The Challenges and Contradictions of Displacement in Armenia

The Challenges and Contradictions of Displacement in Armenia

Karabakh refugee sitting on her bed in a cohabited room in a dilapidated kindergarten building in Massis, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

Almost six months after the mass exodus of the Karabakh Armenians, their plight in Armenia remains as uncertain as ever. On Wednesday, some will even protest in Yerevan’s Freedom Square.  There had been no major humanitarian crisis, despite claims of mass starvation as they crossed into Armenia via the Lachin checkpoint in late September,  but the situation for many remains one of desperation or despair.  A recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) highlighted that clearly earlier this month.  

Malnourishment, insufficient medical assistance, and psychological trauma especially affected the most disadvantaged, previously inside Karabakh and now in Armenia. With limited financial support from the Armenian government, and trying to fit into an economy riding high mainly because of the re-export of EU goods to Russia, it was also hardly unexpected. Some of those problems were also borne out by my own visit last month to some of those refugees scattered across the country.

 

For a while, it was even uncertain how best to refer to the influx given that they simultaneously hold Armenian passports and are effectively considered as refugees inside Armenia itself. Some international non-governmental organisations internally used the term ‘displaced,’ while others such as the UN had their own – “persons in a refugee-like situation.” Now almost everyone calls them refugees.

 

Such ambiguities are not new and reminiscent of the situation I first encountered while documenting the plight of refugees in 1994 and then later from 2002 when terminology was dictated by the government. Those ethnic Armenians that fled Azerbaijan after the pogroms in Baku and Sumgait were “refugees,” but those from Karabakh were “displaced.”

 

[…] 

 

Today, while Yerevan makes it possible for those from Karabakh to register for year-long temporary refugee status, it is nonetheless otherwise largely silent on their right to return even though the international community mentions it often. The government also makes certain assistance subject to applying for citizenship, such as loans to buy homes, something that Karabakh Armenians allege is by design.

 

Accepting that, some fear, could nullify any right to return, permanently or temporarily, or even disqualify them from claiming potential compensation in the future. Such fears are understandable since few of the displaced see a stable future in Armenia, though Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan rejects such accusations against his administration.

 The full opinion piece can be read here.

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Armenia and Azerbaijan Ponder Return of Non-Enclave Gazakh Villages

Armenia and Azerbaijan Ponder Return of Non-Enclave Gazakh Villages

It was almost comical at first but also unexpectedly symbolic. Known for his trademark populism and oratory skills honed to resonate with the masses, it was perhaps the most effective way for Armenia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, to illustrate to the population the actual borders of their country. Holding a golden cutout map of Armenia to one side and, at times, a minuscule representation of the tiny Armenian enclave of Artsvashen in Azerbaijan to the other, his live press conference on 12 March was direct and to the point.

For decades, many Armenians have viewed the country as encompassing not only the now-defunct Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan proper. In early 2020, Pashinyan even included the same irredentist map of a territorial area that had been taken back or returned during and immediately after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan later that same year. In September, the previously de facto but unrecognized Karabakh political entity dissolved itself following a military operation to disarm the local militia.  

 

For decades, many Armenians have viewed the country as encompassing not only the now-defunct Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan proper. In early 2020, Pashinyan even included the same irredentist map of a territorial area that had been taken back or returned during and immediately after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan later that same year. In September, the previously de facto but unrecognized Karabakh political entity dissolved itself following a military operation to disarm the local militia.

 

The situation has dramatically changed since and the press conference hinted at what might happen next in the complicated process of demarcating and delimiting the shared border. The press conference came just two days after Baku demanded the immediate return of four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages situated in its Gazakh region bordering Armenia that were occupied in the early 1990s. Previously, the focus had been on enclaves—territorial areas of both republics physically situated within and surrounded by the other.

 

On the other hand, non-enclave villages are simply those part of a country occupied by another. In his press conference, Pashinyan finally acknowledged that they are not part of the Republic of Armenia and cast some clarity on the issue.

 

[…] 

 

“In the near future, we must take action, and where, for example, our communications are beyond our borders, we must reconstruct our communications in those areas so that all communications of Armenia pass through the de jure territory of Armenia,” he noted. According to some unconfirmed reports, that process has already started, and Pashinyan has also said he will visit the area in question to address any concerns of the local community.

 The full Caspian Post article can be read here

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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European Mission in Armenia Completes Its First Year Amid Regional Tensions

European Mission in Armenia Completes Its First Year Amid Regional Tensions

On February 20, the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) marked the first anniversary of its deployment on the Armenian border with Azerbaijan. According to the European Union, its purpose is to aid in the normalization process between Yerevan and Baku and enhance stability in the South Caucasus. Last year, the EUMA was deployed following the end of a shorter-term European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP), which was deployed in October 2022. While Armenia supports the EUMA’s charge, Baku is wary of Brussels’ mediation in the ongoing peace negotiations between both countries. 

Yerevan requested EUMCAP to stabilize the situation on the border that escalated to armed clashes in September 2022. EUMCAP recruited 40 staff members from the 200-strong civilian and unarmed European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) to support the temporary two-month mission in Armenia. The operation was also funded from the EUMM budget. According to Brussels, the mission was additionally intended to support the border demarcation process and delimitation on both sides. It consisted of 40 unarmed civilian monitors, following an agreement reached at a quadrilateral meeting of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Council President Charles Michel at the first-ever European Political Community Summit held in Prague held earlier that same month.

 

The EUMA faces several challenges and controversies, further exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Azerbaijan and others, including Russia and Iran, assert that the European Union is seeking to embed itself further in an already volatile region. Baku argues that Yerevan can use the EUMA to delay the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement. From the outset, Russia saw the deployment as an effort by the European Union to challenge Moscow’s 30-year presence in the country, especially after Yerevan rejected a similar initiative by the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. “We see this as yet another attempt by the European Union to interfere by any means in the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan [and] to oust our country’s mediation efforts,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova.

 

The EUMCAP initiative ended on December 19, 2022. The plans were already in motion to replace EUMCAP with the larger and longer-term EUMA. On January 23, 2023, the EU Foreign Affairs Council scheduled the mission’s official deployment on February 20. According to many observers, France pushed strongly for the EUMA’s establishment, a country fast becoming Armenia’s main ally in the region. “Through border monitoring, this mission has really limited the danger of escalation,” French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna told the French Parliament on December 6, 2022. “This presence should continue as long as it is needed. This is our belief. This is also … the desire of the Armenians”.

 

[…]

 

In the future, if the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process stalls and/or if EUMA is extended in February 2025, it will be crucial to prevent local political interests and regional geopolitical tensions from undermining the original goal of the deployment: fostering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such efforts must also aim to avoid escalating the conflict.

The full analysis is available here

 

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Clarity, Consistent Rhetoric, and Multitrack Diplomacy Still Lacking in Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalisation Talks

Clarity, Consistent Rhetoric, and Multitrack Diplomacy Still Lacking in Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalisation Talks

It was touch and go for a while. Even a day before this year’s prestigious Munich Security Conference it was unclear whether both Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev would attend. In the past, Armenian leaders have more often shunned the event and even despite December’s much-lauded bilateral COP-29 joint statement made bilaterally by Baku and Yerevan, the war of words between the sides unfortunately continues.

Indeed, it has only been since 2020 that Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have attended the prestigious conference at the same time. Controversy has always followed. Not to be outdone, perhaps, Georgia even got in on the act this year too when Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili attended without clearing it first with the government in Tbilisi. Newly appointed Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze anyway stayed away, favouring Brussels for his first official foreign trip.

 

Perhaps the publication of this year’s Munich Security Report which also criticised Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili just days before the conference was another possible reason for the no-show.

 

Cetin discussed the issue with then President Suleyman Demirel who instructed him to talk to his counterpart, Abulfaz Elchibey. “No-one should be deprived of God-given bread. It’s a humanitarian issue,” the then-Azerbaijani president responded even though the conflict with Armenia over Karabakh had already descended into a full-scale war. Grain shipments, as well as processed commodities from warehouses in Turkey transported by the United States, were dispatched.

 

But even that paled into insignificance compared to the shenanigans usually surrounding Armenia and Azerbaijan. In February 2020, for example, Aliyev and Pashinyan found themselves on the same stage in a well-intended effort by organisers to bring the sides together. Though the two did attempt to put a jovial face on proceedings, it nonetheless descended into petty bickering and a tiresome journey through a bitterly disputed history rather than look to the future.

 

[…] 

The full opinion piece can be read here. 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

European Union Mission in Armenia Marks First Anniversary

European Union Mission in Armenia Marks First Anniversary

European Union Mission in Armenia Head of Mission Markus Ritter speaking in Yerevan on 21 February to mark the deployment’s first anniversary © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

The European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) marked the first anniversary of its deployment on the country’s border with Azerbaijan last week. To celebrate the occasion, an event attended by Western Ambassadors, Armenian government officials including Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan, and some members of local civil society was held in a central Yerevan hotel. Thirty civilian unarmed mission monitors wearing blue mission vests were awarded Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Service medals by EUMA Head of Mission (HoM) Markus Ritter. The former German police chief reiterated the mission’s aim to contribute to the normalisation of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

Deployed on 20 February 2023, EUMA followed the much shorter term two-month European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) that temporarily monitored the Armenia-Azerbaijan border from October 2022. Initially numbering “up to 100” staff when EUMA was first announced, that number has since risen to 138 and will reach 209. At the anniversary event, Ritter said that 48 of its current staff are actual monitors operating from bases in Goris, Ijevan, Jermuk, Kapan, Martuni, and Yeghegnadzor, also the mission’s headquarters. To date EUMA has conducted over 1,720 patrols.

 

“Reinforcing the Mission and increasing the number of staff enables us to conduct more patrols, contributing to overall security and stability in the region”, said Ritter. “We are conducting daily patrols to observe and report the situation on the ground. On this special day, I want to acknowledge the valuable work of the Mission’s personnel and thank the 23 EU Member States who are contributing staff to the mission”.

 

[…]

 

Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s Representative for Special Assignments Elchin Amirbayov also blamed  EUMA for making such incidents more likely. Baku has long accused EUMA of engaging in what it terms “binocular diplomacy”, taking European diplomats to the still problematic border to look at “Azerbaijani positions through binoculars, taking photos and then distributing this on different social media and claiming that it is because only of [the EU] that Azerbaijan is not attacking Armenia”. Last week, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed a new war was ‘very likely’.

 

Despite the controversies, however, EUMA’s presence is considered a much-needed confidence-building measure in Armenia, especially for communities situated on its border with Azerbaijan. “I am sure that the EU monitoring mission is bringing an important contribution to Armenia and the region, which symbolises the EU’s involvement for peace and stability”, CSDP commander Tomat said at the anniversary event. “I’m fully aware of the limits of what we can accomplish in such a delicate and complex environment”, noted Ritter.

The full article is here

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian