Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 2009
Tomorrow, 17 January, residents of what remains of the besieged and breakaway Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) will be allocated ration coupons for basic and essential foodstuffs as control of the strategic Lachin Corridor by self-identified Azerbaijani environmental activists enters its second month. Despite their claims, however, most consider the effective but albeit partial blockade of the region, situated within Azerbaijan but populated mostly by ethnic Armenians, to be more than just about that.
Regardless, the rationing will include goods such as rice, buckwheat, macaroni, and sugar, all apparently distributed from Karabakh’s reserves, while coupons will be available at service points in schools and a university in Stepanakert or in rural administrative centres. Such a move was not unexpected in the current situation and many residents had reportedly already called for such a system to avoid missing out on disappearing supplies in shops while the local authorities likely wanted to prevent a black market from emerging.
The rationing system, incidentally, is on top of humanitarian assistance coming via Lachin through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Russian peacekeeping mission as well as what other stocks or local supplies are available elsewhere. Karabakh, for example, is quite fertile and does have its own local capacity for certain goods such as wheat and flour while also having its own farms, including greenhouses. Nonetheless, in a recent interview, defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan warned that this was still insufficient.
“We will not starve, because there’s enough food,” Vardanyan told Reuters on 24 December. “But some products we cannot get on our internal market.”
Unfortunately, little reliable information is available on the full picture is in Karabakh, but the defacto authorities do at least present some to the public, as would be expected in order to avoid panic or desperation. There have also been social media posts showing that some restaurants and cafes are still operating while one young Karabakh Armenian has been updating her followers on TikTok as to the situation, including what food she is able to purchase in the shops.
This is not surprising given that keeping the economy afloat will be a key concern for Vardanyan and his team. Indeed, in a live Stepanakert-Yerevan bridge, Karabakh’s Minister of Economy, Hrant Safaryan, acknowledged this saying that, as I had speculated about in another post, there is an attempt to keep some eateries and other businesses dependent on various ingredients adequately supplied. Vardanyan had also already met with restaurant and cafe owners to discuss how the authorities could work with them and vice-versa.
Despite this, however, the situation is changing. From what little is known, in the first few weeks of an effective blockade, the main shortage of goods in the shops were predictable – imported packaged goods from Armenia. It is also important to note that many residents had already likely stocked up for the New Year and Christmas season. However, as days passed by, shoppers were instead only able to buy limited amounts of locally produced goods and reportedly only if and when available.
The supply of vegetables and fruits were particularly hit.
On 15 January, however, video emerged, again on TikTok, of Russian peacekeeping troops handing out bags of oranges or mandarins and tomatoes and cucumbers to women outside a hospital in Stepanakert. Though it remains unclear to what extent the mission is helping, Vardanyan has said that 400 vehicles passed through despite the blockade. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has also been able to transfer medical supplies and other items such as infant formula from Armenia while also ferrying critically ill patients to Yerevan.
Even so, while 28 patients have reportedly been transported by the ICRC to Armenia, planned surgeries for 400 others have been suspended due to the lack of supplies or personnel.
Moreover, the situation is more complicated than that. On 10 January, electricity cables from Armenia to Karabakh were damaged, apparently by bad weather according to accounts from Stepanakert, and it has been impossible to pass through Lachin to repair the damage. Thus, Karabakh is also now experiencing a power shortage given that its locally hydro-electric power is far less than prior to the 2020 war when it controlled those seven regions of Azerbaijan since taken back or returned.
New blackouts of two hours will now be extended to four.
And there are other concerns as well. As I highlighted here, and as already mentioned above, the economy will be a matter of huge concern to the local authorities and today Karabakh’s Information Centre reported that 726 businesses, or 17.7 percent of the total number operating, have had to suspend their activities too. In human terms, that means 3,400 people, presumably including those from the mines ostensibly at the centre of the crisis that were recently closed, are now unemployed.
The authorities did, however, prevent a run on the banks by limiting how much currency could be withdrawn from ATMs, advising residents to use cards.
Political intrigues this past weekend, however, have surprised many, though some had expected them given a recent warning from local activist Tigran Petrosyan after comments Vardanyan made about certain Karabakh residents using alleged connections to pass through Lachin and even to bring back food and fuel to sell. “Mr. Vardanyan, this is Karabakh. Be a little careful,” the activist, who was a main force behind the 27 December march on the Russian peacekeeping base to demand they open the Lachin Corridor, wrote.
The replacement of then Security Council Secretary Vitaly Balasanyan just days before on 7 January also irked some in Karabakh who alleged there had been a falling out with Vardanyan. But the real problems emerged when the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was criticised for comments made on 10 January directly implying that the international community does not consider the region to be anything other than an integral part of Azerbaijan. Vardanyan did not react calmly.
In response, on 12 January, Pashinyan urged Karabakh’s leadership to tone down such statements but also to negotiate directly with Baku, something the opposition and other nationalist forces believe means Armenia had ‘washed its hands’ of the region. Rumours then emerged that Karabakh’s defacto president, Arayik Harutyunyan, might dismiss Vardanyan. Supporters of the State Minister accused him of working in cahoots with Pashinyan and some even alleged he had received offers of security and financial benefits from Baku.
Rumours also circulated that Harutyunyan might call early parliamentary and presidential elections, something that National Assembly Speaker Artur Tovmasyan did not rule out on 14 January. “Talking about elections and dismissal is treason and serving the enemy’s agenda,” Vardanyan advisor Mesrob Arakelyan wrote on Facebook in response. “I am not going to resign, especially in the existing situation,” Vardanyan also shared on social media, adding that early elections were also unacceptable.
But in a late night meeting on Sunday, however, it was reported that some kind of compromise had been reached. Vardanyan would remain in his position but with the caveat that he would no longer make any further political statements unless in consultation with Harutyunyan. His focus would also be no more directed towards economic issues. Nonetheless, adding to the intrigue, Balasanyan’s replacement, Ararat Melkumyan, was also replaced earlier today as Security Council Secretary just nine days after being appointed.
In the meantime, the impasse on the Lachin Corridor continues with no apparent end in sight and even though a peace deal after over three decades of an unsustainable and misperceived ‘status quo’ remains as pressing as ever.
Incidentally, for more on work on Lachin itself from 2001-2006 see here, here, here, and here.
Recent Comments