Tensions in Karabakh and Talks in Brussels

Tensions in Karabakh and Talks in Brussels

by | Sep 5, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Lachin Corridor, Nagorno Karabakh

Lachin © Onnik James Kikorian 2001

On 3 August, following the non-fatal shooting of an Armenian soldier and the death of an Azerbaijani conscript in an escalation that led to clashes, Baku launched military operations in Karabakh on a scale not seen since the November 2020 ceasefire statement. Two Armenian soldiers were killed and 19 wounded in multiple Azerbaijani mortar and drone attacks while key strategic heights overlooking Karabakh were also captured. 

Russian Peacekeepers blamed Azerbaijan for violating the fragile armistice while Baku insisted that it acted within its right against ‘illegal armed groups’ that should have already been withdrawn according to the 2020 agreement. National Security Council President Armen Grigoryan admitted last month that Republic of Armenia forces were still operating in Karabakh but that they would be removed in September 2022. 

As tensions boiled, on 2 August, Armenian media reported that Yerevan withdrew its remaining forces ahead of that date. Moreover, two days later, on 4 August, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed this in a cabinet meeting saying that there were now no longer any soldiers from the Republic of Armenia in Karabakh. Nevertheless, it was just one of many issues that had divided the sides. 

Indeed, there are other reasons, say observers. “The incidents have to do with disagreements over provisions of the Russian-backed ceasefire that ended the 2020 war over this mountainous enclave,” wrote the International Crisis Group (ICG) in an 9 August update. “Baku has called the military operation a “revenge” for the death of its soldier […], but its actions appear to owe as well to dissatisfaction with the situation on the ground.”

The ICG specifically points to disagreement between the sides over the re-routing of the Lachin corridor, the main and only road now connecting Armenia with ethnic Armenians living in Karabakh. Though it is believed the route was agreed upon before construction, the timetable for its re-routing might not have been. According to the 2020 ceasefire statement this should have been ‘within’ three years from the signing of the agreement, but Azerbaijan had already almost completed its part.

“Baku believes Yerevan is stalling on laying its several-kilometre section of the new road, although Armenia issued a tender for beginning construction in August,” the ICG explained, while also noting that an Baku also accuses Yerevan of “trying to delay the commissioning of the new road this year, thereby purposely delaying the handover of the city of Lachin and a number of villages to Azerbaijan.”

After the clashes, and although Armenia stated its section of the road would be completed in Spring 2023, the ICG said that the de facto Karabakh authorities are now willing to use the new road “as soon as possible.” Instructions were given to Armenian settlers in Lachin and other villages on the route of the old road to evacuate by 25 August, which they did. However, the international community remains concerned. 

The European Union’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, urged restraint, calling on both sides not to derail a “historic opportunity to turn the page on decades of strife.” “The  recent increase in tensions underscores the need for a negotiated, comprehensive, and sustainable settlement of all remaining issues related to or resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,” the US State Department wrote in its statement.

Also aware of how the fragile the ceasefire has become, European Council President Charles Michel held calls with both the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, and the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan. On 5 August, Michel announced that it was still hoped that talks between the two could be facilitated. “Ahead of our next leaders meeting in Brussels, pursuing dialogue and achieving concrete progress on all items on the agenda is key,” he tweeted.

Notably, the Russian peacekeeping force did not intervene in the clashes, leading to condemnation from some Armenians in Armenia and Karabakh. Prime Minister Pashinyan also criticized its inaction, claiming that this issue had been raised with Moscow and specifically the need for a concrete mandate and terms of engagement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, however, denied that Moscow had received any such proposals, leading to additional claims from Yerevan to the contrary.

“The clashes have once again highlighted the challenges faced by the Russian peacekeeping mission without a clear mandate for how it can engage beyond its monitoring role – a problem made worse by Russia’s loss of standing following its invasion of Ukraine,” the ICG wrote. This is an issue, it believes, that needs to be addressed in the future and especially ahead of the first deadline for extending the Russian peacekeeping presence in the conflict zone past 2025.

The ICG nonetheless ended on a positive note.

Unlike previous escalations, it believed, there was less support for military operations within Azerbaijan. Representatives of the country’s civil society, it claimed, were now concerned that such incidents would undermine the EU-facilitated peace process and damage Baku’s relations with the EU, including in the area of energy. It could also derail the Armenia-Turkey normalisation process and the unblocking of regional connectivity.

Some progress was registered at the 31 August Brussels meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan with European Council President Charles Michel issuing a statement soon after. “Our exchanges were open and productive,” said Michel. “It is positive to see that quite a few steps have been taken to take forward the agreements reached during our last meeting.”

In addition to announcing that the leaders would meet again in November, Michel also said that the next meeting of the border commissions would be held in Brussels the same month. In the meantime, the two Foreign Ministers, Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan, would meet before the end of September to start work on drafting the text of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“Public messaging is crucial,” Michel stressed, explaining the importance of preparing populations for a ‘long-term sustainable peace.’

Other issues discussed in Brussels concerned humanitarian issues and specifically demining, detainees, and the fate of the missing from both wars. However, relations between the sides, as well as the situation along the new Line of Contact (LoC), remains precarious and unpredictable.

“All the ingredients for peace exist in the South Caucasus,” Commonspace opined in an editorial on the August 3 military operation in Karabakh, adding that all the ingredients for war exist too. “What is in front of us is a choice.”

 

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Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan Talk Water

Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan Talk Water

by | Aug 29, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Environment, Nagorno Karabakh

Road to the Sarsang Reservoir, Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 2001

On 22 August, representatives of the Azerbaijan Reclamation and Water Management OJSC visited the Sarsang Reservoir located in the Aghdara/Mardakert region of that part of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) now under the control of Russian peacekeepers. Constructed in 1976, the Sarsang Reservoir has a capacity of 560 million cubic meters and was used to irrigate 96,000 hectares of arable land in Barda, Terter, Agdam, Agjabedi, Yevlakh and Goranboy.

The news came out of nowhere and it was later reported that similar meetings had already been held between local Armenian and Azerbaijani water specialists since February last year. The closest to a sign that some discussion had taken place was in a Eurasianet article published a week before that detailed at least one verbal agreement reached in June. According to that report, Karabakh Armenians had agreed to release 18,000 cubic meters of water to Azerbaijan-controlled areas daily. 

“After the war, on Azerbaijan’s demands, the hydroelectric plant began to produce electricity in summer, that is automatically providing Azerbaijan with water for irrigation,” Eurasianet quoted a Karabakh Armenian official as saying. “The water used for power generation flows into the Mataghis reservoir, which Azerbaijan controls.” 

This, incidentally, is something that the former U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassador James B. Warlick, had encouraged back in 2015, as also touched upon in my interview with him the same year.

Ambassador Warlick: I have repeatedly stressed that the sides should come together with the Co-Chairs to discuss issues that are in the interests of all people affected by the conflict. Water is one of the most obvious initiatives. I hope the sides see value in coming to the table and cooperating on the sharing of water resources. The Co-Chairs remain ready to assist them.

In the post-war environment, such an agreement is mutually beneficial to both as they now rely on each other for irrigation. “There are valves in the territories that have come under the control of Azerbaijan, which can be opened only with the consent of the Azerbaijani side, on which there are preliminary agreements,” Armenian media quoted one Karabakh representative as saying.

This was the first widely publicised example of significant contact and cooperation between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Karabakh. Though there had been some agreement during the construction of the new section of the highway connecting Armenia to Karabakh, meetings over water also saw ethnic Armenian representatives regularly visit areas now returned to Baku’s control.

“Ideas were exchanged about the possible options for the rational use of water resources, taking into account the control of the Sarsang reservoir, and the control over the irrigation infrastructures,” a local Armenian official explained. “In the future, discussions will continue and decisions will be made based on the needs of both electricity production and irrigation as well as the needs related to drinking and irrigation water.”

According to Adil Gafarli, one of the Azerbaijani representatives that visited Sarsang, this was also not the first visit to the reservoir and more bi-monthly meetings are planned starting today. Garfali also described last week’s meeting with his local Armenian counterparts as “sincere and productive.”

 

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Armenia-Azerbaijan Confidence Building Measures – Recommendations

Armenia-Azerbaijan Confidence Building Measures – Recommendations

by | Aug 22, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Commonspace, Nagorno Karabakh

At the beginning of April last year, LINKS Europe published its long awaited recommendations for confidence building measures (CBMs), drawn up by a Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group after six months of consultations in Baku, Yerevan, and Kakheti (Georgia). In its preamble, the authors particularly noted the need to build trust between the parties as well as promote dialogue in support of what appears to be a new peace process. The report was financed by the European Union’s EU4Peace project.

The Liaison Group members and co-rapporteurs should be commended for their efforts. A breakdown of the report’s key findings, conclusions, and recommendations are below.

The report authors point out that even if political leaders opt for peace, the journey forward will be long and difficult. “Mistrust, enemy imagery and a security deficit frustrate against even small steps towards peace and reconciliation,” they note. “The quest for peace needs therefore to be comprehensive and multi-layered – recognizing the complexity of the regional and international context, and with due regard to the baggage of history that weighs heavily on the shoulders of both leaders and citizens alike. The task of building trust and confidence has never been so important, relevant, and necessary as now.”

The Liaison Group identified five key areas where CBMs are necessary:

  • Confidence-building in the field of diplomacy, politics, policy, security and geopolitics

  • Confidence-building in the border areas, and within the communities directly affected by the conflict, and broader people-to-people contacts

  • Confidence-building in the field of connectivity and economic activity

  • Confidence-building in education and working with young people

  • Confidence-building in public spaces, such as media, social media and public platforms, and on heritage, humanitarian and human rights issues

The Liaison Group also specifically highlighted the importance of inclusivity, particularly in terms of women, youth, and displaced communities. They should be placed front and center, it says. The importance of increasing women’s inclusion in the leadership of initiatives and steering groups such as the Liaison Group should be further noted.

30 Measures by 2030

In its recommendations, the Liaison Group details the time frame, target group, potential initiators, and potential outcome of its 30 proposed measures. A summary of the measures and recommendations are below.

The first is to initiate diplomatic contacts between Armenia and Azerbaijan with a view to holding a South Caucasus Peace, Stability, and Security Conference with the participation of relevant stakeholders that could lead to the signing of a regional, peace, stability, and security pact by the end of 2030. Governments and/or international organizations could be the potential initiators of such a development.

A second recommendation is to prepare for 2025 when the Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh might end. Though peacekeeping could be extended for an extra five years, and even beyond that in a different form, this remains uncertain. It is therefore imperative that “discussions and agreements on this topic are done in good time.”

An informal 10-person Armenian-Azerbaijani Joint Monitoring Group to monitor obligations from the 10 November 2020 ceasefire agreement, and subsequent agreements and statements, should be initiated by international institutions such as the EU and/or the OSCE working with the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments. Civil society could also play a role.

The Parliament of Georgia could also encourage regional political dialogue with the involvement of the parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan should also initiate discussions involving municipal authorities in order to establish a mechanism for strengthening communication and interaction between civilian structures in both countries. This would promote relations between the two communities on the ground.

These processes should be dynamic in order to create a cascading effect so that momentum is registered in the process of confidence building. Public discussion in town hall style meetings are also necessary.

A program involving those communities should be developed so that both can Know the Neighbors on the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, enabling a better understanding of each other. Local civil society, with the support of the EU and other international donors, would be a key actor here. Support programs for civil society to become more mainstream is key. Exchange programs for mutual visits by civil society to Baku and Yerevan should be encouraged in the nearest future.

Diaspora communities should be engaged in discussion and kept aware of the processes in play, as well as CBMs introduced. The report notes that a ‘modest start’ in this regard can be made in Europe and the Middle East. It should be noted that the largest Armenian and Azerbaijani diaspora communities can be found in Russia, though the situation in Ukraine may complicate extensive engagement with those communities at present.

A major economic study should be undertaken to underscore how a resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be transformed into a peace-dividend. Working with the donor community and international financial institutions, a South Caucasus Development Fund should be established, possibly in line with the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative and in cooperation with the EBRD. This is something that has been highlighted in previous newsletters.

From 2023, an annual South Caucasus Economic Forum should be held, bringing together business groups and international partners and modeled on the World Economic Forum in Davos. A special Economic Zone should also be established close to the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Working with all three governments, an economic zone can contribute to economic development and innovation. Regional tourism is also another important area to explore and develop through the establishment of a South Caucasus Tourism Bureau.

Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian youth could also benefit from a South Caucasus Youth Summer School. Held in Georgia, a South Caucasus Youth Center modeled on the European Youth Center in Strasbourg would be a welcome development to bring young people from all three countries together. Such an initiative, the authors note, will have “immediate and tangible positive results.” A tolerance program can also prevent youth from falling into the trap of radicalization.

Also on the subject of youth, a joint education fund can enable students and scholars from universities in Armenia and Azerbaijan to jointly participate in collaborative projects and attend academic conferences in third countries as well as benefit from scholarships. Music is also an important medium through which to engage youth in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Many cross-border events do take place, but they are largely unknown to the majority of Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

The report highlights some of the outstanding problems that still need to be overcome. One of the most controversial issues remains that of cultural and religious sites. The report calls for graveyards and cemeteries to be recognized as common heritage. Visits by relatives and descendants from one side of the border to such sites in the other should be facilitated in potential cooperation with ICRC and/or UNESCO. A South Caucasus Heritage Foundation should further tackle the serious and sensitive issue of monuments and other sites, again in cooperation with UNESCO and others.

Despite the overall positive outlook in the report, it also doesn’t shy away from problems that will likely emerge, especially in terms of ethnic and possibly religious tension and discrimination. To address this, the liaison group recommends that an Office of Regional Ombudsperson should be established to deal with any complaints in this area. Importantly, gender is also explicitly addressed. The report suggests that a Women’s Regional Task Force should be created, particularly prioritizing women in border regions as well as those displaced by the conflict.

The report further says that, with the support of the EU, think tanks should be commissioned to produce reports offering an alternative vision of the South Caucasus for 2030. Media organizations have a role to play as well, and a South Caucasus Media Platform can contribute to making the media in both Armenia and Azerbaijan less adversarial.

A regional conference for media could also be held. Such initiatives have occurred before, including developing a code of ethics, but the situation prior to 2020 made any outcomes short-lived and theoretical. Annual prizes for the best contribution to a peaceful South Caucasus in the media and on social media could also be awarded annually.

The report ends with an appeal to the governments and peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the international community to consider the proposals seriously, and particularly welcomes the engagement of the EU in the region.

The full paper can be read online here.

This summary written by Onnik James Krikorian was first published on 9 August 2022.

 

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Civilnet Interviews Arman Grigoryan on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabakh

Civilnet Interviews Arman Grigoryan on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabakh

by | Jul 26, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh, Russia

On 25th July, the Yerevan-based online news site Civilnet uploaded an interview in Russian with Armenian Political Scientist and Lehigh University Professor Arman Grigoryan. Below is a summary of what Grigoryan said and a rough translation. The full interview in Russian is embedded at the bottom of this post.

SUMMARY

Talk of new war could be to prepare the population for peace, but also because some things are already being decided that we have little or no information on.

 

Three strands of NK resolution

  • Border delimitation
  • Unblocking transport
  • Nagorno Karabakh status

The issue of status cannot be decided now so quickly after 30 years of enmity and war. Russia favours a phased approach so that after economic linkages etc. some creative approaches to status can be found.

 

Without this, there will be no ethnic Armenians left in Karabakh. Feeling is that West favours package approach. This could also be driven by the hope that Russian peacekeepers will therefore not be needed in the conflict zone.

 

If all the issues are not resolved by the end of the first five-year term for the Russian peacekeeping mission, and it doesn’t look like they will be, then it will automatically be renewed for a second term.

 

Russia and Azerbaijan will likely find a common language and allow for the extension of the peacekeeping mission. Despite opposition to this in Azerbaijan, Baku won’t risk a crisis or direct confrontation with Moscow.

 

Armenia’s position is seen in the context of opposition criticism of what happened in 2020 and the belief that further concessions will be made. However, whoever is in power will have to make concessions after such a defeat.

 

To maintain such a position as before the 2020 war would be irrational. What concessions Armenia is ready to make is not clear because of domestic political considerations.

 

Whether the West and Russia can coordinate efforts remains unclear. There is already a different approach to status and this also depends on what happens to Russia in Ukraine.

 

Regardless of who mediates, everything is leading to the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan but the nature of this agreement can differ. What can disrupt this is serious destabilisation in the region.

 

Such a situation can occur if Russia faces such problems in Ukraine that it has to turn its attention only to there. A vacuum in the region could occur and the balance of power shift.

 

If this does not happen then with any scenario or any mediation format, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan will probably be signed. Nevertheless, the risk of destabilisation exists.

 

It is in everyone’s interest to unblock regional transportation and communication links in the region, but the question of who will benefit the most remains. Nevertheless, if both sides can gain, both are interested in this.

ROUGH TRANSLATION

On the situation of Armenia finds itself in following the November 2020 ceasefire and recent official warnings about a new war

Before answering this question it is necessary to answer another. What can happen now? What danger are we talking about compared to the situation in which Karabakh and Armenia fell on 9 November?

All we can think of is a large-scale attack on Karabakh and for the same purpose, to attack Armenia and take Syunik. Is that possible? And are they talking about it?

This can happen only in one case – if the Russian factor is weakened.

If Russia’s situation goes bad in Ukraine and Russia turns all its resources and attention to Ukraine. This is the only factor stopping Azerbaijan. If this factor were not present, perhaps such wishes from Azerbaijan would have arisen.

I do not exclude that such statements are made as a result of pessimist analysis (the situation in Ukraine. I think this is a very pessimistic analysis. I think the war will end soon and I think things will be easier for Russia.

It is impossible to speak prematurely about Russia’s defeat or say that Russia is in catastrophic situation.

I think that these statements of our officials are to prepare the people for certain political decisions and new agreements. In fact, these are not new concessions and decisions but simply the fulfilment of the responsibilities that Armenia took after 9 November.

What else can be said about our officials? They often do this after the fact and they don’t reveal all the information immediately. This is how the processing of public opinion is done artificially.

On the likelihood of a road connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through the Syunik region of Armenia

Maybe. There may be certain agreements regarding the Syunik road. The painful issue for our public right now is the road from Syunik and the status of Karabakh.

The confrontation between the West and Russia in Ukraine has increased the uncertainty in our region. How should Armenia behave in this situation?

This is a really difficult situation. I myself was worried for a long time that things would develop like this. Armenia has managed to maintain good relations with Russia and the West during all the governments since independence. 

What should Armenia do?

The first question that should worry the Armenian government is the security of Armenia. I think it is too early to consider a sharp change in political orientation.

Sharp turns and orientations could result with disaster for Armenia. We have examples from Ukraine and Georgia.

I know people say Russia doing badly in Ukraine, Russia is losing in Ukraine, and there is the need to change political orientation and bet on another horse. I do not think that such talks and comments are the result of convincing analysis.

Regarding the question of why the Karabakh issue is not discussed

I do not think that the Karabakh issue has been left on the sidelines. The first reason why it is not actively discussed is that Azerbaijan does not accept that this problem exists.

Azerbaijan clearly and openly says that this problem has been resolved and should not be discussed. In other words, there will be no status for Karabakh, Karabakh will be integrated into Azerbaijan like other regions.

The Armenian authorities sometimes, somehow sluggishly remind us of the existence of the Minsk Group, within which the status of Karabakh should be determined.

And what is the minimum requirements of the Armenian side is not clear. That is, what content in these conversations is completely unclear.

As for Russia, it adheres to the position that it is not expedient to discuss this issue now. And that this will not contribute to the resolution of the conflict. I think, and probably it is not difficult to disagree with this, that it is not possible to find some kind of formula now that would satisfy the minimum requirements of the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides.

To achieve some kind of decision on the status is possible only through pressure and it is clear to everyone who will be the object of such pressure.

Probably it is in the interests of the Armenian side to also separate this issue and approach the settlement and determination of the status with such a staged logic.

Maybe after a certain period of normal relations, the establishment of economic and other ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia, after a certain time it will probably be easier to talk about the status, about some creative solutions.

We had enmity for 30 years, two wars and constant skirmishes. In such an atmosphere, to think that it is possible to reach some kind of agreement and think that the Karabakh Armenians will be able to feel comfortable as citizens of Azerbaijan, this is a myth. There will not even be one Armenian left.

I think that there are also disagreements between Russia and the West on this issue.

I have a feeling that the West is more inclined to a new package agreement where Karabakh will be left as part of Azerbaijan but will have some kind of autonomy status.

Will Baku raise the issue of the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh?

I do not think that Baku will take such a risk until all issues are resolved during this period. And I do not think that all issues will be resolved. If Russia insists on keeping the peacekeeping mission longer than this period I think Azerbaijan and Russia will find a common language and this peacekeeping mission will be extended.

The fact that such voices are heard in Baku, that such demands exist are probably not surprising. I think this should be considered in the context of Azerbaijan’s domestic policy as well. There are people in the opposition who criticise Aliyev. I think that if Russia harshly insists on the extension of the peacekeeping mission, from the Azerbaijani side to insist on the withdrawal of peacekeepers, this will lead to a confrontation with Russia.

The actions of Ilham Aliyev give no reason to think he would adopt such a sharp and risky policy.

What are Armenia’s red lines on Karabakh?

This is a matter of internal policy of Armenia. The opposition sharply criticises Pashinyan because of what happened in 2020 and that he is ready to make some concessions.

Pashinyan has to make some concessions, and for whoever is in power in Armenia after defeat in a war, concessions are inevitable. And it would not be rational to keep the same position that existed in Armenia before the 2020 war. 

But what concessions is Armenia ready to make? They also do not talk about this for obvious reasons.

Firstly, this is a matter of domestic policy, and secondly, they do not yet want to finally clarify their position on what concessions they are ready to make. The third point is, of course, very sad – to realise that the role of Armenia, if not to say that it has disappeared from the negotiation process, but the role of Armenia has been weakened, and this is very tangible.

Red lines they are not defined by words. Red lines are determined by resources, diplomatic international support. It’s just not serious to make a statement that is not backed up by such resources.

We had very well defined red lines before the war. I remember even in 2016, some cultural and diplomatic figures signed under this “Shushi Declaration” that people who talk about territorial compromises should be subjected to criminal liability. We had such red lines.

Are negotiations in two formats unproductive?

This is not only ineffective, it creates very obvious barriers, obvious problems and uncertainties. It is already a fact that they do not have coordination on the Minsk Group. Sergei Lavrov has made repeated statements about this. And there is no coordination and cooperation between the West and Russia on this matter.

Secondly, I have already mentioned the different logic and different approaches to any solution. If they do not coordinate which way Armenia and Azerbaijan will go, it is unclear. This also depends on the outcome of hostilities in Ukraine and what status quo will be created after that.

Will Armenia and Azerbaijan sign a peace agreement?

In any case, if it is Russian mediation or Western mediation, it is obvious that there will be some kind of agreement. The nature of these agreements may differ from each other, but a peace agreement within some framework, in some format, will probably be reached. 

What can prevent this is a serious destabilisation in the region and such a destabilisation can occur if Russia loses the war in Ukraine. That is, the balance may change, the balance of power may change.

If things do not go according to a catastrophic scenario, I think that in any mediation format, a peace agreement will be reached.

Why are Russia and the West simultaneously lobbying for the unblocking of communications in the region?

I think the unblocking of these communications, the solution of the conflict is beneficial to everyone. The question is who will guarantee this, who will have more opportunities for economic cooperation with the region, more opportunities for investment, economic cooperation. 

There will be some differences in the approaches to these issues, but the fact that everyone is interested in unblocking, establishing normal economic ties, I think that this is clear.

Both sides are interested in a settlement. And both sides will be the guarantors of this settlement if it strengthens their influence and creates the ground for close cooperation in the region, of course they are interested in this.

 

You can watch the entire video below. There is also a 20 February 2022 podcast that I held with Arman Grigoryan, who can be followed on Twitter at @AGContrapunctus, in the Karabakh Podcast section of this site.

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Gerard Libaridian’s Latest on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Karabakh Conflict

Gerard Libaridian’s Latest on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Karabakh Conflict

by | Jun 1, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh

Gerard Libaridian 

Arguably one of the most independent and unique voices on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades, Gerard Jirair Libaridian has been particularly on point since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war. Not only was he among the few of us that foresaw a new conflict between the two breaking out in the days and weeks preceding hostilities, but Libaridian was particularly concerned about such an eventuality, though it has to be said that such fears had been growing with each passing year since 2011. 

Senior Advisor to the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, Libaridian has also held the position of director of the Armenian Studies Program at the University of Michigan, and most recently was the co-author of a white paper, The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies. In his recent online presentation for the Cambridge-Yerevan Sister City Association, Libaridian offered his opinion on where things stand and what lies ahead.

He starts the presentation, however, on a pessimistic note, having recently returned from a seven-week visit to Armenia earlier this year.

If you had told me in November of 2020 that there would be sadder days than November 9 when Armenia had to sign a very humiliating ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan after the second Karabakh war, I would not have believed it, but I think we are there now. 

Libaridian later explains that what he means by this is that there now what he terms an assault on democracy in Armenia, with opposition forces close to the former regimes of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan taking to the streets despite last year’s parliamentary elections that saw Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract retain power despite defeat in the 2020 war. Moving on, however, he identifies those questions that are now being asked today.

The first of those is with regards to responsibility for the the 2020 war and its aftermath? There are different answers to this, he says.

One belief is that Pashinyan is responsible and another is that Pashinyan and the previous 25 years of leadership and state-imposed mentality under the presidencies of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan are. These two answers, he says, can be combined by adding that Azerbaijan and Turkey are are responsible. “Any answer,” he says, alluding to the unfortunate tendency to scapegoat and overlook the mistakes of the past, “but me.”

Another question being asked in Armenia is what is the meaning of the 2020 war? There are three answers here, he says.

The first, and which might be held by a good part of the population, is that people are no longer interested and that it doesn’t matter. Then there is the opposition that spreads existential narratives involving Azerbaijan and Turkey while also pushing the idea that there is no point in negotiating with either. Some even go so far as t say that Armenia should move closer to Russia.

Opposing this, however, is another that recognizes that Azerbaijan had specific issues to resolve with Armenia related to Karabakh and that, after decades of registering no progress in negotiations, were resolved through war. Armenia lost and now has to face a new reality that includes the diminished capabilities of the army as well as the state and also the reality that the country was and remains alone. 

No-one helped us, and in fact Russia colluded with Azerbaijan, and therefore we have to think now of what we can save of what’s left our sovereignty and the state – that there is no alternative to negotiations and that we have to find ways to diminish the threat.

In his opinion, Libaridian believes that the newer generation in particular acknowledge that Armenia’s defeat after decades of nationalist narratives and thinking were probably to blame. Now, he says, the government is negotiating to secure Armenia’s sovereignty and borders, to achieve the best possible result for Karabakh, and to decrease any dangers and threats. 

 There is also the question of the role of Russia and the West. “We know the Minsk Group is finished,” says Libaridian. “In my opinion, it was in a coma for a long time, and now it is basically finished as Russia has said the West doesn’t want to work with them.” He also points to the change in titles for the three co-chairs, something that I have also pointed out in the past, including how they are prohibited from acting independently.

There are also questions in in people’s minds, says Libaridian, as to how much Armenia can rely on Russia. Some even hope that Europe and the US can act as counterbalances to Russia, though this isn’t, however, the majority of Armenians. Regardless, he says, another question then arises. What options does Armenia have? 

It is clear that the loss of the war has minimized the options Armenia has and these options have been narrowing down for the past 25 years. The longer we postponed the peaceful resolution, the less options we had, and the war made it clear that we had lost those options.

Armenia has little left to say on the future of Karabakh, he believes. Instead, it will primarily be Russia and Azerbaijan that decides what shape and form it will survive as in the future. Internationally, he says, the situation is obvious. “Karabakh was and is now more clearly recognized as part of Azerbaijan,” he says.

When Aliyev and Azerbaijan started the war and took one third of Karabakh I don’t know of one country that said, no, you can’t do that. And Putin, during and after the war, specified many times that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. Now, there may be other issues to resolve but that’s it – and neither the US, nor France, or anyone else has disagreed. 

Libaridian also turns his attention to the small opposition demonstrations occurring in Yerevan. The issue, he says, is less about Karabakh but more about who should rule and govern Armenia. The vast majority of Armenians remain unconvinced by those political forces linked to or directly representing the previous regimes. 

Personally, I think Pashinyan should have resigned, personally I don’t think he’s the best person to guide these new negotiations, but still the fact is that the whole question of his responsibility for the war, and for the loss, and for the unwise decisions, all of those questions were adjudicated by the 2021 elections. 

 

Well, the outcome is that those who voted for him voted to keep him and that means quite a bit. They preferred to keep a leader who lost the war, who made those very bad decisions, to keep him rather than to have Kocharyan, who represents other problems.   

The situation has, he admits, also been complicated by the war in Ukraine and the question of how Putin will behave depending on whether he wins or loses arises. Is he more dangerous in the first case or the second? Azerbaijan has also become a more significant player in the region because of Ukraine, but as it is likely there will be more limited options for the South Caucasus it remains unclear how that will play out. 

This has also brought up two painful questions in Armenia, he says.

That is, there is what seems to be an orchestrated campaign to dismiss the significance of sovereignty. It is as simple as that. That it is not so simple for Armenia to be independent, there are very significant players in Armenia who think that Armenia should simply become de facto a province of Russia. This is very real. I don’t think most people in Armenia agree, but there are powerful forces inside and outside Armenia that are working on this, that are talking about this, and one way of doing it is to exaggerate and abuse the question of genocide and to create and intensify fear of a new genocide when in fact the threat Armenia faces is not genocide, in my view, but the threat of not acting on the realities that surround it. 

This failure to adjust to the situation Armenia faces is perhaps best exemplified by the campaign to remove Pashinyan from power. An opposition that failed to come to power through elections is now saying that democracy is unnecessary and that a strong leader is required instead, he says. It even goes so far as to suggest that had a strong leader been in power during the war, then Armenia would not have lost.

There are also those who hide under cover of a call for national unity, he continues, and who argue that Pashinyan is not the person who can achieve this. These forces also propose removing Pashinyan through unconstitutional and undemocratic means if necessary. For now, however, says Libiridian, and whether one likes Pashinyan or not, he is the only legitimately elected leader of Armenia. 

Besides, he adds, there is not any opposition party or leader proposing any solution markedly different to what Pashinyan is doing. Ending his opening remarks, Libaridian describes the domestic political situation as one that is very dangerous for Armenia, and in the question and answer session that followed, he offered more of his impressions from his recent visit, including how those he met felt. 

They want to have hope, they feel that they are in a very difficult situation, and some of them see some hope in the negotiations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. That is, one thing is clear. They don’t want more wars and they think that the continuation of the hard line that was before the war, that made war inevitable, that that hard line is not helping and that is evident from the lack of full support of the opposition. 

 

That was evident with the parliamentary elections, it is evident now, even today when [the opposition] are trying to create a popular wave to bring down Pashinyan, I don’t see the numbers there, [people] are tired of the rhetoric, and they’re not buying the narrative. […]

 

[…]

 

They’re waiting to see, but they are supporting negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and I am quite sure that if Pashinyan and his government were not sure [about support] then they would not do it. Pashinyan is a populist [even though] he’s become much more serious since the war, unlike others who have learned no lessons. I can’t say he’s the best negotiator, but I can say he’s on the right path and he would not do it if he thought the majority of Armenians oppose him. 

 

I have no problem in understanding that we have fears, I have no problem in seeing a threat, but […] those who oppose negotiations, in my view, [rely on these fears] to ask people not to think specifically, strategically, and politically. 

In response to another question, Libaridian also referred to the issue of border tensions and past incursions by Azerbaijan. When Armenians consider the enemy they make the mistake of not viewing the situation from their perspective too. If there is an incorrect interpretation of any actions by Azerbaijan and why they are occuring, he believes, then Armenia will not be able to respond correctly. 

So we really have to understand, [Aliyev] was trying to put pressure on Armenia saying look, you signed the November 9 agreement but you haven’t really respected it fully. Now, if we decide that the enemy is whatever we want it to be, then we’re not merely debating, we’re not developing policy, [and] we are negotiating with ourselves. This is the problem. We need to negotiate with the other. We have to understand the other […], otherwise whatever policy we have will not be the right one.

 

We also don’t think about what we say and do [and how it] impacts the other. Now, when Karabakh leaders today say that we want independence or better yet, we want to be part of Russia […], shouldn’t we think about what that means to Aliyev and the Azerbaijani government and to the [Azerbaijani] people? We always talk about what Aliyev has done wrong, and he’s done so many things wrong, but we have to look if there’s anything that we could have said or done differently in order not to provoke, at least.

This is a fundamental flaw in how Armenia formulates its questions and responses, Libaridian believes, but also notes that the same can be said to be true for Azerbaijan as well.  
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The white paper, The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies, co-authored by Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian, and Taline Papazian, can be read here. Libaridian’s Cambridge-Yerevan Sister City Association presentation can be viewed below.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian