Pashinyan Press Conference Highlights Progress and Pitfalls in Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks

Pashinyan Press Conference Highlights Progress and Pitfalls in Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks

Toward the end of July, opposition media sent a written inquiry to the Office of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan asking whether Yerevan would send a delegation to the UN Climate Change Conference (COP-29) scheduled for November in Baku. The move came following an announcement from Azerbaijani presidential advisor Hikmet Hajiyev that such an invitation had been sent. There had also been speculation that Baku was seeking to initial the basic principles for any peace agreement by the time of the event. Pashinyan’s office replied, saying he would address these issues in a press conference after returning from a vacation in early August. Pashinyan has consistently used live press conferences to clarify and promote his policies, especially regarding normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the said press conference did occur, it did so only at the very end of August, during which Pashinyan did not rule out sending a high-level delegation to COP-29 . It took place one day after a regulatory document for the respective Armenian and Azerbaijani border commissions handling delimitation and demarcation was finalized and signed by both sides. The agreement is significant because it must also be approved by the constitutional court and ratified by parliament.

As domestic discontent grows in Armenia and geopolitical tensions between Armenia and Russia, Azerbaijan develop, however, how Pashinyan addresses the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan will determine his place in the future of Armenian politics.

 

The press conference also aimed to clarify Armenia’s stance on various issues related to an agreement on normalizing relations between the two countries before November. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has emphasized this deadline, while Pashinyan and senior officials, such as Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, have expressed hopes for an earlier resolution and a signed treaty. Although progress on border delimitation and demarcation has been notable, the press conference itself was more of a mixed bag. The event highlighted the  notable differences that remain between the sides and suggested that Pashinyan may be trying to balance multiple objectives simultaneously.   […]   On September 10, speaking at the first inaugural Yerevan Dialogue conference, Pashinyan reiterated that a peace treaty with Azerbaijan was realistic even though Baku has ruled out the signing of an incomplete agreement  with the constitutional impasse still unresolved. He also emphasized his own regional connectivity project, the Crossroads of Peace. Baku and Moscow consider this issue addressed in the trilateral ceasefire statement ending the Karabakh War in 2020. Pashinyan disagrees but has no intention of withdrawing his signature from the agreement. With Armenia due to enter another election cycle and a globally uncertain 2025, the next few months will be critical in shaping the future of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and Pashinyan’s political legacy.

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One Caucasus Festival in Georgia Bridges Regional Divides

One Caucasus Festival in Georgia Bridges Regional Divides

Armenian alternative rock band Altsight, One Caucasus, Tserakvi, Georgia ©
Onnik James Krikorian 2024

This month, against the backdrop of the Caucasus Mountains, a unique four-day festival in Georgia celebrated its tenth anniversary. Held annually in August, the multi-disciplinary One Caucasus festival aims to rediscover a spirit of unity and cooperation that once flourished among the diverse nations of the region. Located in the village of Tserakvi, a small Georgian village in the majority ethnic Azerbaijani region of Kvemo Kartli, which is also home to ethnic Armenian and Georgian minorities, this blend of cultures provides a rich context in which to foster mutual understanding and collaboration.

In the weeks leading up to the festival, volunteers transform the festival site on the grounds of the local school and organize cultural and educational workshops for children in nearby villages. Polish Director Witek Hebanowski, who has overseen the event since its inception, describes One Caucasus as a vibrant space where young people can connect, collaborate, and celebrate their shared heritage. Accompanying them on that journey are international volunteers from all seven continents.

 

By 2022, more than 420 volunteers from 40 countries have volunteered at One Caucasus, while 570 musicians from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as countries as diverse as Algeria and Barbados to Scotland and the US, have performed. In total, the organizers say, over 21,000 people have attended the event in the past decade. In addition to conducting workshops for over 1,600 children in the ethnic Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, and mixed communities in the Marneuli municipality of the Kvemo Kartli region, there have also been joint architectural and participatory budget projects.

 

[…]

 

On this, the tenth anniversary of the event, One Caucasus stands as a testament to the power of cultural exchange and the enduring hope for harmony in a region usually characterized by its complexities. In Tserakvi, where the echoes of history mingle with the rhythms of today, the festival remains a vibrant celebration of the region’s shared spirit and diverse heritage. “The Caucasus is known for mutual respect and diversity, says Hebanowski. “We wanted to do something that could unite the whole South Caucasus.”

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End of an Era: Russian Border Guards Depart Yerevan’s Airport

End of an Era: Russian Border Guards Depart Yerevan’s Airport

Russian border guards left Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport last week, concluding their nearly 32-year presence. The first point of contact for many citizens and tourists arriving by air in Armenia, their exact duties and numbers were never formally announced. The 1992 agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia instead only refers to the Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service (FSB) ensuring the protection of the border with Turkiye and Iran. The Armenian National Security Service (NSS) only briefly mentions that the Russian Border Guard Service was stationed at Zvartnots alongside its own Border Guard Troops.

In lieu of a formal agreement, the decision to deploy at the airport had been made verbally. This explains why the Armenian Prime Minister simply announced in February that he had asked Moscow to withdraw them. Though Moscow had warned that this would cause “irreparable damage” to relations between the two countries, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan later agreed in May that they would leave by August 1. Their last day of service on July 31 was cordial, marked by a protocol signed by Edgar Hunanyan, Commander of Armenia’s NSS Border Troops, and Roman Golubitsky, head of Russia’s FSB Border Directorate in Armenia. Hunanyan thanked his Russian counterpart for over three decades of joint service. Golubitsky in turn expressed hope that the country’s security “will be ensured at the same high level by our Armenian colleagues.”

 

Meanwhile, Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov further stated that Russian border guards would remain on the Iranian and Turkish borders as per the 1992 agreement. However, Pashinyan has requested the Russian Border Guard Service to leave the Azerbaijan border area. That had been solely, the responsibility of the Armenian Ministry of Defence until 2020 but Armenian guards had been temporarily and informally reinforced by Moscow after the 44-day war with Azerbaijan. The Russian stand-down has already happened in some locations and the NSS Border Guard Troops recently replaced the Armenian military on the border’s newly demarcated Tavush-Gazakh section of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

 

[…]

 

For now, however, many in Armenia have welcomed the move, which some hope is just the start. “The next step in the process should be the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Armenian-Iranian border,” political scientist Areg Kochinyan told media. Such hopes might be premature, however. Four days after ending their deployment at the airport, local media remained unsure whether they will instead serve elsewhere in the country. Moreover, given that their presence on the border with Iran is determined by the same formal agreement that includes the border with Turkiye, that might not prove as straightforward as simply asking them to leave Zvartnots.

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Clash Over Armenian Constitution Hinders Peace Process

Clash Over Armenian Constitution Hinders Peace Process

Since the exodus last fall of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the once disputed but
now dissolved territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, many have believed a resolution to the
three-decade-long conflict to be within reach. Up until Azerbaijan’s operation to disarm the remnants of the breakaway region’s military last September, it was internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but was governed and populated by ethnic Armenians.

However, in recent months, Baku has been insisting that Yerevan should amend its
constitution first. The problem, it says, is that the document makes reference to the 1990
Declaration of Independence which is, in turn, based on a 1989 statement making
territorial claims on Azerbaijan. This looks likely to have frustrated renewed efforts by the
United States to have the sides expedite the signing of an agreement as a matter of the
utmost urgency.

 

Hopes were certainly dashed at the European Political Community summit held earlier this
month in the United Kingdom. Until the day itself, it wasn’t even clear that the Armenian
and Azerbaijani leaders, Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev, would both attend. Though
Pashinyan’s participation had been expected, Aliyev’s was uncertain. At the previous
summit held in Spain last year, he pulled out at the last minute, questioning the value of
negotiating in forums held outside the region. But show up in the UK he did, albeit without
a prior announcement. Efforts to hold talks between the two men nonetheless failed, with
each blaming the other. The last time the two leaders met face-to-face for talks had been in
February on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.

 

Just a week earlier, at the NATO summit in Washington, D.C., there had also been a
similar sense of uncertainty, but this time involving the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign
ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov. Yerevan had again already confirmed
Mirzoyan's plans to attend, but Baku kept everyone guessing until the last minute. Only a morning push by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken brought them together for a
meeting, with his participation. Though nothing substantial came of it, the Armenian and
Azerbaijani foreign ministries did at least release identical but brief statements referring to
progress registered toward a “historic agreement.” In his own statement, Blinken again
said the sides were “very close” to reaching a deal.

 

[…]

 

At the time of writing, there has been no response from the Armenian Foreign Ministry.
Instead, media report that Pashinyan intends to hold a televised press conference when he
returns from vacation in August to address whether Armenia will attend COP 29 and
whether any document will be signed.

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Armenia Looks West to Reduce Nuclear Energy Dependency on Russia

Armenia Looks West to Reduce Nuclear Energy Dependency on Russia

At the beginning of July, Armenian National Security Secretary Armen Grigoryan announced that talks with the United States to replace Armenia’s aging Metsamor nuclear power plant were now at a “substantive phase.” The first of two reactors at the power plant started operating in 1976, and the plant has largely met Armenia’s energy needs since. Metsamor produces 30–40 percent of Armenia’s electricity, depending on fluctuations in demand. In 2004, however, the European Union froze 100 million euros ($109 million) of aid intended to develop alternative energy sources to the reactor after the Armenian government failed to meet a deadline imposed by a 1998 agreement to close the reactor within six years. The EU delegation head in Yerevan called Metsamor a “danger to the entire region” due to its location in a highly active seismic zone. At the time of construction, the reactor was expected to last until 2016, more than a decade longer than the 1998 EU agreement required . Metsamor’s closing date has been extended several times. Most recently, the local subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom nuclear energy giant signed a contract with Armenia in December 2023 to modernize and extend Metsamor’s lifespan until 2036. The plant will continue to operate until then, when a new nuclear power plant is expected to replace Metsamor. If Yerevan continues to work with Moscow in this fashion, Armenia’s turn to the West will continue to be stunted by its ties to Russia, especially in a sector as important as energy. At any rate, a new nuclear reactor is also vital for the country’s carbon-free future.

Another aspect of this issue is how Armenia is attempting to transition to renewable energy amid climate change concerns. During her visit to Armenia this month, US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power acknowledged that the Armenian government had committed to double renewable energy sources in 2023, but that nuclear energy would remain a core of this initiative. In 2022, Armenia produced nine gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity, mostly from thermal and nuclear sources, at 43.5 and 32 percent, respectively. Hydro, solar, and wind generation stood at just 21.8, 2.7, and 0.02 percent.

 

Efforts to increase Armenia’s solar power potential experienced a brief setback last month when UAE company Masdar suspended construction of a $174 million 200-megawatt plant scheduled to generate electricity by 2025. Without this project, as much as 70 percent of the country’s electricity is still dependent on Moscow. In addition to using Russian nuclear fuel flown in by air, the country imports 87.5 percent of its gas from Russia’s majority state-owned oil company, Gazprom.  The remainder comes from Iran as a part of a deal where Iran provides gas in exchange for electricity from Armenia, which has been extended to last until 2030. Additionally, Moscow has a monopoly on gas supply and distribution in Armenia until 2043, thanks to an agreement signed between Yerevan and Moscow in 2013.

 

In December 2023, Yerevan and Moscow were negotiating the construction of a replacement reactor even though US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a memorandum of understanding in May 2022 on assessing the use of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). SMRs are much smaller than conventional nuclear reactors and can be part of a hybrid energy system, complementing more variable renewable sources such as solar and wind. This is considered safer and better integrates nuclear power into clean energy transition plans. Choosing an American, French, or South Korean replacement for Metsamor would greatly assist Armenia in diversifying away from Russia.

 

[…]

 

To meet Metsamor’s 2036 deadline, some insist that the construction of a replacement reactor would need to start by the beginning of 2025, despite the government saying in 2021 that it was looking to begin construction in 2026–27 instead. That still leaves little time for Yerevan to make a final decision. With the fate of Armenia’s nuclear energy up in the air, Armenia has the opportunity to take a decisive path either closer to Russia or toward the West through the increasingly important geopolitics of energy.

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