Roadblock to peace: the geopolitical quagmire of the “Zangezur Corridor”

Roadblock to peace: the geopolitical quagmire of the “Zangezur Corridor”

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire agreement that put fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the Soviet-era mainly ethnic Armenian Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) on hold – or at least until it escalated into war in 2016 and more devastatingly in 2020. Despite the involvement of international mediators, peace remained elusive despite occasional claims to the contrary. The sides were said to have gotten close, but never enough to prevent tens of thousands dying in over three decades of conflict.

The terms of the 1994 ceasefire agreement, after all, were never implemented and despite hopes that the trilateral ceasefire statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia in 2020 could have been different, the time since has proven that it mostly wasn’t. The situation on the ground is now diametrically reversed, of course, and especially since last year’s exodus of Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population, but one thing has remained constant – the need to unblock regional economic and transport routes and particularly between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave­.

  

In October 1993, Chairman of the the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)’s Minsk Conference, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Mario Raffaelli, had proposed the restoration of the gas pipeline, the Ijevan-Gazakh railway, and then all other forms of communication. But as is the case now, stumbling blocks emerged. In particular, while Baku wanted restoration of the connection through Armenia to Nakhchivan­, Yerevan did not. By 1997, however, it was included as the “Baku­-Horadiz–Meghri–Ordubad–Nakhichevan­-Yerevan route” in the OSCE-proposed “package deal” and later as “direct and immediate land access for Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan” in the OSCE Minsk Group Madrid Principles.

 

Most recently, in the 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement, it was referred to as “unhindered […] transport communication [between the] western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic” as part of unblocking all “economic and transport links in the region […].” 

 

[…]

 

But more than three years since the November trilateral ceasefire statement, it is high time that these issues are finally resolved, something the European Union and the United States hope for. Yes, this should be with the concerns and interests of the main stakeholders in mind, but also without the geopolitics that could see the unblocking of regional communications again remain on paper.

The full opinion piece can be read online here.

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Baku, Yerevan, and Moscow Clash Over Regional Transit

Baku, Yerevan, and Moscow Clash Over Regional Transit

In my first piece for The Jamestown Foundation, I again look at the continuing geopolitical impasse on attempts to restore economic and  transport links in the region following the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war as per the trilateral ceasefire statement that ended it.  This is a topic that I’ve covered consistently since the beginning of 2021 but it has particularly come to a head now as hopes for a framework agreement between Baku and Yerevan persist. 

On January 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed frustration about the endless delays in peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia during his annual press conference in Moscow (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 18). Despite hopes that an agreement to normalize relations could be within reach, progress remains stunted by several outstanding issues increasingly entangled in competing geopolitical interests (see EDM, December 18, 2022). This is most evident in the failure to unblock regional economic and transit ties following the Second Karabakh War in 2020. Harsh rhetoric from both Yerevan and Baku shows no sign of abating and threatens to derail the peace process (see EDM, January 24).

 

Key differences remain between Azerbaijan and Armenia on implementing the trilateral agreement ending the Second Karabakh War. According to the ninth point of the November 2020 ceasefire statement signed by Yerevan, Baku, and Moscow, “all economic and transport connections in the region” should be unblocked, including those between the “western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic” (Kremlin.ru, November 10, 2020). The agreement also states that the transit of people, vehicles, and cargo should be “unhindered,” while Russian border guards would be “responsible for overseeing the transport connections.” As Yerevan increasingly turns its gaze toward the West and the European Union and the United States seek to diminish Russia’s role in the South Caucasus, Armenia continues to show reluctance in fulfilling its commitments. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is growing increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress since 2020, specifically concerning the restoration of its Soviet-era connection via Armenian territory to the Nakhchivan exclave.

 

This is a far cry from more recent trilateral statements signed by the three countries in 2021. Those agreements initially reaffirmed a commitment to unblocking transit corridors, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan openly declaring that there was a “common understanding of how the routes will operate” (Kremlin.ru, November 26, 2021). Not one route, however, has been restored, and no reinstitution of the Soviet-era Nakhchivan line running through Armenia’s Syunik region (also known as Zangezur) has taken place.

 

[…]

 

Concrete details on unblocking regional transit routes could be omitted from any framework agreement to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The danger here, however, is that further delays could lead to future conflict if transportation issues are left unresolved. Azerbaijan hopes to complete its section of the Zangezur Corridor by the end of 2024. Baku has warned that, until the direct link to Nakhchivan is established, it will not unblock any other passages between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Trend, January 10).

The full analysis is available here

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Beyond Borders: Parajanov Centennial Marked in Yerevan and Tbilisi

Beyond Borders: Parajanov Centennial Marked in Yerevan and Tbilisi

Sergey Paradjanov in Tbilisi © Yuri Mechitov

Last week marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of renowned Soviet-era film director Sergey Parajanov. Born on 9 January 1924 in Tbilisi, Georgia, to ethnic Armenian parents, Parajanov’s character was rooted in the city of his birth, while his own influence and legacy has reached far and wide. “I was born in Georgia, worked in Ukraine, and I am going to die in Armenia,” Parajanov said in a 1988 interview.

Parajanov passed away from cancer in Yerevan on 20 July 1990. Best known for 1969’s The Colour of Pomegranates, which is based on the life of 18th-century ethnic Armenian bard and poet Sayat Nova, his legacy continues even today. Even though he never got to live in it, his house museum opened a year later with his childhood belongings and home furnishings transferred to Armenia from Georgia.

 

“In the temple of cinema, there are images, light, and reality,” French Director Jean-Goddard said of The Colour of Pomegranates. “Parajanov was the master of that temple.” Madonna and Lady Gaga also released music videos based on Parajanov’s work in 1985 and 2015, respectively. Forever crossing borders, his last film was 1988’s Ashik Kerib, shot in Baku. 

  

[…]

 

“The legacy of Parajanov is very important for Armenia, Georgia, and also for all humanity,” Armenian Ambassador to Georgia Ashot Smbatyan told me. “Parajanov is a very special bond between Armenia, Georgia, and humanity. We are talking about Parajanov retrospectively, but we must ask ourselves, who else could be so brave during those times to think so freely?”

The full article is here

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Tbilisi’s Armenian Community Celebrates Christmas 

Tbilisi’s Armenian Community Celebrates Christmas 

Ethnic Armenians celebrate Christmas on 6 January in Tbilisi, Georgia.

Almost two weeks after Christmas was celebrated elsewhere in the world, and a day before Georgia celebrated Orthodox Christmas, Tbilisi’s ethnic Armenian community celebrated its own on 6 January this year.   

According to the census in 2014, some 53,000 ethnic Armenians reside in the Georgian capital while some 168,000 ethnic Armenians make up Georgia’s second largest ethnic minority, not including those residing in the breakaway region of Abkhazia.  

  

[…]

 

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili congratulated those citizens of ethnic Armenian background as well as the citizens of Armenia, the country’s southern most neighbour, referring to both as the “brotherly Armenian people.” Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili also wished the Armenian Apostolic Church and its congregation “Peace, health, and welfare.” Other officials in Tbilisi did the same. 

The full photo story is here

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Conflict Voices – December 2010

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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Landmines and unexploded ordnance remain an obstacle for the future development of the South Caucasus

Landmines and unexploded ordnance remain an obstacle for the future development of the South Caucasus

In the South Caucasus landmines and civilians trying to make a living are often seen side by side @ Onnik James Krikorian 2006

As thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) return to their former places of residence in the seven regions surrounding what remains of Nagorno Karabakh, the problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) is as pressing as ever. Last month, Vugar Suleymanov, Chair of Azerbaijan’s National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), reported that 111,207 hectares of contaminated land had been cleared in past three years since the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement.

This included 30,753 anti-personnel mines, 18,531 anti-tank mines, and 60,268 items of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). There is still much to do and it will take decades, but this is also not a recent problem. It has lingered long and is not only confined to Azerbaijan, though the situation there is far worse than elsewhere in the region. Not only do mines remain from the conflict of the early 1990s, but their full number is unknown with some maps either inaccurate or even non-existent.

  

In 2006, as part of a decade-long coverage of the topic, and especially on the activities of the HALO Trust in Karabakh, I remember encountering a minefield close to Lachin. The road was laden with anti-tank mines. An estimated 900 PMN anti-personal mines were in an adjacent field. According to the HALO Trust, the mines had been there for over twelve years since Armenian forces scattered them indiscriminately, fearful of a possible counter-offensive by Azerbaijan.

 

So hastily were they strewn that some even stuck out of the grass, although the mines were also admittedly coloured green.  For years they remained there, forgotten by everyone. The anti-tank mines had not detonated because no heavy traffic passed by while ethnic Azerbaijanis had fled long ago and no Armenians had yet settled their land.

 

[…]

 

But landmines have also been politicised. There is no point going into the accusations against the HALO Trust, but they were often for partisan reasons from all sides. But it is notable that Azerbaijan managed to veto the extension of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) office in Yerevan in 2017 precisely because of support for landmine clearance initiatives. Following the closure of the OSCE office in Tbilisi in 2008 and in Azerbaijan in 2015, this left the organisation with no effective presence on the ground in the entire region.

The full opinion piece can be read online here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian