EU Monitoring Capacity deploys on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border

EU Monitoring Capacity deploys on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border

by | Nov 15, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Balcani Caucaso, European Union, Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh

The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. The Monitoring Capacity in Armenia is made up of staff from EUMM in Georgia and financed from its budget © EUMM

Osservatorio Balcani e Caucasus last week published my brief article on the temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) deployed to Armenia on its border with Azerbaijan in late October. 

The European Union has deployed around 40 unarmed civilian monitors on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan following serious military escalation on 12-13 September, that saw the latter strike and capture territory within the former, leaving nearly 300 dead on both sides. Though requested in September by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the decision to deploy the monitors came on 6 October at the meeting in Prague between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, European Council President Charles Michel, and French President Emmanuel Macron. Azerbaijan, however, did not consent to the mission’s presence on its side of the tense border, though it did agree to “cooperate with this mission as far as it is concerned”.

 

Formally approved by the EU member states on 17 October, the monitors have since started their short mission of only two months following the visit by an EU technical mission days earlier. Though some Armenians hoped for a longer and even a military presence, despite the EU being more known for its civilian missions, this was not unexpected. Indeed, on 29 October, Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar explained that the only way to deploy quickly would be to use some of its 200 monitors in the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in neighbouring Georgia. Moreover, the Armenian mission’s two-month duration would be funded from EUMM Georgia’s budget, currently at 22.4 million Euros per year, and will not be extended.

 

EUMM, also a civilian monitoring mission, was deployed in Georgia in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war and monitors the country’s Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) with two other breakaway regions in the South Caucasus – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Klaar, incidentally, was EUMM Georgia’s head in Tbilisi in 2013-14.

 

[…]

 

Azerbaijan has said that it would like a peace treaty signed by the end of the year, and Armenia has tentatively agreed, but there are still many obstacles to overcome after more than three decades of hostility. Nonetheless, the West clearly views EUMCAP as a necessary instrument to help create a more conducive environment in which to reach such an agreement.

You can read the full article in English or Italian.

 

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Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers Meet in Washington D.C. for Bilateral Talks – and also with U.S. Secretary of State Blinken

Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers Meet in Washington D.C. for Bilateral Talks – and also with U.S. Secretary of State Blinken

by | Nov 8, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, United States

The Armenian delegation (left) meeting with its Azerbaijani counterpart (right) yesterday at Blair House in Washington D.C. via Azerbaijani MFA on Twitter.

For many, the significance of yesterday’s bilateral meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, appears to have been overlooked. Instead, all attention was focused on the later meeting of the two state officials with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Though important, the preparation of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan has actually been assigned to the Foreign Ministers in a bilateral format and not to one with the direct involvement of any external actors.

This was announced by European Council President Charles Michel after the 31 August facilitated meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels. Of course, that the bilateral meeting in Washington D.C. was hosted by the U.S. State Department and upon the initiative of Secretary of State Blinken is not insignificant either, but also follows a similar meeting held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 19 September.

However, it is what was discussed during the  bilateral between Mirzoyan and Bayramov that is arguably more important. Indeed, Blinken himself hinted as much in his opening remarks to the trilateral meeting with the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers held afterwards.

“Direct dialogue is the best way to a truly durable peace, and we are very pleased to support that,” he said. Blinken also reaffirmed the importance of recognising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, something that has become a key element of the meetings between the foreign ministers in Geneva as well the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Prague on 6 October and in Sochi at the end of the same month. Of note too are remarks tweeted by EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar.

Nonetheless, Blinken’s remarks before the trilateral meeting that, like the bilateral discussion held earlier the same day, was held behind closed doors were to the point. 

I think it’s also fair to say that 30-plus years of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh have had tremendous human, material costs – lives lost, scars that are deep.  But what we are seeing now are real steps, and courageous steps, by both countries to put the past behind and to work toward a durable peace.  Both countries are working to that end and to, ultimately, a brighter future for the South Caucasus – a future of peace, countries at peace, countries working together for a better future.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (left), U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan (right) yesterday at Blair House in Washington D.C.. It was the second such meeting in this trilateral format. via Armenian MFA on Twitter

To the disappointment of many, however, very little details emerged from either the bilateral and trilateral meetings for which the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ambassadors to the United States had been present. There had also been meetings with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Olson and U.S. Senior Advisor on Caucasus Negotiations, Philip Reeker, was also present for the trilateral meetings. Possibly of note, however, was that the separate statements issued by the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers were virtually identical.

This was not the case following their last bilateral meeting in Geneva.

In those statements published earlier today, the two sides reaffirmed the commitments undertaken by the Armenian Prime Minister and Azerbaijani President in Prague and, of particular note, in Sochi. This is especially relevant given that some observers have concluded that yesterday’s meeting was a direct response by the United States to the tripartite meeting held on 31 October with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It could of course still be, but there is also increasing concern that Moscow can derail any process that seeks to sideline it.

This makes the reference to Sochi arguably all the more interesting.

For now, however, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers agreed to “expedite their negotiations and organise another meeting in the coming weeks.” This is particularly relevant given a much speculated window of opportunity for signing a peace deal in some shape or form by the end of this year and while the recently deployed but temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP) remains on the ground. The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders are still expected to meet again in Brussels this month.

“The meeting yesterday underscores Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s serious pursuit of peace through intensified dialogue,” said U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price in a statement issued earlier today.

It remains to be seen whether any new details emerge from yesterday’s meeting in the coming days from remarks made by officials domestically in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, or even through leaks as has happened, but the process looks set to continue at least. However, and despite the urgent need for a breakthrough and a peace treaty to be signed in some shape or form, there will still be many obstacles along the way and it can also end in failure. November, basically, looks set to be an incredibly critical and important month.

 

 

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EU Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) starts patrolling the Armenian Border with Azerbaijan

EU Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) starts patrolling the Armenian Border with Azerbaijan

by | Oct 27, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh

EU monitoring mission vehicles © Toivo Klaar on Twitter

Following the arrival of a technical assessment team to Armenia, a monitoring mission from the European Union this week started patrolling the country’s border with Azerbaijan. The decision to deploy the 40 or so civilian monitors has been widely welcomed and applauded, but it is important to realise what it is and what it isn’t. To begin with, for now at least, it is not an indefinite presence in Armenia with a fixed term of just two months only. That might seem short to many, but it’s also important to realise why.

First, though the request to deploy the monitoring team, now officially called the European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) in Armenia, was made in September, the decision to do so wasn’t taken until the Prague meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, French President Emmanuel Macon, and European Council President Charles Michel on 6 October. This decision was officially approved by the foreign ministers of EU member states on 17 October.

In just 10 days, the mission is now functioning, leading some to marvel at the speed at which it did. However, it is important to note that EUMCAP is not only made up of monitors from the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, but is also financed from EUMM’s €22.4 million per year budget. It remains unknown whether EUMCAP would have been able to deploy so quickly were it not for the presence of EUMM in Georgia. Recruitment, procurement, and logistics would likely have been a significant problem otherwise.

It took around six weeks for EUMM to deploy 200 monitors in Georgia following the August 2008 ceasefire with Russia. 

Another reason for the two months duration is quite possibly because the timescale for a possible EU-brokered peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, also driven by the US, is set for the same time period. EUMCAP is intended to bring stability to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and also inform decision makers in Brussels while the border delimitation process is underway, again in the same time period. Though the civilian monitoring mission has little power, experience from Georgia shows it can achieve the lessening of tensions.

Not to say, however, that EUMCAP’s presence guarantees peace on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border while a deal is hammered out. Indeed, even in Georgia, EUMM has been unable to prevent the policy of ‘creeping annexation’ employed by Russia in another of the region’s three breakaway territories, South Ossetia. Nonetheless, and while Azerbaijan did not agree to EUMCAP deploying on its side of the border, that the decision was made in Prague and that Baku agreed to cooperate with it when necessary is encouraging.

It is highly unlikely that EUMCAP would deploy if Brussels perceived that there would be an immediate threat to the safety and security of mission personnel. 

It is therefore important to note that EUMCAP has a clear task at hand that appears directly linked to the process of border delimitation and even the signing of a peace deal by Baku and Yerevan that is anticipated, but admittedly not guaranteed, by the end of the year. Indeed, this is not so much the EU solely investing in Armenia as some have argued but rather, and perhaps more likely, an investment in supporting the Brussels facilitated peace process.

Indeed, even the Armenian Prime Minister has said that he does not see any need to seek to extend the mission unless circumstances dictate. Moreover, given the lack of its own budget and an actual mandate as a European Union Monitoring Mission in Armenia, as opposed to a European Union Monitoring Capacity in Armenia, such a decision would require a more involved European Union process and budgeting for such a mission as well as recruiting its own personnel and procuring equipment for this specific task.

That is not out of the realms of possibility, however, but there is another important point here. It is imperative that EUMCAP is not seen in some circles simply as a way to avoid or defer a much needed peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan. Instead, EUMCAP can help facilitate this process by providing a vital confidence building component to the process when it is most necessary and for that a lot of credit is not just deserved by Brussels, but particularly by the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia.

Without it, and the fine balancing act that was no doubt required to ensure the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) in Georgia could still be monitored effectively, it is possible that EUMCAP would not even be possible – in the short term at least. This is relevant given many question marks over hopes that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could, especially at a time when that body is internally riven because of Ukraine and subject to significant budgetary pressures and the need to seek extra-budgetary finances.

Suffice to say, EUMCAP is therefore very welcome indeed.

 

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OSCE sends Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) to Armenia – With More Questions than Answers

OSCE sends Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) to Armenia – With More Questions than Answers

by | Oct 21, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh

Following the European Union’s announcement that it would send a 40-person civilian monitoring mission to the Armenian border with Azerbaijan for a maximum of two months, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan later surprised many by announcing that Yerevan was also discussing the deployment of observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation and Europe (OSCE). The declaration was made on 18 October during a press conference held in Yerevan alongside his Norwegian counterpart, Anniken Huitfeldt.

From the outset, this sounded highly unlikely.

Complicating matters, however, is the fact that the OSCE relies on consensus among all 57 participating states in its decision making process. This is both its strength and its weakness, though the latter seems to be the reality as relations between the West and Russia continue to sour. Moreover, other participating countries have also managed to derail its smooth functioning  by watering down decisions or documents in order to reach that consensus. In some cases, this has also led to the collapse of entire projects and activities.

As examples, Russia was responsible for the closure of the OSCE Mission in Georgia in late 2008, while Azerbaijan was responsible not only for the closure of the OSCE Mission in Baku in 2015, but also in Yerevan in 2017. But perhaps most demonstrative of this has been the termination of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine by Russia in March 2022 just one month after its invasion. Ironically, just four months earlier, the OSCE had actually presented the Ukrainian monitoring mission as an example of how consensus can work.

Regardless, when the official OSCE statement materialised on Armenia, it turned out that it was sending a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) and not a monitoring one. Moreover, its duration would be for six days only from 21-27 October 2022. NAMs, incidentally, are quite regularly dispatched by the OSCE to individual member states, the most well known example being OSCE/ODIHR ahead of monitoring elections, and the NAM sent to Armenia would be from the OSCE Secretariat, perhaps negating the need for full organisational consensus.

“The technical team comprised of international experts and representatives of the OSCE Secretariat will visit areas along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and hold consultations with the relevant national and local stakeholders as well as international partners on the ground.

Even so, Baku reacted strongly to the news, calling it “a private visit by a group of several participating states” while also decrying the lack of consensus in the decision making process. To be fair, it is quite possible that NAMs do not require this, so what could be Azerbaijan’s problem with sending a six-day NAM to Armenia? For one, perhaps, it could be concern that any report might be critical of Baku. Certainly, given how the OSCE works, it is highly unlikely that any recommendation calling for a monitoring mission to be deployed would be adopted.

To reiterate my earlier point, consensus is both the strength and weakness of the OSCE, but it’s that weakness that is increasingly causing major problems for the organisation, with Azerbaijan already refusing to consider the organisation’s draft budget for next year at a time when it least needs further internal dissent and when its future is already on shaky ground.  On 20th October, for example, the US Mission to the OSCE said that the organisation faced “existential challenges and [was] in dire need of an approved budget.”

In conclusion, at least for now, there are more questions than answers about the OSCE Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) being sent to Armenia. Time, of course, will tell.

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EUMM Georgia to temporarily deploy on Armenia-Azerbaijan Border

EUMM Georgia to temporarily deploy on Armenia-Azerbaijan Border

by | Oct 17, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh

The  European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia is to temporarily deploy 40 of its civilian observers to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border for a maximum period of two months. The decision came during the 6 October meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Council President Charles Michel in Prague.

On the occasion of the meeting of the European Political Community held in Prague on 6 October 2022, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan confirmed their commitment to the UN Charter and to the Declaration agreed in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991, in which both states recognise each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. They confirmed it would be a basis for the work of the border delimitation commissions and that the next meeting of the border commissions would take place in Brussels by the end of October. The aim of this mission is to build confidence and, through its reports, to contribute to the border commissions.

The mission was requested by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on 22 September following last month’s fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan and officially confirmed on 11 October. A technical assessment team, believed to be between 8-10 people is currently in Yerevan preparing for the mission’s deployment.  

As I initially expected and commented on Twitter before details were announced, the civilian monitoring mission will be made up of observers from the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. This makes a lot of sense as their mandate already covers “Georgia and the surrounding region” and they have substantial experience since late 2008 of monitoring the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) in Georgia. 

Geographically and logistically, they are also best situated to deploy in the shortest amount of time to Armenia. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan has not approved their presence on its side of the border. When I raised this issue with International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Zaur Shiriyev in a webinar on 27th September, he said this is because Baku does not want to see an ‘internationalisation’ of the border.

In order to ensure a swift deployment of the EU monitoring capacity, it was decided that the monitoring experts will be temporarily deployed from the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). The EUMM is taking operational steps so that its monitoring capacity in Georgia is not impacted.

We might yet get a specific mandate, but until more is known, just to say that it was also announced that the mission will contribute to renewed efforts by Yerevan and Baku to delimit their shared border. The locations for the mission are still unknown but it would be safe to say that they would be expected to pay particular attention to those parts of the border where clashes are occurring with increasing frequency. 

A word of caution, however. First, the mission is civilian, and even in Georgia it has been unable to prevent the ‘creeping annexation’ strategy employed by Russian forces in South Ossetia. Second, it is unknown whether the mission’s observers will come into contact with Russian border guards now present on some parts of Armenia’s eastern border in addition to their long established placement on the country’s borders with Iran and Turkiye.  

Nevertheless, most analysts and observers believe that the deployment of the mission will contribute to stability on the border as Armenia and Azerbaijan attempt to finalise a peace agreement and officially define their border by year’s end. I am particularly encouraged by the fact that it is EUMM Georgia sending some of their 200 observers given that they have considerable experience in this area.

Moreover, the potential for expanding and extending the mission is also there following any major progress in negotiations or following any peace deal. In the mid-2010s, I also worked with EUMM in Georgia, co-facilitating two workshops for Georgian, Abkhazian, and Ossetian journalists in Brussels and Istanbul, while also leading an internal EUMM working group on elaborating their social media strategy. 

If the mission were to be extended, and as I’ve said for several years now, I’d particularly like to see an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) introduced or, indeed, even within the next two months.

 

 

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