Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Yerevan, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2007

To mark the 25th anniversary of the resignation of Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty’s Yerevan Bureau on 3 February published a summary of a batch of declassified documents relating to attempts in 1997 to end the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh.

Though some allege that the documents have only been declassified now because of the current parallel negotiation platforms established by the European Union, with the support of the United States, and Russia, they appear to have been made public between 2018 and 2021 with the bulk surfacing in 2019.

Nevertheless, this appears to be the first time that any media outlet became aware of their existence, so kudos to RFE/RL for that.

Regardless, as we know, two proposals were eventually on the table – the package and phased or step-by-step approaches. It is believed that Ter-Petrosyan was ready to accept either, though the de facto authorities of Nagorno Karabakh were not. Moreover, and leading to his resignation, there was also severe disagreement and dissent within his inner circle.

Some still maintain that Ter-Petrosyan stepped down to avoid internal unrest at best or something akin to civil war at worst.

“If I accepted the decision to resign, believe me, it means that I considered the alternative more dangerous for our state,” he said.

 

In his 4-minute resignation speech, Ter-Petrosyan did not clarify who these famous forces are, why and how they made such a demand to the President. He hinted that time will give the answers to those questions.

 

Now, declassified documents are appearing in the archives of the United States State Department, which testify not only to Armenian internal political differences, but also to the demands made by the international community behind closed doors.

There’s a lot to unpack in the documents that RFE/RL summarises which I’ll do if time permits as an update to this post or as a separate one, but until then some brief excerpts with the links to the full versions below. Suffice to say, there’s a lot we knew that can be considered pretty much confirmed, but also an unnerving sense of deja vu when compared to the situation today.

Of course, Armenia is now a lot weaker than it was in 1997 and Nagorno Karabakh untenable as any sustainable entity without a peace deal. However, that is precisely the point. Arguably, Ter-Petrosyan rightly saw the dark clouds looming on the horizon while others did not or simply convinced themselves otherwise. 

Certainly, the warning signs remain, and became particularly noticeable once Pashinyan took power in the 2018 “Velvet Revolution.” And while there were signs that geopolitics started to influence the OSCE Minsk Group even in 1997, new geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia following last year’s invasion of Ukraine risks upsetting any new hopes for peace.

Anyway, some excerpts below with links. Bold for emphasis my own.

DEPUTY SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ARZOUMANYAN
02/28/97

 

The Deputy Secretary, and later S/NIS Ambassador Collins, met with Armenian FM Arzoumanyan February 28. The Deputy Secretary hoped that with three strong countries in the chair, we could make progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peace this year. He sought Arzoumanyan’s views on next steps. Arzoumanyan asserted that the bilateral channel was no longer usable and proposed a “three plus three” format, but backtracked quickly when the Deputy Secretary and Amb. Collins objected; he fell back to a position of waiting to see whether the Azerbaijanis could come up with peace proposals. Arzoumanyan sought U.S. help in opening the Turkish-Armenian border; he was concerned that plans for regional transportation links might bypass Armenia. The Deputy Secretary declared U.S. willingness to use our good offices to help Armenia and Turkey improve relations. End Summary

 

[…] 

 

6. Arzoumanyan backtracked. He stressed the need for an Azerbaijani interlocutor who had a “100 percent mandate” from Aliyev, “But shuttling around to European capitals to exchange general ideas is no longer acceptable.” He noted that the Armenian MFA would be more active on NK under his stewardship, and that he was ready to meet “my good friend” Azerbaijani FM Hasanov to discuss the issue. Later, with Collins, Arzoumanyan said that an Azerbaijani paper would help revitalise the bilateral channel; Yerevan could consult closely with Stepanakert on it.

 

7. Arzoumanyan did not, however, rule out a renewal of the demands that NK participate. In the Collins meeting he said the NK Armenians, having occupied so much of Azerbaijan’s territory, felt it was up to Azerbaijan to come to them and talk before they would compromise. In Armenia, too, it was felt that if Azerbaijan considers NK to be part of itself and the NK Armenians to be rebellious Azerbaijani citizens, Azerbaijan should sit down and talk with them, as governments did all over the world.

 

[…]

 

14. Arzoumanyan said that although Armenia could work with the Russian paper, it put Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity first, and “If you show that to Robert (Kocharyan), he’ll throw the whole paper out. In engaging NK, you must be careful not to give them things immediately that they will reject; you must save them, until later.” He suggested that the best elements with which to start off involved the security of NK.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-23de-08db0559d6f7.pdf

MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BORIS YELTSIN AND BILL CLINTON, 1997

 

YEL: Many questions have been resolved. We also managed to resolve the Transdniester problem in Moldova after I invited the , parties to come to Moscow. We are also working in the Minsk conference process, with our troika. I ask you to be more energetic on Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

POTUS: I agree with that. We’ve discussed this many times. We finally have a process in place. You and I and Chirac need to persevere. Settling Nagorno-Karabakh would solve a lot of problems today and save us from a number of problems in the future.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-326a-08db055c3133.pdf

RUSSIAN FM PRIMAKOV, MAY 1, 1997, MFA GUEST HOUSE, MOSCOW

 

2. Summary: At a hastily summoned meeting of Minsk Process co-chairs during Secretary Albright’s visit to Moscow, Russian FM Primakov called for written U.S. and French comments to the 21-point Russian peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh. He hoped to make the 21-point plan, heretofore a strictly Russian document, into a joint co-chair plan and the basis for their approach to the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and asked for French and U.S. suggestions. Primakov also emphasised that the co-chairs will have to apply pressure to the parties to secure acceptance of any peace plan. The Secretary sought French and Russian comments on the recent U.S. paper on Nagorno Karabakh. The three co-chairs agreed to meet again in Washington around the middle of May. They also agreed to treat both the Russian paper and the U.S. interim agreement proposal on an equal basis. They agreed to look toward a co-chairmanship trip to the region as soon as possible after reaching agreement on a text. End Summary.

 

8. Saying that he did not intend to denigrate the U.S. paper, Primakov nevertheless argued against seeking an interim agreement. “Without the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and a determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status, we will not get any agreement,” he asserted. Primakov urged the co-chairs to come to closure on the outlines of a settlement and on their approach to the parties. Primakov said the co-chairs should stop referring to an “American” and a “Russian” plan. They both needed to be joint. It is important to arrange as soon as possible a trip to the Caucasus by the co-chairs to present a plan, and impose it. The cease-fire, paradoxically, has caused the Armenians and Azeris to be complacent and increasingly disinclined to compromise. The parties, Primakov emphasised, must be shown that their stubbornness will produce unwelcome consequences. […].

 

12. Primakov noted that time was working against Yerevan. While it stagnated, Azerbaijan was becoming rich. […] Paradoxically this made the parties less eager for compromise. Primakov observed that he had been brought up in the Caucasus and knew their peoples. Pressure was needed.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/03/08550000-0a00-0242-54e9-08db05f6c0b6.pdf

SUBJECT: SECRETARY’S CONVERSATION WITH TURKISH MFA UNDERSECRETARY OYMEN
05/02/97

5. Oymen continued that if the Armenians could be convinced to start evacuating the occupied territories in Azerbaijan and let the refugees return, Turkey would be able to open roads and railroads. Oymen said that if Ivanov felt Moscow could do something, he thought it worth trying. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov would visit Ankara in June. If the U.S. could pressure the Russians and Armenians, it could be possible to move ahead. 

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/03/006c0000-0aff-0242-8de4-08db05f72840.pdf

OSCE MINSK CONFERENCE CO-CHAIRS PRESENT COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT PLAN TO TER-PETROSSIAN, JUNE 1997

 

3. Ter-Petrossian began by welcoming the delegation and noting that he had been “waiting a long time” for such a visit. He stated that he hoped the co-chairs brought good news, as there had been almost no progress in the negotiations on Karabakh for more than a year. The only thing we have is the cease-fire which is still holding, he commented. Referring to the recent border incidents on the Armenian-Azeri border, Ter-Petrossian assured the delegation that these incidents were not serious. President Aliyev had also said they were not serious, and since the two rarely agreed on anything, in this case it must be true, Ter-Petrossian quipped. He stressed the importance of maintaining the cease-fire; “The rest depends on what you’ve decided,” he said. 

 

[…]

 

7. Russian Ambassador Lozinsky similarly stressed co-chair unity. Everything mentioned by the other co-chairs is supported by Russia, he emphasised. In the past, there was a tendency to forum-shop, but now that three interested Minsk Group members were leading the negotiating effort, there was a new impetus to the process. The co-chairs had drafted a comprehensive agreement, which would be the basis for the united approach.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/006c0000-0aff-0242-d64b-08db055c2604.pdf

MEMCON OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT/RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV DINNER AT THE G-8 DENVER SUMMIT, BUCKHORN EXCHANGE, JUNE 19, 1997

 

Primakov: I would like to open our discussions first and foremost with a very serious problem — Nagorno-Karabakh. We are concerned, I’m afraid, all three sides responding to us officially and rejecting everything. The Armenians stepped back from their previous position. This may be a big negative in that it reflects how they feel about us being together — the U.S. & Russia. I think we should act because if we don’t, we will be nothing more than paper tigers.

 

 Talbott: I saw the text of the three Presidents regarding N-K.

 

Primakov: Yes, I saw it also, and showed it to Yeltsin and I think it is a plan of great importance. However, we should do something else. I think we should agree on a course of action. This should be confidential, but has to show teeth. You, the U.S., can do something with the Azeris vis-a-vis the oil weapon. You can say something like this: you will not encourage your companies to help on oil if things are not settled. With respect to Armenia, we could use the “weapons weapon.” In other words, Russia could give them weapons while the U.S. could play the oil thing.

 

Naturally, we have to do something on both sides. The Armenians did not even try to analyze our proposal — they only went for full N-K independence. The Azeris insisted on autonomy for N-K, but only in Azerbaijan. It was what I call a rigid vertical solution. They made a definite step backward with respect to the 21-point document that we put together for them. Ter-Petrosian said to me earlier in my discussions with him that this could be a good basis for a solution and now he has backed off.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-6a76-08db055c261c.pdf

TALBOTT—PRIMAKOV OCTOBER 8, 1997, PRIMAKOV’S OFFICE, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY…. MEMCON

 

22. The Deputy Secretary then asked about the Minister’s trip to Baku. Primakov said that he got back very late. He had gone to Baku to push the Azerbaijanis to respond to the Minsk Group. He had a commitment from the Aliyev to provide his proposals in written form. Primakov commented that Aliyev is basically pointed in the right direction. The group around him – ForMin Hasanov and Presidential Advisor Qualazade – want to break out of the Minsk Group framework. Primakov expects to get an answer from Yerevan today (Wednesday). That will cover the problem with Stepanakert (Primakov noted in a general back and forth that the problem in Baku involved, among other matters, efforts by Hasanov to move the issue of Shusha, to part one of the Minsk Group draft). Primakov continued that there had been some good news from the Armenian side when Ter-Petrossian gave a press conference September 30 (Check Date). It was a good statement, Primakov said, that the status quo is not good for anyone, that Karabakh will not get independence from Azerbaijan or annexation to Armenia, that there is no package solution, and that we will have to proceed step by step. Primakov said the thought this was a courageous statement. It would be a help if the U.S. would encourage the diaspora to be more supportive.

 

24. The Deputy Secretary acknowledged the problem of difficult pressure on Ter Petrossian, including from outside. He also said that he shared Primakov’s positive assessment of Ter Petrossian’s recent public statements. […] Primakov commented that if we can get step one of the Minsk Project, that will break the ties to Iran and will lift blockades at the Turkish border. […] He thought sooner or later it was going to come down to having to push Nagorno-Karabakh as the party to the process with the most unacceptable, unworkable positions.

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-a799-08db055c3054.pdf

SUBJECT: ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT’S CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY POLITICAL DIRECTOR JACQUES BLOT (OCTOBER 1997)

 

7. Blot said Ter Petrossian told Chirac there was no possibility of a new confrontation; Now was the time for a compromise and Armenia was ready to negotiate a solution. According to Ter Petrossian, there was no possibility of economic development without peace and it was in Armenia’s interest to reach an agreement. It was necessary to convince Nagorno Karabakh and there would have to be more guarantees. […]

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-b232-08db055c30f3.pdf

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR JACQUES BLOT, JANUARY 8, 1998

 

5. The discussion then turned to NAGORNO-KARABAKH. Blot reported that during Armenian PM Kocharian’s recent visit to Paris the French perceived no real change his position and no prospect for a real start to negotiations. Blot wondered whether PM KOCHARIAN and President Ter-Petrossian really have different positions, or whether perhaps they have informally agreed that Ter-Petrossian will emphasize one message for us while KOCHARIAN will EMPHASIZE another for Nagorno-Karabakh. The French do not see any real means of pressure on NAGORNO-KARABAKH: the Russians are informally allied with the Armenians and the U.S. and France are constrained by domestic political sensitivities from the diaspora. Therefore, the best approach may be to propose additional incentives, both in economic and security areas, to make the package that is currently on the table more attractive to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Deputy Secretary agreed there is a real possibility that Ter-Petrossian and Kocharian could close their positions in a way we would not want. Pascoe noted that while the Armenian-American community still strongly supports Nagorno-Karabakh, it seems to be increasingly aware that time is not on Armenia’s or Nagorno-Karabakh’ s side.

 

6. The Deputy Secretary asked for clarification: Did Blot believe we should concentrate on adding incentives for Nagorno-Karabakh to our step-by-step proposal or open the way to a comprehensive proposal? Blot responded that we had to stay firm on the step-by-step approach, but we could be flexible on the timing of the discussions on the two parts. But there could be no link holding implementation of one hostage to the other. If agreement could be reached within six months on the cessation of the armed conflict, that phase could proceed to implementation while negotiations continued on status.

 

7. […] Blot replied that, frankly, he thought Russia viewed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue more in the context of its relations with the United States than with Armenia. In his view, the Russians believe our overall strategy in this part of the world is to reduce Russian influence, and therefore they would be seeking above all to consolidate and protect that influence. Indeed, Blot felt that the Russians perceive the U.S. proposal for an East-West energy corridor from central Asia as a new attempt to isolate Russia, and that this has spilled over into a deterioration of the’climate within which the MINSK Group works. To head this off, he suggested that he, the Deputy Secretary, and Russian Deputy FM Pastukhov discuss not only NAGORNO-KARABAKH, but general policy toward the Caucusus in their next MEETING.

 

8. The Deputy Secretary replied that we are aware that the Russians are suspicious of our intentions, particularly regarding energy development in Central Asia. However, it is by no means our policy to exclude Russia from energy development. The one country we seek to isolate in this region is Iran. […]

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/006c0000-0aff-0242-ce2e-08db055c256e.pdf

January  1998
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH PRIMAKOV IN SWEDEN

 

YMP: Okay, start in Paris if you like. But, once you have flown all the way across the Atlantic you are only a couple of hours from Stepanakert. You might as well keep going. You really should. We are doing everything we can to support President Ter-Petrosslan. I have sent him Ietters and spoken with him by telephone to give him the message that we think he did something smart and courageous when he wrote his article endorsing a package settlement. But, you know, he has very serious opposition. We are trying to support him. Aliyev knows this and has not problem, but the N-K Armenians are a big problem. If the Conference Co-Chairs representing the U.S., France and Russia, were to come to Stepanakert they would come as the representative of three, well I would say, three very serious countries. It would have some effect. It would indicate that if they oppose a peace settlement they are flouting the will of the entire world.

 

[…]

 

ST: […] With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Conference Co-Chairs will meet in Paris in early February. You should send Boris Pastukhov there armed with all of the arguments you can muster for having the Co-Chairs visit Stepanakert. I am ready to go back, but only if I am convinced it will do some good. Perhaps Pastukhov did not report to you all the details of our last visit when Ghoukasian compared the cochairs to the notorious “troikas” durtng Stalin’s purges and accused of us of plotting the elimination of the N-K Armenians. I’m in no great hurry to be treated to another reception like that. We agree that we’ve got to support Ter-Petrossian. We understand that there is a real struggle going on between Ter-Petrossian and Kocharian right now.

 

YMP: Yes, I can tell you that Kocharlan wants to be President of Armenia. Look, the N-K Armenians are an obstacle. Let’s not beat about the bush about that. But what can we do? I have been for a package agreement all along. Stepanakert was against it. Then we I proposed a step-by-step approach both Baku and Stepanakert were opposed. 

Link: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/02/08550000-0a00-0242-9da8-08db055c2589.pdf

SUBJECT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH: ACTING SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH ARMENIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR LIBARIDIAN

 

3. The Acting Secretary led off, after courtesies, by saying the U.S. counted on Armenia to have intense exchanges with the NK Armenians. Delivering them would be the toughest task in achieving peace. Libaridian replied that when “we have a paper we can accept” (from the Co-Chairs), “Ter-Petrossian will fight for it in Yerevan, including publicly, and he will fight for it in Stepanakert.”

 

[…]

 

5. In the second of two long meetings with the NK leadership, Libaridian continued, the Armenians had brought the NK leadership to the point of saying, “Maybe we don’t need to discuss status now.” Libaridian cautioned, however, that reaching an agreement would not be easy. He said he was encouraged by some of the things Aliyev had said during his U.S. visit — which seemed to indicate Azerbaijan was on board with the step-by-step approach — while excoriating Aliyev’s breaches of the process’ confidentiality. In a fresh Armenian interpretation of the OSCE Lisbon Summit, Libaridian suggested that the international community’s public endorsement of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity may have given Aliyev political cover for putting off dealing with status now in the Minsk process.

 

6. Talbott said he was encouraged by Libaridian’s analysis and positive interpretation of Aliyev’s visit. We had worked hard to get Aliyev to be forthcoming in public. Talbott continued that after meeting the NK leadership, he had a palpable sense of their admirable qualities, but no illusions about how tough a job the Armenians would have in making them understand that this process is about the art of the possible. He asked Libaridian for his thoughts on how to proceed. Libaridian, who had just come from a meeting with Rep. Gilman and other representatives, stressed the role of post-conflict assistance, as well as the importance of how it was presented. The NK Armenians would react badly if assistance appeared to them as a bribe for compromise; but they should be made to realize that a solution will help in the financing of reconstruction.

 

[…]

 

14. Talbott concluded by stressing the interest with which President Clinton followed the NK issue, seeing it as part of the larger strategic and economic puzzle. The President, he said, stresses the need to make Armenia part of the coming boom in the region — a desire Talbott seconded, having choppered over the vast, dead Nairit synthetic rubber factory. It was, he said, an advertisement for what is not happening and what could happen. But nothing will happen without peace.

 LINK: https://docs.rferl.org/hy-AM/2023/02/03/006c0000-0aff-0242-7d79-08db05fa90f6.pdf

As I said, there’s a lot to go through in these documents, but it is interesting to see how many of the same issues have surfaced again today when time is once again not on Armenia or Karabakh’s side, although, to be frank, it never was. Moreover, some argue, Ter-Petrosyan’s acceptance of the step-by-step approach was perhaps the last chance for peace prior to today.

For 28 years, however, both the Armenian government and even the main civil society players ignored this reality and marginalised or ostracised anyone that sought to remind them of Ter-Petrosyan’s warnings. Incidentally, many also did the same with any mention of the OSCE Minsk Group’s Madrid Principles too or subsequent variations on that basic framework.

“After the resignation of the first president, for more than two decades, all three leaders of Armenia adopted the policy of maintaining the status quo. All three accused Ter-Petrosyan of defeatism and betrayal at different stages of their rule,” RFE/RL concludes. Though Baku has at times rejected certain peace proposals in the past, many have also implied that Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and Pashinyan have too, effectively making the 2020 Karabakh war inevitable. 

 You can read RFE/RL’s summary in Armenian here. It is also available in Russian here.