Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan meets with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in a meeting facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels © Official Photo

Despite low expectations following the meeting late last month between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Sochi, another between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Ilham Aliyev held a day before the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in Brussels on 15 December can be largely assessed as successful. It marks the first direct engagement of the European Union in the Karabakh conflict despite over three decades of animosity that obstructed cooperation between the two in the EaP. Previously, the EU has largely confined its involvement to voicing support for the OSCE Minsk Group process.

In a statement issued after the meeting, European Council President Charles Michel declared that the EU was committed to working closely with Armenia and Azerbaijan to create an atmosphere of trust and sustainable peace underpinned by a comprehensive peace agreement. This also included the establishment of a direct line of communication between the defence ministers of both countries in order to help de-escalate tensions between on the border. Humanitarian issues, such as the release of the remaining Armenian detainees held by Azerbaijan, and demining activities were also discussed.

In the case of the latter, the EU said it would provide technical assistance, something that was also put at the disposal of the sides in the likely long and difficult task of border delimitation and demarcation. An economic advisory platform would also be established by the EU to contribute to peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation in the region. Taking questions from journalists, Michel also said that at one point he had left Aliyev and Pashinyan alone at the working dinner to discuss issues privately between themselves.

“The EU is committed,” Michel said. “We want to play a positive, a useful role for more stability, for more security, for more prosperity in this region. We also want to support the humanitarian gestures that are needed. On the railways, for example, an agreement was made tonight because it was very clear that they have a common understanding on what is needed to reopen those communication lines.”

Implementing Point 9 of the November 2020 ceasefire agreement, however, still remains a matter of controversy and disagreement between the sides, with Pashinyan tweeting that Armenia still considers that Baku is obstructing the process by insisting that there should be no customs checks on the route connecting Azerbaijan through Armenia to its exclave of Nakhichevan. On his part, Aliyev compared what is often referred to as the “Zangezur Corridor” in Azerbaijan to the Lachin Corridor connecting Armenia to what remains of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).

“There should be no customs checkpoints on the Zangezur corridor just like there is none on the Lachin corridor,” said Aliyev earlier in the day at a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. He also stressed that this linkage would not only allow Azerbaijan to connect to Nakhichevan by rail, but also Armenia to gain better access to the Iranian and Russian markets. “It was agreed to proceed with the restoration of railway lines, with appropriate arrangements for border and customs controls, based on the principle of reciprocity,” said Michel in his statement.

Yet the above statements by Pashinyan and Aliyev appear to indicate differences in interpreting the definition of reciprocity.

Compared to Sochi, and noticeably highlighting the difference in approaches by the EU and the Russian Federation, the meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan was more casual than that in Sochi, with the two leaders joining Michel at a round rather than oval table for discussions over dinner that lasted over 4.5 hours. Another second meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders was held on the initiation of French President Emmanuel Macron over coffee the following evening. Despite this, however, the EU does not seek to compete with Russia in the processes that look set to continue.

Michel underscored the EU’s belief that the trilateral statements of 9 November 2020 and 11 January 2021 should be honoured, including implementation of ‘understandings’ that had been reached in the Sochi meeting of 26 November 2021. “The statement makes it clear that the EU has no intention to replace any existing formats but rather contribute to the ongoing and future discussions and agreements,” tweeted International Crisis Group (ICG) Senior Analyst Olessya Vartanyan.

The Brussels meeting also came after two other related positive developments. On Friday 10 November the deputy foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkey met in Moscow to start preliminary discussions on the 3+3 regional format for cooperation, albeit with the absence of Georgia. And on the day of the meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan in Brussels, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, announced that Yerevan and Ankara had agreed to name two special envoys to start bilateral negotiations on normalising Armenia-Turkey relations.

On 15 November, Ankara named Serdar Kilic, the former Turkish Ambassador to the United States, as its pick. Turkey will nonetheless consult with Azerbaijan in this process, but following the 2020 Karabakh war, the obstacles that plagued the last attempt to normalise relations in the form of 2009’s Armenia-Turkey Protocols no longer exist. That attempt failed due to Baku’s resistance given that Armenian forces still controlled the seven regions surrounding the former NKAO. Analysts such as Regional Studies Center Director Richard Giragosian also believe that progress in this area is more likely given Turkish hopes to ‘regain a seat at the table” after being sidelined by Moscow over the past year.

“This is the first time ever we see the EU president hosting two South Caucasian leaders for talks on their key problems,” tweeted ICG’s Vartanyan in a thread. “Despite yesterday’s controversy over statements about “corridors,” the meeting was a success.”

The November 2020 Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan left many questions unanswered, not only in terms of its implementation but also in terms of whether the West has any role in any processes that might emerge. Not only were the US and European Union taken by surprise by last year’s war, but they have also largely remained marginalised or absent from developments since.

That might change given the recent announcement that President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan could meet on the sidelines of the Eastern Partnership Summit due to be held in Brussels on 15 December, but the EU’s objectives in facilitating such a tête-à-tête appear quite modest. While confidence building measures are vital, especially in the humanitarian sphere, the question still remains…

What more can the European Union do?

Russia’s peace deal for Armenia and Azerbaijan has halted the war over Nagorny Karabakh and exposed the Western countries as bystanders. The Europeans must now try to help shape a lasting peace on the ground – Thomas de Waal

In an opinion piece written a week after the 2020 ceasefire agreement, Carnegie Endowment Senior Fellow Thomas de Waal noted that both Armenians and Azerbaijanis view the European Union as a less than credible actor while France continues to be viewed as particularly controversial in Baku. Not for the first time, de Waal suggests that it might be better for Paris to renounce its seat in the OSCE Minsk Group in favour of another country such as Germany or the EU itself.

“Western countries were pushed to the margins and will need to work hard to make themselves relevant again,” he wrote, adding that the conflict between two members of the Eastern Partnership challenges EU hopes to take on a more strategic role in the region. Instead, there is much work that needs to be done in the post-war environment where the EU could potentially play a role, especially in terms of reconstruction and supporting the return of IDPs, perhaps in cooperation with the UN.

“That engagement also requires great humility,” says de Waal. “The Western powers should acknowledge that they basically allowed themselves to be bystanders to the great-power deal that halted the new war over Nagorny Karabakh.”

If the European Union wants to be more active in peacebuilding, the implementation of concrete socio-economic projects with the mutual participation of Azerbaijan and Armenia is vital for peaceful interaction of the two nations – Parviz Yarmammad

In The Parliament Magazine, Parviz Yarmammad says that the South Caucasus remains an important region for the EU because of the energy and transportation projects that already run through it. However, the EU needs to earn the trust of both sides and the recent allocation of €2.6 billion to Armenia, while Azerbaijan received only €140 million, has not helped achieve that.

Instead, he says, the EU should involve both countries in socio-economic projects where mutual cooperation and interaction can be developed.

On the tactical level, the EU’s role should expand to post-conflict management and to foster an environment in which people-to-people relations in both countries gradually stabilize. Clearly, economic opportunities will be a sphere where both countries may recognise the existence of mutually shared interests – Borut Grgic and Bernhard Knoll-Tudor

There have also been calls by Borut Grgic and Bernhard Knoll-Tudor for the establishment of a Karabakh Development Bank, modelled after the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), but involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the EU, to help finance necessary infrastructure projects such as power and water management as well as to support small to medium-sized business initiatives.This would also offset any perceived risk for general investment in what still remains an unpredictable conflict zone.

They also suggest the creation of free economic zones and the involvement of TRACECA, itself established with financing from the European Commission. Armenia and Azerbaijan are members, as is the EU, and its Secretariat is in Baku. Other areas could include supporting educational and cultural linkages and exchanges while the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), though not related to the EU, could support cross-border media initiatives.

“Further, the European Commission could publish calls for tech innovation in the context of the EU’s Eastern Partnership dimension, sponsoring projects jointly authored by Azerbaijani and Armenian teams of coders, subject to selection by an expert jury.”

Following the ceasefire agreement that ended the Second Karabakh War in November 2020, leaders in both Baku and Yerevan have expressed interest in unlocking regional connectivity. The EU would be well placed to facilitate the resumption of this railway connection, thanks to the experience acquired from various EUBAM missions, particularly in the Transnistrian region. EU involvement would be consistent with its thrust to support stability and prosperity in the framework of its Eastern Partnership – Emmanuel Dreyfus and Jules Hugot

On PONARS Eurasia, Emmanuel Dreyfus and Jules Hugot acknowledge the role the EU has already played in terms of railway connectivity through Transnistria and by supporting the establishment of conflict management systems, not only in Ukraine and Moldova, but also in Georgia. With Tbilisi hesitant to publicly support the 3+3 regional format favoured by Ankara and Moscow, the EU could still involve it in any regional framework in a way that is more acceptable to the government.

In the same vein, LINKS Europe Director Dennis Sammut says that despite inaction to date, the EU does at least have a relatively ‘clean slate’ compared to other international actors. “Issues related to connectivity, investment, human development and education should dominate the Brussels talks. Here the EU needs to be generous and ambitious, and insist on frameworks that will require the two sides to work together, preferably also with the participation of the Georgians.”

Sochi and Brussels will be two different meetings and they need to be approached differently by all sides. The EU should not try to replicate Sochi in Brussels. That would be both disingenuous and unachievable. But with some astute diplomacy and a measure of goodwill from all sides, the Brussels meeting can also be meaningful, and can in the long term end up being even more significant for the future peace and prosperity of the South Caucasus – Dennis Sammut

“The recent armed conflict is a wake-up call to Brussels to stake its claim in a territory that has geostrategic and immense cultural significance,” according to Grgic and Knoll-Tudor.