Tbilisi: Ultranationalist Demonstrations and a Counterprotest

Tbilisi: Ultranationalist Demonstrations and a Counterprotest

Ultranationalist demonstration, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2016

A meeting yesterday with a visiting US researcher looking at far-right movements in Europe reminded me that I hadn’t posted any of the photos I’ve taken at various ultranationalist marches and counter protests that have happened in Tbilisi. I had used one in my recent piece for Stratfor on radicalization in Georgia, but haven’t had much time this past year to do anything other than post them on Facebook.

Ultranationalist Demonstration, September 2016

Ostensibly planned as a demonstration dedicated to the full of the city of Sukhumi in Abkhazia on 27 September 1993, the march organized by several Georgia ultranationalist and Neo-Nazi groups such as Georgian Power and the Dinamo Tbilisi Ultras was very clearly aimed at immigrants. Unfortunately, while the demo was at first peaceful if boisterous, it ended with attacks on cafes and restaurants owned by muslims on Tbilisi’s Agmashenebeli Avenue. It was reported that one woman had her hijab forcibly removed and that 11 demonstrators were detained.

The “Georgian March,” Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2017

The “Georgian March,” July 2017

In July the following year, another similarly targeted anti-immigrant march was held on Tbilisi’s Agmashenebeli Avenue. At around 2,000, turnout was significantly larger than the ultra-nationalist demonstration the previous year, but not quite as problematic in terms of public order. However, some muslim businesses closed early while some muslim onlookers did appear perturbed. A priest and a large portrait of David the Builder, a Georgian monarch who fought against muslim invaders in the 12th Century, led the march.

Some accused the organizers, and the Alliance of Patriots who participated in the march, of directly or indirectly working in the interests of Russia. The claims were denied and the organizers in return lambasted Soros-funded NGOs. Controversially, however, they also wrote on social media comments that most interpreted as threats to gang rape a prominent female critic of the march. 

The “Women’s March,” Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2017

In response, women’s rights organizations held their own counter-protest in the same location. Some speakers also spoke out in support of religious and cultural diversity.

“No To Russian Fascism,” Demonstration, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2017

Also in response to the anti-immigrant “Georgian March,” the European Georgia opposition party held a demonstration soon after the Women’s March to call for an end to “Russian fascism.” Attracting about as many people as those who attended the ultra-nationalist demonstration, and although it was disrupted at times by anti-immigrant counter-protestors that police had to mobilize against, some Iranian tourists looked on in appreciation.
Another Year, Another One Caucasus

Another Year, Another One Caucasus

Natiq Rhythm Group (Azerbaijan), Tserakvi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2017

After covering last year’s One Caucasus Festival for Meydan TV there was no way I was going to miss this year’s. That was just as well as there was definitely more international media interest in the event that brings Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians together in a small, somewhat isolated village located about two hours away from Tbilisi.

Follow the links for my pieces on EurasiaNet, Meydan TV, and Stratfor.

One Caucasus, Tserakvi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2017

Les Gardiens du Silence

Les Gardiens du Silence

 Les Gardiens du Silence, Tserakvi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2017

One of the standout bands at this year’s One Caucasus Festival in Georgia was undoubtedly the Baku-based Les Gardiens du Silence, a collective playing improvised world and spiritual music. They had also performed in Tbilisi a week earlier, and did so again soon after the festival, but it was their performances around a campfire at One Caucasus that was the most enjoyable.

After the festival I also interviewed one of the bands members when the band were back in Tbilisi. The band has a Facebook page here.

Countering Violent Extremism in Georgia

Last month Stratfor published my latest piece on radicalization in Georgia and what needs to be done in order to prevent and counter it. Since becoming involved in this sphere from 2013 on, it’s become an increasingly active area of interest of mine and not least because while other countries have been quick to introduce national strategies to combat the phenomenon, Georgia has not. Indeed, the same is true for civil society.

Finally, and after stressing the importance of this in op-eds for EurasiaNet and the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) in 2015, that now looks about to happen.

Levan Tokhosashvili, also known as “Al Bara Pankisi,” died fighting for the Islamic State in Syria. At least, that’s what Georgian media reported on Aug. 28. But at the beginning of September, those claims came under scrutiny when Tokhosashvili’s friends and relatives in Georgia insisted he was still alive. As Joanna Paraszczuk, a researcher tracking Russian-speaking foreign fighters in Syria, noted on her blog at the time, the confusion summed up just how problematic verifying information from conflict zones can be.

 

She might also have added that the same holds true for understanding the extent of the threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) from the South Caucasus and of radicalization in Georgia. Though some research into the subject has been done, hard numbers are tough to come by, and the push and pull factors behind the recruitment of these fighters are still open to debate.

 

[…]

 

Even so, things do seem to be improving. Recognition is growing of civil society’s role in CVE, or as the D.C.-based Muflehun’s executive director Humera Khan defines it, “the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing toward violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives.”

 

Last year, moreover, the independent Hedayah International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism based in Abu Dhabi conducted a needs assessment in Georgia as part of its STRIVE for Development project, an EU program aimed at increasing communities’ resilience to violence. Extensive research on the problem of radicalization in Georgia is now underway, and an open call for CVE projects covering Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the Balkans has already followed.

 

Furthermore, several U.S.-based organizations were invited in July to bid for a U.S. Agency for International Development contract for violent extremism risk analysis in Georgia. The contract includes a CVE training component for the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi and would run from November to December. The assessment would explore not just Pankisi but also Adjara and ethnic Azeri communities.

 

Despite this progress, officials still appear to be overlooking the dangers that other forms of extremism pose. In addition to the rising tension between Adjara’s Christians and Muslims, neo-Nazi and ultranationalist groups target immigrants — particularly Muslims — and engage in violence, albeit fairly limited. These movements risk feeding the narratives that groups like the Islamic State use to boost their recruitment. Says Clifford, “it’s too early to say for sure, but [such] events have the potential to reinforce individuals’ beliefs about the society they live in and therefore cause ‘reciprocal radicalization.'”

 

Though Pokalova and Clifford both view Georgia’s impending projects as a step in the right direction, they have added some important caveats. “When it comes to CVE programs, it depends how one defines them,” Pokalova said. “From a broader perspective, one can include such programs as inter-religious dialogue initiatives into CVE. Such broader programs might not necessarily deal with terrorism specifically, but by fostering better societal ties such programs contribute to the prevention of extremism.” Clifford, for his part, added a word of warning: “The landscape of radicalization in Georgia unfortunately reflects its diverse makeup, and there are multiple forms of radicalization in the country that span national, ethnic, religious and geographic boundaries. Thus, this is a circumstance where ‘one-size-fits-all’ CVE programs are destined to fail.”

The full piece can be read on Stratfor here.

Woodstock in the South Caucasus

Woodstock in the South Caucasus

Vishup Ensemble (Armenia), Tserakvi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2017

Stratfor has published my text and photographs on the One Caucasus Festival held in the village of Tserakvi in Georgia. It’s aim is to bring together young Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian musicians and other artists to work together to build a common image of a united and peaceful region.

Billed as the ‘most inspiring festival in Georgia,’ I was at first skeptical when I heard about One Caucasus, a four-day musical event held every August that can be best described as a Woodstock for the South Caucasus. Don’t get me wrong. The idea of bringing Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians together in a neutral location is, of course, to be commended. Armenia and Azerbaijan, after all, have been at war with each other for nearly three decades now, and the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict diminishes with each passing year. Citizens of both countries rarely get the opportunity to meet.

 Great festival.