Documenting life under siege in Karabakh – On TikTok

Documenting life under siege in Karabakh – On TikTok

Understanding the situation in Karabakh in the fourth week of what amounts to an effective blockade is increasingly difficult. Some social media accounts allege starvation is already upon the population while others say there are no problems at all. In reality, neither is correct and even though defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan says that the region, situated within Azerbaijan with only the narrow 5 km-wide Lachin corridor to connect it to Armenia, is able to last longer than the three weeks it already has even with imported product shortages.

Thankfully, however, and as the alleged environmental protest by Azerbaijani activists, presumably with the support of Baku, effectively blocking most road transportation other than that consisting of Russian peacekeeping or International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicles, one young Karabakh Armenian is updating her followers  on TikTok about life under siege. Her updates are down to earth and genuine, lending credence to the stereotype of Karabakh Armenians as being sturdy and resilient. Basically, life goes on.

Follow her here

Updated 5 January 2023.

@mash.gasparyannn Ձեր նոր տարին շնորհավոր🤍Blokada or 21 #blokada #artsakh #rek #vlog ♬ Chill Vibes - Tollan Kim

 

 

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Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Lachin Corridor standoff enters fourth week

Lachin Corridor standoff enters fourth week

 Russian peacekeepers on the Lachin corridor © Azertac

The 25 December rally in Stepanakert, the defacto capital of what remains of the Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), was large. An estimated 30-35,000 ethnic Armenian residents of the breakaway region gathered in the city’s Renaissance Square in an act of defiance in response to Azerbaijani “eco—activists” picketing the Lachin corridor.

Predictably, it wasn’t long before the ‘numbers game’ reared its head. 

Though many reports put the crowd at ‘thousands’ or ‘tens of thousands,” some Armenian media claimed 50,000 were in attendance while others even put it at as high as 60-70,000. Not unexpectedly, some Azerbaijani sources also claimed that only 17-20,000 took part despite an abundance of online crowd estimation tools to prove them otherwise. 

At the center of these claim and counter-claim disagreements are, of course, related to uncertainty as to how many people do actually live in Karabakh. Armenians put that figure at 120,000 while Azerbaijan claims that there are only 25,000, as if inflating the number or reducing it will determine the future of the region once a peace deal is negotiated.

In reality, neither are likely correct. It is unlikely to be as high as 120,000, but it is hard to imagine it could be anywhere as low as 25,000 too. The truth, however, is that we simply don’t know. And nor does it probably matter.

What does matter, however, is that Azerbaijanis claiming to be environmental activists have controlled the only link between Karabakh and Armenia for three weeks now in the new reality that emerged following the 2020 war. Armenians says this amounts to a blockade of the region situated within and surrounded by Azerbaijan proper while Baku claims that the road is open.

Further, some Armenian activists, especially online, claim Azerbaijan is attempting to ethnically cleanse the region of its population by preventing the import of food from Armenia, starving them out. Baku, however, says such goods may enter if there are checks on what is being transported, something they allege the defacto Karabakh authorities have refused.

And this remains at the heart of the ongoing dispute despite claims otherwise.

According to the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement, the transportation of people and goods between Armenia and Karabakh would be guaranteed on the Lachin corridor while unimpeded access between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan would be facilitated through Armenia. However, Yerevan is reluctant to have the latter with no border or customs checks.

Of course, the “new transport communications” through Armenia’s Siunik region to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave haven’t even been constructed yet, but Baku therefore argues that if this is Yerevan’s position then there should be similar checks on the Lachin corridor . This continues to be one of the main stumbling blocks in attempts to normalise relations.

It has also taken on geopolitical significance since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is, however, transporting critically ill patients from Karabakh to Armenia for treatment and bringing back medical supplies on their return. ICRC has already transported some 10 tons of medicine, medical supplies, and infant food from Armenia, for example, that should last 10 days, presumably until another occurs.

Meanwhile, convoys from the Russian peacekeeping mission travel through the Azerbaijani protestors on a daily basis, though it is unknown what they are carrying. Moreover, confusing the issue of who is blocking what, when a group of motorists from Yerevan attempted to travel into Karabakh a week ago, failure to negotiate passage with the Russians saw them turn back. 

This is possibly why the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in a recent ruling, could not ascertain to what extent the blockage on the Lachin Corridor was being orchestrated by Azerbaijan. Instead, it simply reminded Baku of its obligation to allow the free movement of humanitarian assistance and those Karabakh residents stranded in Armenia.

That last part, however, has not happened, though it remains unclear why.

Muddying waters further, and definitely obfuscating matters, of course, is yet another fully-fledged information war, though ironically not from official circles this time. It has also been made worse by the absence of in-depth reporting on the situation even in the Armenian media, creating additional problems and creating a space for sensationalist narratives. 

A few social media accounts, for example, spread photographs of empty shelves in supermarkets and closed vegetable and fruit stands. There was no bread, others claimed, and no eggs, with the population now facing imminent starvation. However, this is not the reality that even defacto Karabakh State Minister Ruben Vardanyan presents to the world.

“We will not starve, because there’s enough food,” Vardanyan told Reuters on 24 December. “But some products we cannot get on our internal market.”

Indeed, albeit aside from medical supplies, the problem so far seems more one of fuel and certain imported goods, he added. Moreover, he continued, Karabakh is instead preparing itself for a long winter under the condition of an effective blockade, again indicating that any panic spread and amplified on social media isn’t yet experienced by the local population.

The Russian-Armenian Vardanyan has even paid tribute to the spirit and resilience of the Karabakh Armenians, many of whom engage in agriculture, including using greenhouses, as well as animal husbandry. And on 24 December, in a rare example of much-needed objective reporting, Aliq Media also published an account by a local journalist on the ground. 

“The mood is normal and people are trying to take the situation calmly. I don’t know how to express it, maybe I could even say it’s a little indifferent, people are so calm,” Srbuhi Vanyan is quoted as saying. “There is still no problem with bread, cereals, pulses. We still have what is produced locally – dairy products, meat, etc.”

Indeed, one young woman in Stepanakert has even been updating her followers on a semi-regular basis as to what she is cooking and consuming at home. She also shows what she is able to find for purchase in the shops and markets. In the past week alone this has included chicken, rice, eggs, potatoes, bread, and onions, as well as some greens and fruit.

There is also a steady stream of official price monitoring reports made publicly available as part of the operations centre Vardanyan heads. Those reports, incidentally, do indicate that certain goods are largely unavailable or intermittent in terms of supply and that there has especially been a problem with certain vegetables, some of which are imported.

On 20 December, it was also reported that farmers still have supplies of diesel to continue the late sowing of crops. It should also be mentioned that  Karabakh banned the export of wheat and barley to Armenia in July 2022. “We don’t have a flour and wheat problem,” Stepanakert Mayor David Sargsyan said on 30 December. “The bread factories are working as normal.”

Vardanyan also met last week with the owners of restaurants and cafes in Stepanakert to discuss keeping their businesses open, though there is now a maximum size of 15 people for groups dining out. This can reach 35 people for post-function events such as funerals. Social media also shows that many pizzerias, pâtisseries, and other catering firms still operate.

One restaurant, for example, posted on its Facebook page only today that it will reopen tomorrow after it closed for the New Year. Another is also now advertising a special ‘Mafia’ game night, also known as ‘Werewolf,’ to be held every Wednesday starting this week. As it too is a restaurant-cafe, this implies those going will also consume items from its menu.  

This possibly indicates that the authorities are reserving certain goods for key commercial enterprises, including cafes and restaurants, as well as bakeries. Wine, of course, is not an issue in a region that produces its own and the same is true for vodka. Karabakh’s Public TV even aired a report on a fairly new albeit small winery in one village just two days ago.

Tea and coffee also appear to be available, though cigarettes are reportedly close to disappearing completely. 

None of which, of course, is to diminish the potential severity of the situation in Karabakh if it continues. Certainly, at some point there will be an even greater scarcity of goods that cannot be produced locally. This would includes hygiene and sanitation products, cosmetics, commercially produced snacks, and specialized ingredients for Stepanakert’s eateries. 

Though many are not essential items, they would affect the ability of some businesses to continue. For example, although still visible in video reports from Karabakh’s Public TV and even in social media posts by residents, carbonated drinks, chocolates, coffee, potato crisps, and other goods not produced locally will eventually disappear when existing stocks run out.

This will obviously hit Karabakh’s already shaky economy, something Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reports is already starting to happen.

“Small shops have not opened as they have no products, but the big ones still have it to some extent,” RFE/RL quoted one resident as saying earlier today.” The big stores are open and they have stored goods. They take them out regularly and they give little by little. People have also created reserves so that they can last a long time.”

Physical currency is also a problem, though likely because Karabakh uses the Armenian dram so supply is now limited. It also no doubt prevents some residents imperiling local banks by withdrawing their savings. Instead, residents have been requested to mainly use plastic cards.

Regardless, it still remains uncertain when the standoff on the Lachin corridor will be resolved, but at least Karabakh doesn’t appear to be facing starvation – and nor are the defacto authorities claiming that it will. Instead, Vardanyan’s team have been minimising major disruption to ensure that life can continue as close to normality as is practically possible.

That’s not to say things are normal, however. There is clearly rationing occurring and the gradual intermittent resupply of shops and catering businesses occurring while other goods, as mentioned above, will clearly run out and some probably have already.

Moreover, perhaps the main issue of concern with the situation on the Lachin corridor is that it hardly contributes to an environment conducive to peace or eventual reconciliation between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It should also be remembered that there are still hundreds of Karabakh Armenians stranded in Yerevan and Goris. Among them are children.

Indeed, on 30 December, UNICEF Armenia echoed the calls of the UN Secretary General’s spokesperson to ‘ensure freedom and security of movement’ so that ‘international obligations to protect children are met.’ There are also reportedly problems emerging for those residents with specific nutritional needs, especially in kindergartens and nursing homes.

For everyone’s sake, a resolution of the standoff on the Lachin corridor is therefore necessary.

 —
Update 3 January 2023: Ruben Vardanyan today announced that some goods stored in Karabakh’s food reserves will be distributed to shops. This gradual and limited resupply sounds logical given that there is so far no official rationing introduced and it also prevents panic buying.

 

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Standoff in Lachin as Humanitarian Concerns Mount

Standoff in Lachin as Humanitarian Concerns Mount

© Azerbaijani protest on the Lachin highway / Public Domain

At time of writing, the strategic Lachin corridor has been effectively blocked for twelve days by Azerbaijani protestors. Depending on whom you ask, this recent development either risks derailing an already precarious Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process or makes the signing of a treaty all the more urgent. Whatever your position, however, it was clear that Baku would apply pressure on the only connection between Armenia and what remains of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).

What was unknown was simply how. 

Framed as an Azerbaijani environmental protest, what effectively amounts to a blockade highlights what only a few of us warned nearly two years ago – Karabakh is geographically isolated after the 2020 war and, while reliant on Russia for security, is almost totally dependent on Baku for its sustainability, especially in terms of essential resources and now, it seems, trade and transport. Paradoxically, this reality was ignored or inexplicably overlooked by most commentators in the two years since the 2020 ceasefire statement was signed.

In practical terms, Azerbaijan did not need to launch renewed military operations to coerce further concessions from Yerevan and Stepanakert. All it needed to do was tighten the screws. 

Admittedly, some Armenian analysts did understood that pressure would be applied on Lachin, albeit only in the last month or so. Nonetheless, they understood that something was coming and not least since what was effectively a 3 December dress rehearsal with representatives of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Ecology and the AzerGold Joint Stock Company (JSC) blocking the highway for three hours and raising the issue of illegal mining and alleged environmental damage in Karabakh. 

The Azerbaijani media had also been full of claims that Armenia was shipping munitions and landmines to Karabakh via the highway, though these appear to be so far unproven, while reports of precious metals being extracted and exported to Armenia also surfaced. In an attempt to defuse tensions on the road, the protestors entered into negotiations with the Russian peacekeeping command, reportedly also involving Karabakh Security Council Secretary Vitaly Balasanyan, and an agreement was reached.

Scanning machines would be introduced at one or more Russian checkpoints while Azerbaijani specialists would be granted access to the mines. However, on 10 December, Karabakh Armenians reportedly prevented the visit. The defacto authorities in Stepanakert claim that there was no official request sent to them and on 11 December, Baku sent a diplomatic note to Moscow demanding that access should be forthcoming. The following morning, the Lachin highway was again blocked by Azerbaijani protestors. 

The particular mine in question, incidentally, has long been a matter of controversy. After the 2020 war, the enterprise ceased operations after its pumping station fell under Azerbaijani control, but it is unclear when it resumed operations. Ostensibly owned by Base Metals CJSC, the largest tax payer in Karabakh, the Anglo-Asian Mining company has also staked its claim on the mines. It bases this on the 1997 sale by Azerbaijan of the right to the mines even though it was situated in territory outside of Baku’s control.

Indeed, this development seems as much aimed at re-asserting Azerbaijan’s claims to what the international community views as its sovereign territory now in a new post-2020 conflict environment. In that sense, and with new obstacles emerging in the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process, Baku is using any means at its disposal to achieve that. However, there are several specific issues at the heart of this dispute other than simply mineral resources. 

Certainly, few outside of Azerbaijan view the protestors blocking the Lachin highway as genuine environmental activists. First, it is not easy for Azerbaijani citizens to travel to Shusha, the strategic hilltop citadel that returned to Baku’s control in November 2020, and even fewer are able to travel from there down to where the Lachin road passes. Indeed, aside from military personnel, it is nigh on impossible, lending credence to claims that rather than organic, the demonstration was organised by the Azerbaijani authorities.

And as many have also pointed out, it would be unthinkable for any such demonstration or road closure to occur in Azerbaijan proper. . 

Even so, while the issue of legal entitlement to the mines, as well as related environmental concerns, are certainly part of the unfolding drama, consensus among many views this as more a pretext. Also of significance, for example, is the recent arrival of Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan in Karabakh and his appointment as defacto State Minister. An outsider, Baku views him as “Moscow’s man,” an allegation that Vardanyan denies, but also an opinion shared by some, though not all, analysts in Armenia.

The latter, incidentally, charge that Vardanyan is using Karabakh as a stepping stone to pursue a political career in Armenia with an eventual aim to re-assert Moscow’s influence over the country. This, of course, is only speculation, but it is a view held by those admittedly in the pro-western camp in the country. Regardless, Vardanyan’s attempts to reinforce the status quo by exerting what increasingly appears to be considerable control over the breakaway region are not welcomed by Baku.

In particular, Azerbaijan  says that it was engaged with the Karabakh Armenians, on water for example, but that such contacts allegedly stopped when Vardanyan took his position. 

Irking Baku, on 17 November, Vardanyan even said that he considered himself as ‘qualified’ to enter into negotiations over the future of Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan reacted harshly to the statement, though the issue of some kind of mechanism for dialogue between with the Karabakh Armenians has increasingly come to the fore following the 27 September meeting of Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington D.C..

As part of those talks, it is believed that such a mechanism was discussed, though Yerevan and Baku are at odds over whether an international mechanism was agreed or not. A leaked document that appears to be genuine or at least credible, seems to be vague in terms of confirming whether this was decided or simply discussed.. 

The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regardless, the Azerbaijani protests do appear as much targeted against Vardanyan, possibly to also erode his credibility over time, but there are other issues that indicate frustration with the peace process has set in. Indeed, the timing of the environmental protests also comes precisely after other developments that might well have frozen the European Union-facilitated Brussels process. Rightly or wrongly, Baku puts the blame for this firmly on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s shoulders. 

Azerbaijan specifically claims that Pashinyan made last minute demands for French President Emmanuel Macron to be present at a scheduled meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels on 7 December that would be facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel. Armenia says that such a format was agreed at the Prague summit on 6 October that for the first did involve Macron. Prior to that, he had only been seen during an informal trilateral discussion and one teleconference with Aliyev, Pashinyan, and Michel.

Neither the European Union or France has clearly commented on either claim, leaving it unclear as to which side’s account is correct. Regardless, the meeting was cancelled and for all intents and purposes, Azerbaijani hopes for a peace treaty to be signed by the end of this year clearly dashed. Another grievance is also the failure to provide a link between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan even though Armenia has access to Karabakh via Lachin. 

Both routes were key provisions of the 9-10 November 2020 tripartite ceasefire statement.

6. […] The Lachin Corridor (5 km wide), which will provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia while not passing through the territory of Shusha, shall remain under the control of the Russian Federation peacemaking forces.

 

[…]

 

The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.

 

[…]

 

9. All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections.

 

Subject to agreement between the Parties, the construction of new transport communications to link the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be ensured.

Though Pashinyan has instead offered three alternative crossing points on its borders with Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, Azerbaijan considers them unsuitable for a variety of reasons. First, they are significantly longer than the most direct route between Azerbaijan and its exclave and secondly, they would be impossible to secure unless Russia were to deploy additional forces elsewhere on Armenian territory. With regards to the route Baku wants, the Russian FSB already has a presence on the Armenia-Iran border.

There is also the issue of customs and border checks which Armenia appears reluctant to concede on. In response, Azerbaijan argues, if there are to be checks on what it terms the “Zangezur Corridor,” then so too should there be on the Lachin corridor.  While both routes would remain under the sovereignty of each country, they would be anyway controlled by Moscow. The Lachin corridor is already temporarily under the control of Russian peacekeeping force while the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) would oversee the route via Armenia. 

As a result, and despite setbacks with its invasion of Ukraine, as well as some disagreement between Yerevan and Moscow over inaction from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), some allege that the impasse on the Lachin Corridor suits Moscow and that it too seeks to force the issue of the route through Armenia to Nakhichevan. However, others believe that Baku is seeking to discredit the credibility of the Russian peacekeeping force which is responsible under the 2020 ceasefire statement for ensuring access. 

But it isn’t just Azerbaijan. While Yerevan has been somewhat restrained in commenting on events in Lachin, it too has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping force for not preventing or intervening in the standoff. In reality, however, it was unlikely that Moscow would resort to force given that peacekeeping forces, even with a mandate, are more likely to remain neutral and facilitate negotiations, something that Moscow says is happening. For its part, the defacto Karabakh authorities say they instead want a Russian presence mandated and increased.

The mission has also sent convoys through the Azerbaijani protest camp during the standoff, though it is unclear whether they are ferrying foodstuffs or other humanitarian assistance. Stepanakert denies this, while Baku insists that it will allow Armenian civilian traffic to pass through the camp. Vardanyan has openly rejected this offer, citing security concerns, and confusing matters more, it also appears that Armenia has blocked access to the Lachin Corridor on its side of mutual border, presumably for the same reason.

Today it also appears that a group of journalists from Karabakh attempted to travel along the highway towards the Azerbaijani protest camp but were turned back by Russian peacekeeping forces, further muddying the waters as to who is blocking what.

Also at time of writing, only one Armenian ambulance ferrying a critically ill Karabakh resident to Yerevan has so far been escorted through the camp by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The following day, a second ambulance stranded in Armenia returned with it back to Stepanakert. Interestingly, on 21 December, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg ruled that it was unclear to what extent Azerbaijan had control on the road and instead highlighted the need to only guarantee such humanitarian access.

Noting that the extent to which the Government of Azerbaijan were currently in control of the situation in the “Lachin Corridor” was disputed and unclear at this stage, noting in addition the obligation of Azerbaijan under Article 6 of the Trilateral Statement signed on 9 November 2020 to “guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions” and reminding them of their obligations under the Convention, the Court decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before it, to indicate to the Government of Azerbaijan, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to take all measures that are within their jurisdiction to ensure safe passage through the “Lachin Corridor” of seriously ill persons in need of medical treatment in Armenia and others who were stranded on the road without shelter or means of subsistence.

Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch, while not demanding that the Azerbaijani protests stop, has also commented on the situation and suggested that the protest camp could at least be organised in such a way so as not to effectively disrupt traffic for whatever the reason..   

Those in control of the road and the area around it – that is Azerbaijan authorities and the Russian peacekeeping force – should ensure that vehicles with humanitarian goods can pass and that freedom of movement is not stopped, Human Rights Watch said. 

 

Whether the protesters have genuine environmental concerns or other grievances, Azerbaijan should facilitate the right to peaceful protest by interacting with the protesters in a way that ensures the road remains open and the protest does not deny Nagorno-Karabakh residents their rights of access to essential services and goods, and to freedom of movement.

Others have also called for the free movement of vehicles, but as credible reports of food and fuel running out for Karabakh residents emerge, many more are concerned that a humanitarian crisis is in the making. Stepanakert claims that 120,000 ethnic Armenians are at risk of starvation and inadequate medical treatment while Baku says all traffic is free to pass and that fewer people anyway reside in the area currently under the control of the Russian peacekeeping force.

In reality, nobody knows how many people live in Karabakh, but it is unlikely to be close to the claimed 120,000 but also certainly nowhere near to the 25,000 claimed by Baku. Regardless, the situation is not good to say the least.

Ultimately, however, one side will have to fold, but for now the standoff continues and however it does, one thing is clear. There is an urgent need for a peace agreement to be negotiated and signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan sooner rather than later. Time has never been on the side of peace in this conflict and as I’ve written many times before, and also said at a civil society meeting in Tbilisi in January, Stepanakert and Baku urgently need to talk.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

EUMM Georgia to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia as EUMCAP ends

EUMM Georgia to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia as EUMCAP ends

Today, 19 December 2022, the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) ended its short two-month mission in Armenia. Deployed as a result of the 6 October Prague meeting between European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, its short mission coincided with apparent signals emanating from the 27 September meeting between senior Armenian and Azerbaijani officials in Washington D.C. that a peace deal between Yerevan and Baku could be signed by year’s end.

I took a calculated guess back then that EUMCAP  would likely be made up of staff temporarily seconded from an existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions elsewhere, and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia was the most likely candidate. Indeed, that was correct, but any hopes for the signing of even a framework peace agreement appear to have been dashed since then, raising certain questions about whether EUMCAP would be extended let alone transformed into a dedicated mission.

This is an important issue because EUMM in Georgia can hardly afford to keep some of its own personnel in Armenia or send any more down unless it recruits more civilian monitors and support staff.

In its press release issued today, the European Council appears to imply that a dedicated mission is not definite and that any decision will likely be contingent on progress in the EU-facilitated peace process. Given that the EU is not known for putting its observers directly in harm’s way, this would mean registering results, whether publicly or privately, in the  border demarcation process and/or the normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan. However, the tone of the press release sounds cautiously optimistic.

The deployment of 40 European monitoring experts has proved to be effective and contributed to building confidence in an unstable situation. Today we start a new phase in the EU’s engagement in the South Caucasus, with a transitional team that will prepare the ground for a possible longer term EU mission in Armenia, with the ultimate goal of contributing to sustainable peace in the region.

 

[…] 

 

Against this background, the Council – in agreement with Armenia’s authorities – decided that the existing EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) will deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia to enhance the EU’s awareness of the security situation, and contribute to the planning and preparation of a possible civilian CSDP mission in the country. The transitional planning assistance team is also expected to support the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, in the EU-facilitated normalisation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

It can only be hoped that the Charles Michel-facilitated process can be kickstarted despite the recent cancelation of a meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan planned for Brussels on 7 December. Certainly, EUMM, which has been operating in Georgia since the August 2008 war with Russia, has been exemplary. Though it cannot prevent ceasefire violations, it can at least calm tensions, including through its Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), working with at-risk communities, and cross-border media workshops.

These are all developments that would benefit Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the region as a whole, but probably only if the EU were convinced that both are truly close to signing a long-awaited peace agreement – and before the end of next year. Indeed, some might argue, preferably by the beginning of Spring 2023 when the snow melts and border incidents become more frequent. Russia and possibly Iran’s reaction, however, will be something to look out for. 

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Landmine Free South Caucasus 2022 Campaign

Landmine Free South Caucasus 2022 Campaign

Campaign Logo © Landmine Free South Caucasus

Late last month civil society in Azerbaijan and Georgia marked a day of solidarity for the victims of landmines and the communities that are affected by them. I attended the event held by LINKS Europe and its local partners in Tbilisi while another event was held simultaneously by my good friend Ahmad Alili, Director of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre (CPAC), in Baku. I was told a similar event was also held in Yerevan.

Personally speaking, this is particularly an issue of importance for me given my own work covering the problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Armenia, Karabakh, and the then Armenian-controlled seven regions surrounding the breakaway region from about 2000-2011. Therefore, in support of the Landmine Free South Caucasus campaign, I include the official statement from LINKS Europe below.

The South Caucasus remains one of the areas most infected with contamination by landmines and other unexploded remnants of war in the world. Apart from the thou- sands of casualties caused directly or indirectly by landmines and other unexploded ordnance over the last three and a half decades, including several hundred in the last year, this contamination negatively impacts whole communities across the region, affecting their economic well-being, and exposing them to the constant threat of risk and danger.

 

In 2019 and in 2021, the regional campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus was suc- cessfully implemented across the region. Government officials, demining organisa- tions and civil society, together with representatives of the international community, actively discussed the threat that landmines pose, and action that could be taken to eradicate them. The campaign took the message for a landmine free South Caucasus to schools and communities across the region.

 

We are pleased to announce the launch of the 2022 Regional Campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus which this year will be launched on 30 November with a “Day of Solidarity with the victims of landmines and other unexploded remnants of war, and their communities, in the South Caucasus”.

 

As in the past, the campaign will be delivered in five languages: Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Russian and English. Starting on 30 November, the campaign will run until 30 June 2023, with activities focusing on the heavy human and economic cost of unexploded remnants of war, and to increase awareness of the need for their swift eradication. By reaching out in solidarity to communities affected by landmines we want to assure them that they are not alone. We also recall that hundreds of de- miners across the region risk their lives on a daily basis as they work tirelessly to rid the region from this scourge. We hail their efforts and say thank you for their precious work. As land is rehabilitated and returned to its proper use, care should be taken to make sure that it is the communities affected that should benefit first from its eco- nomic exploitation.

 

Finally, we appreciate the support of the international community in the quest for eradicating all landmines and other unexploded remnants of war from the South Caucasus. However the magnitude of the challenge facing the demining community is such that a much bigger level of support is required so that the capacity of local demining efforts is increased to a level where it can respond adequately to the tasks at hand. This support should be forthcoming quickly and at levels that would make a real difference.

 

We appeal to the people of the South Caucasus and to the international community:

 

  • Join us in expressing our solidarity with individuals and communities that are victims of landmines and other explosive remnants of war!

  • Join us in saying thank you to deminers!

  • Join us in calling for a landmine free South Caucasus by the end of this decade, or soon after.

     

The campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus is a regional effort with the participation of organisations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, working together with international part- ners. The campaign is co-ordinated by LINKS Europe and supported by the European Union. For more information please contact Patrick Norén: patrick@links-europe.eu.

Controlled detonation of landmines and UXO by the HALO Trust, Askeran, Nagorno Karabakh
© Onnik James Krikorian 2010

Incidentally, in the LINKS Europe newsletter that accompanies the campaign, it is also reported that in October alone, the National Agency for Mine Action of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) defused or destroyed over 4,000 landmines and UXO. Though some of the minefields in the seven regions now returned to Azerbaijani control were cleared in the 2000s, there are many more that remain or have been laid since.

Those mines have already taken a heavy toll in the post-2020 war environment.

It should also be remembered that Armenia has its own problems with landmines on the border too, and LINKS Europe also says that in November the Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) held a training for UN employees in Armenia on explosive munitions and the danger that they pose. Earlier in October, CHDE also held awareness workshops for children and teachers in villages in the Gegharkunik region of the country.

Meanwhile, in Karabakh, the HALO Trust demining charity continues its work there. I’ve accompanied HALO Trust many times as they worked on demining land and collecting UXO from about 2000 to 2011 and some of my articles on the situation in Armenia and Karabakh 2000-2011 can be read online here, here, here, and here. There’s also a gallery of images taken during some of those visits here.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian