European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) likely planned for February 2023

European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) likely planned for February 2023

On 4 January, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) posted a call for contributions to a new EU Mission to Armenia (EUMA) that would monitor the country’s fragile and sometimes volatile border with neighbouring Azerbaijan. Most positions for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian mission would be secondments from EU countries and 69 are currently being advertised with a deadline of 19 January.

However, in a post on LinkedIn, Tobias Pietz, Deputy Head of Analysis at the German Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), wrote that the mission could be as many as 100 and that a decision on its deployment was due to be made at a meeting of the EU’s Political and Security Council (PSC) on 10  January. The mission, he noted, would be “strongly supported” by the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia.

EUMM, incidentally, made up the temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) that was deployed in Armenia for two months in October last year and which ended in December. Since the end of its mission there have been numerous calls for its extension or transformation into a dedicated mission along the lines of EUMM and a Transition Planning Assistance Team had already been dispatched to Armenia to prepare for this likelihood. 

An EU technical assessment team also arrived in Yerevan on 9 January for the same reason and met with Armenia’s Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, and Security Council Secretary, Armen Grigoryan. Also present at the meetings were the head of the EU Delegation to Armenia, Andrea Wictorin. “Mirzoyan lauded the role of the EU monitoring mission in bolstering stability in the region,” an official statement read. 

Azerbaijan, however, has not been so enthusiastic, with its Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Baramov, saying on 27 December that any new mission should first be discussed with Baku.

Indeed, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev also complained about any new mission in a press conference held yesterday, 10 January. “It will not increase security,” he stated, also alluding to Baku’s displeasure with France’s role in the process, “but on the contrary will undermine the format of negotiation [with Armenia]. […] France has in fact completely isolated itself from the process. Now there is only American and Russia.”

Though Armenia is free to choose what is deployed on its own soil, the situation becomes a little less clear given that its border with Azerbaijan has not been officially demarcated, something the EUMCAP was initially deployed to assist with. Whether there is still the need to have Azerbaijan on board, even if only reluctantly, as might well have the case with EUMCAP when the decision to send as part of talks held in Prague on 6 October, remains unclear.

And while, then Ambassador-designate of the Czech Republic to Yerevan shied away from naming those countries that might object to a proper EU monitoring mission to Armenia in one sentence, he preceded it with quite the opposite in a 20 December interview with Radio Free Europe. “Our mutual task […] is to try to show all sides involved that a mission like that would be useful,” he said.

“So let’s work with the Azerbaijanis, let’s work with the Russians as well, […] trying to show and prove that you are happy with the involvement of the European Union. […] I can just hint that not all parties involved were as happy with the mission, with the small observation mission as Armenia […] was. Let’s work with those who were not that positive about the EU mission and let’s try to prove that it can be helpful.”

Certainly, if EUMM in Georgia’s record is anything to go by, the EUMA mission would indeed help calm tensions on the border, although it cannot prevent incidents or slight geographic changes, as has been the case along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) for South Ossetia. Nonetheless, EUMA would presumably be able to work with Armenian border communities and perhaps even with journalists from across the dividing line as has been the case in Georgia.

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that by virtue of being deployed on the Armenian side only that an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) will be established given that EUMA will only operate in Armenia and there will be no mission deployed in Azerbaijan. Incidentally, when I put this issue to International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Zaur Shiryev on 27 September he said this was because Baku does not want an “internationalisation of the border.”

For now, however, it remains unclear if any of this will prevent a EUMA deployment, although it is quite possible that it will also require a decision from the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council as was also the case with the temporary EUMCAP mission. Indeed, on 5 January, Finland’s Crisis Management Centre advertised for personnel to be seconded while stressing that “no decision has yet been made on the establishment of the EUMA mission.”

“Also,” it noted, “the exact location of the possible operation or tasks, the security or accommodation arrangements, or the operation specifics of its service relationship remain unclear. According to the preliminary schedule, the establishment of the mission is to be decided at the end of January and for its operation to start at the end of February. If the mission is launched, departure for the tasks can take place to a quick schedule.”

Regardless, if such a mission does get a final go-ahead by the end of the month, some speculate that its duration will be for one year. Though this might sound short it should be pointed out that EUMM in Georgia currently works on a rotating two-year term pending further extension. This would presumably turn out to be the case for EUMA’s mission too.

 

 

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Ankara gives Green Light for Direct Armenia-Turkey Cargo Flights

Ankara gives Green Light for Direct Armenia-Turkey Cargo Flights

Turkish Airlines flight © Onnik James Krikorian 2019

Though it had been announced in early December that direct cargo flights would start between Armenia and Turkey by the end of last year, the apparent deadlock in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, as well as the impasse between Yerevan, Baku, and Stepanakert on the Lachin Corridor, hardly prepared anyone for such an eventuality. However, a news report published by the Andalou News Agency on 6 January 2023 confirmed that Ankara had indeed given the go-ahead for such flights starting 1 January.

The news follows that of the resumption of direct passenger flights between Yerevan and Istanbul in February last year, though not part of the slow but renewed attempt to normalise relations between the two countries following the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war.

The same day as the 6 January announcement, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that direct cargo flights could now operate while Turkish media reported that this came as a result of direct negotiations between the Armenian and Turkish Special Envoys, Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kilic. Armenian MFA spokesperson Vahan Hunanyan also said that Yerevan hoped that another decision taken by Yerevan and Ankara in December as part of the normalisation process would become reality.

We expect that the other agreement, ensuring the possibility of crossing the land border for citizens of third countries, will also be implemented as soon as possible,” he told media.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that while no air freight company has announced that it will operate the Armenia-Turkey route at time of writing, and it is still believed that further progress will be dependent on parallel developments in the Armenia-Azerbaijan process too, though it can only be hoped that they start sooner rather than later. Incidentally, it remains unclear whether Ankara’s decision indicates that some backdoor diplomacy between Yerevan and Baku has continued despite the standoff in Lachin.

At any rate, and reminiscent of the start of the last ill-fated normalisation process in 2009, it also comes just two and half months before the Armenian and Turkish national football teams are due to face each other in their first UEFA Euro 2024 qualifying match in late March 2023. Tons of old posts from the 2008-2009 Armenia-Turkey normalisation process to transfer here, but for now, another one, this time from the Margara crossing, close to Yerevan. 

 

 

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Calls for a Humanitarian Air Corridor to Karabakh

Calls for a Humanitarian Air Corridor to Karabakh

Wreckage of an Armenian Yak-40 passenger aircraft that was flying from Stepanakert to Yerevan and hit by fire from an Azerbaijani SU-25 on 9 May 1992, forcing it to crash close to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border near Sisian. Among the 30 or so passengers on board were wounded soldiers. There were no fatalities © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

Yesterday, Artur Tovmasyan, defacto Speaker of Karabakh’s National Assembly, issued a statement calling on the Russian, French and U.S. Presidents to force Azerbaijan to allow an airlift from Armenia to the isolated region’s airport situated outside of Stepanakert. The remarks came after over three weeks of what are claimed to be environmental protests effectively blocking access to and from Karabakh on the Lachin Corridor.

In words echoing those of defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan, Tovmasyan said that this was necessary to transport vital humanitarian assistance to the besieged ethnic Armenian residents of what remains of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). That, however, is unlikely to happen. Indeed, in a news item published today, Security and Policy Consultant Sossi Tatikyan explained why. 

“Unfortunately, this is not possible without the agreement of Azerbaijan or the resolution of the UN Security Council,” she told Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). “It was not even possible to adopt a statement of the UN Security Council, as we saw a few days ago, because there was no consensus. That is the main problem.”

Though other airlifts to Darfur and Zaire are mentioned in the piece, there are also major differences. “Now there is a lot of talk about humanitarian airlift – delivering aid by air,” Tatikyan said. “Azerbaijan can say that there is no need for it because the Red Cross trucks can already pass and bring aid, place emphasis on this and reject it with such a technical reason.” 

Nonetheless, this of course does not mean that Tatikyan is happy with the situation. “If we give the issue a purely humanitarian nature we can go for short-term solutions […] but the political and security issues will not be resolved,” she said. “That is, the blockade of Artsakh can be normalised and it said, here, some humanitarian aid is entering and people are not condemned to an extremely dire situation, so let it [Lachin] remain closed.” 

Of course, Stepanakert’s airport, located in Khojaly, now renamed Ivanyan by the defacto authorities following the war of the early 1990s, is no stranger to controversy. Though it was operational back then, and I personally landed there in an Armenian military helicopter when I travelled from Yerevan to Karabakh in 1994, it wasn’t until 2008 that steps were taken to make it actually operational in the post-war period.

Indeed, when the construction of what is now a new and modern airport was completed in 2011, then Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan announced that he would be on onboard the first inaugural flight from Yerevan. Azerbaijan responded angrily and threatened to shoot down any aircraft entering what is internationally recognised as its airspace, and even though the physical territory below was out of Baku’s control.

A month later, those threats were walked back following international condemnation, and Baku stated that it would never “use force against civilian forces.” Nonetheless, the inauguration of the new airport never took place and no flights were ever launched. Stepanakert clearly hopes that this time will be different. 

In the here and now, however, and though it is feasible that there could be international pressure on Azerbaijan to allow at least a humanitarian airlift given that supplies are reportedly running low, Baku will be reluctant to agree. As Tatikyan mentioned, Azerbaijan would simply point to the large number of Russian peacekeeping convoys and some International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicles that can still transit through Lachin.

Moreover, Baku claims that, in fact, the highway is already open to all vehicles.

But, of course, there’s also a caveat. Azerbaijan would also insist that all goods should be inspected, something that the defacto Karabakh authorities have already rejected and certainly do not want. Such stops, they argue, would then inevitably lead to the normalisation of border and customs controls on a highway that had previously been largely free of them prior to the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement and even until 12 December 2022.

And this, of course, is the crux of the matter. There still remains disagreement between Yerevan and Baku over the ‘unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions from Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan,’ as stipulated by the 2020 ceasefire statement. Azerbaijan therefore believes that if Armenia continues to insist on border and customs controls on that route, then it should have the same for the Lachin Corridor. 

Though the impasse on the Lachin Corridor continues to be framed as an environmental protest, most analysts understand that it is actually more than just that. Indeed, the opening of what Azerbaijan has termed the ‘Zangezur Corridor ‘ remains a key objective for Baku. Meanwhile, some social media accounts even allege that Armenia has blockaded Nakhichevan, though this is far from the truth.

While Armenia’s border with Nakhichevan is indeed closed, the exclave also has land borders with Iran and Turkey while Karabakh only has the Lachin Corridor. Moreover, and somewhat ironically given these new calls for Karabakh’s airport to be opened, Azerbaijani commercial aircraft still continue to fly from Baku to Nakhichevan via Armenian airspace and have done so since October 2021.

Even so, a solution to the standoff on the Lachin Corridor continues to remain elusive with neither side willing to budge and thus, no end in sight. Indeed, Vardanyan has already told Karabakh’s population to be ready for a long winter. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that the airport is going to open even for an airlift. 

 

 

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Documenting life under siege in Karabakh – On TikTok

Documenting life under siege in Karabakh – On TikTok

Understanding the situation in Karabakh in the fourth week of what amounts to an effective blockade is increasingly difficult. Some social media accounts allege starvation is already upon the population while others say there are no problems at all. In reality, neither is correct and even though defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan says that the region, situated within Azerbaijan with only the narrow 5 km-wide Lachin corridor to connect it to Armenia, is able to last longer than the three weeks it already has even with imported product shortages.

Thankfully, however, and as the alleged environmental protest by Azerbaijani activists, presumably with the support of Baku, effectively blocking most road transportation other than that consisting of Russian peacekeeping or International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicles, one young Karabakh Armenian is updating her followers  on TikTok about life under siege. Her updates are down to earth and genuine, lending credence to the stereotype of Karabakh Armenians as being sturdy and resilient. Basically, life goes on.

Follow her here

Updated 5 January 2023.

@mash.gasparyannn Ձեր նոր տարին շնորհավոր🤍Blokada or 21 #blokada #artsakh #rek #vlog ♬ Chill Vibes - Tollan Kim

 

 

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Lachin Corridor standoff enters fourth week

Lachin Corridor standoff enters fourth week

 Russian peacekeepers on the Lachin corridor © Azertac

The 25 December rally in Stepanakert, the defacto capital of what remains of the Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), was large. An estimated 30-35,000 ethnic Armenian residents of the breakaway region gathered in the city’s Renaissance Square in an act of defiance in response to Azerbaijani “eco—activists” picketing the Lachin corridor.

Predictably, it wasn’t long before the ‘numbers game’ reared its head. 

Though many reports put the crowd at ‘thousands’ or ‘tens of thousands,” some Armenian media claimed 50,000 were in attendance while others even put it at as high as 60-70,000. Not unexpectedly, some Azerbaijani sources also claimed that only 17-20,000 took part despite an abundance of online crowd estimation tools to prove them otherwise. 

At the center of these claim and counter-claim disagreements are, of course, related to uncertainty as to how many people do actually live in Karabakh. Armenians put that figure at 120,000 while Azerbaijan claims that there are only 25,000, as if inflating the number or reducing it will determine the future of the region once a peace deal is negotiated.

In reality, neither are likely correct. It is unlikely to be as high as 120,000, but it is hard to imagine it could be anywhere as low as 25,000 too. The truth, however, is that we simply don’t know. And nor does it probably matter.

What does matter, however, is that Azerbaijanis claiming to be environmental activists have controlled the only link between Karabakh and Armenia for three weeks now in the new reality that emerged following the 2020 war. Armenians says this amounts to a blockade of the region situated within and surrounded by Azerbaijan proper while Baku claims that the road is open.

Further, some Armenian activists, especially online, claim Azerbaijan is attempting to ethnically cleanse the region of its population by preventing the import of food from Armenia, starving them out. Baku, however, says such goods may enter if there are checks on what is being transported, something they allege the defacto Karabakh authorities have refused.

And this remains at the heart of the ongoing dispute despite claims otherwise.

According to the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement, the transportation of people and goods between Armenia and Karabakh would be guaranteed on the Lachin corridor while unimpeded access between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan would be facilitated through Armenia. However, Yerevan is reluctant to have the latter with no border or customs checks.

Of course, the “new transport communications” through Armenia’s Siunik region to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave haven’t even been constructed yet, but Baku therefore argues that if this is Yerevan’s position then there should be similar checks on the Lachin corridor . This continues to be one of the main stumbling blocks in attempts to normalise relations.

It has also taken on geopolitical significance since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is, however, transporting critically ill patients from Karabakh to Armenia for treatment and bringing back medical supplies on their return. ICRC has already transported some 10 tons of medicine, medical supplies, and infant food from Armenia, for example, that should last 10 days, presumably until another occurs.

Meanwhile, convoys from the Russian peacekeeping mission travel through the Azerbaijani protestors on a daily basis, though it is unknown what they are carrying. Moreover, confusing the issue of who is blocking what, when a group of motorists from Yerevan attempted to travel into Karabakh a week ago, failure to negotiate passage with the Russians saw them turn back. 

This is possibly why the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in a recent ruling, could not ascertain to what extent the blockage on the Lachin Corridor was being orchestrated by Azerbaijan. Instead, it simply reminded Baku of its obligation to allow the free movement of humanitarian assistance and those Karabakh residents stranded in Armenia.

That last part, however, has not happened, though it remains unclear why.

Muddying waters further, and definitely obfuscating matters, of course, is yet another fully-fledged information war, though ironically not from official circles this time. It has also been made worse by the absence of in-depth reporting on the situation even in the Armenian media, creating additional problems and creating a space for sensationalist narratives. 

A few social media accounts, for example, spread photographs of empty shelves in supermarkets and closed vegetable and fruit stands. There was no bread, others claimed, and no eggs, with the population now facing imminent starvation. However, this is not the reality that even defacto Karabakh State Minister Ruben Vardanyan presents to the world.

“We will not starve, because there’s enough food,” Vardanyan told Reuters on 24 December. “But some products we cannot get on our internal market.”

Indeed, albeit aside from medical supplies, the problem so far seems more one of fuel and certain imported goods, he added. Moreover, he continued, Karabakh is instead preparing itself for a long winter under the condition of an effective blockade, again indicating that any panic spread and amplified on social media isn’t yet experienced by the local population.

The Russian-Armenian Vardanyan has even paid tribute to the spirit and resilience of the Karabakh Armenians, many of whom engage in agriculture, including using greenhouses, as well as animal husbandry. And on 24 December, in a rare example of much-needed objective reporting, Aliq Media also published an account by a local journalist on the ground. 

“The mood is normal and people are trying to take the situation calmly. I don’t know how to express it, maybe I could even say it’s a little indifferent, people are so calm,” Srbuhi Vanyan is quoted as saying. “There is still no problem with bread, cereals, pulses. We still have what is produced locally – dairy products, meat, etc.”

Indeed, one young woman in Stepanakert has even been updating her followers on a semi-regular basis as to what she is cooking and consuming at home. She also shows what she is able to find for purchase in the shops and markets. In the past week alone this has included chicken, rice, eggs, potatoes, bread, and onions, as well as some greens and fruit.

There is also a steady stream of official price monitoring reports made publicly available as part of the operations centre Vardanyan heads. Those reports, incidentally, do indicate that certain goods are largely unavailable or intermittent in terms of supply and that there has especially been a problem with certain vegetables, some of which are imported.

On 20 December, it was also reported that farmers still have supplies of diesel to continue the late sowing of crops. It should also be mentioned that  Karabakh banned the export of wheat and barley to Armenia in July 2022. “We don’t have a flour and wheat problem,” Stepanakert Mayor David Sargsyan said on 30 December. “The bread factories are working as normal.”

Vardanyan also met last week with the owners of restaurants and cafes in Stepanakert to discuss keeping their businesses open, though there is now a maximum size of 15 people for groups dining out. This can reach 35 people for post-function events such as funerals. Social media also shows that many pizzerias, pâtisseries, and other catering firms still operate.

One restaurant, for example, posted on its Facebook page only today that it will reopen tomorrow after it closed for the New Year. Another is also now advertising a special ‘Mafia’ game night, also known as ‘Werewolf,’ to be held every Wednesday starting this week. As it too is a restaurant-cafe, this implies those going will also consume items from its menu.  

This possibly indicates that the authorities are reserving certain goods for key commercial enterprises, including cafes and restaurants, as well as bakeries. Wine, of course, is not an issue in a region that produces its own and the same is true for vodka. Karabakh’s Public TV even aired a report on a fairly new albeit small winery in one village just two days ago.

Tea and coffee also appear to be available, though cigarettes are reportedly close to disappearing completely. 

None of which, of course, is to diminish the potential severity of the situation in Karabakh if it continues. Certainly, at some point there will be an even greater scarcity of goods that cannot be produced locally. This would includes hygiene and sanitation products, cosmetics, commercially produced snacks, and specialized ingredients for Stepanakert’s eateries. 

Though many are not essential items, they would affect the ability of some businesses to continue. For example, although still visible in video reports from Karabakh’s Public TV and even in social media posts by residents, carbonated drinks, chocolates, coffee, potato crisps, and other goods not produced locally will eventually disappear when existing stocks run out.

This will obviously hit Karabakh’s already shaky economy, something Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reports is already starting to happen.

“Small shops have not opened as they have no products, but the big ones still have it to some extent,” RFE/RL quoted one resident as saying earlier today.” The big stores are open and they have stored goods. They take them out regularly and they give little by little. People have also created reserves so that they can last a long time.”

Physical currency is also a problem, though likely because Karabakh uses the Armenian dram so supply is now limited. It also no doubt prevents some residents imperiling local banks by withdrawing their savings. Instead, residents have been requested to mainly use plastic cards.

Regardless, it still remains uncertain when the standoff on the Lachin corridor will be resolved, but at least Karabakh doesn’t appear to be facing starvation – and nor are the defacto authorities claiming that it will. Instead, Vardanyan’s team have been minimising major disruption to ensure that life can continue as close to normality as is practically possible.

That’s not to say things are normal, however. There is clearly rationing occurring and the gradual intermittent resupply of shops and catering businesses occurring while other goods, as mentioned above, will clearly run out and some probably have already.

Moreover, perhaps the main issue of concern with the situation on the Lachin corridor is that it hardly contributes to an environment conducive to peace or eventual reconciliation between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It should also be remembered that there are still hundreds of Karabakh Armenians stranded in Yerevan and Goris. Among them are children.

Indeed, on 30 December, UNICEF Armenia echoed the calls of the UN Secretary General’s spokesperson to ‘ensure freedom and security of movement’ so that ‘international obligations to protect children are met.’ There are also reportedly problems emerging for those residents with specific nutritional needs, especially in kindergartens and nursing homes.

For everyone’s sake, a resolution of the standoff on the Lachin corridor is therefore necessary.

 —
Update 3 January 2023: Ruben Vardanyan today announced that some goods stored in Karabakh’s food reserves will be distributed to shops. This gradual and limited resupply sounds logical given that there is so far no official rationing introduced and it also prevents panic buying.

 

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Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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