U.S. Hosts Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers for Possible Roadmap to Peace Treaty

U.S. Hosts Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers for Possible Roadmap to Peace Treaty

by | May 10, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Balcani Caucaso, Nagorno Karabakh, United States

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov @ Official Photo .

As talks between Yerevan and Baku continue, with a spate of meetings between the leaders scheduled in the near future, following last week’s bilateral negotiations between the two foreign ministers in the United States, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa has published another of my updates on the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process.

On 1 May 2023, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov were hosted in the United States by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Though some had speculated that such a meeting was being planned, what appeared to be a general stagnation in the normalisation process between the two countries meant that few expected it.

 

Nonetheless, a day before the ministers and their delegations headed off to Washington D.C., the Azerbaijani Turan News Agency and Armenian Hraparak both published pieces saying that the meeting would take place. Turan also said its sources had informed them that the meeting could last ‘several days,’ an unprecedented development since the 2020 war.

 

An announcement posted on the website of the Armenian National Assembly confirmed that the same day – parliamentary vice-president Ruben Rubinyan would join Mirzoyan as part of the delegation in the U.S. from 29 April to 5 May. There was also speculation that a ‘roadmap’ towards the normalisation of relations could be signed, though none was announced or signed.

 

Speaking in Yerevan on 28 April, French foreign minister Catherine Colonna had also said that there was the possibility Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev could meet on the sidelines of the upcoming second European Political Community (EPC) event in Chisinau, Moldova, on 1 June. Colonna had already visited Baku the same week.

 

[…]

 

On 8 May, the Financial Times reported that sources told it that Aliyev and Pashinyan would meet once again for talks facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel this weekend. It also reported that the 1 June meeting on the sidelines of the EPC is still on the cards, adding that German chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Emmanuel Macron would join them.

The full article can be read here.

 

 

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Opinion: time has never been on the side of an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal

Opinion: time has never been on the side of an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal

by | Apr 27, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Commonspace, Nagorno Karabakh

© United World International 

Commonspace yesterday published another opinion piece of mine on the current peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“Time is not on the side of peace between [Armenia and Azerbaijan] and never has been,” writes Onnik James Krikorian for commonspace.eu. “The wounds of the past are still raw and will continue to fester unless there is concrete progress, whether through the efforts of the European Union, United States, or Russia.” He adds that “in such an environment, it is imperative for local and international actors to become proactive again, with absolutely no space for complacency or hope for a new but unsustainable status quo to emerge.”

 

Next month will mark the 29th anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that ostensibly brought an end to the first Karabakh war. Almost to the day, it will also be 2.5 years since the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement halted what most refer to as the second Karabakh war. Despite initial hopes, the current peace process appears to have stalled.

 

This current failure to end another sorry chapter in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not bode well for the future, to put it mildly.

 

Time is not on the side of peace between the two warring nations and never has been. The wounds of the past are still raw and will continue to fester unless there is concrete progress, whether through the efforts of the European Union, United States, or Russia. Furthermore, last year’s full scale invasion of Ukraine by Moscow further complicates the situation.

 

[…]

 

In such an environment, it is imperative for local and international actors to become proactive again, with absolutely no space for complacency or hope for a new but unsustainable status quo to emerge. Even if the international community once again shifts its focus from conflict resolution to conflict prevention as it did a decade ago, the 2020 Karabakh war demonstrated how ineffective that was as strategy.

The full opinion piece can be read here.

 

 

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Armenia-Azerbaijan, tensions rise as Baku establishes border control on Lachin Corridor

Armenia-Azerbaijan, tensions rise as Baku establishes border control on Lachin Corridor

by | Apr 27, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Balcani Caucaso, Nagorno Karabakh

© fifg/Shutterstock

A few days ago, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa published my latest on the recent tensions on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. However, some argue, they also represent the possibility that negotiations on Yerevan-Baku peace treaty might come to fruition. Most others disagree, of course, but the situation can perhaps be best described as unclear. 

Azerbaijan has announced the establishment of a border post on the Lachin corridor – a significant development in the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh war. The installation of the post on 23 April represents another assertion of sovereignty by Azerbaijan not only on the strategic land route from Armenia but also on the besieged breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh to which it connects..

 

The step also poses additional challenges and implications for Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population as mediation efforts appear to falter. This follows over 133 days of travel along the road being seriously restricted by what is claimed to be an environmental protest by Azerbaijani activists. Only the Russian peacekeeping contingent and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have used the route since.

.

 Baku charges that the highway, along with an alternative route only recently confirmed, was being used for “the rotation of personnel of Armenian armed forces that continue to be illegally stationed in the territory of Azerbaijan, the transfer of weapons and ammunition, entrance of terrorists, as well as illicit trafficking of natural resources.”  

 

Yerevan denies the claims.

 

The installation of an Azerbaijani post on the strategic highway, however, had long been anticipated and can also be linked to the lack of progress on unblocking regional transport and communication routes in the region, as per the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement. Both the Lachin Corridor and a land link between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan via Armenia were included, but disagreement over border and customs controls frustrated progress on the second.  

 

[…]

 

Some, however, believe that the checkpoint highlights the need for a resolution to the conflict. “The events […] on the Lachin corridor indicate that we are now moving on from the Ceasefire Agreement”, tweeted Tim Potier, a Tufts University International Law professor. “It is too early to be sure, but I believe that these events mean Armenia and Azerbaijan are closer to signing a peace treaty, not further away”.  

 

Yet, few others share that optimism and many warn that Karabakh is likely to experience further depopulation amid an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable future. There is nonetheless at least consensus among international actors that the conflict must be resolved, though how remains unclear.  

The full article can be read here.

 

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Armenia Seeks Security Outside Moscow’s Orbit

Armenia Seeks Security Outside Moscow’s Orbit

by | Apr 21, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Union, Nagorno Karabakh, Russia, Transitions Online

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian mission © EUMM

Ten days ago, Transitions magazine published my latest on the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA). Though the monitoring mission continues to be appreciated and welcomed in the country, there still remain overly high expectations of what is a small presence along a 1,000 kilometre border with no power or ability to deter any armed incidents or skirmishes.

Indeed, on the day of publication, four Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers were killed near the village of Tegh. There are also signs that Moscow is again pressing Yerevan to also accept a mission from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

“The appearance of the EU representatives in the border regions of Armenia […] can only bring geopolitical confrontation to the region and exacerbate existing contradictions,” the Russian Foreign Ministry warned sternly in a statement following the European Union’s decision in January to deploy a 100-strong mission to monitor Armenia’s volatile border with Azerbaijan.

 

Russia, which has supplied arms to both the Armenian and Azerbaijani armies, deployed a peacekeeping force after brokering a cease-fire to end hostilities in 2020 after Azerbaijan recaptured much of the territory taken by Armenian-backed forces in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in the early 1990s.

 

“The EU’s attempts to gain a foothold in Armenia at any cost and to squeeze Russia’s mediation efforts could damage the fundamental interests of Armenians and Azerbaijanis in their aspirations for a return to peaceful development in the region,” the Foreign Ministry statement continued in a sign that Armenia’s perceived flirtation with the West continues to irk Moscow while the EU and United States attempt to normalize Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and facilitate a peace treaty.

 

[…]

 

It appears that Russia will not remain passive while the EU, and the United States in its parallel but supportive track, persist in efforts to broker a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The opposition in Armenia and some Armenian analysts, however, believe such an agreement would set the scene for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh by the end of 2025 (something that Baku also appears keen to achieve through a relevant mechanism included in the 2020 ceasefire agreement).

 

Rather than contribute to resolution of the conflict, they argue, increased geopolitical rivalry in the region could lead to unpredictable consequences such as a new war but this time within the territory of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the depopulation of Karabakh, or even a larger regional conflict involving Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the West even if only by proxy.

 

“Armenia should not think that EUMA is sent by the EU to freeze the conflict and to provide it with time to strengthen its military while acting as a buffer against a potential Azerbaijani attack,” Yerevan-based regional analyst Benyamin Poghosyan said in an interview with the author in February. He explained that Yerevan should also refrain from public criticism of Russia’s peacekeeping force in Karabakh as well as its general presence in the region.

 

In an attempt to reach a compromise, at the end of March, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, and they proposed holding a trilateral meeting with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov in the near future, following the postponement of one planned for the end of December.

 

In addition, Lavrov mentioned that a CSTO mission could be dispatched to Armenia within a few days if the Armenian government were to finally accept this offer, a proposal that Yerevan has still not formally rejected.

The full article can be read here.

For more on EUMCAP and EUMA see my previous posts here.

 

 

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The Pashinyan Conundrum: Predictably Unpredictable, Consistently Inconsistent

The Pashinyan Conundrum: Predictably Unpredictable, Consistently Inconsistent

by | Apr 20, 2023 | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh

Nikol Pashinyan © Onnik James Krikorian 2008

Resolving the conflict in Karabakh requires a careful assessment of the roles of Russia, the EU, and the United States—states that have been involved as mediator, facilitator, and supporter of the peace process, respectively. Moscow believes two things: one, that the EU and the U.S. are hoping to edge Russia out of the region; and two, that there is a particular interest in removing the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh when its first and possibly last five‑year term expires at the end of 2025. 

Ultimately, finding a solution to the conflict over Karabakh and the broader Armenia‑Azerbaijan conflict will require a delicate balancing act among the various stakeholders involved  with a focus on promoting peace, stability, and security in the region. But in the absence of such an environment, there are concerns that competition between the actors involved could disrupt what progress has reportedly been made to date. 

 

Regardless of that rivalry, however, it should be remembered that any peace deal will be signed by the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders—and nobody else. But here, too, the situation is unclear. Despite Azerbaijan’s decisive victory over Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war, a final peace treaty remains elusive nearly two and a half years after the trilateral Armenia‑Azerbaijan‑Russia ceasefire statement was announced on 10 November 2020. 

 

[…] 

 

From a logical perspective, it appears unlikely that the deadlock between Armenia and Azerbaijan can continue beyond 2023, as time is running out. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, there is uncertainty over when the Russian peacekeeping force will withdraw from the ethnic‑Armenian Karabakh entity in 2025. Secondly, Armenia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in 2026 (as noted above). This implies that any peace agreement reached after 2023 may not allow sufficient time for the Armenian populace to experience any concrete advantages before the next election cycle, during which the issue of Karabakh could be a delicate matter. 

 

On the one hand, Pashinyan has good reasons to wait and see if Baku will soften its demands. On the other, delaying a resolution could have disastrous consequences not only for Armenia but also for the ethnic‑Armenian population in Karabakh. Currently, the Armenian narrative claims that Baku aims to “ethnically cleanse” the region, though this is more accurately characterized as depopulation. The problem with such existential narratives, however, is that they can sometimes become self‑fulfilling. 

 

Even before 2020, both Armenia and the ethnic‑Armenian Karabakh entity faced severe demographic problems and, in the case of the latter, such a tendency can only but increase in the absence of a peace deal and the loss of any resources that it once possessed outside the former NKAO.

 

Regardless, while most observers see resolution only through the prism of regional and other international actors, it should be remembered that, at the end of the day, it still comes down to a decision by Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this context and given his tendency to change his opinion and allegiances unexpectedly, as efforts to end a conflict that has lasted over three decades continue, Pashinyan’s predictably unpredictable and consistently inconsistent approach remains the most difficult conundrum to decipher of all. 

The full approximately 5,000 word piece can be read here. 

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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