Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Turkey-Armenia border – A Multimedia Exhibition

Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Turkey-Armenia border – A Multimedia Exhibition

Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Turkey-Armenia Border Exhibition, Istanbul, Turkey ©
Onnik James Krikorian 2012

Having already been shown at the Galata Fotoğrafhanesi Fotoğraf Akademisi in Istanbul last year, the Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Turkey-Armenia Border multimedia exhibition finally hits Yerevan today and will run from 27 August to 7 September at the ACCEA/NPAK Armenian Center for Contemporary and Experimental Art. Without a doubt it’s one of the best cross-border media projects I’ve seen in the region and especially as it presents Armenia-Turkey relations and the closed border in a new and very compelling way.

The station workers waiting for years and years for a train that never comes; Gyumri’s Kima who have been waiting for years for a guest from Turkey to come and knock on her door; the children of Bayandur who break the silence of the border with their music; Sofia whose path crosses with the inhabitants of a Kars neighbourhood awaiting demolition due to urban gentrification plans, while she was looking for the traces of her grandfather; a Kurd and an Armenian whose voice try to reach each other as they face their past traumas do all call us to listen, speak and act “beyond waiting”.

Having seen that work already, I really have to say that both the trainers and the participants produced some excellent work.

Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Turkey-Armenia Border Exhibition, Istanbul, Turkey
© Onnik James Krikorian 2012

Hrant Dink Foundation, Galata Fotoğrafhanesi Fotoğraf Akademisi, Free Press Unlimited and Youth Initiative Centre of Gyumri have jointly organised the Multimedia Project for Promoting Dialogue with the support of the Consulate-General of the Netherlands and the British Embassy. The Project aims at establishing direct communication between photojournalists and photographers from Armenia and Turkey and enabling them to think collectively to promote dialogue between the two countries by making 5 joint multimedia productions.

The project has brought together 10 participants, 5 from Turkey, 5 from Armenia with prior experience in documentary photography/photojournalism in two multimedia workshops in İstanbul and in a photojournalistic trip to Kars and Gyumri.

Aleksey Manukyan, Anush Babajanyan, Armenuhi Vardanyan, Marianna Vardanyan and Sofia Danielyan from Armenia joined Anıl Çizmecioğlu, Arif Yaman, Derya Deniz Pekkıyıcı, Eren Aytuğ and Volkan Doğar from Turkey at the first multimedia workshop at İstanbul Tütün Deposu on September 12-18, 2011.

During the first workshop, they attended sessions on “Multimedia Production” by the documentary film maker Jack Janssen; “Multimedia Techniques” by the visual artist Sevgi Ortaç; “Documentary Photography” by the photographer Yücel Tunca and “Visual Storytelling” by the photographer Berge Arabian.

Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Turkey-Armenia Border Exhibition, Istanbul, Turkey
© Onnik James Krikorian 2012

I was particularly pleased to also be invited as one of the trainers, but work commitments prevented me from doing so. I did, however, participate in the second and final workshop held in Istanbul, Turkey, in September 2011 as well as the opening of the exhibition, also in Istanbul, last year.

In addition to helping out as the pieces were put together, I presented on my experience using social media for promoting alternative narratives, news and information in the context of the Nagorno Karabakh, an issue that has already frustrated attempts to open the Armenia-Turkey border.

In the last phase, all teams got together at a second workshop in İstanbul at Galata Fotoğrafhanesi from November 21 to 27, 2011 to finalise the editing of their multimedia productions. During the week, participants screened their work-in-progress and worked with Jack Janssen and Sevgi Ortaç to finalise their editing. The last workshop also hosted journalist and photographer Onnik Krikorian who shared his own project OneWorld using multimedia and social media for promoting dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Unfortunately, the multimedia shorts are not yet online, but my understanding is that they will be once the exhibition in Yerevan is over. Until then, if you’re in Armenia, you should definitely check it out at the ACCEA/NPAK Armenian Center for Contemporary and Experimental Art in Yerevan from 27 August to 7 September. It should also be exhibited in Gyumri afterwards.

Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Turkey-Armenia Border Exhibition, Istanbul, Turkey
© Onnik James Krikorian 2012

Meanwhile, two of the participants, Anush Babajanyan from Armenia and Arif Yaman from Turkey were interviewed by CivilNet. Anush’s words towards the end struck a particular note with me:

I would not necessarily like to see more of these kinds of projects because… they’re good, but.. I mean, they can’t continue forever. Something else has to be done. Something more expansive […] which I can’t really imagine right now. […] They begin out of questions and problems. If I say, yes, let’s continue this type of project that means the solution hasn’t been found yet so I wouldn’t like these kinds of projects to continue in that manner. It would be nice if these kind of projects happened on their own without organizations gathering people, but people just going and doing it on their own, just out of their natural interest and desire. That would be nice and that would be a more logical continuation of this project because our relationship and our getting to know each other is between us and our films which we created are for the people […]. That should hopefully transform into a more natural and humane relationship between the nations.

Couldn’t agree more and I hope that projects such as Beyond Waiting: Stories from the Armenia-Turkey Border make that a reality in the nearest future. Beyond Waiting indeed.

Georgi Vanyan: The Tekali Process Continues

Georgi Vanyan: The Tekali Process Continues

Georgi Vanyan, Tekali, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2012

Recent clashes on the Line of Contact (LOC) separating Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have again raised concerns over the fragility of the 1994 ceasefire agreement. That should have put fighting over the disputed territory of Karabakh on hold, but with a final peace deal still elusive, thousands have been killed in cross-border skirmishes in the eighteen years since. At least three Armenian and five Azerbaijani soldiers died in the latest major skirmishes on the Line of Contact (LoC), which reportedly included incursions into Armenia proper, while both sides blamed the other for the violence.

Coming as it did as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the South Caucasus at the beginning of June, some analysts and observers contend that it was a deliberate attempt to remind the international community that the Karabakh conflict most definitely was not ‘frozen.’ Alarm that a new war might break out also rattled neighboring Georgia as the number of Russian air sorties increased and Moscow announced it would double its military presence in Armenia even if others such as Richard Giragosian said they were not expecting a new premeditated offensive.

Indeed, Giragosian, who is the director of the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Center (RSC), told journalists that Azerbaijan had formulated a new military strategy to reach operational combat readiness by 2014, the 20th anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire, and not before. Nevertheless, the International Crisis Group (ICG) remains concerned that the possibility of incidents on the LOC spiraling out of control could lead to an ‘accidental war’ breaking out instead. RFE/RL puts the number of dead since June as at least 11, while the Economist reported last year that over 3,000 have died since the 1994 ceasefire.

“An arms race, escalating front-line clashes, vitriolic war rhetoric and a virtual breakdown in peace talks are increasing the chance Armenia and Azerbaijan will go back to war over Nagorno Karabakh,” noted the ICG in its report, Preventing War, published in February last year. “Increased military capabilities on both sides would make a new armed conflict in the South Caucasus far more deadly than the 1992-1994 one that ended with a shaky truce. Regional Alliances could pull in Russia, Turkey and Iran..”

The Armenian military also discounted the possibility of a new war breaking out by design, or at least in the immediate future. “As a result of evaluating the situation, we have arrived at the conclusion that the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities is low today,” Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan told reporters as quoted by RFE/RL and other sources. “Having said that,” he added, and as the military vowed to respond to each incident by killing a larger number of Azerbaijani soldiers, “the armed forces and their leadership exist just for that and are prepared for that.”

 

The ‘Tekali Process’

Despite the bleak prospects for peace, however, some Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society organizations and activists reacted to the latest border violence differently than in previous years by convening a public hearing held less than two weeks later in Tekali, a small ethnic Azeri village in Georgia situated close to the border with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Planned as a regional peace keeping center in the South Caucasus, the public hearings are the brainchild of actor and director turned peace activist Georgi Vanyan.

No stranger to controversy, Vanyan is often branded a traitor, either privately by some NGOs or publicly by nationalist forces in Armenia. This was most evident in April this year when plans to screen non-politicized films from Azerbaijan were disrupted in Vanadzor and Gyumri by small groups of nationalists. Those organizing the protests were the same that have also disrupted International Women’s Day events in Yerevan as well as a recent diversity march. The group is also believed to be linked to the recent firebombing of a gay-friendly alternative bar in Yerevan.

International human rights groups decried the actions against Vanyan, which included physical assault and an attack on the Vanadzor Helsinki Citizens Assembly, as well as the involvement in Gyumri of its notorious mayor, Vartan Ghukasyan. “The history of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan means that a film from Azerbaijan is controversial for some, but that doesn’t justify not screening the films, far less any threat or use of violence,” said Giorgi Gogia, senior South Caucasus researcher at Human Rights Watch.

“I think that real art serves the kindness, humanity and reconciliation of people, and an idea came to my mind. Why not repeat the initiative of Vanyan in Azerbaijan?” said Zardusht Alizadeh, an Azerbaijani analyst and political commentator, as well as a speaker at events held by his Armenian counterpart, in response to the reaction. Ironically, a film by Azerbaijani film director Murad Ibragimbekov was scheduled to be shown as part of the Golden Apricot Film Festival in Yerevan on July 9, raising further and more complicated questions about the coordinated campaign against Vanyan.

 

Peace-building Center

In Tekali, Vanyan also operates outside of the narrow boundaries set on most NGOs either by themselves or by official structures, and has to date held four public hearings in the village which have been well attended by Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians. In the first event after the June clashes, and quite unlike other peace building activities which target participants almost solely from the capitals of the three countries, this also included residents of regions in Armenia and Azerbaijan directly affected by the ongoing conflict over Karabakh.

“Armenians and Azerbaijanis are human beings first of all and have a basic desire for peace. What we need to do is to initiate some kind of open discussion. Instead of organizing seminars, we talk to people in the markets, or in cultural centers,” Vanyan told me in an interview in 2009. “Communication is not betrayal. It is a natural human need,” he was quoted as saying by one newspaper the same year in response to those questioning and obstructing his activities in Armenia. International organizations also stress the urgent need for more people-to-people contacts.

In Tekali, dozens of people, including Armenians from Noyemberyan, a regional center close to the location of the recent clashes, as well as Azerbaijanis from Gazakh and Ganja participated in the discussion led by three speakers each from both countries. The event was organized by the recently founded Tekali Association of Georgia, Azerbaijan’s Center of Regional Cooperation and Community Development, and Vanyan’s Caucasus Center for Peacekeeping Initiatives of Armenia. The question posed was should civil society intervene on the matter of cross-border clashes?

“Let’s try to clarify what’s going on,” said Luiza Poghosyan who considered the front line skirmishes to be tantamount to an act of ‘terrorism’ against the populations of both countries. “Personally, I see no logical sense in the fire exchanges on the front. Human losses do not bring any tactical success to any of the parties.”

“Has civil society done anything effective yet?” asked Azerbaijan Academy of Science Department head Ali Abbasov rhetorically. “The answer is no. They are distanced from the negotiations, but civil society can and must say its piece,” he said.

“We have been living [with] the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict for 24 years already. That conflict has inflicted many wounds on our peoples and erected many barriers and psychological obstacles between them. Who benefits from ceasefire violations?” added Mahram Toyaşoğlu from a regional Azerbaijani NGO in Gazakh.

Speaking following the public discussion, Vanyan was pleased with the results of the meeting. “The speakers touched on the problem of a mechanism through which each could participate in the prevention of incidents on the Line of Contact,” he said. “It was also noted that the Tekali format is suitable to make the first steps such as establishing contact on both sides of the conflict as well as to consider further actions. It was decided that a Monitoring and Rapid Reaction Group on the Line of Contact should be established.”

“In the opinion of the participants,” wrote Azerbaijani journalist and analyst Ilgar Velizade in a blog post days later, “society has, to this day, taken no steps to end hostilities, and remains far removed from what goes on at the border. […] Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society organizations now need to cooperate with one another in order to resolve the situation. […] the meeting in Tekali demonstrated once more the Armenian and Azerbaijani public desire for peace to be established in the conflict zone as quickly as possible […]. As we say, hope never dies.”

Whether that intent is as widespread, as Velizade says or as much as Vanyan hopes, remains to be seen, but the first meeting to establish the Monitoring and Rapid Reaction Group was held in Tekali on July 21. Present were representatives from the NGOs and the International Crisis Group. So too were Bernard O’Sullivan and Stephen Young from the Brussels-based Nonviolent Peaceforce, an organization already working in Georgia, Mindanao/Philippines, South Sudan, and elsewhere. O’Sullivan spoke to me following the public discussion.

“The Tekali Process first of all attracts our interest because clearly people have a need for civil society to act amongst and protect themselves,” he said. “However, we work on the principle of acceptance. We only go to conflict zones where we’re accepted and obviously this includes civil society, but critically it also means the political leadership, i.e. the governments, of all sides. What will come out of the Tekali Process? I see there is very good will here. The Tekali group said it’s not in their interest to get involved in military or political outcomes, but it is for civilians across ethnic groups to protect themselves in a non-violent way. That’s why we’re very interested.”

Turkey’s South Caucasus Agenda

Turkey’s South Caucasus Agenda

Armenian Church, Istanbul, Turkey © Onnik James Krikorian

Strategically situated as a major conduit for vital energy resources, the South Caucasus has long been an area for competing regional and geopolitical interests. But while competition between Russia and the United States has preoccupied many analysts since 1991 when the three countries making up the region declared their independence from the former Soviet Union, some consider that Turkey could also play an important role in the region. Despite its well-known problems with Armenia, this is particularly true since tensions between Russia and Georgia culminated in the August 2008 war.

At the beginning of March therefore, an international conference held in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, brought together analysts, diplomats and decision makers from Turkey, the South Caucasus, and international bodies to discuss Ankara’s perceived and potential role in the region. Organized by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), the question posed was what role could Turkey play in stabilizing the South Caucasus and how could civil society contribute to peace building despite low levels of civic engagement?

Despite an initiative to launch a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform in 2008, and attempts the following year to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and open the border closed in 1993, participants considered that Turkey is punching well below its weight. TESEV Foreign Policy Program’s Aybars Görgülü explained why.

“The South Caucasus is little discussed or known in Turkey, while successive governments neglected the region for too long,” he said. “When the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia and Georgia were not in Turkey’s list of priorities. Instead, an opportunity was seen in the Turkic world, and financial and political resources were used to create a sphere of influence there. Relations with Azerbaijan also became the backbone of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region, largely driven by identity and kinship type factors, which some argue limited its success.”

Indeed, noted Görgülü, Turkey’s good relations with Azerbaijan and the solidarity between the two countries complicated Turkey’s relationship with Armenia. “Both already had serious disagreements such as border recognition and the [1915] Genocide, but Turkey’s unconditional support for Azerbaijan [in the conflict with Armenia over Karabakh] became another source of conflict,” he noted. “Turkey’s policy in the early 1990s was based on a romantic and idealized notion more defined by a gap between expectation and actual capability.”

On the other hand, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey made a distinction in its foreign policy between the Caucasus and Central Asia. “It started to adopt a more constructive and comprehensive foreign policy strategy,” Görgülü argued. “So, in that sense, Turkey can be considered a latecomer to the region. The energy card was highly important for Turkey as a hub for the transportation of Caspian oil and gas to the West, and so, like Azerbaijan, Georgia also became an important country, especially after the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.”

Nevertheless, he continued, Armenia was always the missing piece in the puzzle. “Relations with Azerbaijan are still the backbone of Turkey’s policy towards the region, and even though the ‘One Nation-Two States’ motto does not really reflect the political reality,” he stressed, “it is still reflected in official rhetoric and solidarity between Turkish and Azerbaijan state elites remains strong while there is domestic support as well.”

As for Armenia, after the much publicized “football diplomacy” initiative, expectations were raised for normalization, but the situation is now deadlocked with no breakthrough likely in the near future. And while civil society in Turkey is developing, there still remains little interest in the South Caucasus on both the state and NGO level. Even so, there has been significant progress in terms of dialogue between Armenian and Turkish NGOs, and in the absence of official relations, Görgülü argued, it is the responsibility of civil society to continue with this process. 

Russian military checkpoint on the road to Gori, Georgia. The conflict between Russia and Georgia is seen as the main stimulus behind Turkey’s initiative to engage with the South Caucasus © Onnik James Krikorian 2008

The official view from Turkey

Not surprisingly, the official line from Levent Murat Burhan, the Turkish Ambassador to Georgia, focused mainly on the problems in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. “Situated at the crossroads of East and West as well as North and South, and home to a multitude of different ethnicities, languages and religions, the South Caucasus is one of the most challenging in the global political landscape,” he said. “Its huge potential has not been fully realized because of conflict and shortcomings in terms of political, economic, and social development.”

The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia demonstrated the danger posed by persisting protracted conflicts and why the present status quo is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long term, Burhan argued. As such, he concluded, the region is a priority in Turkish foreign policy.

Burhan provided examples of this Turkish approach in terms of supporting security and stability and creating a climate of regional cooperation. Initially supported officially in Yerevan as well as by the international community, even if controversial for many in the Diaspora, Turkey in particular remains committed to the normalization process with Armenia, he stated, believing that the two protocols signed in Zurich at the end of October 2009 represented a unique historical opportunity to establish peace and stability in the South Caucasus.

Nevertheless, he added, Turkey considers that the normalization process with Armenia and resolution of the Karabakh conflict are connected and that they therefore affect each other. “With the stalemate [over the disputed territory] also negatively affecting regional dynamics, and even though the Turkey-Armenia and the Armenia-Azerbaijan tracks are to be negotiated separately, there is a relation between the two,” he said. “A positive move in one will help facilitate progress in the other.”

“A more general example, related to this, is that we believe the unsolved conflicts in the South Caucasus are the main obstacles to peace and stability in the region,” he continued. “Therefore, immediately following the Georgian-Russian conflict in August 2008, we introduced an initiative to bring together regional Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) members. The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform initiative was launched after the outbreak of hostilities and we believe it is the right mechanism to address all regional problems.”

The Armenian Perspective

Naturally, the Armenian position presented by former Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) member and Yerevan State University Professor David Hovannisyan was more critical. “Bilateral relations should simply be that,” he countered. “They aren’t multilateral, so when the Turkish government decided to make linkages between the Armenia-Turkish normalization process and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh it wasn’t fair or helpful in creating a more positive environment for further dialogue.”

Hovannisyan also said that he considered the proposal of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation platform naive. “Considered seriously, the initiative was a good one, but it was also completely idealistic and unrealistic,” he explained. ”Even if the Turkish initiative did reduce tensions in the region during and after the August 2008 war, it couldn’t become a new process. There is instead the need for trust, new open-minded elites, new governments, and a real process of democratization in all the countries in the region.”

In combination with involvement in the European Union’s Eastern Partnership, Turkey’s role could be more active, but ultimately it is limited in terms of Armenian-Turkish relations, Hovannisyan continued. “There are normal diplomatic procedures for the establishment of diplomatic relations so why did Armenia and Turkey begin to discuss the text of the protocols? It was from our point of view genocide so if we really want to create a real process of reconciliation between two nations there also needs to be an apology.”

Flanked by an Armenian security detail, the car carrying Turkish President Abdullah Gul drives from Zvartnots Airport to Downtown Yerevan less than one month after the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia © Onnik James Krikorian 2008

Challenging the Status Quo in the South Caucasus

Chaired by Guenther Baechler, the Swiss Ambassador to Georgia, the first of three panels examined the current role of Turkey in the South Caucasus and how that should develop in the future. The panel addressed whether Turkey is living up to its potential and whether there is a systematic approach in terms of any strategy for the future. Was the absence of reference to Russia and Iran in the Turkish Ambassador’s address diplomatic courtesy in order not to address competitors in the region?

Temel Iskit, a retired Turkish Ambassador, considered these important questions that had to be answered. Iskit also thought that while the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform was a positive initiative on the part of Turkey, its timing was not helpful. “Turkey was not seen as an objective player in the region,” he said. “It was, and still is, considered to be closer to Azerbaijan than Armenia. Even so, the initiative was welcomed by Armenia and not Azerbaijan and Georgia because it was the first time Ankara initially approached Yerevan without preconditions.”

Armenia was eager to participate in the initiative, he explained, and even if this didn’t happen, one by-product was the resulting approach towards Armenia in the form of a road map, enhanced by “football diplomacy,” before the ill-fated signing of two protocols to normalize relations. “Even if Turkey hoped normalization might also contribute to resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, it was not perceived as such by Azerbaijan. Perceptions therefore need to be changed in all three countries,” Iskit said.

“There are two tracks, Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan, but unfortunately at some point they start to converge. In Turkey, people’s sympathies are with Azerbaijan so this creates political pressure on the government even if there is has been a change in terms of the country’s attitude to Armenia and even the Genocide. Of course, it is slow to change, but over time both Armenia and Turkey will fully understand they share a common history. This is a long-term transformation and civil society is already playing a role in this.”

The View from Azerbaijan

Avaz Hasanov, Director of Society for Humanitarian Research in Baku says the Azerbaijani government as well as domestic society fully supports Turkey’s desire to resolve the Karabakh conflict while rapprochement is also in the interest of the US, EU, and partly Russia too. “Since the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey will build peace and stability in the South Caucasus, integration into Europe will naturally increase as well,” Hasanov opined. “Georgia is more active here, but Euro-integration will promote democratization and realization of peace in the region.”

Nevertheless, he added, energy and communication projects involving Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, but excluding Armenia, do not help realize this goal.

“Azerbaijan considers the economic blockade [of Armenia] as the main tool to push for a favorable resolution of the Karabakh conflict,” Hasanov argued. “So, the support of Turkey in terms of normalizing relations can also help overcome the myths and stereotypes prevalent in Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. […] Unfortunately, however, much of civil society instead helps maintains the status quo by mirroring public opinion in its resistance to compromise for the sake of peace as well as the region’s future. There is also no political will.”

One of two closed border gates separating Armenia and Turkey. One is close to Gyumri while this one is situated in Margara, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2009

The International Community’s Perspective

“Turkey could potentially become a key actor in the South Caucasus, but why does Turkey not occupy that role in reality?” asked moderator Dieter Boden, a German diplomat and former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and previously head of the OSCE Special Mission to Georgia. “Turkey has articulated itself as a central country in quite a few places, but relatively speaking this has been felt less strongly in the Caucasus.”

Nigar Goksel responded. “One reason for this could be that Turkey is cautious about stepping on Russia’s toes.”

Goksel, a Senior Analyst and Caucasus Coordinator with the European Stability Initiative (ESI), also believed that unrealistic expectations were set in attempts to improve relations with Armenia. “Many in the West believed that with so many stalemates in the region the one positive dynamic that could be introduced would be opening Turkey’s border with Armenia so that relations would normalize in order to break Russia’s domination,” she said. “It might also break stereotypes and introduce a positive dynamic into Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.”

Theoretically, many analysts agree, but Goksel also noted that the opposite could be argued as well. “Azerbaijan’s perspective that it is in its interest for the Armenia-Turkey border to remain closed and there is the view in Baku that Armenia will harden its position on the Karabakh issue if the border is opened,” she explained. “A theoretical argument can also be made that a rift between Baku and Ankara can only give more power to Russia in the neighborhood while others argue that even if Turkey does open the border, Russia’s leverage in Armenia is not going to decrease.”

Another big challenge for Turkey will be 2015, stated Goksel, noting that it would be the 100th anniversary of the Genocide, a term that nearly all participants except for the active Turkish Ambassador in Tbilisi used. “Here the question is what will Turkey do?” she asked. “There will be significant pressure to do something, but it’s very important that Turkey starts thinking about this now if it wants to play an important role in the region. It’s also important that it doesn’t react emotionally, but in a rational way that looks forward to the next 100 years of regional stability and cooperation.”

The International Crisis Group’s Sabine Freizer agreed. “If the Armenian-Turkish process was undertaken half-heartedly and only for international reasons then Turkey is going to have a problem in 2015,” she said before turning her attention to Karabakh. “The main miscalculation [with the protocols] was that there were two processes going on in parallel, and that while there was progress on Armenia-Turkey there was the sense that this was also true in the Nagorno Karabakh talks. Unfortunately that was not the case.”’

 

Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) Caucasus Barometer 2011

Nevertheless, she noted, there is still some engagement between Armenia and Turkey which should continue regardless of the conflict with Azerbaijan. “There has been discussion about energy deals between Armenia and Eastern Turkey and that should go forward, and there are already some small steps. For example, Turkey is allowing Armenian trucks into its territory, it provides visas to Armenian citizens, and there are direct flights to and from Yerevan. Turkey hasn’t shut off completely, but there’s also the need to look to the future.”

Others such as Pascal Heyman from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Conflict Prevention Center suggested that Turkey could promote more Track II diplomacy initiatives, including those for Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians. “Confidence building measures in the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict have been difficult to achieve agreement on, however, and when they are accepted they largely remain unimplemented. People-to-People contacts, such as those between journalists, have also been difficult to arrange, “he said.

All the speakers, however, noted the urgency of the matter. “Ankara prefers to stabilize the situation hoping it won’t get out of hand while waiting for a better time,” said Peter Semneby, Former EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus. “This position is a dangerous one, if understandable, because it could mean tensions will build up under the surface and be more difficult to address in the future before becoming as uncontrollable as in 2008. There is an arms race which rapidly lowers the threshold for the use of violence and force if nothing is done.”

Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) Caucasus Barometer 2011


The Role of Civil Society

Moderator Kenneth Yalowitz, a retired U.S. Ambassador to Georgia and Belarus, introduced the third and final panel, noting that the involvement of NGOs and other non-State actors will be crucial. “There are no such things as frozen conflicts and the situation is not stable as shown in August 2008 with the war between Russia and Georgia,” he said. “The situation in terms of Nagorno Karabakh is unstable and could again turn into hostilities so there is much work to do in terms of ongoing negotiations and state-to-state relations.”

Unfortunately, Yalowitz noted, data from the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) shows that the level of trust in NGOs, as well as an understanding of what civil society actually does, is at a very low level across the entire region. In the context of Karabakh, EPF’s Vazgen Karapetyan offered an insight as to why. “There are some justifiable reasons why NGOs remain low key, but there are also some less than justifiable ones such as competition for resources on the local level so as not to lose ‘business’ and also because donors do not demand a serious impact,” he explained.

Negative stereotypes and hate speech, mainly from governments as well as the media, are therefore not challenged and the impact of civil society in mainstream society is limited as a result. Another reason is that a lack of coordination domestically, as well as cross-border, combined with the heightened official policy of constructing the “image of the enemy,” raises suspicion among citizens towards confidence building and peace building initiatives. “That’s a more than less legitimate reason for low awareness,” he concluded.

Craig Oliphant, formerly with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office and now with the NGO Saferworld added some other reasons. “Frustrations and grievances in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict not only remain, but have actually worsened and increased,” he said. “Baku looks at Track II diplomacy and the involvement of NGOs with skepticism, considering that confidence building measures should not be seen as some kind of ‘reward’ for Armenia in the absence of any actual resolution. As a psychological problem, that’s a particular challenge for NGOs.”

Even so, noted Oliphant, Turkey has shown itself to be an ideal host country for numerous cross-border civil society initiatives for participants from the South Caucasus. But, with many believing that Turkey is hesitant in encroaching upon Russia’s perceived sphere of influence even if it does show an interest in engaging Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and with Armenia-Turkey relations and the Karabakh peace process in deadlock, it seems unlikely that Ankara will be able to assume a more pro-active role in the region any time soon.

Nevertheless, with many considering that Ankara’s priorities and interests in the region are almost identical to those of the European Union’s, the debate and discussion will no doubt continue, and especially in the context of its approach to Armenia. “However,” remarked George Khutsishvili, director of the Tbilisi-based International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), in the remarks from the floor that followed, “there are more questions than answers about what its role should be.”

For more background, there is also a report, Turkey’s South Caucasus Agenda: The Role of State and Non-State Actors, that I co-authored with Aybars Görgülü here.

Qafqazda etnik konfliktlərin “semiotik anomaliyalar” prinsipində çözümü (Dağlıq Qarabağ timsalında)

Qafqazda etnik konfliktlərin “semiotik anomaliyalar” prinsipində çözümü (Dağlıq Qarabağ timsalında)

Şuşa ,Dağlıq Qarabağ © Onnik James Krikorian 2010

Professor Niyazi Mehdi tərəfindən

Dağlıq Qarabağ konfliktinin indiki mərhələsində konfliktin çözümü adların, simvolların yığılıb törətdiyi çıxmaza, küncə düşüb. Standart yollarla oradan heç cürə çıxmaq olmur: ermənilər müstəqil respublika simvolunu güzəşt edə bilmirlər, azərbaycanlılar isə öz sərhədlərini dəyişib Azərbaycanın məkanca kiçilməsinə razı ola bilmirlər. Oxşar durum Çeçenistan və Rusiya, Abxaz və Gürcüstan konfliktlərində də var. Biz  bu çıxmazdan qurtulmaq üçün yeni avtonomiya modelini təklif edirik (“nomiya” yunanca qanundur, “avtonomiya” isə “öz qanunları ilə özünü idarə edən” deməkdir). 

Bizim təklif etdiyimiz model Qafqaz üçün düşünülsə də Qafqazdan qıraq  yerlərdə, məsələn, Kiprdə, Güney Azərbaycanla bağlı İranda da lazımi transformasiyalardan sonra tətbiq edilə bilər.

Təklif etdiyimiz avtonomiya modeli konflikti semiotik (işarə sistemi ilə bağlı) anomaliya prinsiplərində çözür. İndi isə anomal avtonomiya modelini Dağlıq Qarabağ konflikti və faktları materiallarında yoxlanmadan keçirək.

Öncə təklifimizin kontekstini vermək üçün hazırkı durumu cızaq: 

DQ konfliktinin çözümünə Ermənistan tərəfindən əngəl olan motivlər: Ermənistan ordusu Dağlıq Qarabağda indiki uğurdan sonra faktiki olaraq DQ-ni Azərbaycan Dövlət sistemindən çıxarıb. Ancaq Beynəlxalq Hüquq bu de-faktonu de yure-yə çevirməyə imkan vermir. Bundan çıxılmaz vəziyyət yaranıb. Sözsüz, DQ erməniləri üçün imkan var ki, bəzi siyasi simvollarda Azərbaycan tərkibində qalıb faktiki olaraq müstəqil dövlət kimi yaşasınlar. Ancaq belə perspektivdən ermənilər qorxurlar. 

Birincisi, ondan qorxurlar ki, Azərbaycan hərbi-iqtisadi-mənəvi planda güclənsə, o biri tərəfdən isə Qafqaz üzərində Beynəlxalq nəzarət  zəifləsə, Azərbaycan DQ üzərindəki suverenlik simvollarından istifadə edərək DQ-də həmin faktiki müstəqil dövlət vəziyyətini aradan götürəcək. Deməli, ermənilər yüz faizlik qarantiyanın mümkün olmadığı durumda Azərbaycan dövlətinə mənsub olmaq simvollarının gizli təhlükələrindən ehtiyat edirlər. 

İkincisi, sakit vəziyyətdə Azərbaycanda miqrasiya və demoqrafik dinamikadan qorxurlar. Bildirirlər ki, DQ-də Naxçıvan variantı təkrar oluna bilər, yəni DQ-də azərbaycanlı artımı barış vasitələri ilə ermənilərin DQ-dən sıxışdırılması, deməli DQ-yə sülh yolu ilə qələbə çalınması ola bilər (bu, erməni versiyasıdır və azərbaycanlı tırəfin ona cavabı var). 

Üçüncüsü, DQ üzərində Azərbaycan dövlət simvollarının qəbulu Ermənistan və DQ ermənilərinin müqavimətləri ilə bağlıdır: rəsmilər bildirirlər ki, bu qədər uğurdan sonra keçmişə dönüb DQ-nin öncəki statusunu qaytarmağa camaat imkan verməz.

DQ konfliktinin çözümünə Azərbaycan tərəfindən əngəl olan motivlər:  

Birincisi, mədəni, etnik və dövlət şüuruna görə azərbaycanlılar üçün Qarabağ dağlıq hissəsi ilə birlikdə vətən coğrafiyasındadır. DQ-ni ayırmaq bu şüur üçün milli qəza, az qala kosmik katastrofdur.

İkincisi, Beynəlxalq Hüququn məntiqi, sistemi (məsələn, sərhədlərin toxunulmazlığı, BMT-nin Azərbaycanı indiki sərhədlərində tanıması və s.) Azərbaycanın xeyrinə işləyir. Bu üstünlükləri əldən vermək absurd  olar. 

Üçüncüsü, güclənmək perspektivini istisna etmək olmaz, deməli, gələcəkdə revanş götürmək imkanı qalır.

Dördüncüsü, Beynəlxalq Hüququn öz avtomatizmi var, ona görə də siyasi simvollarda balaca bir güzəşt edən kimi, həmin avtomatizm “yapon dominosu” prinsipi ilə işə düşür və DQ-nin tamam itirilməsinə gətirib çıxarır: məsələn, DQ erməniləri ilə tərəf kimi danışıqların aparılması həməncə Beynəlxalq Hüququn avtomatizmi ilə DQ-nin müstəqilliyinin tanınmasında önəmli addım olur.

Beləliklə, hər iki tərəfdə duran motivlərin vektoru DQ konfliktini küncə, çıxmaza salır.

Beynəlxalq güclərin indiki sivilizasyon düzən, sahman yaratmaq pafosunda konfliktin çözümünü küncdən çıxarmaq imkanı yox dərəcəsindədir. Azərbaycan, Ermənistan kimi ölkələrdə rəhbərliyin yalnız qorxunc korrupsiyası və ya xaricdə azman “gizli bank hesabları” varsa, o zaman ifşa olunmaq şantajı və ya “hesabları” itirmək təhlükəsi yabançı təzyiqlər qarşısında belə ölkənin rəhbərini (rəhbərliyini) zəif edə bilər. Azərbaycan kimi ölkələrin rəhbərliyini “diz çökdürmək” üçün Beynəlxalq güclərin əlində hansısa başqa bir ciddi vasitə görünmür.

ABŞ Konqresinin 907-ci düzəlişi, Rusiyanın uzun müddət Azərbaycanla ticarəti zəiflətməklə ona zərbə vurması, İranın bəzi analoji addımları  sonda göstərdi ki, ölkə bu tipli təzyiqlərə dözə bilir. Beləliklə, Azərbaycan elementar təpər göstərməklə konfliktin çözümünü küncdə, çıxmazda saxlaya bilər. 

Ancaq belə bir çıxmazlığın verdiyi ümüdə baxmayaraq,  çoxları bilir ki, konflikt hər tərəfi (yəni Azərbaycanı, Ermənistanı, Dağlıq Qarabağ ermənilərini) razı salan şəkildə həll olunsa, yaxşıdır. Deyəsən, tərəflərin hamısı “yaxınlaşan mövqelər” prinsipində ona razılaşırlar ki, DQ-də ermənilər rahatca, maksimum demoqrafiq, iqtisadi, hərbi təhlükəsizlik şəraitində yaşamalıdırlar, eləcə də DQ-nin Azərbaycan əhalisi öz öncəki torpaqlarında, şəhər-kəndlərində, məhəllələrində  maksimum güvənlik şəraitində olmalıdırlar. Düzdür, hərbi uğurlarından sonra DQ ermənilərinin bir istəyi də var, yaşadıqları yerləri öz dövlətləri kimi duysunlar. Azərbaycanın erməni azlığı istəyir ki, DQ onların milli dövlətçilik şüurunun daha bir faktı olsun. Ciddi çətinliyi bu istək yaradır.

Belə bir kontekstdə biz konfliktin barış yolu ilə çözümünü mümkün edən DQ modelini veririk. Həmin modeli qurmağa imkan verən metodologiya belədir:  model, birincisi, Dağlıq Qarabağı Azərbaycan anomaliyası kimi tanıyır (“a-nomaliya” yunanca qanunauyğunludan qıraqda duran, a-normal, normadan dişarıda qalan hadisədir). Bu o deməkdir ki, DQ-nin statusu Beynəlxalq Hüququn bəzi qaydalarının məntiqinə sığmayan prinsipdə qurulur və həmin hüquqa baxanda DQ anomaliya olur. İkincisi, model bizim metforik olaraq adlandırdığımız “dinamik pat” vəziyyəti yaradan prosedurlardan istifadə edir. Şahmatda bu dinamikanı biz “əbədi şah” situasiyasında görürük.  İki fiqur bir-birinə qarşı hərəkət edir, ancaq hərəkət heç bir yeni vəziyyətə, inkişafa  gətirib çıxarmır. Beləcə, sonsuz sayda təkrarlanma imkanı yaranır ki, bu da oynayanları heç-heçə durumunda saxlayır. Əbədi hərəkət etmək imkanı ilə hərəkətdən heç bir  irəliləyişə, yeni vəziyyətə çıxılmaması paradoksal şəkildə birləşir. Biz təklif etdiyimiz modeldə metaforik olaraq heç-heçəni bildirdiyimiz bu pat variantını nəzərdə tuturuq.   

Modeldə pat vəziyyətini yaradan prosedurlar Azərbaycana imkan verir ki, DQ ermənilərinə bəzi prinsipal güzəştləri edəndə beynəlxalq Hüququn avtomatizmi işə düşüb DQ-ni Azərbaycandan çıxarmasın. Erməni tərəfinə isə pat vəziyyətinə gətirib çıxaran prosedurlar imkan verir ki, onlar üçün Azərbaycan təhlükələrinin avtomatizminin qarşısı alınsın.

Bu modeldə pat proseduru “bir güzəşti onun əvəzində alınan güzəştlə təhlükəsizləşdirmə (neytrallaşdırma)” situasiyasını yaradır. Belə model hər iki tərəfin ambisiyalarını ödəməyə şərait yaradır və eləcə də DQ-də hər iki etnosdan olan camaatın güvənlikdə öz dövlət şüurları ilə yaşamasına imkan verir.

Bizim təklif etdiyimiz model XX yüz ildə gedən tendensiyalar XXI 

əsrdə həlledici amilə çevrilərsə, işləyə bilər. Kosovo, Bosniya olayları isə həmin tendensiyanı belə aydın edir: 

– heç bir milli, etnik azlığa zorakılıq etmək olmaz, onları yerindən qovmaq arzusuna düşməyin axırı yoxdur; 

– sivilizasyon (uyqar) Dünya heç kimə imkan verməyəcək ki, etnik, dini rəqibi yox etmək arzusunu gerçəkləşdirsin. 

– dünya qoymayacaq ki, etnik konfliktlərdə kimsə qalib çıxsın. Etnik və başqa azlıqlar müstəvisində olanlar yerlərində qalıb inkişaf etməlidirlər; 

– eyni zamanda bu azlıqlara imkan verilməyəcək ki, dövlətlərin sərhədlərini separatçılıq edib azaltsınlar;

– yaranan ziddiyyətlər mədəni münasibətlər koordinatlarında çözüləcək. 

Əgər Azərbaycan tərəfini götürsək, bu deyilən dünya sistemi zəifləsə, DQ erməniləri aşağıda verəcəyimiz avtonomiya modelindən istifadə edib DQ-ni ayırmaq istəsələr, o, güc vasitəsi ilə prosesin qarşısını almağa hazır olmalıdır. Bu o deməkdir ki, aşağıda verəcəyimiz model tərəflərin bir-birinə şübhə ilə, Beynəlxalq qurumların ciddi “bahalı” nəzarət sistemi ilə nəzarətini istisna etmir. 

Biz aşağıda DQ anomal avtonomiyasının açar-prinsiplərini veririk, detallar, aspektlər ekspert işlərinin nəticəsində aydınlaşa bilər. Biz, sadəcə, konseptual cizgiləri aşağıdakı şərti bəndlərdə cızırıq:

1) Azərbaycan, Ermənistan və DQ-nin azərbaycanlı, DQ-nin erməni icmaları razı olurlar ki, DQ Azərbaycandaxili anomaliya olmalıdır – ona görə də problem anomaliya kimi çözülməlidir. 

Bu qəbul olunandan sonra DQ-nin anomallığığı, yəni Beynəlxalq prinsiplərin məntiqi əsasında çözülməməsi üçün pat vəziyyətlər yaradılır: irəlicədən bəzi siyasi-hüquqi gedişləri pat vəziyyətinə salan bağlaşma yapılır (bağlaşmada “pat vəziyyətinin” prosedurları qəbul olunur). DQ anomaliyası müqavilə nəticəsində aşağıda verilən vəziyyətlər tipindən, pat situasiyalarından əldə edilir:

2) DQ-ni Azərbaycan “DQR” adında tanıyır – sanki bu, “DQR”-in müstəqilliyinin tanınmasıdır, ancaq ““DQR””-in Azərbaycan referendumu olmadan adını dəyişdirməyə, Azərbaycan sərhədlərindən çıxmağa ixtiyarı olmur (ermənilər özlərinə, məsələn, “Arsaq” və ya başqa adı götürə bilmirlər, eləcə də Azərbaycanın ixtiyar verməmək hüququ “DQR” simvolunu tanımasının kompensasiyası olur. Mümkündür ki, Azərbaycan “DQR”i rəsmi sənədlərində həmişə dırnaqda yazsın).

3) “DQR”-in öz ordusu olur (adda), ancaq adı “ordu” olan bu qurum Azərbaycanın inspeksiyası altında olur və yalnız polis kimi yaraqlanır, ağır silahlı orduya çevrilmir (ordu simvolundan Beynəlxalq hüquq avtomatizmi ilə gerçək orduya keçmək olmur, vəziyyət “pat prinsipində” çıxmaza salınır). Bu orduda ermənilər və azərbaycanlılar DQ-dəki etnik tənasüblərinə uyğun olaraq təmsil olunurlar 

4) “DQR”-in özünün parlamenti olur, bu parlamentdə azərbaycanlı azlığın kvota ilə deputatları olur. Parlament Azərbaycan Milli Məclisinin qanunlarını modifikasiya edir, yalnız irəlicədən razılaşdırılmış məsələlərdə öz qanunlarını çıxara bilir.

5) “DQR”-in Azərbaycan Parlamentində kvota prinsipi ilə nümayəndələri olur, təkliflər verirlər, səsvermədə iştirak edirlər. 

6) 5 ildə bir dəfə Azərbaycan parlamenti “DQR”-i ləğv etmək haqqında məsələ qaldırır, yalnız bu məsələdə (bir neçə başqa simvolik məsələ də əlavə etmək olar) “DQR” nümayəndələrinin veto hüququ olur. Məsələ qalxanda “DQR”-in rəsmi sənədi əsasında onun nümayəndəliyi veto qoyur (“DQR”-in rəsmi sənədi ona görə prosedura daxil edilir ki, təsadüflərə və b. səbəblərə görə vetonun qoyulmamasının qarşısı alınsın – məsələn, erməni nümayəndələri korrupsiyaya uyub veto qoya bilməsinlər).

7) Hər beş ildən bir “DQR” parlamenti Azərbaycandan çıxmaq (öz pulunu yaratmaq və s.) haqqında qanun çıxarmaq istəyir və Azərbaycan azlığı Bakının verdiyi sənəd əsasında veto qoyur. 

8) Bu veto qoymaq tipli pat oyununu simvolik aksiya kimi bir çox ağrılı məsələlərdə bağlı işlətmək olar. Zaman keçdikcə anomaliyalar, pat gedişləri, çıxmaz vəziyyətlər öz yumorunu, yüngüllüyünü azaldır, qəribə, orijinal rituala çevrilir: belə rituallar İngiltərənin bəzi siyasi aksiyalarında qalıb. Biz bu rituallara da semiotik anomaliyalar deyərdik: onların işarə, bildirici (siqnifikasiya) cərgəsinin gerçəklikdəki təməlləri (vaxtı ilə bildirdikləri gerçəklik faktları) annihilizə olsa da, yoxluğa uğrasa və ya deskriditasiyaya düşsə də əvəzində psixoloji təsir, kulturoloji cazibə planında önəmləri artır. Avstraliyanın dövlət başçısı sayılan Yelizoveta II-nin kraliça personası belə semiotik anomaliyalardandır. 

(İrəlidə göstərdiyimiz “pat situasiyalarının” azərbaycanlı-erməni ziddiyyətlərinə gətirə biləcəyi terapevtik, psixoloji təsirləri ayrıca araşdırıb düşünmək olar).

9) Ermənistan Azərbaycana və ya başqa ölkəyə müharibə elan etsə, “DQR”-in ixtiyarı olmur ki, “respublika” hüquqi terminin avtomatizmi ilə Ermənistanla ittifaqa girə bilsin.

10) Azərbaycan Ermənistana və ya başqa ölkəyə  müharibə elan etsə, ixtiyarı olmur ki, “DQR”-i  öz tərkibi kimi müharibəyə cəlb etsin.

Beləliklə, hər tərəfin ambisiya və ləyaqət duyğusu simvolların dilində ödənilir. Pat prosedurları sayəsində ağrılı məsələlərlə, başqa tərəf üçün qorxulu istəklərlə bağlı hərəkət imitasiyası yaradılır, ancaq bu hərəkət heç vaxt irəliyə aparmır, yerində sayır.

Verilən anomaliya avtonomiyasının modelinin qarantı BMT və dəyişən vəziyyətdə onun varisi olmalıdır. Modeli içəridən dağıtmaq üçün sistemli iş aparan və ya modeldən üz çevirən tərəf müqaviləyə əsasən özünü BMT-yə qarşı müharibə vəziyyətinə salan tərəf sayılır və ona görə də ona qarşı adekvat ölçülər götürülür. 

Dediymiz kimi, biz anomal avtonomiyanın paradiqmasını, açar, giriş tipli modelini veririk. Bu modeldən qabaq Şuşa, Laçın, Kəlbəcər, Ağdərə üzrə razılaşmalar olmalıdır. Razılaşmalarda yenə anomaliya və pat prosedurlarından istifadə etmək olar. 

(Bəndlərdə verdiyimiz bütün misallar şərtidir və prinsipləri açmaq üçündür. Dörd tərəf anomal avtonomiya modelini pat prosedurlarının vasitəsi ilə hazırlamağa razı olsalar, prinsipləri saxlayıb bizim yuxarıdakı bəndlərdə yaratdığımız situasiyalara düzəlişlər və ya alternativlər verə bilər). 

 

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Arson Attack on Gay-Friendly Bar in Yerevan Raises Fears of Nationalist Extremism

Arson Attack on Gay-Friendly Bar in Yerevan Raises Fears of Nationalist Extremism

An arson attack on a bar popular with alternative types in Yerevan has rung alarm bells among civil society activists concerned that ultra-nationalism is on the rise © Onnik James Krikorian 2012

It used to be a bar with no prejudices. For local and foreigners, the young and elderly, heterosexuals and gay, D.I.Y. was one of the most relaxed drinking spots in Yerevan’s sparse bar scene. That, however, changed at around 5.30am on May 8, 2012 when a Molotov cocktail was thrown through its ground level glass door, causing an estimated $4,000 in damage, and endangering whole families living in the apartments situated above.

One of the few spaces where Women’s Rights, LGBT and other activists could gather, it was immediately suspected that Armenian nationalists were responsible. Speculation that members of a Neo-Nazi group, Dark Ravens Armenia, were irked by the bar’s gay friendly atmosphere and the fact that one of its co-owners, activist and punk rocker Tsomak Oganesova, participated in last year’s Gay Pride in Istanbul, Turkey, abounded.

Predictably, few Armenian news sites reported the news, but the news quickly spread on Facebook and Twitter or through alternative online resources such as CivilNet TV.

“Alleged arson attack towards my favorite #Yerevan bar DIY. Motives not clear yet, possibility of #hatecrime but not confirmed #Armenia,” tweeted prolific LGBT rights blogger Mika Artyan who was later proved to be right.

Reportedly, it took 12 hours before police arrived at the scene of the firebombing, by which time many of the D.I.Y. patrons were already organizing events to meet up and raise fund for the bar’s repairs. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) at least caught the attack on video and it wasn’t long before the culprits were arrested. What happened next, however, was unexpected and ultimately shocking for many civil society activists.

D.I.Y. a week before the firebombing © Onnik James Krikorian 2012

While some nationalist-leaning voices, in a likely attempt to misinform, spread rumors that the bombing was undertaken by D.I.Y. itself in order to “attract publicity,” two brothers, Iranian-Armenian Hampig and Mgrdich (Arame) Khapazyan, were named as suspects.

Despite the severity of the crime, however, the Khapazyan borothers were released from custody just days later. And, as word spread that the two men were related to a prominent Dashnak in Iran, Artsvik Minasyan and Hrayr Karapetyan, two members of parliament from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF-D), posted bail of one million Armenian Drams (less than $2,600) for one. The other was released on written guarantee that he would not leave the country.

Adding insult to injury, not only did Minasyan not deny their guilt, but the lawmaker also justified their actions, calling the two brothers “normal people” who had acted according to “societal & national ideology” against individuals such as Oganesova who “destroy society.” Artyan could only conclude that the ARF-D supported what he termed “terrorism” in Armenia and demanded an explanation from the party.

And with good reason. A second attack on what remained of D.I.Y. occurred on May 15, with the bar being daubed in Nazi Swastika symbols. “Hate crime, no public condemnation by authorities, more encouragement by an MP and now repetition of hate crime, do you see the cycle?” asked on Armenian Facebook user rhetorically. Others such as Yerevan-based Canadian-Armenian LGBT-activist Adrineh McCaan were more forthright.

“For the first time since moving to Armenia, I am afraid. Queer women are in the spotlight — an unfamiliar and not at all good place to be in,” she wrote on her blog, Le Retour in 3 Parts. “[…] now we’re in the spotlight and the wayward glances I get every day anyway have taken on a whole new meaning.”

Eventually, several editorials in Armenian-American newspapers affiliated with the ARF-D expressed concern. “[…] what is uncommon–and disturbingly so–is this act’s connection to the ARF, a social-democratic party that upholds human rights as a fundamental tenet of its platform and ideology. […] By associating themselves with this act, [ARF-D MPs] have condoned the prevailing homophobia that afflicts Armenia today,” read one.

In Armenia, however, even government officials fueled the fire of intolerance and hatred.

“As an Armenian citizen and member of a national-conservative party, I find the rebellion of the two young Armenian people against homosexuals, who have created a den of perversion in our country and have a goal of alienating society from its moral values, completely right and justified,” spokesperson of the ruling Republican Party and Vice-Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Eduard Sharmazanov said.

Another, Chief of Staff of the Public Council of Armenia, Hakob Barkhudaryan, even set up a Facebook page supporting the arsonists, reported Artyan on his blog, until it was eventually taken down for reasons unknown.

But, faced with the increasing backlash from some circles, including the party’s wing in the U.S., ARF-D Bureau Member and Chairperson of the party’s parliamentary bloc Vahan Hovannisyan sought to distance himself from the attack. “The ARF has no phobias,” he told reporters. “It is the ARF contention that curtailing the rights of civilized people or using force against them is unacceptable.”

The ARF-D’s Political Affairs Director Giro Manoyan also condemned the attack, as did party member and Vice-President of Socialist International, Maria Titizian. “The perpetrators of this crime must be punished within the letter and spirit of Armenian law,” she said in her statement that was also published on her Facebook page. “If today their target is the LGBT society, tomorrow it can be anyone else.”

Artyan, however, is not satisfied.

“I am glad to hear all these statements by ARF members and groups from the US,” he told Ararat Magazine. “They condemn hate crime and homophobia in Armenia using the strongest possible wording. However, one important issue remains untouched: Those ARF MPs who endorsed the attackers and encourage anti-gay violence in Armenia, particularly Artsvik Minasyan and Artur Aghabekyan.”

“Vahan Hovhannisyan spoke of ‘no phobia’ in the ARF, but like others failed to address the actions of members of the very parliamentary bloc he is chairing,” Artyan continued. “Unless ARF Dashnaktsutyun addresses the issue of their disgraced MPs, all these good statements will remain insufficient and will not rectify the damage done to the party’s reputation. The MPs should be openly reprimanded and resign.”

Until that happens, he argues, similar incidents will occur again — just as they did on May 21, for example, when Pink Armenia and the Women’s Resource Center marked the United Nation’s World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development with a rally in central Yerevan. Alleging that the march was a Gay Pride event, nationalists infiltrated and disrupted proceedings. They also later launched yet another assault on D.I.Y.

“I am disgusted by the vulgar, aggressive and dangerous display of hatred […] yesterday, where a motley group of fascist youth, ultra-nationalists and […] the disturbing ‘Armenian Aryan’ group ranted and raved about ‘defending’ their version of ‘national values.’ Is this the kind of country that Armenia is becoming?” wrote American-Armenian Director of the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Center, Richard Giragosian, in response on Facebook.

Early data from a 2011 survey by the Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) supports such concerns, with 76 percent of respondents saying they could not justify homosexuality, roughly in line with the 72 percent in a Pink Armenia poll who believed the government should “fight against homosexuals.” That, say activists and the few politicians who did support D.I.Y. and the country’s marginalized LGBT community, is worrying.

“There is no national interest, no integrity of the country, if an Armenian is not free in his or her homeland,” Heritage Party leader Raffi Hovannisian told reporters after attending a post-blast benefit concert at D.I.Y. on May 18. For now though, all eyes will be on the trial of the arsonists. If convicted, reports EurasiaNet, the two men face a fine of just 50,000-100,000 drams ($125 – $253) plus damages, or a prison term of two months to two years.