Standoff in Lachin as Humanitarian Concerns Mount

Standoff in Lachin as Humanitarian Concerns Mount

by | Dec 23, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lachin Corridor, Nagorno Karabakh

© Azerbaijani protest on the Lachin highway / Public Domain

At time of writing, the strategic Lachin corridor has been effectively blocked for twelve days by Azerbaijani protestors. Depending on whom you ask, this recent development either risks derailing an already precarious Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process or makes the signing of a treaty all the more urgent. Whatever your position, however, it was clear that Baku would apply pressure on the only connection between Armenia and what remains of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).

What was unknown was simply how. 

Framed as an Azerbaijani environmental protest, what effectively amounts to a blockade highlights what only a few of us warned nearly two years ago – Karabakh is geographically isolated after the 2020 war and, while reliant on Russia for security, is almost totally dependent on Baku for its sustainability, especially in terms of essential resources and now, it seems, trade and transport. Paradoxically, this reality was ignored or inexplicably overlooked by most commentators in the two years since the 2020 ceasefire statement was signed.

In practical terms, Azerbaijan did not need to launch renewed military operations to coerce further concessions from Yerevan and Stepanakert. All it needed to do was tighten the screws. 

Admittedly, some Armenian analysts did understood that pressure would be applied on Lachin, albeit only in the last month or so. Nonetheless, they understood that something was coming and not least since what was effectively a 3 December dress rehearsal with representatives of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Ecology and the AzerGold Joint Stock Company (JSC) blocking the highway for three hours and raising the issue of illegal mining and alleged environmental damage in Karabakh. 

The Azerbaijani media had also been full of claims that Armenia was shipping munitions and landmines to Karabakh via the highway, though these appear to be so far unproven, while reports of precious metals being extracted and exported to Armenia also surfaced. In an attempt to defuse tensions on the road, the protestors entered into negotiations with the Russian peacekeeping command, reportedly also involving Karabakh Security Council Secretary Vitaly Balasanyan, and an agreement was reached.

Scanning machines would be introduced at one or more Russian checkpoints while Azerbaijani specialists would be granted access to the mines. However, on 10 December, Karabakh Armenians reportedly prevented the visit. The defacto authorities in Stepanakert claim that there was no official request sent to them and on 11 December, Baku sent a diplomatic note to Moscow demanding that access should be forthcoming. The following morning, the Lachin highway was again blocked by Azerbaijani protestors. 

The particular mine in question, incidentally, has long been a matter of controversy. After the 2020 war, the enterprise ceased operations after its pumping station fell under Azerbaijani control, but it is unclear when it resumed operations. Ostensibly owned by Base Metals CJSC, the largest tax payer in Karabakh, the Anglo-Asian Mining company has also staked its claim on the mines. It bases this on the 1997 sale by Azerbaijan of the right to the mines even though it was situated in territory outside of Baku’s control.

Indeed, this development seems as much aimed at re-asserting Azerbaijan’s claims to what the international community views as its sovereign territory now in a new post-2020 conflict environment. In that sense, and with new obstacles emerging in the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process, Baku is using any means at its disposal to achieve that. However, there are several specific issues at the heart of this dispute other than simply mineral resources. 

Certainly, few outside of Azerbaijan view the protestors blocking the Lachin highway as genuine environmental activists. First, it is not easy for Azerbaijani citizens to travel to Shusha, the strategic hilltop citadel that returned to Baku’s control in November 2020, and even fewer are able to travel from there down to where the Lachin road passes. Indeed, aside from military personnel, it is nigh on impossible, lending credence to claims that rather than organic, the demonstration was organised by the Azerbaijani authorities.

And as many have also pointed out, it would be unthinkable for any such demonstration or road closure to occur in Azerbaijan proper. . 

Even so, while the issue of legal entitlement to the mines, as well as related environmental concerns, are certainly part of the unfolding drama, consensus among many views this as more a pretext. Also of significance, for example, is the recent arrival of Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan in Karabakh and his appointment as defacto State Minister. An outsider, Baku views him as “Moscow’s man,” an allegation that Vardanyan denies, but also an opinion shared by some, though not all, analysts in Armenia.

The latter, incidentally, charge that Vardanyan is using Karabakh as a stepping stone to pursue a political career in Armenia with an eventual aim to re-assert Moscow’s influence over the country. This, of course, is only speculation, but it is a view held by those admittedly in the pro-western camp in the country. Regardless, Vardanyan’s attempts to reinforce the status quo by exerting what increasingly appears to be considerable control over the breakaway region are not welcomed by Baku.

In particular, Azerbaijan  says that it was engaged with the Karabakh Armenians, on water for example, but that such contacts allegedly stopped when Vardanyan took his position. 

Irking Baku, on 17 November, Vardanyan even said that he considered himself as ‘qualified’ to enter into negotiations over the future of Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan reacted harshly to the statement, though the issue of some kind of mechanism for dialogue between with the Karabakh Armenians has increasingly come to the fore following the 27 September meeting of Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington D.C..

As part of those talks, it is believed that such a mechanism was discussed, though Yerevan and Baku are at odds over whether an international mechanism was agreed or not. A leaked document that appears to be genuine or at least credible, seems to be vague in terms of confirming whether this was decided or simply discussed.. 

The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Regardless, the Azerbaijani protests do appear as much targeted against Vardanyan, possibly to also erode his credibility over time, but there are other issues that indicate frustration with the peace process has set in. Indeed, the timing of the environmental protests also comes precisely after other developments that might well have frozen the European Union-facilitated Brussels process. Rightly or wrongly, Baku puts the blame for this firmly on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s shoulders. 

Azerbaijan specifically claims that Pashinyan made last minute demands for French President Emmanuel Macron to be present at a scheduled meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels on 7 December that would be facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel. Armenia says that such a format was agreed at the Prague summit on 6 October that for the first did involve Macron. Prior to that, he had only been seen during an informal trilateral discussion and one teleconference with Aliyev, Pashinyan, and Michel.

Neither the European Union or France has clearly commented on either claim, leaving it unclear as to which side’s account is correct. Regardless, the meeting was cancelled and for all intents and purposes, Azerbaijani hopes for a peace treaty to be signed by the end of this year clearly dashed. Another grievance is also the failure to provide a link between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan even though Armenia has access to Karabakh via Lachin. 

Both routes were key provisions of the 9-10 November 2020 tripartite ceasefire statement.

6. […] The Lachin Corridor (5 km wide), which will provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia while not passing through the territory of Shusha, shall remain under the control of the Russian Federation peacemaking forces.

 

[…]

 

The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.

 

[…]

 

9. All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections.

 

Subject to agreement between the Parties, the construction of new transport communications to link the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be ensured.

Though Pashinyan has instead offered three alternative crossing points on its borders with Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, Azerbaijan considers them unsuitable for a variety of reasons. First, they are significantly longer than the most direct route between Azerbaijan and its exclave and secondly, they would be impossible to secure unless Russia were to deploy additional forces elsewhere on Armenian territory. With regards to the route Baku wants, the Russian FSB already has a presence on the Armenia-Iran border.

There is also the issue of customs and border checks which Armenia appears reluctant to concede on. In response, Azerbaijan argues, if there are to be checks on what it terms the “Zangezur Corridor,” then so too should there be on the Lachin corridor.  While both routes would remain under the sovereignty of each country, they would be anyway controlled by Moscow. The Lachin corridor is already temporarily under the control of Russian peacekeeping force while the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) would oversee the route via Armenia. 

As a result, and despite setbacks with its invasion of Ukraine, as well as some disagreement between Yerevan and Moscow over inaction from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), some allege that the impasse on the Lachin Corridor suits Moscow and that it too seeks to force the issue of the route through Armenia to Nakhichevan. However, others believe that Baku is seeking to discredit the credibility of the Russian peacekeeping force which is responsible under the 2020 ceasefire statement for ensuring access. 

But it isn’t just Azerbaijan. While Yerevan has been somewhat restrained in commenting on events in Lachin, it too has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping force for not preventing or intervening in the standoff. In reality, however, it was unlikely that Moscow would resort to force given that peacekeeping forces, even with a mandate, are more likely to remain neutral and facilitate negotiations, something that Moscow says is happening. For its part, the defacto Karabakh authorities say they instead want a Russian presence mandated and increased.

The mission has also sent convoys through the Azerbaijani protest camp during the standoff, though it is unclear whether they are ferrying foodstuffs or other humanitarian assistance. Stepanakert denies this, while Baku insists that it will allow Armenian civilian traffic to pass through the camp. Vardanyan has openly rejected this offer, citing security concerns, and confusing matters more, it also appears that Armenia has blocked access to the Lachin Corridor on its side of mutual border, presumably for the same reason.

Today it also appears that a group of journalists from Karabakh attempted to travel along the highway towards the Azerbaijani protest camp but were turned back by Russian peacekeeping forces, further muddying the waters as to who is blocking what.

Also at time of writing, only one Armenian ambulance ferrying a critically ill Karabakh resident to Yerevan has so far been escorted through the camp by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The following day, a second ambulance stranded in Armenia returned with it back to Stepanakert. Interestingly, on 21 December, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg ruled that it was unclear to what extent Azerbaijan had control on the road and instead highlighted the need to only guarantee such humanitarian access.

Noting that the extent to which the Government of Azerbaijan were currently in control of the situation in the “Lachin Corridor” was disputed and unclear at this stage, noting in addition the obligation of Azerbaijan under Article 6 of the Trilateral Statement signed on 9 November 2020 to “guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions” and reminding them of their obligations under the Convention, the Court decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before it, to indicate to the Government of Azerbaijan, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to take all measures that are within their jurisdiction to ensure safe passage through the “Lachin Corridor” of seriously ill persons in need of medical treatment in Armenia and others who were stranded on the road without shelter or means of subsistence.

Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch, while not demanding that the Azerbaijani protests stop, has also commented on the situation and suggested that the protest camp could at least be organised in such a way so as not to effectively disrupt traffic for whatever the reason..   

Those in control of the road and the area around it – that is Azerbaijan authorities and the Russian peacekeeping force – should ensure that vehicles with humanitarian goods can pass and that freedom of movement is not stopped, Human Rights Watch said. 

 

Whether the protesters have genuine environmental concerns or other grievances, Azerbaijan should facilitate the right to peaceful protest by interacting with the protesters in a way that ensures the road remains open and the protest does not deny Nagorno-Karabakh residents their rights of access to essential services and goods, and to freedom of movement.

Others have also called for the free movement of vehicles, but as credible reports of food and fuel running out for Karabakh residents emerge, many more are concerned that a humanitarian crisis is in the making. Stepanakert claims that 120,000 ethnic Armenians are at risk of starvation and inadequate medical treatment while Baku says all traffic is free to pass and that fewer people anyway reside in the area currently under the control of the Russian peacekeeping force.

In reality, nobody knows how many people live in Karabakh, but it is unlikely to be close to the claimed 120,000 but also certainly nowhere near to the 25,000 claimed by Baku. Regardless, the situation is not good to say the least.

Ultimately, however, one side will have to fold, but for now the standoff continues and however it does, one thing is clear. There is an urgent need for a peace agreement to be negotiated and signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan sooner rather than later. Time has never been on the side of peace in this conflict and as I’ve written many times before, and also said at a civil society meeting in Tbilisi in January, Stepanakert and Baku urgently need to talk.

 

 

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EUMM Georgia to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia as EUMCAP ends

EUMM Georgia to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia as EUMCAP ends

by | Dec 19, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh

Today, 19 December 2022, the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) ended its short two-month mission in Armenia. Deployed as a result of the 6 October Prague meeting between European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, its short mission coincided with apparent signals emanating from the 27 September meeting between senior Armenian and Azerbaijani officials in Washington D.C. that a peace deal between Yerevan and Baku could be signed by year’s end.

I took a calculated guess back then that EUMCAP  would likely be made up of staff temporarily seconded from an existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions elsewhere, and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia was the most likely candidate. Indeed, that was correct, but any hopes for the signing of even a framework peace agreement appear to have been dashed since then, raising certain questions about whether EUMCAP would be extended let alone transformed into a dedicated mission.

This is an important issue because EUMM in Georgia can hardly afford to keep some of its own personnel in Armenia or send any more down unless it recruits more civilian monitors and support staff.

In its press release issued today, the European Council appears to imply that a dedicated mission is not definite and that any decision will likely be contingent on progress in the EU-facilitated peace process. Given that the EU is not known for putting its observers directly in harm’s way, this would mean registering results, whether publicly or privately, in the  border demarcation process and/or the normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan. However, the tone of the press release sounds cautiously optimistic.

The deployment of 40 European monitoring experts has proved to be effective and contributed to building confidence in an unstable situation. Today we start a new phase in the EU’s engagement in the South Caucasus, with a transitional team that will prepare the ground for a possible longer term EU mission in Armenia, with the ultimate goal of contributing to sustainable peace in the region.

 

[…] 

 

Against this background, the Council – in agreement with Armenia’s authorities – decided that the existing EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) will deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia to enhance the EU’s awareness of the security situation, and contribute to the planning and preparation of a possible civilian CSDP mission in the country. The transitional planning assistance team is also expected to support the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, in the EU-facilitated normalisation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

It can only be hoped that the Charles Michel-facilitated process can be kickstarted despite the recent cancelation of a meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan planned for Brussels on 7 December. Certainly, EUMM, which has been operating in Georgia since the August 2008 war with Russia, has been exemplary. Though it cannot prevent ceasefire violations, it can at least calm tensions, including through its Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), working with at-risk communities, and cross-border media workshops.

These are all developments that would benefit Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the region as a whole, but probably only if the EU were convinced that both are truly close to signing a long-awaited peace agreement – and before the end of next year. Indeed, some might argue, preferably by the beginning of Spring 2023 when the snow melts and border incidents become more frequent. Russia and possibly Iran’s reaction, however, will be something to look out for. 

 

 

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Landmine Free South Caucasus 2022 Campaign

Landmine Free South Caucasus 2022 Campaign

by | Dec 16, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh

Campaign Logo © Landmine Free South Caucasus

Late last month civil society in Azerbaijan and Georgia marked a day of solidarity for the victims of landmines and the communities that are affected by them. I attended the event held by LINKS Europe and its local partners in Tbilisi while another event was held simultaneously by my good friend Ahmad Alili, Director of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre (CPAC), in Baku. I was told a similar event was also held in Yerevan.

Personally speaking, this is particularly an issue of importance for me given my own work covering the problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Armenia, Karabakh, and the then Armenian-controlled seven regions surrounding the breakaway region from about 2000-2011. Therefore, in support of the Landmine Free South Caucasus campaign, I include the official statement from LINKS Europe below.

The South Caucasus remains one of the areas most infected with contamination by landmines and other unexploded remnants of war in the world. Apart from the thou- sands of casualties caused directly or indirectly by landmines and other unexploded ordnance over the last three and a half decades, including several hundred in the last year, this contamination negatively impacts whole communities across the region, affecting their economic well-being, and exposing them to the constant threat of risk and danger.

 

In 2019 and in 2021, the regional campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus was suc- cessfully implemented across the region. Government officials, demining organisa- tions and civil society, together with representatives of the international community, actively discussed the threat that landmines pose, and action that could be taken to eradicate them. The campaign took the message for a landmine free South Caucasus to schools and communities across the region.

 

We are pleased to announce the launch of the 2022 Regional Campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus which this year will be launched on 30 November with a “Day of Solidarity with the victims of landmines and other unexploded remnants of war, and their communities, in the South Caucasus”.

 

As in the past, the campaign will be delivered in five languages: Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Russian and English. Starting on 30 November, the campaign will run until 30 June 2023, with activities focusing on the heavy human and economic cost of unexploded remnants of war, and to increase awareness of the need for their swift eradication. By reaching out in solidarity to communities affected by landmines we want to assure them that they are not alone. We also recall that hundreds of de- miners across the region risk their lives on a daily basis as they work tirelessly to rid the region from this scourge. We hail their efforts and say thank you for their precious work. As land is rehabilitated and returned to its proper use, care should be taken to make sure that it is the communities affected that should benefit first from its eco- nomic exploitation.

 

Finally, we appreciate the support of the international community in the quest for eradicating all landmines and other unexploded remnants of war from the South Caucasus. However the magnitude of the challenge facing the demining community is such that a much bigger level of support is required so that the capacity of local demining efforts is increased to a level where it can respond adequately to the tasks at hand. This support should be forthcoming quickly and at levels that would make a real difference.

 

We appeal to the people of the South Caucasus and to the international community:

 

  • Join us in expressing our solidarity with individuals and communities that are victims of landmines and other explosive remnants of war!

  • Join us in saying thank you to deminers!

  • Join us in calling for a landmine free South Caucasus by the end of this decade, or soon after.

     

The campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus is a regional effort with the participation of organisations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, working together with international part- ners. The campaign is co-ordinated by LINKS Europe and supported by the European Union. For more information please contact Patrick Norén: patrick@links-europe.eu.

Controlled detonation of landmines and UXO by the HALO Trust, Askeran, Nagorno Karabakh
© Onnik James Krikorian 2010

Incidentally, in the LINKS Europe newsletter that accompanies the campaign, it is also reported that in October alone, the National Agency for Mine Action of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) defused or destroyed over 4,000 landmines and UXO. Though some of the minefields in the seven regions now returned to Azerbaijani control were cleared in the 2000s, there are many more that remain or have been laid since.

Those mines have already taken a heavy toll in the post-2020 war environment.

It should also be remembered that Armenia has its own problems with landmines on the border too, and LINKS Europe also says that in November the Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) held a training for UN employees in Armenia on explosive munitions and the danger that they pose. Earlier in October, CHDE also held awareness workshops for children and teachers in villages in the Gegharkunik region of the country.

Meanwhile, in Karabakh, the HALO Trust demining charity continues its work there. I’ve accompanied HALO Trust many times as they worked on demining land and collecting UXO from about 2000 to 2011 and some of my articles on the situation in Armenia and Karabakh 2000-2011 can be read online here, here, here, and here. There’s also a gallery of images taken during some of those visits here.

 

 

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EUMM Georgia to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia as EUMCAP ends

Calls for the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia to be extended

by | Dec 10, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh

According to the Armenian Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, the European Monitoring Mission Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia will end on 20 December 2022. Requested by Mirzoyan on 22 September following fierce fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the border a week earlier, the decision to deploy came out of the quadripartite meeting of the two leaders and European Council and French presidents, Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron, in Prague on 6 October. The decision was approved by EU member states on 17 October.

Initially deployed for up to two months, and despite an interview with EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar published on 29 October in which he said that it could not continue past that date, there are already calls for EUMCAP to be extended. The most vocal have come from France’s Foreign Minister, Catherine Colonna. “Through the monitoring of the border, this mission has really limited the danger of escalation,” she told the French Parliament on 6 December. 

“This presence should continue as long as it is needed. This is our belief. This is also […] the desire of the Armenians,” Colonna added.

However, it is uncertain whether EUMCAP can be extended. In order to deploy in such a short amount of time it was necessary to utilise the human and financial resources of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia. Deployed following the August 2008 war with Russia, staff from EUMM make up the 40-strong EUMCAP and were thus taken away from their normal duties monitoring the Abkhazia and South Ossetia Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs). Any  extension would require their continued absence.

It should also be noted that EUMM does not just monitor the ABLs. It also concerns itself with any security risks in Georgia from radicalisation to domestic political tensions that might erupt into violence. For the record, I’ve been called to meetings with EUMM to discuss both. Regardless, despite that and Klaar’s earlier comments about the temporary nature of the deployment made up of civilian monitors, European Council Decision 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 does at least provide for such a possibility.

Article 3a

 

1.   EUMM Georgia shall monitor, analyse and report on the situation in the region around the international border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, with a view to contributing to the restoration of peace and security in the area, to the building of confidence and to the delimitation of the international border between the two States.

 

2.   A strategic assessment, including on the possible continuation, adaptation or termination of that task, shall be conducted by the Political and Security Committee six weeks after deployment.

 

3.   That task shall end when the Council so decides.

With uncertainty still surrounding any extension of EUMCAP or its transformation into a dedicated European Monitoring Mission in Armenia rather than simply a Monitoring Capacity, there are certain issues to take into account. Firstly, on 7 December, Marek Szczygiel, Head of Mission for EUMM in Georgia, announced on Twitter that his term would end on 14 December. This naturally coincides with the 3 December 2020 decision by the European Council to prolong EUMM’s mission for two years until 14 December 2022 with a budget of €44.8 million.

This probably implies that another decision on EUMM’s continued deployment in Georgia has already been taken or is about to be.

It is therefore not beyond the realms of possibility that any decision to further prolong the deployment of EUMM in Georgia could also include an increase in budget and staffing to allow EUMCAP to continue its work in Armenia. Though it can not prevent any incidents, and though its role is not to publicly report on them, there is no doubt that EUMCAP, like EUMM, can at least contribute to the easing of tensions on the border to some extent. It should also be remembered that its role is clearly defined in the European Council decision.

On 6 October 2022, on the occasion of the meeting of the European Political Community held in Prague, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan confirmed their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Declaration agreed in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991, in which both States recognised each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The two States moreover agreed in principle to the deployment of an EU civilian CSDP Mission alongside their common international border with a view to contributing to the restoration of peace and security in the area, to the building of confidence and to the delimitation of the international border between the two States.

But there are dangers as well. Increasingly, some analysts in Yerevan openly argue that the continued deployment of EUMCAP in Armenia can be seen as a way to delay a peace agreement or even buy time in order for the country to re-arm ahead of what they see as an inevitable new conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it is unlikely that the European Union would want to be used with that goal in mind. Moreover, warn some Azerbaijani analysts, as EUMCAP is deployed only on the Armenian side of the border, there are other concerns too.

First, they argue, any inkling that EUMCAP could inadvertently delay the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly and adversely affect the standing and credibility of the European Union just as it has the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group. The optics of EUMCAP monitors standing side by side with Armenian soldiers focusing military grade binoculars on Azerbaijani military positions would also not be positive, they argue, creating the impression that the EU has taken sides in the 30-year-old conflict.

Given the EU’s stated aim to assist and support both Armenia and Azerbaijan as a neutral facilitator and mediator, this would be counterproductive unless Yerevan and Baku are clearly on the path to peace and both sides view the presence of monitors as contributing to that. 

Nevertheless, with the clock ticking down on EUMCAP and just a week and a half to go before its official termination unless extended or transformed, the answer to this question will soon be known. It might also reflect on whether the European Union believes, despite recent setbacks, that there is still life left in the Charles Michel-facilitated Brussels process to assist Armenia and Azerbaijan in finally negotiating and implementing a long overdue peace agreement. And it is this that might be the most important signal of all.  

As testimony to that, on his recent visit to Tbilisi, U.S. Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Philip Reeker lauded Georgia for EUMM’s role in establishing and deploying EUMCAP to assist in the western-led process. However, and although the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) did not deploy a monitoring mission despite requests to do so, the Russian and Iranian reaction to any continued EUMCAP or equivalent mission on Armenian soil will also be something to keep a watchful eye out for.

–

Update, 12 December 2022: “The Council reviewed the EU Monitoring Capacity to Armenia which will complete its activities on 19 December. In order to maintain the EU’s credibility as a facilitator of dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a team will be deployed to Armenia as of 20 December to contribute to the planning of a possible Civilian mission to be launched, in case of agreement, in 2023.” Link

 

 

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U.S. urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to maintain momentum in peace negotiations

U.S. urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to maintain momentum in peace negotiations

by | Nov 19, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, United States

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (left), U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan (right) yesterday at Blair House in Washington D.C.. It was the second such meeting in this trilateral format. via Armenian MFA

Less than a month and a half before the end of the year, hopes remain high for the normalisation of relations between Yerevan and Baku, especially since the last round of negotiations held in the United States. “I urged Prime Minister Pashinyan to sustain momentum on peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia following the foreign ministers’ talks in Washington on 7 November,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted on 16 November after a follow-up call to the Armenian leader. Hours later he tweeted the same message, but this time addressed to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

Though many remain skeptical about the timescale, Blinken’s comments followed what appears to have been a productive bilateral meeting between the Armenian Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov, in Washington D.C.. A trilateral meeting with Blinken followed and, according to U.S. accounts, Mirzoyan and Bayramov agreed on a post-meeting statement in just 40 minutes. Their previous bilateral meeting in Geneva saw separate and different press releases published afterwards. 

The same day, in an otherwise poorly attended Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting on “Assessing U.S. Policy in the Caucasus,” such hopes were clearly articulated  by senior U.S. officials. “The sides are at a historic crossroads,” said U.S. State Department Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Philip Reeker. “We’re encouraging them to choose a future of prosperity and demonstrate the wisdom of working together on a peace that will benefit the people of the region for generations to come.”

Though little new was said by Reeker and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried at the hearing, they did at least confirm some of what is known, including indirectly confirming the veracity of a leaked document summarising key points from a meeting between Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev held on 27 September. The notes indicated that it is hoped sufficient progress on border limitation and a peace deal is possibly by the end of the year.

The deployment of a temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia for a two-month period from late October also hints at this. 

During the Senate Foreign Committee meeting that lasted not much longer than an hour, both Reeker and Donfried in particular commended the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, for his 13 April speech in the Armenian National Assembly admitting that the international community believes Yerevan should ‘lower the benchmark’ on Nagorno Karabakh, a comment interpreted by many to mean that Yerevan should drop its support for independence of the mainly ethnic Armenian-populated territory situated within Azerbaijan.

This had always been the stumbling block in previous negotiations along with the occupation of the seven regions surrounding Karabakh that are now back under Baku’s control. Moreover, it is also clear that the issue of the normalisation of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations will be considered as a separate issue apart from that of Nagorno Karabakh, which many consider is now an internal matter for Azerbaijan, though not one away from the watchful eyes of the international community.

Not unexpectedly, of course, the issue remains highly sensitive and whether formally or informally linked, it also still lies at the heart of the conflict. Somehow, however, separating the two appears to be the only way forwards. This also became apparent on 27 September at the meeting between Grigoryan and Hajiyev in Washington D.C., as well as in the official Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press statement following a 2 October meeting of the foreign ministers in Geneva. The necessity to create a ‘discussion mechanism’ to allow Baku to communicate with the ethnic Armenian population of Karabakh was discussed.

Again, this was mentioned in the 27 September leaked document.

The Government of Azerbaijan will nominate a representative to work with a similar representative designated by the Armenian ethnic community in Nagorno-Karabakh to conduct discussions on the rights and securities for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. Representatives will provide to the international community on their discussions. The parties will continue to review the role of an international observer, without prejudice to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, to provide confidence regarding protections for minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The details contained within the document, incidentally, were also effectively  confirmed in an interview with Armenian National Security Secretary Armen Grigoryan days after it surfaced. However, in response, on 13 October, his Azerbaijani counterpart, Hikmet Hajiyev, responded to Grigoryan’s comments by saying there can be no question of an international mechanism being introduced. It should be pointed out, however, that this could mean simply that Baku does not want a format such as the OSCE Minsk Group resurrected or introduced given its failure to achieve any results prior to the 2020 war.

Regardless, given the increasingly precarious situation Karabakh Armenians now find themselves in, living within an area now stripped of much of its natural resources and unable to produce the types of goods and services it once exported to Armenia, such a mechanism would be both logical and necessary in the current circumstances that do not seem likely to change in the future apart from for the worse.  It should also be remembered that some cooperation and communication has already occurred in terms of roads and water.

The need for this to be expanded upon is supported by both the US and EU.

“While the resolution of contentious issues remains the responsibility of Armenia and Azerbaijan, I have made it clear the international community and the United States has a specific responsibility to ensure that the rights and security of ethnic Armenians are addressed credibly and in line with a peace settlement,” said Reeker at this week’s hearing. […] I have repeatedly encouraged the leaders in both countries to consider an international mechanism or construct to ensure, monitor, and report on any agreement involving Nagorno Karabakh.”

Indeed, it was this issue that Reeker focused on most.

“That’s important and to do that fully, […] they need to consider how they can engage a mechanism, an international effort to support, to monitor, to offer help, and it can have an economic component and capacity as well, to make sure those people have an opportunity to define what security and rights means and to see that it is implemented […],” he continued while also implying in additional comments that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had acknowledged this in private discussions.

What shape or form such a mechanism might take remains unclear, but Azerbaijan has indeed stated that it will engage in direct discussions with the ethnic Armenian population of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).  On 17 November, for example, Aliyev confirmed this even if did also rule out any negotiations with the newly installed defacto Minister of State for Nagorno Karabakh, Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan. On 18 November, the defacto Karabakh authorities rejected this and further demanded that such talks must be internationally mediated.

The OSCE Minsk Group was even mentioned.

But for most observers, the OSCE Minsk Group lies dormant without any chance of revival following Russia’s  24 February invasion of Ukraine. Even forgetting Azerbaijan’s refusal to engage within this format since the 2020 war, and the OSCE’s own internal problems as an organisation operating on consensus, it also seems unlikely that the three co-chair countries of the U.S., France, and Russia can cooperate in this format. Speaking at the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Reeker also acknowledged that while its mandate remains active, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship now doesn’t function at all.

Even so, unconfirmed rumours continue to spread, including from former MP Arman Babajanyan who said in an interview on Armenian Public TV that during the talks in Washington D.C. on 7 November the creation of a UN Security Council-endorsed format comprising the U.S, EU, and Russia was discussed. There has been no other mention of this and it should be treated as unconfirmed and speculation only, but given the risk of multiple peace formats colliding, such an idea would at least makes sense. Moreover, unlike the Minsk Group, it notably excludes France, an unreliable international mediator in the eyes of Baku.

As for Moscow, Reeker also admitted that Russia still remains an actor, especially in Armenia.  

Bringing the disparate sides together does admittedly sound impossible in the wake of Ukraine.  but it is notable that after a pause for almost a year, the 56th round of the Geneva International Discussions, a forum created after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war was held on 5 October. Originally scheduled for March, it is co-chaired by the OSCE, EU, and UN with the involvement of Georgia, Russia, the U.S., and also the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the West and Russia can engage there, why not in another conflict zone in the same region?

Nonetheless, charge some Armenian analysts, Brussels and D.C. hope to see the Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh leave when its first term expires in 2025, something that Azerbaijan also says it wants. Some others, however, believe that Moscow and Baku might strike a deal to extend the mission for one more 5-year term in exchange for integrating Karabakh more fully into Azerbaijan proper. Interestingly, on 10 November, Pashinyan also proposed establishing a demilitarised zone with international guarantees during his trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Aliyev in Sochi on 31 October.

Moreover, he has since once more declared that Armenia is ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, though stressing it will likely take the form of a framework rather than a comprehensive agreement. Given the short window until the end of the year, this sounds logical considering all the complexities arising after over three decades of enmity and conflict. However, warn some analysts, it is also important that such an agreement not prove to be as ambiguous and open to interpretation as some points in the 9-10 November ceasefire statement that have created numerous problems in the two years since it was signed.

The issue of border and customs controls on any route connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhichevan has been a particularly thorny issue and unless it too is resolved it is now quite possible that Azerbaijan will demand its own checks on the Lachin corridor, the route connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh through sovereign Azerbaijani territory currently under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers but only for as long as they remain. It is difficult to imagine a peace treaty being signed without addressing this issue, but noteworthy that unblocking regional communications has always been an integral part of any peace deal.

As always, what happens next relies on there being the sufficient political will in both Yerevan and Baku to finally turn the page on a conflict that should have been resolved decades ago. 

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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