Beez Theatre's Qarınqulu Ayı Balası Spreads Messages of Friendship and Community

Beez Theatre's Qarınqulu Ayı Balası Spreads Messages of Friendship and Community

by | Mar 15, 2023 | Azerbaijan, Caspian Post, Georgia, Minorities

Beez Theatre, Mirza Fatali Akhundov Museum © Onnik James Krikorian / Caspian Post 2023

The Caspian Post has published my story accompanied by photographs of the Beez Children’s Theatre. I remember them from just after the pandemic and always wanted to do a story on the troupe. I’ve spent a long time covering minority communities in the region – from the Yezidis in Armenia to the ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani communities here in Georgia. At some point I must post more of this work that I’ve undertaken since 1998.

The Beez Azerbaijani Children’s Theatre is a unique cultural institution in Gardabani, a small town in the Kvemo Kartli region of Georgia where 65 percent of the population are ethnic Azerbaijani. The theatre was founded three years ago to provide a platform for children to express themselves through theatre and to promote Azerbaijani culture in Georgia.

 

[…]

 

The theatre takes its name from the honeybee and the sound it makes, a fitting symbol of the hard work necessary to foster creativity, imagination, and social skills in children. Combining traditional and modern music, dance, and costumes with modern storytelling techniques, Beez is already creating a unique and engaging experience for audiences of all ages, and has won competitions held by the Georgian Ministry of Culture.

 

[…]

 

“There were three main messages in the play,” Islamoglu told The Caspian Post after the performance: “not to be afraid of doctors, not to be afraid of medicine, and [to be] kind to each other.”

The full story can read here while The Caspian Post also put together a nice little social media-friendly slideshow on various platforms such as this one on Twitter.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Georgian government withdraws controversial legislation amid protests 

Georgian government withdraws controversial legislation amid protests 

by | Mar 11, 2023 | Balcani Caucaso, European Union, Georgia

Riot police assembled before dispersing the crowds protesting controversial legislation passed on the first reading last week in Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2023

If there’s one thing Georgians have a habit of doing above all else it’s protesting – and last week was no exception. Public outrage at the passing of controversial legislation on ‘foreign agents’ saw thousands take to the streets outside the parliament building on Tbilisi’s main thoroughfare, Rustaveli Avenue. Even so, despite having covered pretty much every major demonstration here since 2012, I initially decided not to go down. Too much work focused now on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and no desire to be tear-gassed again.

However, as soon as the riot police were deployed on the first evening it became clear that I had to, including the next day. Anyway, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa has since published some of my photographs. 

Following two nights of protests that saw riot police use tear gas and water cannon, the Georgian government announced that it has withdrawn controversial legislation that critics say would set back democratic development in the country and reverse the country’s stated policy of joining the European Union.

 

 The law that passed its first reading on 7 March would make non-governmental organisation, including media, obliged to register as ‘foreign agents’ if the amount of funding from abroad exceeded 20 percent of their budgets. The legislation has been compared to a similar 2012 passed in Russia that stifled civil activism in the country.  

 

It is for this reason that critics of the bill have labelled it the ‘Russian law.”

 

[…]

 

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the granting of EU candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia’s own application is currently under considerations. The opposition claims that the passage of the law on foreign agents would set back the country’s aspirations for EU membership year or even derail it.  

 

 Now all eyes will be on what happens next.  

The photo story is available in English here and in Italian here. The Caspian Post also used an image of mine for its social media streams.

Anyway, tear gas I was and many times on both nights. Given that two people lost eyes on 20 June 2019, a demonstration I also covered, it could be that the excessive use of tear gas was to avoid resorting to rubber bullets. Nevertheless, its use was disproportionate in most cases and wafted in the wind no doubt affecting residential areas close by.

As for the legislation itself, it seems that this impressive display of people play worked. For now at least. More photos on my Facebook.

Opinion: Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution must take social media more seriously

Opinion: Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution must take social media more seriously

by | Mar 10, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Commonspace, Nagorno Karabakh, Social Media

Commonspace, a publications of LINKS Europe, yesterday published my opinion piece on the need for conflict resolution practitioners in the South Caucasus to fully embrace social media as part of their initiatives and activities. This is especially necessary for the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Karabakh where its use is lacking to say the least. 

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh has continued for over three decades and peace continues to remain elusive, writes Onnik James Krikorian in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. Populist rhetoric and combative media reports reinforce entrenched positions in both societies, but the situation has become markedly worse with the emergence of a new battleground – social media. 

 

[…]

 

Another new addition to an online arsenal were memes.

 

“According to social media specialists, political memetic content can make one more susceptible to hardliner arguments,” wrote Renée Rippberger just two days before the 2020 war broke out. “Political or nationalistic memes often use humour to make their message more palatable because however distasteful, ‘it’s comfortable, it speaks to peoples’ values and also their cultural upbringing.’” 

 

“In an entrenched conflict such as the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, memes help to normalise uncompromising positions.”

 

This shouldn’t come as a surprise and some governments are already well aware of how the Tik-Tok and Instagram generation consume information. US Marine Corps Major Michael B. Prosser, for example, even suggested setting up a Meme Warfare Centre (MWC) in the US Army and noted the importance of involving cognitive scientists, cultural anthropologists, behavioural scientists, and game theory experts. 

 

“Memes influence ideas, ideas influence and form beliefs. Beliefs generate and influence political positions combined with feelings and emotions, eventually producing actions, which inform and influence behaviour,” Prosser wrote in his Masters thesis.

 

[…]

 

Of course, the weaponisation of social media is nothing new. Both Brexit in the U.K. and the 2016 presidential election campaign in the U.S. already highlighted how rather than bring people together, social media is arguably more effective in driving them apart. And just as social media has proven an effective tool for violent extremist groups to radicalise susceptible individuals, so too has it been able to do the same in domestic politics and international relations.

 

[…]

 

Despite some calls for civil society organisations working on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to incorporate robust social media strategies in their work over the past 15 years, few if any have done so. Moreover, there is a distinct lack of content produced to reach specific demographic and linguistic groups in a manner accessible to them. Instead, for many in the conflict resolution community, it seems that simply opening a Facebook group or holding a Zoom meeting is considered enough. 

 

Suffice to say, it is not. Audiences are tiny and what content is produced is rarely seen. Even fewer amplify it further. 

 

[…]

 

It is now time for individuals, grassroots movements, and civil society organisations engaged in this sphere to harness that power effectively. And if peace negotiations ever progress that far, the same will also be true for the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments as well.  

The full opinion piece can be read here while my previous work since 2010 on the use of social media in conflict zones and in the sphere of countering and preventing violent extremism are available here.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Karabakh Armenian and Azerbaijan Representatives meet at Russian Peacekeeping Force HQ

Karabakh Armenian and Azerbaijan Representatives meet at Russian Peacekeeping Force HQ

by | Mar 1, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, Russia

The meeting of the Azerbaijani and Karabakh Armenian representatives at the Russian peacekeeping base today as published by various media

Representatives of Azerbaijan and the defacto authorities representing local ethnic Armenians today met  under the auspices of the Russian peacekeeping force at its headquarters in Khojali.  Such meetings are not new but there are a few arguably important differences.

The first and most signifant one is that an Azerbaijani MP, Ramin Mammadov, was not only present but has now been identified as the person responsible to represent Azerbaijan in talks with the Karabakh Armenians.

Seems he was also born in Karabakh, incidentally. A second is that for the first time ever from meetings that have been held at the Russian peacekeeping base is that there was a photograph.

Thus, Armenian media could identify defacto Karabakh National Security Secretary Samvel Shahramanyan as also present.

Another significance is that this follows the dismissal of Russian-Armenian businessman Ruben Vardanyan as defacto Karabakh State Minister. In Munich, Azerbaijani President had again signalled that Baku would engage in such talks but not with Vardanyan. 

Though we do not as yet know if Shahramyan has been also been named as the representative in such talks, it is worth noting that one of his predecessors, Vitali Balasanyan, had also been involved in such meetings, though not as publicly, until his dismissal in early January.

Talk of appointing specific representatives from both sides were also apparently discussed at the 27 September meeting between Armenian National Secretary Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijan Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington D.C. last year.

The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.

That Baku and Stepanakert must engage in direct communication was also something I have long since called for to happen for over two years now and also raised at a meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijan civil society actors in Tbilisi in January 2021. 

Anyway, this much for now as I plan to write either a comprehensive article instead, but as an update, just to say that representatives of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, State Service for Real Estate Affairs under the Ministry of Economy, the [natural resources] monitoring group, and AzerGold were also present.

These bodies being present highlight how the continuing stand-off on the Lachin Corridor were clearly discussed. Another related issue is the inevitable distinction between two negotiation tracks now. That is, Armenia-Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan-Karabakh, something else immediately after the November 2020 ceasefire statement that I forecast would happen.

There’s still a difficult path to tread, but the more open nature of the meeting is something to be welcomed. The only exception to less exposed meetings before has been when Karabakh Armenian and Azerbaijani water specialists met at the Sarsang Reservoir. However, that was not of such an official nature as today even if video and photos were also released.

As for the fact it was held through Russian mediation and facilitation, it so far does not appear to have shake the European Union at least. “Encouraging news from Khojaly today regarding contacts between Baku representatives and Karabakh Armenians,” EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, has already tweeted about today’s meeting. 

 

March 2, 2023 Update: My article for the Caspian Post is now available here.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Two-Year European Union Monitoring Mission Deployed in Armenia

Two-Year European Union Monitoring Mission Deployed in Armenia

by | Feb 28, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Balcani Caucaso, European Union

Logo of the new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) unarmed civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) that will be headquartered in Yeghegnadzor, Vayots Dzor region.

A week after the deployment of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), a dedicated 100-person strong observation of the country’s border with Azerbaijan, there’s still much that remains unknown about its activities. However, in two pieces published this week by the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) and Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, I’ve tried to summarise what we do know. 

In the first, published yesterday, there’s initial reaction from analysts in Yerevan and Baku such as Benyamin Poghosyan, Farid Shafiyev, and Mahammad Mammadov, as well as those involved in the process of contribution personnel to the mission such as Tobias Pietz. 

The EU has deployed an expanded monitoring mission to Armenia’s volatile border with Azerbaijan in a move that confirms Brussels’ increased commitment in a region that Moscow historically considered its sphere of influence.

 

In response, the Russian foreign ministry stated that the EU mission would only further stoke “geopolitical confrontation”.

 

The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) officially started on February 20 and comprises “exclusively civilian staff [that] will number approximately 100 in total, including around 50 unarmed observers,” according to a press release.

 :

[…]

 :

EUMCAP received a cold reception from Baku, which nevertheless agreed to cooperate with it. In Armenia the mission was criticised by the political opposition for not publicly releasing any reports.

 

Analysts, however, evaluated it positively.

 

“[Its] deployment was a significant step in emphasising EU interest and involvement in the South Caucasus and in Armenia,” Benyamin Poghosyan, director of the Centre for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan, told IWPR.

 :

[…]

 

Poghosyan posited that the underlying intention was to contribute to peace talks.

 

“The primary objective is to create a more conducive environment for the resumption and continuation of Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations and the eventual signing of a peace agreement within a reasonable timescale – probably by the end of 2023,” he said.

 

Nonetheless, he sounded a note of caution.

 

“Armenia should not think that EUMA is sent by the EU to freeze the conflict and to provide it with time to strengthen its military while acting as a buffer against a potential Azerbaijani attack,” Poghosyan continued, maintaining that Yerevan should refrain from public criticism of Russia’s peacekeeping force in Karabakh and its general presence in the region.  

 

[…]

 

[…] ZIF’s Pietz maintained that the mission’s potential far outweighed its risks.

 

“Yes, Azerbaijan and Russia have not signaled their support for EUMA but especially Baku has no interest to jeopardise its ties, including economically, with the EU by putting the mission and its personnel in actual danger,” he explained. “I rather fear that encounters between local Russian border or military units with EUMA patrols might pose some risks.

 

“That is why it will be key for EUMA to set up respective emergency communication channels with local commanders and communities.”

The full article is here.

Meanwhile, what did become obvious from the outset, however, is that the European Union needs to focus on managing expectations. As some analysts, including myself, have noted, EUMA is unable to prevent or deter any cross-border incidents or military actions. Its primary task will be to monitor and report back to Brussels. Unfortunately, however, there were initially incorrect reports in the local media that some of the mission could be armed.

It won’t be, and as was clearly stated from the very start. Nonetheless, it is widely believed that EUMA will be able to help reduce tensions on the border even if it will also require an underlying peace process to accompany it in order to be truly effective. Even so, the mission will still prove a sensitive one as I outlined for Osservatorio today. 

[…] despite the precedent of the earlier civilian monitoring capacity, some Armenian media inaccurately reported the news, even going as far to imply that while 50 of the 100 staff will be “unarmed monitors”, the remaining 50 might carry weapons. Other reports incorrectly stated that there were 100 monitors and not 50, while yet another even referred to EUMA as “European Union ground forces”.

 

None of those claims was correct, however, and all were potentially damaging for the mission before it had even operated for a full day. In fairness, news reports that seconded gendarmes and police officers from France and Germany would be among others in EUMA could be the reason for the confusion, coincidentally highlighting how the EU will need to manage expectations for the mission.

 

“As monitors they are no longer police, even though in the case of EUMM Georgia some of the seconded police decided to wear their uniforms. But they are always unarmed”, clarifies Tobias Pietz, Deputy Head of Analysis at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), a German governmental agency that will also contribute staff to EUMA.

 

[…]

 

Even so, concerns have been raised in Baku.

 

“Unlike the previous temporary version of the mission, there is no clear peace agenda and no coordination with Azerbaijan”, says Topchubashov analyst Mahammad Mammadov. “It may damage the EU’s image as an honest broker in the region and Baku is highly concerned about losing the EU mediation track as it has been the favoured choice for a number of reasons”.

 

[…]

 

“The observers must pay heed to the other important party in the region — Russia, which has military and border guards along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan”, wroteInternational Crisis Group Senior Analyst Olesya Vartanyan for Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s International Politics and Society journal.

 

“The EU should give its mission the tools to facilitate dialogue between Armenian and Azerbaijani military and border guards posted along the border if that might help prevent or damp down violence”, she further remarked, possibly referring to something akin to the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) that EUMM has established on the ABLs in Georgia.

 

While there are scant other details available on EUMA, the European Union does indeed see it as a tool to create a more conducive environment for negotiations between Yerevan and Baku. Indeed, that had been the purpose of the earlier EUMCAP too, including in assisting the task of border demarcation and delimitation.

 

[…]

 

It is too early to tell how successful EUMA will prove, but many analysts believe that it could contribute to peace and stability on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Some like Poghosyan, however, warn that, unless accompanied by the genuine resumption of the Brussels Process, its efforts could amount to little more than increased regional rivalry in the South Caucasus.

 

There are some signs of hope. Despite the sudden cancellation of a 7 December meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan with European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels, the EU negotiation track does not appear to have collapsed.

 

“We have repeatedly reaffirmed our commitment to the peace process, namely the Brussels process”, stated Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during a panel sessionat the Munich Security Conference on 18 February. “Yesterday during a meeting with President of the European Council Charles Michel [and] today during a meeting with Secretary of State Blinken”.

 

During the conference, incidentally, Aliyev had met with Michel to discuss the EU’s new mission in Armenia, though no other details are known. On 25 February, however, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus announced during an interview that there were new efforts to revitalise the Brussels Process though the date for a possible meeting between Michel, Aliyev, and Pashinyan was yet to be determined.

The full article is available in English here and in Italian here.

Anyway, as an update to these pieces, the European Union’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, Toivo Klaar, was interviewed by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty’s Yerevan Bureau. “To say that an unarmed observation mission is directed against anyone is to distort the facts,” he is quoted as saying in the interview by Jam News. Klaar is also relatively upbeat following Munich.

Anyway, for more on EUMA and its predecessor, the temporary short-term European Union Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP), see all my posts here. 

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian