Russian Military Roadblock on the road to Gori, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2008 

With reports that much of Russia’s military presence in Georgia has been withdrawn, reflection on a serious conflict that threatened to ignite the entire South Caucasus is becoming more and more the order of the day. Without a doubt, fallout from the conflict — especially as allegations of abusing a truce agreement continue to be levelled at Russia — will resonate for some time to come. The BBC reports, for example, that while Russian combat troops have pulled out of Georgia proper, other troops under the premise of peacekeeping will remain which potentially allows Moscow to maintain the effective division of the country between east and west thanks to control of parts of the highway around Gori.

Ostensibly a “buffer zone,” questions are now being asked as to what is the real reason for their presence, especially as Russia also intends to remain in the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti.

France brokered the ceasefire to end fighting over Georgia’s pro-Russian breakaway province of South Ossetia.

 

Its terms are vague about the extent of any buffer zones, analysts say.

 

A White House spokesman, Gordon Johndroe, said the checkpoints and buffer zones set up by Russia were not part of the ceasefire agreement.

 

A spokesman for the French foreign ministry, Eric Chevalier, said a United Nations Security Council resolution was needed to clarify exactly what the ceasefire agreement covers.

 

The Russian military say they intend to maintain a peacekeeping presence in Georgia, controlling buffer zones around both South Ossetia and the other breakaway province, Abkhazia.

 

The zones include sections of the main highway from the capital Tbilisi to the Black Sea as well as Georgia’s main airbase at Senaki.

 

[…]

 

BBC diplomatic correspondent Jonathan Marcus says Western diplomats fear that Moscow is determined to define the parameters of the interim security arrangements on its own terms.

 

Part of the problem, he adds, is the extraordinary vagueness of the EU-brokered ceasefire deal, which speaks only of “additional security measures” in “the immediate proximity of South Ossetia” – proximity being defined as a distance of “several kilometres”.

Russian checkpoint on the outskirts of Gori, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2008 

Some international commentators and many Georgians believe that Russia’s continued presence on Georgian soil is one main goal other than the control of a former Soviet Republic that dared to turn its back on its former rulers in Moscow. The goal, they say, is to seek regime change and the removal of the Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, from office. But, if that is the case, the plan seems to have backfired. For now, at least, Saakashvili is riding high on a wave of anti-Russian and nationalist sentiment in Georgian society.

As one journalist friend based in Tbilisi said to me:

Population critical of the stupidity that caused this mess, but, when it comes to a choice between Russians and Misha, everyone will take Misha. As one journalist said, “I don’t like Misha, but no way Russia is going to dictate who my president is.”

In a few months time, when the smoke clears, however, it’s anybody’s guess. Known as an impulsive hothead, some real and very difficult questions are bound to be asked as to why the Georgian government responded to months of alleged Russian provocation by shelling South Ossetia and what it claims are still Georgian citizens living in the breakaway region’s capital of Tskhinvali. Russian forces were known to be stationed on the other side of the Roki tunnel leading into South Ossetia, so what on earth was going through Saakashvili’s mind?

Indeed, nearly four years ago to the day, The New York Times quoted Saakashvili as saying he would not seek to provoke military confrontation over his country’s breakaway regions. Saakashvili’s words seem incredibly ironic given the situation Georgia finds itself in today.

Aware of the high tensions, he has repeatedly said that he will not push his country to war and that he intends to move in stages. But he has also said Georgia’s military units, even if they become engaged in combat, can show restraint — a sign that he accepts that a certain amount of violence is probable.

 

”It’s not like they will shoot at us, we will shoot back and the war will start,” he said. ”We know how to control ourselves.”

Mikhail Saakashvili, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2008

Fast forward to today and not only did Saakashvili  take on a larger and more formidable military force backed up by militia on the ground and air support, but rather than regain lost territory, Georgia now looks as though it has lost area it controlled in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Few analysts believe Georgia will ever regain control of either breakaway region.

This is especially bad for hundreds of thousands of IDPs that fled fighting in Abkhazia where a campaign of ethnic cleansing was conducted by separatists with Russian backing against the largest ethnic group there — Georgians. Although there was always the hope that they could one day return to their former homes, as Tom de Waal writes for the BBC, if South Ossetians, Abkhaz and Georgians could get along in the past, there seems no hope of that being the case in the forseeable future.

When Russian troops eventually pull out of Georgian towns such as Gori and Zugdidi, ordinary Georgians will heave a sigh of relief.

 

But that will also be the moment that they take on board the fact that the two territories at the heart of the conflict with Moscow, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, although formally still regarded internationally as Georgian territory, are now essentially lost to them.

 

[…]

 

Relatively few Georgians left during or after the small-scale 1990-92 conflict over South Ossetia and despite intermittent skirmishes and incidents, neighbourly contacts continued.

 

[…]

 

The Russian authorities and their South Ossetian allies are now saying that they will not allow the Georgians back any time soon.

 

A Russian foreign ministry statement on August 18 said, “It is clear that some time – and not a short period of time – must pass in order to heal the wounds and to restore confidence. Only after this, the conditions will be created for discussing practical aspects related to the problems of refugees.”

 

Caught in the middle of these international wrangles are the current and former populations of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Abkhaz, Ossetians and other nationalities such as Armenians on the one hand, and the displaced Georgians on the other.

 

They often get along fine when they have a chance to engage in low-level meetings arranged by foreign organisations or across market stalls.

 

Now, unfortunately, they are being wrenched apart further than ever by conflict.

Yet, despite some minor signs of dissent in the Georgian capital, Saakashvili appears to have emerged from the short but devastating conflict unscathed. Anti-Russian posters depicting the former and current presidents, Vladimir Putin and Dimitri Medvedev, as well as Hitler and Mussolini, are everywhere to be seen in Tbilisi, and anti-Russian grafitti is on display opposite the Russian Embassy itself. Georgian TV is full of war films and even broadcasts music sung by singers dressed in military fatigue, presumably to keep the people’s spirits up.

One thing is certain, though. After the experience of Georgia and its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia, it is now time for the international community to finally resolve the issue of the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus before violence erupts once again. The only problem is that in order to do so, historical ethnic rivalries need to put aside. Peace through compromise is the only solution, but few seem willing or able to walk down that road.

Opposite the former Russian Embassy, Tbilisi, Georgia © Onnik James Krikorian 2008

Most Georgians also recognize that this is not the same country that existed before Saakashvili came to power. Although some rumours did circulate of Georgians exploiting the situation in Borjomi for their own benefit, the country did remain intact and did not descend into violence outside the conflict zone. The national and local government structures continued to function efficiently and there was no increased police presence on the streets of Tbilisi let alone military forces.

But whether support for Saakashvili continues, especially after the effective loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the partial occupation of its territory by a foreign power remains to be seen and ultimately depends on who bears full responsibility for the conflict.

Both sides blame each other for starting the violence and, as the recriminations get louder, the truth about what really happened seems in danger of being drowned out.

 

[…]

 

But human rights groups and conflict resolution specialists argue that a full investigation into the circumstances and events of the fighting in South Ossetia are an urgent priority.

 

In a region where ancient feuds shape current events, half-truths from one conflict all too quickly become the myths that fuel the next cycle of violence.

 

[…]

 

The immediate causes of the fighting centre on the events of 7 August. After days of heavy exchanges of fire with South Ossetian separatist fighters, and several fruitless attempts to arrange peace talks, the Georgian side had called a unilateral ceasefire.

 

[…]

 

But five and a half hours later, Georgia’s patience snapped.

 

The defence ministry in Tbilisi announced that it had sent troops into South Ossetia “to restore constitutional order in the entire region”.

 

[…]

 

Fierce fighting erupted around the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, and Georgian war planes were reported to be in action bombing the town and surrounding areas.

 

The Georgians said they had been forced to retaliate after coming under continuing and sustained attack from the South Ossetian side.

 

Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze, speaking on the morning of 8 August, said there had also been reports of an incursion of “so-called volunteer fighters” from North Ossetia coming through the Roki tunnel, which links South Ossetia to Russia.

[…]

 

So far there have been no independent reports about this alleged incursion, although there were reports of Russian military exercises in the area around the Roki tunnel in the days leading up to the fighting. It is just one of many questions about this war which have yet to be answered.

For now, few Georgians are ready to seek such answers. Even Saakashvili’s predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, has been relatively silent on the matter even though he has many reasons to attack the current president who ousted him from power in the November 2003 Rose Revolution. “Now is not the time,” Shevardnadze is quoted by Reuters as saying when asked if Saakashvili should be criticized for what many in the West privately or publicly view as a reckless response to years of Russian provocation and meddling in Georgia.

And Jibs at Steady State, a blog that has been exceedingly critical of Saakashvili and the Georgian government, agrees, saying that while such questions and criticisms need to be raised, this is not the time. He also says that even if Saakashvili did over-react, the Russians have been trying to provoke Georgia into a military confrontation for years.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia has finally brought out to light processes that have been taking place for 2 decades now. 17 years ago, when Georgia was at war with the same Abkhazian and South Ossetian regions, Russia secretly supported the breakaway leadership with military, economic and human resources.

 

[…]

 

Over the last decade, Russia has been meddling in Georgia’s affairs in all possible ways — by supporting the separatist claims, by intruding into internationally defined borders, dropping bombs, etc. all while saying there was no evidence to prove this.

 

[…]

 

There is also an element of Georgian leadership’s arrogance: while Russian funds pop up during major privatization deals in Georgia, Georgia’s president Mikhail Saakashvili is using every opportunity to call Russia names… He has come to represent everything they don’t like about Georgians […].

 

[…]

 

Anyone sympathetic to Russian invasion of Georgia will say — but what about the fact that Georgia launched an all out attack against the small South Ossetians?

 

What the Georgian leadership has done, is clearly wrong. They have played into a trap — which caused a great pain and suffering to many Georgians. Tens of thousands of people have fled their homes from the advancing Russian forces accompanied by their South Ossetian proxies.

 

Time is not right at the moment to analyze why the Georgian leadership took steps that backfired to overblown proportions. They will have to face very tough questions — which, unlike their usual BS when opposed, they will have to answer. […] In short, there are shortcomings and even blunders that Georgians have been pursuing for a few years now.

However, at the moment the most important to have Russians withdraw from the territory and have immediate humanitarian assistance brought to those who need it. Questions afterwards…

Of course, questions also need to be asked about the state of democracy in Russia. Although few doubted it, military action over South Ossetia clearly identifies the fact that it is Vladimir Putin who is in control and not his recent successor as president, Dimitri Medvedev, as The New York Times explains.

If there were any doubts, the last week has confirmed that Mr. Putin, who became prime minister this spring after eight years as president, is running Russia, not his successor, President Dmitri A. Medvedev. And Mr. Putin is at last able to find relief from the insults that Russia endured after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

 

[…]

 

In recent days, Mr. Putin has appeared on television with his sleeves rolled up, mingling with refugees on the border with South Ossetia — the very picture of a man of action.

 

By contrast, Mr. Medvedev is shown sitting at his desk in Moscow, giving ceremonial orders to the minister of defense.

 

“He is playing the game which is designed by Putin,” Mr. Rahr, who serves on the German Council on Foreign Relations, said of the new president.

 

Yulia L. Latynina, a frequent critic of Mr. Putin’s government, noted with amusement that on the eve of the conflict in Georgia, when President Bush and Mr. Putin were deep in conversation in Beijing at the start of the Olympics, Mr. Medvedev was taking a cruise on the Volga River.

 

“Now he can cruise the Volga for all the remaining years, or can go right to the Bahamas,” she wrote in Daily Magazine, a Russian Web site. “I must admit that for the first time in my life I felt admiration for the skill with which Vladimir Putin maintains his power.”

Meanwhile, others such as the International Crisis Group, have already been asking questions and come up with a list of recommendations for Georgia, Russia and the international community to consider in order to stabilize the post-conflict situation. Russia is also seen as much to blame as Georgia, the U.S., U.N. and Europe. It would appear that everybody is at fault to some extent.

[…] Russia’s disproportionate counter-attack, with movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy and disruption of communications and movement between different regions of the country, constitutes a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations. It has undermined regional stability and security; threatened energy corridors that are vital for Europe; made claims with respect to ethnic Russians and other minorities that could be used to destabilise other parts of the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine a potential target; and shown disregard for international law.

 

Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from the independence of Kosovo to the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the personality and world view of Russia’s predominant leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

 

[…]

 

The crisis also reflects serious mistakes by the U.S. and the European Union (EU) in Georgia since 2004, most significantly failing to adequately press President Saakashvili to abandon a quick-fix approach toward restoring Georgian control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian army was trained and sold weapons without ensuring that these would not be used to recover the conflict territories, and Russia’s anger over these actions and other perceived post-Cold War slights was misread. Instead of concentrating on democratic institutions and rule of law, the U.S. too often focused its support on Saakashvili personally, even as he engaged in reckless and authoritarian behaviour. As the long-frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to heat up, Georgia’s partners did too little to encourage it to engage more substantially in confidence building and dialogue with the de facto authorities and Russia.

  

At the broader level, the crisis raises significant questions about the capacity of the EU, the UN and NATO to address fundamental issues. While European leaders stepped forward to achieve the ceasefire agreement, their inability to put forward a forceful response to the Russian action reflects a lowest common denominator approach that discourages stronger and more innovative policies. Similarly, the UN Security Council, divided by whether to include references to Georgia’s territorial integrity in either a resolution or statement, has issued nothing on the conflict since it began to boil over on 7 August. In an unhappy reminder of the Cold War years, the conflict has called into question the Council’s capacity to address any issue over which P-5 members have significantly different interests. And in the process of seeking justification for its actions, Russia has also misstated and distorted the UN-approved principle of “responsibility to protect”.

Yet, while some questions are starting to be asked, the main focus of attention is slowly starting to shift towards the economic and humanitarian cost of the conflict. Amnesty International has researchers on the ground who sum up the tragedy of war.

“About 100,000 displaced people are living in and around the capital Tbilisi. We have witnessed the difficult conditions they have to live in; most IDPs are housed in schools and kindergartens where they do not have proper beds or clothes or other necessities; though most centres have access to essential medication and sufficient food. Some IDPs are housed in run-down buildings – the worst conditions are in a former Soviet military people where 1,600 people are living in very bad conditions without running water and electricity. Others are being housed in camps near Tbilisi. We have seen also the assistance IDPs are receiving from the local community, the Georgian authorities and international agencies. People are bringing clothes and food, international and Georgian agencies are distributing food and medicine on a regular basis and are taking measures to improve the living conditions.

 

“The real problem has been with people who have been left behind in the areas where the hostilies took place. These people are at risk as humanitarian aid does not always manage to get through to them, though the looting and attacks on villages have decreased in the last few days and humanitarian aid is beginning to get through.”

 

[…]

 

“Throughout the mission we have heard stories of human suffering. We have also heard some remarkable stories of human strength and perseverance and small acts of kindness or sacrifice.

 

“An elderly Russian woman told us how she had to flee her Georgian village after watching her house being torched by paramilitaries. Together with her paralyzed husband and three other elderly women, one of whom was 94, she travelled 40km on foot for four days over high mountains, she saw dead bodies of civilians being devoured by dogs and pigs, burnt villages and booby-trapped houses. She also saw Russian armed convoys and was fed by Russian soldiers. Towards the end, the woman and her co-travellers were picked up by a car carrying a priest and taken to Tbilisi.

More to come…