other unexploded ordnance over the last three and a half decades, including several hundred in the last year, this contamination negatively impacts whole communities across the region, affecting their economic well-being, and exposing them to the constant threat of risk and danger.

 

In 2019 and in 2021, the regional campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus was suc- cessfully implemented across the region. Government officials, demining organisa- tions and civil society, together with representatives of the international community, actively discussed the threat that landmines pose, and action that could be taken to eradicate them. The campaign took the message for a landmine free South Caucasus to schools and communities across the region.

 

We are pleased to announce the launch of the 2022 Regional Campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus which this year will be launched on 30 November with a “Day of Solidarity with the victims of landmines and other unexploded remnants of war, and their communities, in the South Caucasus”.

 

As in the past, the campaign will be delivered in five languages: Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Russian and English. Starting on 30 November, the campaign will run until 30 June 2023, with activities focusing on the heavy human and economic cost of unexploded remnants of war, and to increase awareness of the need for their swift eradication. By reaching out in solidarity to communities affected by landmines we want to assure them that they are not alone. We also recall that hundreds of de- miners across the region risk their lives on a daily basis as they work tirelessly to rid the region from this scourge. We hail their efforts and say thank you for their precious work. As land is rehabilitated and returned to its proper use, care should be taken to make sure that it is the communities affected that should benefit first from its eco- nomic exploitation.

 

Finally, we appreciate the support of the international community in the quest for eradicating all landmines and other unexploded remnants of war from the South Caucasus. However the magnitude of the challenge facing the demining community is such that a much bigger level of support is required so that the capacity of local demining efforts is increased to a level where it can respond adequately to the tasks at hand. This support should be forthcoming quickly and at levels that would make a real difference.

 

We appeal to the people of the South Caucasus and to the international community:

 

  • Join us in expressing our solidarity with individuals and communities that are victims of landmines and other explosive remnants of war!

  • Join us in saying thank you to deminers!

  • Join us in calling for a landmine free South Caucasus by the end of this decade, or soon after.

     

The campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus is a regional effort with the participation of organisations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, working together with international part- ners. The campaign is co-ordinated by LINKS Europe and supported by the European Union. For more information please contact Patrick Norén: patrick@links-europe.eu.

Controlled detonation of landmines and UXO by the HALO Trust, Askeran, Nagorno Karabakh
© Onnik James Krikorian 2010

Incidentally, in the LINKS Europe newsletter that accompanies the campaign, it is also reported that in October alone, the National Agency for Mine Action of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) defused or destroyed over 4,000 landmines and UXO. Though some of the minefields in the seven regions now returned to Azerbaijani control were cleared in the 2000s, there are many more that remain or have been laid since.

Those mines have already taken a heavy toll in the post-2020 war environment.

It should also be remembered that Armenia has its own problems with landmines on the border too, and LINKS Europe also says that in November the Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) held a training for UN employees in Armenia on explosive munitions and the danger that they pose. Earlier in October, CHDE also held awareness workshops for children and teachers in villages in the Gegharkunik region of the country.

Meanwhile, in Karabakh, the HALO Trust demining charity continues its work there. I’ve accompanied HALO Trust many times as they worked on demining land and collecting UXO from about 2000 to 2011 and some of my articles on the situation in Armenia and Karabakh 2000-2011 can be read online here, here, here, and here. There’s also a gallery of images taken during some of those visits here.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Calls for the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia to be extended

Calls for the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia to be extended

According to the Armenian Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, the European Monitoring Mission Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia will end on 20 December 2022. Requested by Mirzoyan on 22 September following fierce fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the border a week earlier, the decision to deploy came out of the quadripartite meeting of the two leaders and European Council and French presidents, Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron, in Prague on 6 October. The decision was approved by EU member states on 17 October.

Initially deployed for up to two months, and despite an interview with EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar published on 29 October in which he said that it could not continue past that date, there are already calls for EUMCAP to be extended. The most vocal have come from France’s Foreign Minister, Catherine Colonna. “Through the monitoring of the border, this mission has really limited the danger of escalation,” she told the French Parliament on 6 December. 

“This presence should continue as long as it is needed. This is our belief. This is also […] the desire of the Armenians,” Colonna added.

However, it is uncertain whether EUMCAP can be extended. In order to deploy in such a short amount of time it was necessary to utilise the human and financial resources of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia. Deployed following the August 2008 war with Russia, staff from EUMM make up the 40-strong EUMCAP and were thus taken away from their normal duties monitoring the Abkhazia and South Ossetia Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs). Any  extension would require their continued absence.

It should also be noted that EUMM does not just monitor the ABLs. It also concerns itself with any security risks in Georgia from radicalisation to domestic political tensions that might erupt into violence. For the record, I’ve been called to meetings with EUMM to discuss both. Regardless, despite that and Klaar’s earlier comments about the temporary nature of the deployment made up of civilian monitors, European Council Decision 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 does at least provide for such a possibility.

Article 3a

 

1.   EUMM Georgia shall monitor, analyse and report on the situation in the region around the international border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, with a view to contributing to the restoration of peace and security in the area, to the building of confidence and to the delimitation of the international border between the two States.

 

2.   A strategic assessment, including on the possible continuation, adaptation or termination of that task, shall be conducted by the Political and Security Committee six weeks after deployment.

 

3.   That task shall end when the Council so decides.

With uncertainty still surrounding any extension of EUMCAP or its transformation into a dedicated European Monitoring Mission in Armenia rather than simply a Monitoring Capacity, there are certain issues to take into account. Firstly, on 7 December, Marek Szczygiel, Head of Mission for EUMM in Georgia, announced on Twitter that his term would end on 14 December. This naturally coincides with the 3 December 2020 decision by the European Council to prolong EUMM’s mission for two years until 14 December 2022 with a budget of €44.8 million.

This probably implies that another decision on EUMM’s continued deployment in Georgia has already been taken or is about to be.

It is therefore not beyond the realms of possibility that any decision to further prolong the deployment of EUMM in Georgia could also include an increase in budget and staffing to allow EUMCAP to continue its work in Armenia. Though it can not prevent any incidents, and though its role is not to publicly report on them, there is no doubt that EUMCAP, like EUMM, can at least contribute to the easing of tensions on the border to some extent. It should also be remembered that its role is clearly defined in the European Council decision.

On 6 October 2022, on the occasion of the meeting of the European Political Community held in Prague, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan confirmed their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Declaration agreed in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991, in which both States recognised each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The two States moreover agreed in principle to the deployment of an EU civilian CSDP Mission alongside their common international border with a view to contributing to the restoration of peace and security in the area, to the building of confidence and to the delimitation of the international border between the two States.

But there are dangers as well. Increasingly, some analysts in Yerevan openly argue that the continued deployment of EUMCAP in Armenia can be seen as a way to delay a peace agreement or even buy time in order for the country to re-arm ahead of what they see as an inevitable new conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it is unlikely that the European Union would want to be used with that goal in mind. Moreover, warn some Azerbaijani analysts, as EUMCAP is deployed only on the Armenian side of the border, there are other concerns too.

First, they argue, any inkling that EUMCAP could inadvertently delay the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly and adversely affect the standing and credibility of the European Union just as it has the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group. The optics of EUMCAP monitors standing side by side with Armenian soldiers focusing military grade binoculars on Azerbaijani military positions would also not be positive, they argue, creating the impression that the EU has taken sides in the 30-year-old conflict.

Given the EU’s stated aim to assist and support both Armenia and Azerbaijan as a neutral facilitator and mediator, this would be counterproductive unless Yerevan and Baku are clearly on the path to peace and both sides view the presence of monitors as contributing to that. 

Nevertheless, with the clock ticking down on EUMCAP and just a week and a half to go before its official termination unless extended or transformed, the answer to this question will soon be known. It might also reflect on whether the European Union believes, despite recent setbacks, that there is still life left in the Charles Michel-facilitated Brussels process to assist Armenia and Azerbaijan in finally negotiating and implementing a long overdue peace agreement. And it is this that might be the most important signal of all.  

As testimony to that, on his recent visit to Tbilisi, U.S. Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Philip Reeker lauded Georgia for EUMM’s role in establishing and deploying EUMCAP to assist in the western-led process. However, and although the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) did not deploy a monitoring mission despite requests to do so, the Russian and Iranian reaction to any continued EUMCAP or equivalent mission on Armenian soil will also be something to keep a watchful eye out for.

Update, 12 December 2022: “The Council reviewed the EU Monitoring Capacity to Armenia which will complete its activities on 19 December. In order to maintain the EU’s credibility as a facilitator of dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a team will be deployed to Armenia as of 20 December to contribute to the planning of a possible Civilian mission to be launched, in case of agreement, in 2023.” Link

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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U.S. urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to maintain momentum in peace negotiations

U.S. urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to maintain momentum in peace negotiations

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (left), U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan (right) yesterday at Blair House in Washington D.C.. It was the second such meeting in this trilateral format. via Armenian MFA

Less than a month and a half before the end of the year, hopes remain high for the normalisation of relations between Yerevan and Baku, especially since the last round of negotiations held in the United States. “I urged Prime Minister Pashinyan to sustain momentum on peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia following the foreign ministers’ talks in Washington on 7 November,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted on 16 November after a follow-up call to the Armenian leader. Hours later he tweeted the same message, but this time addressed to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

Though many remain skeptical about the timescale, Blinken’s comments followed what appears to have been a productive bilateral meeting between the Armenian Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov, in Washington D.C.. A trilateral meeting with Blinken followed and, according to U.S. accounts, Mirzoyan and Bayramov agreed on a post-meeting statement in just 40 minutes. Their previous bilateral meeting in Geneva saw separate and different press releases published afterwards. 

The same day, in an otherwise poorly attended Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting on “Assessing U.S. Policy in the Caucasus,” such hopes were clearly articulated  by senior U.S. officials. “The sides are at a historic crossroads,” said U.S. State Department Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Philip Reeker. “We’re encouraging them to choose a future of prosperity and demonstrate the wisdom of working together on a peace that will benefit the people of the region for generations to come.”

Though little new was said by Reeker and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried at the hearing, they did at least confirm some of what is known, including indirectly confirming the veracity of a leaked document summarising key points from a meeting between Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev held on 27 September. The notes indicated that it is hoped sufficient progress on border limitation and a peace deal is possibly by the end of the year.

The deployment of a temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia for a two-month period from late October also hints at this

During the Senate Foreign Committee meeting that lasted not much longer than an hour, both Reeker and Donfried in particular commended the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, for his 13 April speech in the Armenian National Assembly admitting that the international community believes Yerevan should ‘lower the benchmark’ on Nagorno Karabakh, a comment interpreted by many to mean that Yerevan should drop its support for independence of the mainly ethnic Armenian-populated territory situated within Azerbaijan.

This had always been the stumbling block in previous negotiations along with the occupation of the seven regions surrounding Karabakh that are now back under Baku’s control. Moreover, it is also clear that the issue of the normalisation of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations will be considered as a separate issue apart from that of Nagorno Karabakh, which many consider is now an internal matter for Azerbaijan, though not one away from the watchful eyes of the international community.

Not unexpectedly, of course, the issue remains highly sensitive and whether formally or informally linked, it also still lies at the heart of the conflict. Somehow, however, separating the two appears to be the only way forwards. This also became apparent on 27 September at the meeting between Grigoryan and Hajiyev in Washington D.C., as well as in the official Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press statement following a 2 October meeting of the foreign ministers in Geneva. The necessity to create a ‘discussion mechanism’ to allow Baku to communicate with the ethnic Armenian population of Karabakh was discussed.

Again, this was mentioned in the 27 September leaked document.

The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The details contained within the document, incidentally, were also effectively  confirmed in an interview with Armenian National Security Secretary Armen Grigoryan days after it surfaced. However, in response, on 13 October, his Azerbaijani counterpart, Hikmet Hajiyev, responded to Grigoryan’s comments by saying there can be no question of an international mechanism being introduced. It should be pointed out, however, that this could mean simply that Baku does not want a format such as the OSCE Minsk Group resurrected or introduced given its failure to achieve any results prior to the 2020 war.

Regardless, given the increasingly precarious situation Karabakh Armenians now find themselves in, living within an area now stripped of much of its natural resources and unable to produce the types of goods and services it once exported to Armenia, such a mechanism would be both logical and necessary in the current circumstances that do not seem likely to change in the future apart from for the worse.  It should also be remembered that some cooperation and communication has already occurred in terms of roads and water.

The need for this to be expanded upon is supported by both the US and EU.

“While the resolution of contentious issues remains the responsibility of Armenia and Azerbaijan, I have made it clear the international community and the United States has a specific responsibility to ensure that the rights and security of ethnic Armenians are addressed credibly and in line with a peace settlement,” said Reeker at this week’s hearing. […] I have repeatedly encouraged the leaders in both countries to consider an international mechanism or construct to ensure, monitor, and report on any agreement involving Nagorno Karabakh.”

Indeed, it was this issue that Reeker focused on most.

“That’s important and to do that fully, […] they need to consider how they can engage a mechanism, an international effort to support, to monitor, to offer help, and it can have an economic component and capacity as well, to make sure those people have an opportunity to define what security and rights means and to see that it is implemented […],” he continued while also implying in additional comments that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had acknowledged this in private discussions.

What shape or form such a mechanism might take remains unclear, but Azerbaijan has indeed stated that it will engage in direct discussions with the ethnic Armenian population of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).  On 17 November, for example, Aliyev confirmed this even if did also rule out any negotiations with the newly installed defacto Minister of State for Nagorno Karabakh, Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan. On 18 November, the defacto Karabakh authorities rejected this and further demanded that such talks must be internationally mediated.

The OSCE Minsk Group was even mentioned.

But for most observers, the OSCE Minsk Group lies dormant without any chance of revival following Russia’s  24 February invasion of Ukraine. Even forgetting Azerbaijan’s refusal to engage within this format since the 2020 war, and the OSCE’s own internal problems as an organisation operating on consensus, it also seems unlikely that the three co-chair countries of the U.S., France, and Russia can cooperate in this format. Speaking at the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Reeker also acknowledged that while its mandate remains active, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship now doesn’t function at all.

Even so, unconfirmed rumours continue to spread, including from former MP Arman Babajanyan who said in an interview on Armenian Public TV that during the talks in Washington D.C. on 7 November the creation of a UN Security Council-endorsed format comprising the U.S, EU, and Russia was discussed. There has been no other mention of this and it should be treated as unconfirmed and speculation only, but given the risk of multiple peace formats colliding, such an idea would at least makes sense. Moreover, unlike the Minsk Group, it notably excludes France, an unreliable international mediator in the eyes of Baku.

As for Moscow, Reeker also admitted that Russia still remains an actor, especially in Armenia.  

Bringing the disparate sides together does admittedly sound impossible in the wake of Ukraine.  but it is notable that after a pause for almost a year, the 56th round of the Geneva International Discussions, a forum created after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war was held on 5 October. Originally scheduled for March, it is co-chaired by the OSCE, EU, and UN with the involvement of Georgia, Russia, the U.S., and also the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the West and Russia can engage there, why not in another conflict zone in the same region?

Nonetheless, charge some Armenian analysts, Brussels and D.C. hope to see the Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh leave when its first term expires in 2025, something that Azerbaijan also says it wants. Some others, however, believe that Moscow and Baku might strike a deal to extend the mission for one more 5-year term in exchange for integrating Karabakh more fully into Azerbaijan proper. Interestingly, on 10 November, Pashinyan also proposed establishing a demilitarised zone with international guarantees during his trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Aliyev in Sochi on 31 October.

Moreover, he has since once more declared that Armenia is ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, though stressing it will likely take the form of a framework rather than a comprehensive agreement. Given the short window until the end of the year, this sounds logical considering all the complexities arising after over three decades of enmity and conflict. However, warn some analysts, it is also important that such an agreement not prove to be as ambiguous and open to interpretation as some points in the 9-10 November ceasefire statement that have created numerous problems in the two years since it was signed.

The issue of border and customs controls on any route connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhichevan has been a particularly thorny issue and unless it too is resolved it is now quite possible that Azerbaijan will demand its own checks on the Lachin corridor, the route connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh through sovereign Azerbaijani territory currently under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers but only for as long as they remain. It is difficult to imagine a peace treaty being signed without addressing this issue, but noteworthy that unblocking regional communications has always been an integral part of any peace deal.

As always, what happens next relies on there being the sufficient political will in both Yerevan and Baku to finally turn the page on a conflict that should have been resolved decades ago. 

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

EU Monitoring Capacity deploys on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border

EU Monitoring Capacity deploys on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border

The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. The Monitoring Capacity in Armenia is made up of staff from EUMM in Georgia and financed from its budget © EUMM

Osservatorio Balcani e Caucasus last week published my brief article on the temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) deployed to Armenia on its border with Azerbaijan in late October. 

The European Union has deployed around 40 unarmed civilian monitors on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan following serious military escalation on 12-13 September, that saw the latter strike and capture territory within the former, leaving nearly 300 dead on both sides. Though requested in September by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the decision to deploy the monitors came on 6 October at the meeting in Prague between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, European Council President Charles Michel, and French President Emmanuel Macron. Azerbaijan, however, did not consent to the mission’s presence on its side of the tense border, though it did agree to “cooperate with this mission as far as it is concerned”.

 

Formally approved by the EU member states on 17 October, the monitors have since started their short mission of only two months following the visit by an EU technical mission days earlier. Though some Armenians hoped for a longer and even a military presence, despite the EU being more known for its civilian missions, this was not unexpected. Indeed, on 29 October, Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar explained that the only way to deploy quickly would be to use some of its 200 monitors in the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia. Moreover, the Armenian mission’s two-month duration would be funded from EUMM Georgia’s budget, currently at 22.4 million Euros per year, and will not be extended.

 

EUMM, also a civilian monitoring mission, was deployed in Georgia in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war and monitors the country’s Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) with two other breakaway regions in the South Caucasus – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Klaar, incidentally, was EUMM Georgia’s head in Tbilisi in 2013-14.

 

[…]

 

Azerbaijan has said that it would like a peace treaty signed by the end of the year, and Armenia has tentatively agreed, but there are still many obstacles to overcome after more than three decades of hostility. Nonetheless, the West clearly views EUMCAP as a necessary instrument to help create a more conducive environment in which to reach such an agreement.

You can read the full article in English or Italian.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers Meet in Washington D.C. for Bilateral Talks – and also with U.S. Secretary of State Blinken

Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers Meet in Washington D.C. for Bilateral Talks – and also with U.S. Secretary of State Blinken

The Armenian delegation (left) meeting with its Azerbaijani counterpart (right) yesterday at Blair House in Washington D.C. via Azerbaijani MFA on Twitter.

For many, the significance of yesterday’s bilateral meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, appears to have been overlooked. Instead, all attention was focused on the later meeting of the two state officials with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Though important, the preparation of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan has actually been assigned to the Foreign Ministers in a bilateral format and not to one with the direct involvement of any external actors.

This was announced by European Council President Charles Michel after the 31 August facilitated meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels. Of course, that the bilateral meeting in Washington D.C. was hosted by the U.S. State Department and upon the initiative of Secretary of State Blinken is not insignificant either, but also follows a similar meeting held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 19 September.

However, it is what was discussed during the  bilateral between Mirzoyan and Bayramov that is arguably more important. Indeed, Blinken himself hinted as much in his opening remarks to the trilateral meeting with the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers held afterwards.

Direct dialogue is the best way to a truly durable peace, and we are very pleased to support that,” he said. Blinken also reaffirmed the importance of recognising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, something that has become a key element of the meetings between the foreign ministers in Geneva as well the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Prague on 6 October and in Sochi at the end of the same month. Of note too are remarks tweeted by EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar.

Nonetheless, Blinken’s remarks before the trilateral meeting that, like the bilateral discussion held earlier the same day, was held behind closed doors were to the point. 

I think it’s also fair to say that 30-plus years of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh have had tremendous human, material costs – lives lost, scars that are deep.  But what we are seeing now are real steps, and courageous steps, by both countries to put the past behind and to work toward a durable peace.  Both countries are working to that end and to, ultimately, a brighter future for the South Caucasus – a future of peace, countries at peace, countries working together for a better future.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (left), U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan (right) yesterday at Blair House in Washington D.C.. It was the second such meeting in this trilateral format. via Armenian MFA on Twitter

To the disappointment of many, however, very little details emerged from either the bilateral and trilateral meetings for which the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ambassadors to the United States had been present. There had also been meetings with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Olson and U.S. Senior Advisor on Caucasus Negotiations, Philip Reeker, was also present for the trilateral meetings. Possibly of note, however, was that the separate statements issued by the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers were virtually identical.

This was not the case following their last bilateral meeting in Geneva.

In those statements published earlier today, the two sides reaffirmed the commitments undertaken by the Armenian Prime Minister and Azerbaijani President in Prague and, of particular note, in Sochi. This is especially relevant given that some observers have concluded that yesterday’s meeting was a direct response by the United States to the tripartite meeting held on 31 October with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It could of course still be, but there is also increasing concern that Moscow can derail any process that seeks to sideline it.

This makes the reference to Sochi arguably all the more interesting.

For now, however, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers agreed to “expedite their negotiations and organise another meeting in the coming weeks.” This is particularly relevant given a much speculated window of opportunity for signing a peace deal in some shape or form by the end of this year and while the recently deployed but temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP) remains on the ground. The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders are still expected to meet again in Brussels this month.

The meeting yesterday underscores Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s serious pursuit of peace through intensified dialogue,” said U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price in a statement issued earlier today.

It remains to be seen whether any new details emerge from yesterday’s meeting in the coming days from remarks made by officials domestically in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, or even through leaks as has happened, but the process looks set to continue at least. However, and despite the urgent need for a breakthrough and a peace treaty to be signed in some shape or form, there will still be many obstacles along the way and it can also end in failure. November, basically, looks set to be an incredibly critical and important month.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian