Brussels: Last Chance for an Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace?

Brussels: Last Chance for an Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace?

by | Apr 10, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, European Council President Charles Michel, and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels on 6 April 2022 © European Union

Last Wednesday’s meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels was a serious endeavour. As early as 22 March, Armenian media had reported such a meeting was planned and, unlike previous meetings, senior Armenian and Azerbaijani officials had already met in Brussels on 30 March to prepare for the talks.

Those officials were Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council, and Hikmet Hajiyev, advisor and head of the Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration. The European Council’s statement said that both agreed to meet again in the near future.

Moreover, months of speculation, albeit largely away from the public eye and media, had prepared some of us for what could be expected. Much of that was also revealed in the middle of March when Baku publicised its suggested 5-points that could form the basis for negotiations to normalise relations between the two estranged neighbours. 

They were, or rather are:

Mutual recognition of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of internationally recognized borders and political independence of each other;

 

Mutual confirmation of the absence of territorial claims against each other and acceptance of legally binding obligations not to raise such a claim in future;

 

Obligation to refrain in their inter-State relations from undermining the security of each other, from threat or use of force both against political independence and territorial integrity, and in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN Charter;

 

Delimitation and demarcation of the state border, and establishment of the diplomatic relations;

 

Unblocking of the transportation and other communications, building other communications as appropriate, and establishment of cooperation in other fields of mutual interest.

Yerevan responded to the proposal by saying that the points were acceptable, but added that there was also the need to include the question of the security and rights of the ethnic Armenian population living in what remains of the Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). For Armenia, the process is also important because the parallel process of Armenia-Turkey normalisation is linked to that with Baku.

According to a statement released afterwards, two of Azerbaijan’s points were specifically touched upon in the Brussels meeting, with the EU reiterating its support for the unblocking of regional economic and transport links as per the 2020 ceasefire agreement, including from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan, and there was also an agreement to establish a joint commission to start the process of delimiting the Armenia-Azerbaijan border by the end of the month.

The importance of addressing humanitarian issues in order “to promote confidence and peaceful coexistence was also stressed,” including the release of the remaining Armenian detainees held by Baku and the outstanding question of missing people, presumably from both the first and second Karabakh wars. The EU would also support work to support demining efforts as well as the long and arduous task of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In terms of the latter, the EU is perhaps best placed to assist in this given its recent allocation of financial packages up to €2.5 billion and €2 billion to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively.

Michel is also reported to have shown the two leaders satellite images highlighting how close the Armenian and Azerbaijani militaries are, thus leading to tensions and occasional clashes. He also announced that Aliyev and Pashinyan had agreed to “launch a concrete process to prepare for a possible peace treaty and to address all necessary elements for such a treaty.”

“The process started, it is extremely clear. It started tonight,” Michel told journalists as he ended a brief meeting with journalists following the meeting that lasted for over 4.5 hours. 

There also seems to be a sense of urgency to that process, something that should be welcomed as it has always seemed lacking in the past, with RFE/RL quoting an anonymous EU diplomat as saying that the plan is to move quickly on organising more talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the nearest future.

“I’m fully conscious when I say that there’s not much time left,” said the diplomat. “I think we will need to be following up quite quickly with this. And I think there is an expectation that we would look to have a meeting at leaders’ level relatively soon to review progress and tackle any outstanding issues that are blocking the moves forward.”

The diplomat also said they believed that the issue of the status of Nagorno Karabakh might be brought up in future talks. Even though Baku considers the issue already resolved following the 44-day war, Yerevan disagrees, though possibly with a caveat. If in the past Armenia only interpreted the principle of self-determination as meaning independence, a less maximalist approach might now be adopted.

As Eurasianet reported on 1 April, some believe the Armenian government could now be ready to accept Karabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan as long as the rights of its ethnic Armenian population are guaranteed. Certainly, the international community has not shown itself ready to recognise the territory as independent, and Armenia’s trump card, the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan it had previously controlled, is now gone.

Nonetheless, Yerevan is likely also hoping for some kind of compromise from Baku, as one anonymous diplomat told the publication.

The specific nature of those rights is a big open question “because one of the key rights has always been self-determination. […] But if they are willing to think about that in terms other than the traditional Karabakhi-Armenian view that it means something essentially leading to independence, then there may be some room to negotiate,” one foreign diplomat familiar with the negotiations told Eurasianet on condition of anonymity.

 

“That [the rights of Armenians in Karabakh] continues to be the core question of the whole basket of issues that continue to divide Armenia and Azerbaijan,” the diplomat continued. “Most of them can be resolved if the issue of the future of the Armenian population could be addressed. That is the issue that started the conflict and … the issue that needs to be addressed to resolve the conflict.”

 

[…]

 

One Baku-based analyst said that the government there may be interested in offering some kind of political rights as well, but would still stop short of a special status for the region.

 

“After the war, it seemed that returning back to the ‘90s with an administrative status for Nagorno-Karabakh would be impossible, but the government would like to offer a minimum plan like talking about cultural rights. And if there is an appetite from the local Armenians, then the discussion could turn into something bigger than cultural rights,” the analyst told Eurasianet on condition of anonymity. 

As detailed in a recent podcast this interpretation of self-determination has also dogged previous attempts to resolve the conflict. Armenia’s position was that it can only mean independence, i.e. external self-determination, rather than another form, internal self-determination, that allows for some form of autonomy in terms of local governance or decision-making.

Few took the Eurasianet piece seriously and some even attempted to discredit it, despite the fact that it had been predicted since 1997. Others, such as Yerevan-based political analyst Benyamin Poghosyan, though seemingly against this outcome, have also been saying the same for several months, including in an audio podcast broadcast 12 days before the publication of the Eurasianet piece.

In that podcast, Poghosyan said he believed that the Armenian leadership is ‘psychologically ready’ for abandoning the maximalist demands of the previous authorities, but it remains unclear if it is ‘politically ready.’ There is also the issue of the return of ethnic Armenians to Hadrut and Shusha, albeit as Azerbaijani citizens according to Baku, and the return of Azerbaijanis to parts of the former NKAO they had previously inhabited. 

Though some analysts have warned that Karabakh could find itself becoming ‘another Abkhazia or South Ossetia,’ with Russian forces stationed there indefinitely, Karabakh is markedly different. As mentioned in an earlier blog post, it is now almost entirely surrounded by parts of Azerbaijan taken back or returned after the 2020 war and almost totally reliant on Baku for resources so much so that its future is questionable without an agreement.

As much as 80 percent of Karabakh’s water reportedly flows into it via Azerbaijan-controlled territory as does a gas pipeline traverse the same, and apparently other amenities such as Internet as well. Electricity generation will increasingly become a problem in the future too. Thus, at some point, direct communication between Stepanakert and Baku seems inevitable if Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population is to remain, a very real concern for many.

Other such as Gerard Libaridian have also stressed the importance of striking a deal that allows the community to remain. Moreover, he warns, though many believe Russian peacekeepers will remain indefinitely, there is actually uncertainty, either in 2025 when its first term expires and may or may not be extended, but also in 2030 when there is no reference in the ceasefire agreement to any additional extension.

The former presidential advisor and co-author of a recent white paper, The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies, articulated this last year.

The leadership and most probably the people of Karabakh seem to have tied their future to the presence of the Russian peacekeeper and to Russia. The path remains uncharted, and its future uncertain as a consequence of various factors. The authors do not see the path to independence a likely one after this war, just as it was unlikely before the war.

In such a situation, what might well emerge if talks continue is the reframing of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict from an interstate one to a matter of minority rights within Azerbaijan. Yerevan, however, could remain engaged politically and diplomatically rather than militarily. Certainly, following the 2020 war, Armenia is in no position to act as a security guarantor, unofficially deploying its own military as it has in the past.

Though many Armenians remain unconvinced, the Armenian opposition made up of former regime forces certainly believe this to be the government’s position. The evening before the Brussels meeting, it held a demonstration in Yerevan’s Liberty Square accusing the government of being ready to recognise Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, effectively accepting that Nagorno Karabakh is an integral part of its neighbour.

The rally, however, was poorly attended with video footage showing that only about 5-7,000 people turned up. In part, though, this could be because of a number of factors. First, few in Armenia believe that any government would be prepared to ‘abandon,’ as they see it, Karabakh, and secondly, the opposition remains largely discredited in the eyes of those who can still remember the years of the Kocharian and Sargsyan regimes. 

Time will tell if the opposition can mobilise greater numbers in the future, but for now that seems unlikely even if the population disagrees with anything less for Karabakh than independence or unification with Armenia. Indeed, in his podcast, Benyamin Poghosyan argues that Yerevan’s overtures to the OSCE Minsk Group, now seemingly defunct since the Russia-Ukraine war, is an attempt to buy time to prepare the population for peace. 

Three decades later, and long overdue, now would certainly seem to be time. It might even be the last chance to sign a peace agreement if a third Karabakh war in the future is to be averted, something that some already warn could well take the form of a far more devastating proxy war. Lest it’s forgotten, in 2011, warnings of a second Karabakh war were ignored and drowned out by maximalist demands. Now is not the time to ignore such warnings again.

In 2022, though, there’s room for some cautious optimism with last week’s EU-facilitated meeting welcomed by the international community, including by Russia and the United States. That’s not to say, however, that many issues don’t remain outstanding or that a difficult and possibly long path doesn’t lie ahead. That, after all, is what negotiations are all about, and it can only be hoped that significant progress is made over the coming months.

It’s a sobering thought, after all, to remember that I wrote a similar post to this one in 2011. Suffice to say, I do not want to have to write another in 2033.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Rethinking Peacebuilding in the South Caucasus in Relation to the War in Ukraine

Rethinking Peacebuilding in the South Caucasus in Relation to the War in Ukraine

by | Apr 3, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, Social Media

Last week, Caucasus Edition, a publication of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation, held another Zoom webinar, this time entitled “Rethinking Peacebuilding in the South Caucasus in Relation to the War in Ukraine.” Recently, there have been many commenting on what the Russian invasion might have on this region, but framing it in terms of reconsidering peacebuilding strategies in the South Caucasus is an especially relevant one. 

Before summarizing some key points from the webinar, I’d agree with this for three reasons. 

First, peacebuilding projects here have been lackluster at best and ineffective at worst. Second, the war in Ukraine is already having an effect on the countries of the South Caucasus and will continue to do so. Third, if a war was to break out between Armenia and Azerbaijan, rather than solely over Nagorno Karabakh, or between Georgia and Russia, it will likely be far more devastating than previous conflicts.  

And yet, as one of the panelists, Sevil Huseynova, noted:

Now again, all interest will be directed towards Ukraine, [and] the South Caucasus with its conflicts will again find itself in the shadow of a bigger, more important, and a more relevant conflict for the EU. This doesn’t mean that that there will no longer be any support for peace building in the South Caucasus, but a decline in interest and a change in priorities is likely to happen. 

Sevil Huseynova, Caucasus Edition Symposium, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2022

Joining Huseynova were her fellow Caucasus Edition co-editors, Assistant Professor Philip Gamaghelyan and Lecturer Vadim Romashov, while the webinar was moderated by another, Christina Soloyan, who introduced the online discussion quite eloquently and succinctly.

The second Karabakh war created a humanitarian crisis and deepened the grievances and mistrust in our societies towards each other. It has also created a major existential crisis within the peace building community, locally and internationally, that required major reconsideration of peace building methods and goals […] and now the war in Ukraine is changing our understanding of conflicts in the region, in the post-Soviet space, and beyond.

Incidentally, kudos to the organisers for making the discussion public. Soloyan also explained that it was first intended as an internal and closed editorial discussion, but the Caucasus Edition team instead decided to make it open, going as far to allow members of the audience to make audio-visual interventions in the Q&A session that followed the main discussion, in addition to the more regular  questions via the chat box.

The discussion, of course, focused on both the Karabakh conflict and Ukraine, but the focus of this post will be on what was said with regard to the former. Nonetheless, the latter does validate Gameghlyan’s long standing concern that another war risks resembling what we’re seeing in Ukraine and before it, Syria. Indeed, this has led some to consider what could be called the Syria-isation of conflict in the South Caucasus, a term that can now also be aptly applied to the war in Ukraine:

It is not an accident that Azerbaijan stopped in 2020 at the border of the border of Armenia, because it was not seen as a legitimate target. I’m not sure that this will be the case if we continue this trajectory. 

 

[…]

 

Any war now, any conflict in the post-Soviet space, opens up then a possibility of turning that region, that has an open conflict, into an area of proxy war and that puts a tremendous responsibility, I would say, on Armenia and Azerbaijan to solve their conflict as soon as possible because yes, in the short term, one or the other, probably Azerbaijan first of all, could benefit from another round of war. but in the longer term, none of us are going to benefit because, again, simply, looking at what is happening in Ukraine, we are likely to become an area of proxy war. 

Yet, it should not have taken 16 months since the November 2020 ceasefire for a sense of urgency to materialize in the sphere of Armenia-Azerbaijan peacebuilding. While Gamagehlyan expressed his concerns soon after the trilateral statement, most others remained silent, inactive, or held secretive and closed meetings in hotels abroad with nothing to present to a concerned public afterwards. Most are also still in the dark ages when it comes to utilizing tech and social media for strategic communications, a basic minimum these days.

As Gamaghelyan stated:

The challenge was that once the war hit, [and] the second Karabakh war specifically, we saw that almost the entire peacebuilding field fell apart. Almost no NGO, I would say, stood out [as] pro-peace or anti-war. Even those that were involved for years just disappeared in one day.

Since then, a few notable exceptions – LINKS, which is quite active through its Commonspace platform while Caucasus Edition also held an event in Tbilisi in January, though has sadly yet to publicise or produce a summary of the discussion. That said, and to their credit, they did widen the selection of participants and also allowed others to highlight that it had been held. There really needs to be more publicity surrounding such meetings so that they can effectively be  normalised. 

Phil Gamaghelyan, Caucasus Edition Symposium, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2022

Moreover, Gamaghelyan was quite open in terms of the failure of more than a decade of international donor funded projects in the region, considering them to rely too much on technocratic solutions limited by short-term funding. And from my point of view, it should be also pointed out that the bulk of this funding went not to local organisations or actors on the ground, but to international organisations based outside the region.

Regardless, Romashov also noted the importance of utilising media in conflict resolution more seriously, something that has also been sorely lacking to date. This topic, incidentally, was the subject of another Caucasus Edition webinar on the role of the media in September last year and I also think lessons could be learned from the world of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), especially when it comes to countering dominant narratives. 

Key to successful P/CVE initiatives, incidentally, is the utilization of credible messengers, effective messaging, and targeting alternative narratives to specific demographic audiences through a diverse variety of mediums, from the traditional to the modern, something that Huseynova effectively acknowledged in her estimation of what needs to change in traditional peacebuilding approaches and initiatives.

We have few very well known public intellectuals involved in the peace movement. There are few public and famous people in general […] people who have access to the public field with a large audience. People whose position is difficult to marginalize. So we need to create the conditions for such names to emerge, we need to seriously work on access to the public field, create new radio, TV, support bloggers, musicians, artists, anyone who can help involve as many people as possible. 

 

[…]

 

Do they teach peace in our schools and how to achieve it? No.

Returning to P/CVE for just a minute, one solution here could be the use of comic books, something a friend, the late Suleiman Bakhit, pioneered and implemented in his native Jordan to counter extremist narratives in schools. Meanwhile, cross-border cultural projects such as One Caucasus, Caucasus Jazz Festival, Caucasus Music Awards, and even the Wacken Metal Battle Caucasus could be ideal spaces for organizations to explore in order to reach youth.

It was encouraging to hear Romashov agree:

Since the second Karabakh war and when I encountered these horrible nationalistic songs coming from both sides, and when at the same time I managed to find with the help of some of my colleagues, songs from Armenia and Azerbaijan with very human, anti-war, pro-peace songs […] I realized how important it is to bring these artists together.

Romashov also highlighted another failure of peacebuilding in the region – the need to look at what he termed the micro-dynamics of peace:

I think this is the time that we need to reconsider that peacebuilding is not only about NGOs speaking about peace and creating platforms for dialogue. This is also about work on the ground with people directly affected by the wars, by the conflicts, by the trauma. […] There is always a danger that without providing certain platforms, these voices will disappear – so networking is important too.

 

[…]

 

Let’s forget about dialogue platforms of experts. This is a very exclusive, elitist approach to talk about peace and to talk about how to deal with conflicts and violence. The people on the ground in their daily lives also have very important knowledge that should be taken into account.

Gamaghelyan also expanded on this:

Where are these voices? Why are we only hearing pro-war sentiment […] this is where the issue of platforms comes because the voices are there. They have been continually marginalized. So, the voices are there. In private conversations they come out, some people stand out, and put themselves at risk.

 

Is there a platform, a space for public discussion about this? Very rarely. Basically no.

 

[…]

 

When you go to the regions there is no pro-war sentiment. The closer to the border you get, the more peace people want.

 

[…]

 

Those voices are not channeled and absolutely not heard.

None of the above, of course, invalidates the need for academic research, conferences, and especially the sort of work Imagine has been conducting in bringing young Armenians and Azerbaijanis together to discuss some very serious topics indeed, but it is clear that these initiatives on their own have failed to have an impact on either society. That said, lacking any political will on either side to find a solution to the conflict prior to 2020, the task was an uphill struggle anyway.

Vadim Romashov, Caucasus Edition Symposium, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2022

Assuming that the political will now materializes, perhaps the peacebuilding sphere can become more inclusive, open, and innovative. On that, said Gamaghelyan, this has finally started to happen in Armenia as government narratives change, in turn resulting in more people now questioning what he referred to as the ‘war paradigm.’ He also said the same was true with many of his friends and colleagues in Azerbaijan, even if so far in private conversation.

In conclusion, I’ll admit I went into this webinar skeptical, but came away pleasantly surprised. Nonetheless, it’s time there was a sense of greater urgency among most other organisations in terms of resolving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Time was not on anyone’s side for almost 30 years before the 2020 war, and then prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is even less so now.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Punks Not Dead in Tbilisi, Georgia

Punks Not Dead in Tbilisi, Georgia

by | Mar 28, 2022 | #TbilisiUnderground, Georgia, Music

Vodka Vtraiom, Dirty Habit Bar, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2022

I almost missed Saturday’s gig by veteran Georgian punk band Vodka Vtraiom, but thankfully stumbled upon the announcement of the event held at Tbilisi’s Dirty Habit bar with just two hours to spare. Kesha, the band’s vocalist had arrived in Georgia a day earlier and this was the first gig by the band in what must be almost three years.

Vodka Vtraiom featured heavily in my still to be completed film, Tbilisi Underground, and they always put on a wicked show. No surprise then that the bar was filled to capacity and people were even turned away at the door there was no room inside. Opening for Vodka Vtraiom was another local Georgian punk band, Panika. 

 Both Kesha and drummer Borgir are IDPs from Abkhazia, incidentally, and their lyrics encompass everything from drug addiction to humorous ditties about the Gldani district of Tbilisi. Hope it won’t be another three years until the next gig. A few photos from the event in the slideshow below. More are on the Tbilisi Underground Facebook page.

Vodka Vtraiom, Dirty Habit Bar, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2022

Ukraine and the South Caucasus

Ukraine and the South Caucasus

by | Mar 9, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh, Russia

Graphic © The Economist

After months of amassing his troops on the Ukrainian border, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the order to invade further into Ukrainian territory late last month. For the first time in two decades, full-scale war returned to the European continent, sending out shockwaves globally. Outrage was widespread and in a rare show of unity, even if unwilling or unable to directly intervene militarily, the vast majority of UN member states condemned the Russian action.

Nearly two weeks after the invasion, NATO has been tested to the limit, also resisting calls for direct military intervention, though offering other support, and the European Union did agree on a large package of sanctions aimed at isolating Russia and economically punishing Putin and his closest associates. Of course, the sanctions will also affect the global economy, and that also includes the economies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict will also test the three countries in the wake of arguably waning US and EU influence in the region over the past six years, and especially since the 2020 Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some analysts are already offering their take on how all three countries are responding to what is a constantly evolving situation.

In short, they are treading carefully.

Armenia

Armenia is arguably in the most difficult position of all three countries, with much of its economy and its almost all of its security dependent on Russia. It is the one country in the region that is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has already warned his country that the war in Ukraine will adversely affect the economy and that sanctions on Russia will hurt the EEU.

Speaking on Civilnet, Anna Ohanyan, a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Stonehill College in the US, says that supply chains, food prices, inflation, and remittances from abroad will be affected given the close integration between Armenia and Russia. The effects will be long-term because sanctions amount to the economic containment of Russia. “Because sanctions are so overwhelming, they amount to really crippling the Russian economy in order to eliminate its capacity to wage war,” she says.

What is Armenia’s economic policy going to be if Russia is going to remain under this extensive containment strategy? she asks. “Not only Russia will be thinking about this, but also all of the countries in Russia’s vicinity,” Ohanyan says. “If Russia suffers then Armenia, which is so dependent on Russia, will also suffer,” says Ronald Grigor Suny, speaking to Radio Free Europe’s Armenia Service, “and that is a regrettable fallout from this terrible event.”

Ethnic Armenians in what remains of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) also look to Moscow rather than Yerevan and even went as far as welcoming the 21 February recognition by Russia of Ukraine’s Donesk and Luhansk oblasts. Here, however, it is important to note that this does not represent Yerevan’s position, which has not recognised them and has remains relatively silent on the crisis in Ukraine compared to its neighbours.

While Russia is Armenia’s main trading power and the country is also reliant on remittances sent home by Armenians working abroad, mainly in Russia, but despite this reliance on Russia, Armenia has otherwise sought to maintain a balancing act between East and West. Benyamin Poghosyan, founder and chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan, calls Armenia’s modest cooperation with the US, EU, and NATO ‘positive.’ 

Nonetheless, Russia’s Ukraine invasion and worsened relations between the West and Russia will have consequences for Armenia, he believes. “Yerevan should do everything not to cancel its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community, but it will be challenging, if not impossible, to keep the same level of relations. Armenia will also suffer economically due to the West’s economic war against Russia,” Poghosyan wrote.

Armenia “cannot avoid the consequence of the Russia-Ukraine war entirely,” he concluded, predicting that Yerevan would abstain from the vote condemning Russia’s aggression in the UN General Assembly on 2 March. “No one should expect Armenia to vote for an anti-Russian resolution, as that vote will immediately put Armenian vital national interests under threat,” he believed, though he also recommended that it not to participate in the voting at all.

In fact, Armenia did abstain during the vote while Azerbaijan did not participate. “This step probably will not be perceived by Russia as betrayal and will not anger the Kremlin, while it will not destroy the few bridges with the West,” he says. Meanwhile, in the vote to suspend Russia’s representation in the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly in February, Armenia was the only country other than Russia to vote against.

Again, Azerbaijan did not participate.

Other analysts, however, are more concerned about what impact the Ukrainian-Russian war will have on attempts to find a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Some analysts such as Poghosyan have argued that Armenia and Russia should form even closer bonds, but others do not, viewing the situation one of great concern when previously the United States, the EU, and Russia could be considered to be roughly on the same page.

Civilnet analyst Tigran Grigoryan says that there is even more uncertainty over the future of the OSCE Minsk Group as a result. If past tensions between Russia and the West did not disrupt the OSCE Minsk process, any policy to “isolate Russia in all areas” by the West could see Russia further monopolise efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict, effectively rendering the OSCE Minsk Group irrelevant.

Writing in commonspace.eu, Vasif Huseynov also believes that practical cooperation between the US, French, and Russian Co-Chairs is hardly likely following the invasion of Ukraine, but also says that it might not be necessary given steps being taken to normalise both Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.” This offers a chance for Baku and Yerevan to promote bilateral contacts without any third-party mediation, he concludes.

Nonetheless, Grigoryan believes that the attitude of the West to the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh could negatively change over time. As Armenia seeks to normalise its relations with Turkey as well as find a lasting peace with Azerbaijan, in part to reduce its dependency on Moscow, Ukraine has shown that Russia will take radical steps to maintain control over what it considers its sphere of influence.

“The main threat to Armenia’s statehood may come from Moscow, not Baku or Ankara,” warns Grigoryan. “Russia, isolated from the West, will try to increase its influence in the regions it stills controls. This will significantly reduce Armenia’s sovereignty.”

“The outbreak of war in Ukraine was the worst-case scenario for Armenia and can create serious risks in our region, complicating the already difficult geopolitical situation of Armenia,” he concludes.

Azerbaijan

In a long thread on Twitter, International Crisis Group analyst Zaur Shiriyev believes that the assault on Ukraine is definitely perceived as a danger by Azerbaijan. Baku would therefore like to see the earliest resolution of the conflict and has attempted to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow. As an example of this, he points to President Aliyev’s visit to Ukraine on 14 January as tensions escalated. He also held a telephone call with President Vladimir Putin weeks before war broke out.

However, the signing of a Declaration on Allied Cooperation by Aliyev and Putin on 22 February, just two days before the start of the war, surprised many, even though Shiriyev says most of its content was simply a reaffirmation of existing bilateral and intergovernmental agreements or treaties already in force. But, he adds, there were some additional points on mutual support and military cooperation similar to those contained in the 2021 Shusha Declaration signed by Azerbaijan and Turkey last year.

“If in the 90s Azerbaijan maintained a balance with Russia through the West’s support,” tweeted Shiriyev, “the West’s political departure from the region, especially after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and Moscow’s growing influence in the region, forced Baku to correct its notion of balance.”

Nonetheless, Shiriyev says the Russian agreement lacks ratification by the Azerbaijani parliament so does not carry as much weight as the Shusha Declaration, which was.

“Though framed as an alliance, the new declaration is written in general language assuring Baku’s friendly attitude toward Russia, but falls short of outlining specific obligations for either party,” wrote Fuad Shahbazov in World Politics Review. “For Moscow, it was likely meant to ensure that Azerbaijan abstains from Western efforts to isolate Russia, including sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union, following the invasion of Ukraine.”

“Besides these more general points, there are also a few new articles in the document outlining closer defense and military cooperation,” Shahbazov concluded. “In practical terms, these mean that Baku will probably continue to import Russian arms, participate in joint modernization programs of certain types of Soviet-era weapons—particularly helicopters and aircraft—and cooperate with Moscow on issues related to regional security.”

“There are concerns that Russia will be the only hegemon in the South Caucasus and the region will remain isolated, and increasingly return to the Russian orbit,” believes Shiriyev. This also explains why Baku has not been vocal in criticising Russia for its actions despite strong condemnation from Azerbaijanis online. The Azerbaijani government has, however, stressed that the Ukraine-Russia conflict requires a diplomatic situation recognising territorial integrity and the sovereignty of states.

In this delicate balancing act, Azerbaijan has nonetheless delivered $5 million of humanitarian aid and SOCAR has instructed its petrol stations in Ukraine to provide free fuel to ambulances, fire engines, and other vehicles performing humanitarian duties. Moreover, believes Shiriyev, despite some pro-Ukrainian rallies in Baku, the authorities are unlikely to express any anti-Russian sentiment.

“In any case, one thing is crystal clear. Russia is losing  any remaining positive image in the eyes of Azerbaijani public,” concludes Shiriyev. “In sum, Baku’s current strategy is  to wait and watch, while providing humanitarian support to Ukraine, and to avoid antagonizing (Russia), but whatever will be end game in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, including all regional countries will share the economic and political costs that Russia incurs.”

Eurasianet also reports that the alliance agreement with Moscow will necessitate Azerbaijan coordinating with Russia any future potential exports of gas to Europe, though others disagree, citing how small the amount of gas exported from Azerbaijan would be compared to that from Russia. At any rate, and like its neighbours, a reduction in remittances from migrant workers in Russia will have a negative impact on Azerbaijan’s economy.

Georgia

Traditionally the most pro-Western country in the region, Georgia finds itself in a more immediately vulnerable situation. Having already been invaded by Russia in August 2008, the government, writes International Crisis Group Senior Analyst Olesya Vartanyan, “is treading carefully on the war in Ukraine, fearing that if it upsets the Kremlin, it may be left to face the consequences alone.” As a result, despite having pushed strongly for closer integration with the EU and NATO since the 2008 war, the Georgian government has “tiptoed around the crisis.”

Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili has already angered many by refusing to support sanctions against Russia, even going as far as calling them “unproductive,” also arguing that they would adversely affect remittances from Georgians working in Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in an unprecedented move, recalled Kyiv’s ambassador to Tbilisi in protest at what he called an “immoral position.” Attempts by the Georgian government to prevent volunteers from traveling to Ukraine to fight also provoked another diplomatic incident.

Nonetheless, the National Bank of Georgia did say it would not allow the evasion of sanctions and Georgia did vote in support of the 2 March UN General Assembly Resolution condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Tbilisi also voted in favour of Russia’s suspension from the Council of Europe.

Yet, says Vartanyan, and despite its commitment to both, Georgia remains frustrated by the lack of any real prospect of joining the EU and NATO. “These investments were not enough to overcome resistance among European and U.S. officials and politicians who see the downsides of Georgian membership in either organisation as outweighing any benefits,” she writes. “They argue that Georgian membership would anger the Kremlin and deepen its conflict with the West, reducing rather than increasing security for all.”

Perhaps as a last ditch effort to see its EU aspirations come true, when Ukraine announced that it was submitting its request for candidate status, Georgia along with Moldova did the same soon after. Previously, Georgia had planned to submit its application at the end of 2024. It remains to be seen if any or all applications for candidate status will be approved and even if they are, the EU has made it clear the road to actual membership remains long and difficult.

More importantly, at stake is Georgia’s security, says Vartanyan. With its own separatist regions controlled by Moscow, Russia can apply pressure on Tbilisi effectively and easily. The Russian military is already present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has spent years constructing fences, military bases, and observation points. Vartanyan says the authorities are worried that any small incident on the line of separation could be exploited by Moscow to invade even more of Georgia.

“As the war in Ukraine proceeds, countries all over the world will have to reassess policies toward Georgia and other countries where Russia seeks more influence, but which themselves have sought closer ties with the West,” she concludes.

This sentiment is also shared by Carnegie Senior Fellow Thomas de Waal. “Overnight the EU has to change a neighborhood policy focused on incremental reform into one that is about the survival of these countries as states,” he writes about the EU’s Eastern Partnership countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, in general. He also offers some conclusions and recommendations in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

For Armenia, he says, the EU should now move to support the Pashinyan government in more concrete ways. This should also be the position of diaspora organisations even though they have been critical of his handling of the 2020 war. As for Azerbaijan, though the recent agreement signed on 22 February carries with it risks, strategic alliance and cooperation with Turkey is “an insurance policy of sorts.”

Georgia, however, is most at risk with the government’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine exacerbating already deep polarisation and political instability at home.

“The EU talks a lot about resilience,” he concludes. “Now is the time to work quickly to strengthen it— not just in Georgia […], but in Armenia and Azerbaijan as well.”

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Karabakh in Focus at Yerevan Euronest Meeting

Karabakh in Focus at Yerevan Euronest Meeting

by | Mar 9, 2022 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh

Having refused to attend the last meeting of Euronest held in Yerevan in 2015, the arrival of two Azerbaijani MPs, Tahir Mirkishili and Soltan Mammadov, in Armenia this week was the first in a decade. According to one regional analyst, their participation was an achievement in itself and others might also wonder if this also isn’t a precedent for the resumption of other exchanges between the two countries following the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno Karabakh.

In the past, delegations of Armenian MPs have also attended Euronest meetings in Baku in 2012 and 2017 while even the religious leaders of both countries visited each other in 2010-2011. There have also been civil society, media, sporting, and cultural exchanges, though these became significantly less over the 9 years preceding the 2020 war. The lack of such mutual visits were just one warning sign that war was likely inevitable.

Of course, the visit did not go ahead without some problems. The road from Zvartsnots airport to downtown Yerevan was temporarily blocked by a small group of war veterans on the day of the MP’s arrival, for example. A small group of activists from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutyun’s Armenian Youth Federation (AYF) also picketed the hotel where Mirkishili and Mammadov were staying.

Likewise, opposition members of the Armenian Euronest delegation refused to dine with their Azerbaijani counterparts and one Yerevan restaurant canceled the reservation for a Euronest delegation dinner although others did not. Some AYF activists were also detained last night on charges of hooliganism, again outside the hotel where Mirkishili and Mammadov were staying. Armenian police acted swiftly to maintain public order.

 

Such actions, however, were hardly unexpected, however. There were also demonstrations against the arrival of Armenian MPs to Baku and in 2004, Azerbaijani police dispersed an demonstration by members of the Karabakh Liberation Organisation (KLO), a group of war veterans, after they attempted to a storm a Baku hotel where two Armenian soldiers were attending a NATO conference in Azerbaijan.

There were also some other controversial incidents during this year’s Euronest. Usage of the Irevan instead of Yerevan on social media, as well as a comment regarding the origins of the Blue Mosque in the city, by the Azerbaijani MPs irked many Armenians while the use of a map by one Armenian businesswoman of the seven regions formerly under Armenian control and now returned to Azerbaijan being part of Nagorno Karabakh angered Azerbaijanis.

Nonetheless, the two Azerbaijani MPs thanked their Armenian hosts many times during the event for their hospitality, and in his opening remarks for a panel on the security situation in the South Caucasus, German MEP Helmet Geuking attempted to set the right tone.

 “The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is the longest running conflict in the post-Soviet space. The war of 2020 has dramatically changed the situation on the ground,” he said. “The Eastern Partnership aims to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan and we should use this fact to promote regional peace. In fact, the visit of our colleagues from Azerbaijan here in Yerevan for this Euronest session is most certainly the first visit of Azerbaijani MPs to Armenia after the war.

Let us hope, therefore, that it can contribute at least a little bit to finding some mutual understanding and creating an atmosphere of trust. I would like to urge all members to approach this debate precisely in this spirit which I’ve just set out.”

Those Armenian MPs aligned with the former regimes of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, and now the opposition, however, had other ideas, and appeared to attend the event only in order to launch blistering attacks on Azerbaijan and the two Azerbaijani MPs live on camera for all to see and hear. Sadly, and while the sides are not expected to agree with each other on many issues, there was no attempt to engage in discussion or dialogue.

The only saving grace, perhaps, from the session were the opening presentations of two regional analysts, Yerevan-based Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) Richard Giragosian and Baku-based International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Zaur Shiriyev. First to speak, attending the even in person, was Giragosian.

“From an Armenian perspective, there are three core elements,” he said. “Armenia’s commitment to diplomatic re-engagement, the return of the OSCE’s Minsk Group as the only diplomatic entity empowered to facilitate a negotiated resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. This is especially important because we are in a fragile, delicate, post-war reality, but far from a post-conflict landscape.”

Giragosian also warned that the 2020 war was a dangerous precedent for the region, seemingly vindicating the use of force over diplomacy. Instead, he said, there needs to be a “renewed commitment to diplomatic negotiations in order to transform a Russian-imposed ceasefire into a more lasting, durable peace process envisaging both status and security.” Giragosian also highlighted the need for Azerbaijan to release the remaining detainees held by Baku.

“The first imperative is the human cost of the war that remains lingering,” said Giragosian. “That is, the incomplete return of all prisoners of war and detainees from Azerbaijani captivity. Only then can Armenia begin to move beyond the war. The second imperative is de-escalation along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan and […] the necessity to construct a legal institutional framework for border delimitation and demarcation.”

Speaking later, Mammadov reiterated that for Azerbaijan, there are no remaining PoWs being held by Azerbaijan. Those in detention were captured following the November 2020 ceasefire agreement. He did, however, agree that the issue of demarcating the border with Armenia was necessary. “Azerbaijan has unfrozen all relations between our countries,” he said, saying this would bring “peace and security, prosperity and economic development.” 

For Azerbaijan,  the two visiting MPs said the war is over.

Such an opinion, however, was not that of the European Union, one MEP noted and Giragosian also stressed the need to re-engage the OSCE Minsk Group in order to find a lasting and durable peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “This is an opportunity with our Azerbaijani colleagues,” he said.

Speaking after Giragosian via video link from Baku, Shiriyev also agreed that the issue of border delimitation and demarcation was a pressing on, but also raised the situation of over 600,000 Azerbaijanis who had to flee their homes during the war of the early 1990s. Virtually nothing remained in the seven regions formerly under Armenian control, something that Mirkishili also raised as someone originating from there. 

The danger of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) remained a real one, continued Shiriyev, and also affected communities on both sides on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. There was the need for technical and financial support in order to move forward. He also said that by opening energy as well as transport corridors would benefit all countries of the region, including Armenia.

“It is not any longer an issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia,” said Shiriyev. “It is a regional issue and one of the important game changers on this issue is the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process, something Giragosian had also stressed earlier. Any positive movement between Turkey and Armenia will open a much more constructive environment for peace talks or discussion between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”

The Minsk Group, he added, was not seen positively by Baku so there is the need to reimagine how it would work and what agenda it would serve. Confidence building measure were vital and the European Union could help here by “not only to support traditional peacebuilding tools, but there also needs to be more focus on media engagement because […] the societies have lived for 30 years in a state of enmity. This can only change with the help of the media.”

Despite the confrontational attitude of MPs representing the Armenian opposition later, the head of the Euronest Armenian delegation and a member of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, Maria Karapetyan, was more reasoned, professional, and articulate.  

“I want to make our agenda very clear,” she started. “Following the devastating 44-day war in 2020, Armenia chose the path of new snap elections and a democratic process to resolve our political internal crisis and also to understand what kind of a mandate do the people of Armenia vest us with to continue our path and the voice of the Armenian people has been very clear. It is rule of law internally and era of peace externally.” 

According to Karapetyan, there are several items on Armenia’s agenda.

The first is to unblock all economic and transport links in the region. “This is not only an economic issue, but also a security one,” she said. “We believe that interdependence will create an incentive for the non-resumption of violence in the South Caucasus.” 

The second item on the agenda, she continued was to delimit and demarcate the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in parallel with the withdraw of the armed forces of both countries from the border areas. This process should start immediately. There was also the need to allow international organisations unfettered access to the region to monitor the state of cultural heritage sites. 

Karapetyan also stressed the need to return any Armenians still held captive by Azerbaijan. “There are still Prisoners of War in Baku and we want them to come home,” she said. “Armenia has returned all Prisoners of War immediately following the 44-day war in 2020, and we’ve also returned all landmine maps to Azerbaijan, so we also hope that our citizens will come home as soon as possible.” 

“The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is still not resolved,” she also said, “but when we reiterate that the Nagorno Karabakh is not resolved we do not intend to solicit international support to perpetuate this conflict. We want to solicit international support to resolve this conflict to reach a state of sustainable, permanent peace in the South Caucasus.

 And finally, the Armenia-Turkey normalisation process, as separate as we see this process from the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, it is undeniable that there are interconnections here. We also are in favour of this process and we want to see […] the opening of the border between Armenia and Turkey and […] the establishment of diplomatic relations.”    

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian