Pashinyan Escalates Tensions With Armenian Apostolic Church

Pashinyan Escalates Tensions With Armenian Apostolic Church

Armenia is again gripped by a dramatic confrontation between its political and religious elites. Recent public attacks by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Catholicos Karekin II, the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, are the latest in a series of standoffs since 2018 that reflect a broader struggle between Armenia’s revolutionary present and its entrenched past. This comes a year after Karekin II approved of street protests led by one of his archbishops to force Pashinyan’s resignation. Pashinyan has accused the Catholicos of violating his vow of celibacy and fathering a child. These accusations are not new. They last surfaced in the Armenian media over a decade ago. The recent language accompanying these charges, including that from Pashinyan’s wife, Anna Hakobyan, who likened the clergy to pedophiles, however, marks a significant escalation. Many suspect that Pashinyan seeks to silence critical voices ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026.

The church and opposition groups are hitting back. Even though the Catholicos has not previously denied these accusations, his supporters have claimed that the allegations violate articles of Armenia’s criminal code. The government, however, has for over a year now claimed that the Armenian Apostolic Church has violated the constitutional separation of church and state by involving the Catholicos in domestic politics, including by opposing the fragile peace process with Azerbaijan.

 

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Allegations of corruption have plagued Karekin II, real name Ktrij Nersessyan, for years. This includes the controversial appointment of his brother, Yezras, who Pashinyan now refers to only by his birth name, as head the Russian Diocese and its association with pro-Russian military factions, such as the Arbat Battalion, which was implicated in an alleged coup attempt on the Pashinyan government last year. These connections have only reinforced the perception that the Church is more of a political actor than a spiritual institution.

 

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As the 2026 elections approach, the rift between the Church and the state is likely to intensify. The conflict has become emblematic of a larger ideological struggle between two visions of Armenia—one rooted in the post-Soviet legacy of Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and the Church, and the other in Pashinyan’s vision of a reformed country seeking to integrate into both regional and international structures, and at peace with its neighbors. If unresolved, it risks destabilizing not just the already shaky relationship between church and state, but Armenia’s broader national identity at a time when many argue that unity is most needed. 

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Pashinyan Targets Remnants of Old Regime as Election Showdown Looms

Pashinyan Targets Remnants of Old Regime as Election Showdown Looms

Ten months before his inauguration as Catholicos, Karekin II stands next to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan at an official event in Spitak, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 1998

For over a week now, the Armenian public has been subjected to another unedifying spectacle between the country’s political and spiritual leadership. Tirades posted on social media by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan targeting Armenian Catholicos Karekin II, who he accuses of fathering at least one child despite an oath of celibacy, have been incendiary. The allegation is not new. Armenian media even named an alleged daughter back in 2013. However, Pashinyan’s wife, Anna Hakobyan, further ratcheted up tensions by referring to some members of the clergy as paedophiles while not presenting any evidence.

Just days before Pashinyan’s posts, Karekin II was in Switzerland where he took part in a conference where Armenian cultural heritage in Karabakh took centre stage, an issue Pashinyan has been careful to avoid at this juncture when the text of a peace treaty has been finalised but not signed. Hakobyan specifically insulted the church for participating in the event now more likely to obstruct a possible peace deal than contribute to one. The government had already signalled that doing so now would carry with it significant national security concerns. It is likely that the new attacks on Karekin II are connected.

 

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Even when the Catholicos was elected in 1999, his legitimacy was disputed from the start. Unlike his predecessor, Karekin II’s selection was accompanied by accusations that it had been orchestrated by then-president Robert Kocharyan and supportive groups such as the Armenian Church in Russia. Adding to the intrigue, Karekin II was elected on the same day that gunmen stormed the Armenian National Assembly, killing eight including newly elected prime minister Vazgen Sargsyan and parliamentary speaker Karen Demirchyan. Nobody is suggesting the two events were connected but the coincidence was uncanny.

 

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Instead, there now seems to be a final showdown on the horizon between the pre-revolution regimes of old and what was meant to replace them. In short, a Historical Armenia personified by Kocharyan, Sargsyan, Karekin II, and perhaps even Ter-Petrosyan, locked into an existential battle with Pashinyan’s Real Armenia concept. As the coming year before the 2026 parliamentary elections progresses, the situation is likely to become even more heated and potentially volatile.

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Armenia’s Political Climate Heats Up as Elections Draw Closer

Armenia’s Political Climate Heats Up as Elections Draw Closer

Official Photo

Amid growing tensions in the Armenian National Assembly, Armenia’s political climate continues to intensify ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections. The opposition is ramping up efforts to discredit Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, this time criticizing his policy of normalizing relations with neighboring Türkiye. The situation has been further inflamed by an incident in which an opposition blogger was reportedly assaulted by pro-Pashinyan members of a Yerevan district council. Last week, Pashinyan also lost his temper against opposition lawmakers during a parliamentary session, which critics interpreted as a threat to arrest opposition members of parliament who had accused members of his party of corruption. Despite likely being an impulsive and poorly judged overreaction, the episode highlights the mounting pressure on the embattled prime minister as the elections draw nearer.

Last week, Armenia’s Ministry of Justice drafted legislation that would force the removal of slanderous content. This means the government would effectively “curb press freedom” if the media, especially pro-opposition, does not self-regulate itself. A journalist in Armenia’s southernmost Siunik region looks set to be prosecuted for her reporting on anti-Pashinyan protests that took place four years ago. There are growing concerns that democratic progress is now in decline in Armenia as Pashinyan sets his sights on his political rivals and other critical voices in the country. 

 

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According to the latest Marketing Professional Group (MPG)/Gallup International survey conducted between April 29 and May 2, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party’s electoral chances remain low. As a previous poll demonstrated in January, only 11 to 11.5 percent of respondents said they would re-elect the current government. A combined 20 percent of respondents, however, would vote for others representing the four main parties that made up the previous governments under the Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan administrations consecutively from 1998–2018. Just over 28 percent of respondents said they were undecided, intended to spoil their ballots, or were against all. Though such intentions could change over the coming year, there is nonetheless plenty for Pashinyan to worry about following recent defeats in local elections in Gyumri, where a pro-Russia candidate became mayor and pro-EU parties failed to pass the threshold for representation.

 

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“It is possible to bring people to the streets but it is very difficult to keep them there … with unrealistic statements, innuendos, and patriotic appeals instead of political programs,” one political scientist told local media earlier this month, potentially raising the stakes even higher. Senior Armenian officials, including National Assembly Speaker Simonyan and Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan, also warn that Russia has been engaged in a “hybrid war” in Armenia since 2018 when Pashinyan came to power. Moscow denies the accusation, but the information sphere will certainly influence the outcome, whether from domestic or external sources. There is a large overlap between both, and the issues are genuinely organic. Regardless, the stakes remain high for the country’s future post-2026, especially if there is no progress on signing a peace deal with Azerbaijan or if a nationalist political force gains more influence. Even if Pashinyan’s party were to win the most votes in next year’s elections compared to individual rivals, without a majority of parliamentary deputies in the National Assembly, it could usher in a period of instability in the future.

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Armenia Braces for a Turbulent Pre-Election Period

Armenia Braces for a Turbulent Pre-Election Period

Ballots printed for the last ever direct presidential elections in Armenia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2008

With parliamentary elections in Armenia just over a year away, opposition figures and some analysts are increasingly questioning Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyans prospects for re-election. Critics argue that he has failed to fulfil his widely promoted peace agenda and hold him accountable for the exodus of approximately 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the former Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) in late September 2023. They also point to unrealistic campaign promises made during the last parliamentary elections held in 2021, including the pledge to reclaim the strategic hilltop citadel of Shusha and pursue remedial secession for the separatist but now dissolved Karabakh — goals widely seen as unattainable from the outset.

Some argue that it was Prime Minister Pashinyan’s refusal to acknowledge the reciprocal nature of two agreed transport linkages —from Armenia to Karabakh and Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan— in November 2020 that led to a stalemate over the Lachin corridor. This, they contend, ultimately resulted in the demise of Karabakh as an ethnic Armenian political entity and was predictable since the ink dried on the trilateral ceasefire statement. Pashinyan was to exploit the complete loss of Karabakh to pivot politically, declaring it time to focus solely on securing the future of the Republic of Armenia within its internationally recognised borders. The Armenian opposition, however, claimed this outcome was orchestrated with the backing of the European Union and United States, aimed at reducing or eliminating Russian influence in the strategically important South Caucasus.

 

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Although the resurgence of a more assertive opposition under the guidance of Kocharyan and Sargsyan was predictable, what was less expected was Pashinyans ability to survive repeated political crisis after crisis. This resilience was most apparent in 2024 when Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, a revanchist cleric, failed to mobilise sufficient numbers on the streets to leverage sufficient public outrage just as the parliamentary opposition couldn’t even in 2022 when a pregnant woman was killed by Pashinyans speeding convoy in central Yerevan. On the other hand, with the trauma of defeat still fresh, many Armenians are naturally reluctant to risk further bloodshed in a conflict they are again unlikely to win. Armenia lacks meaningful security guarantees, and the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) was never intended to act as one.

 

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Ultimately, however, it will all depend on the electorate which will likely be overwhelmed by a deluge of partisan propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation from multiple sources over the coming year in what could prove a highly contentious and bitter period defined by geopolitical and not domestic concerns. It is high time that society engages in informed discussion and debate beforehand to neutralise the potentially explosive consequences before it is too late. At the beginning of the year, Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service already warned that there were already signs of domestic instability to come in 2025. The stakes have never been higher.

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Armenian Local Elections a Barometer for Pashinyan’s Political Future

Armenian Local Elections a Barometer for Pashinyan’s Political Future

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan finds himself facing a turbulent political landscape following snap local elections in the municipalities of Gyumri and Parakar late last month. Despite municipal votes often being dismissed as minor, the outcome of the March 30 elections carries national weight. In both Gyumri and Parakar, Pashinyan’s ruling political party, Civil Contract, failed to secure a majority of the votes. The elections were widely considered a referendum on Pashinyan’s premiership. Pashinyan’s approval ratings hover around 11 percent, according to a survey published in January of this year. This, combined with the election results in Gyumri and Parakar, means that Pashinyan’s political survivability may be in question.

In Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city and home to the Russian 102nd military base, Pashinyan’s approval ratings are particularly symbolic given that he embarked on a pivotal march to unseat his predecessor, walking 117 kilometers (72 miles) from Gyumri to Yerevan in 2018, almost seven years ago to the day. Despite most Armenians expecting Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party to outright win the elections, there was the possibility that another party could strike a deal for it to still govern.

 

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In September 2023, Civil Contract had also failed to win an outright majority in the Yerevan municipal elections, attracting just 33 percent of the vote. Pashinyan’s candidate, Tigran Avinyan, had to instead rely on an extra-parliamentary Public Voice led by a former policeman and controversial video blogger, currently detained in the United States, to retain power. In Gyumri last month, however, there was no political force to make a deal. Even a new pro-European Union extra-parliamentary force believed close to Pashinyan failed to pass the six percent threshold.

 

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For now, Pashinyan must balance westward aspirations with the ever-present shadow of Russia and an increasingly assertive opposition at home. If he can offer voters a compelling vision of a “Real Armenia”—one that overcomes military defeat, economic stagnation, and regional isolation—he might still chart a path to re-election. The 2018 Velvet Revolution, however, feels distant for most Armenians now, as demonstrated in Gyumri. The loss of Karabakh and the attempted control of power in the regions of Armenia define his tenure today.

The full piece is available here.

 

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