Though initially intended to be held in an online format on 9 November, the eventual meeting of the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian leaders instead took place on 26 November in Sochi. The reason for the delay, according to the Armenian side, was the sensitivity of the date, coming as it did a year after the signing of the 2020 ceasefire agreement. There was also some controversy surrounding the possible signing of two documents on border demarcation and unblocking regional economic and transport routes.

 

While those documents were not signed at the meeting, the three leaders did at least issue a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the 9-point ceasefire agreement, though some observers instead considered that the three-hour meeting turned out to be a non-event. Others more familiar with attempts to resolve the decades-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, thought otherwise.

 

In an email briefing, Richard Giragosian, Director of the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Center (RSC), considered it another important step forwards. “The meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders offered an essential return to diplomacy over force of arms,” he wrote, adding that this was just part of a much longer and complex process.

 

[…]

 

That optimism, however, might have been premature. While the trilateral meeting did take place on 1 December as expected, the discussions between the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian Deputy Prime Ministers was described as ‘tense’ by one media outlet. Moreover, not only did the promised details never surface, but it was announced that further meetings would be necessary.

 

It is unclear whether this is an embarrassment for Putin, but skeptics have already considered the Sochi meeting to be a direct response to the announcement of an EU-facilitated meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on the sidelines of the Eastern Partnership Summit due to be held in Brussels on 15 December.

 

The proposed EU meeting had been in the works for several weeks before it was actually announced.

 

Indeed, in mid-October, RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak had already said that such a meeting was being organised on the sidelines of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels. “Let’s be honest about this,” he said in an interview. “The EU has very little room for manoeuvre […] but what they can do is to offer money, time, and diplomacy.”

 

But while the days since the Sochi meeting have not passed as expected, the situation might also not be as bleak as it seems. On 4 December, 10 Armenian soldiers captured by Azerbaijan in the mid-November border clashes were exchanged for maps detailing the location of landmines in territory now back under Baku’s control.

 

However, unless the trilateral working group finally announces its results beforehand, all focus will now be on the 15 December meeting and some kind of breakthrough. According to the EU, it is hoped that confidence building measures between the two will be agreed upon, something that recent weeks have shown to be as necessary as ever if not even more so.

The full article is here.

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A trilateral meeting between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia should take place tomorrow, November 26, in the Russian tourist resort of Sochi. At the center of the diplomatic initiative the possible agreements between the two warring countries. However, the information is still scarce.

The hopes for a possible meeting on 9-10 November between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin soon fell flat. Furthermore, new clashes occurred on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. It was the worst flare-up since the 2020 ceasefire agreement.

 

Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other for the fighting that left at least six Armenian and seven Azerbaijani soldiers dead. Around two dozen Armenian soldiers are also believed to have been taken prisoner by Azerbaijan. This, adding to existing concerns regarding those already held by Baku since late last year, dashed any hopes for a breakthrough.

 

That is, until now.

 

As suggested by Radio Free Europe in mid-October, the European Union was preparing a meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan on the sidelines of the EU Partnership Summit scheduled for Brussels next month. That was confirmed on 19 November by Charles Michel, the European Council’s president. Russia, not wanting to have its own role diminished, surfaced again as possible facilitator of a meeting, also confirmed for 26 November in the Russian seaside resort of Sochi.

 

[…]

 

It remains unclear whether any such a document might be signed at the end of this week, but the timing of the press conference gives reason to think that it could be on the cards. Regardless, argues Giragosian, some obstacles and issues remain unresolved.

 

“Given the delay in the return of all prisoners of war and civilian non-combatant detainees from Azerbaijani captivity, the required return to diplomacy only furthers the delay in reaching a negotiated peace agreement”, he says. “In this context, the timetable for such a peace agreement lies largely with the Azerbaijani government and will depend on when Baku is ready to re-engage in the peace process”.

 

As of writing, hopes that a breakthrough might be forthcoming at the Sochi meeting appeared to be bolstered by last-minute shuttle diplomacy. A day after Pashinyan’s televised interview, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk visited both Baku and Yerevan.

The full article is here.

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Though the future remains unpredictable, last year’s war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh changed the geographical and geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus after three decades of bitterness, conflict, and division. Now, some analysts hope, there is an opportunity to turn a new page in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.

The 9-10 November 2020 ceasefire that ended last year’s fighting should have clarified this future, but a lack of transparency and a drought of objective or informed analysis has left the public in both countries confused and in the dark. Certainly, some provisions of the agreement remain unfulfilled, though that might change in the coming weeks and months.

 

Armenia wants Azerbaijan to return the remaining captives that it holds while Baku is frustrated that an anticipated transport link running through Armenia to its exclave of Nakhichevan, as dictated by the ceasefire agreement, has not yet been established. It also demands that Yerevan hand over any maps of minefields in territory now back under Baku’s control.

 

Meanwhile, despite more frequent talk of normalising relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and possibly Armenia and Turkey too, there have been no clear signs as to when such developments might happen.

 

“For 12 months, the Armenian government and much of the population has been limited to a state of denial where it took many, many months in order to accept a new reality,” says Richard Giragosian, the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan. Now, he says, those signs might be on the horizon.

 

“The turning point,” he says, “came on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York [in September] when the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers with the OSCE Minsk Group mediators were able to reconvene in a meeting that heralds the return and resumption of diplomacy over the force of arms.”

 

“This marks a return to diplomacy and a belated Armenian adjustment to a painful, unprecedented new reality.”

The full article is here.