Final confirmation of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) expected on 23 January

Final confirmation of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) expected on 23 January

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian mission © EUMM

As had been expected, a final decision on the deployment of a larger and longer-term Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian monitor mission to Armenia will be made by the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on Monday, 23 January. This follows a preliminary decision already taken by the Political and EU Security Committee (PSC). 

The proposed European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) will follow last year’s temporary shorter-term European Union Monitoring Capacity in Armenia that was deployed in October last year. There had already been calls for it to be extended or transformed into EUMA even before the mission had ended in late December.

While it has also been rumoured that EUMA would be deployed on 20 February, pending final confirmation, what remains unclear is how large it will be and for how long it will be present.

Though EUMCAP numbered just 40 on secondment from the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, this will be an actual deployment and not a temporary capacity. Sources familiar with the process say that the Crisis Management Concept initially envisaged up to 100 unarmed civilian monitors for a period yet to be announced.

The recruitment announcement on the EU External Action Service (EEAS), however, is currently requesting applications for 69 listed personnel, and for a period of one year, but that could simply be a preliminary recruitment or secondment of personnel from EU member states and for contractual processes in terms of duration.  

Nonetheless, Armenian media today reported that it could be as large as 200 and last for 2 years, equalling that of EUMM in Georgia. Moreover, its area of deployment would cover the entire territory of Armenia though this seems unlikely given that Russian border guards are responsible for patrolling the border with Iran and Turkey. 

In reality, of course, its primary focus will be Armenia’s vulnerable border with Azerbaijan. There is so far no reaction from Baku about the likely move. It had previously complained about plans for EUMA to be deployed saying that it would increase security concerns rather than reduce them. It also said it cast serious doubts about the future of the EU peace process.

Some Armenian analysts have also called for a longer term EU CSDP mission in order to delay the signing of an anticipated peace deal between Yerevan and Baku as well as to allow the country to re-arm itself in case of future hostilities. Though EUMA would be unable to prevent a border incursion, it would at least make the international ramifications of one quite serious.

In the meantime, it is unclear how Iran and especially Russia will react to any deployment of a larger, dedicated, and longer-term mission to Armenia given that EUMA will likely be continued after its first term expires, no matter how long that might be. EUMM Georgia currently works on rolling two-year extensions since it deployed in late 2008. 

Adding more intrigue to what can be viewed as a possible shift in Armenia’s geopolitical orientation, EEAS today also published a statement reflecting on this year’s 20th anniversary of civilian monitoring missions in the framework of CSDP missions by EU Civilian Operations Commander Stefano Tomat. He also laid out expectations for the future. 

“New missions on our Eastern flank are already under consideration,”he wrote, in what some insiders believe refers to Armenia and Moldova. “We can also expect that EU civilian missions will increase cooperation with their military counterparts in EU military missions and operations as well as with EU justice and […] the EU Border and Coastguard Force.”

“Civilian CSDP will be primed to continue to serve the EU’s foreign policy objectives and the security of its citizens in more turbulent times,” Tomat concluded. 

For more on EUMCAP and EUMA see my previous posts here.

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Social, Economic, and Political Pressures increase in Besieged Karabakh

Social, Economic, and Political Pressures increase in Besieged Karabakh

Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 2009

Tomorrow, 17 January, residents of what remains of the besieged and breakaway Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) will be allocated ration coupons for basic and essential foodstuffs as control of the strategic Lachin Corridor by self-identified Azerbaijani environmental activists enters its second month. Despite their claims, however, most consider the effective but albeit partial blockade of the region, situated within Azerbaijan but populated mostly by ethnic Armenians, to be more than just about that.

Regardless, the rationing will include goods such as rice, buckwheat, macaroni, and sugar, all apparently distributed from Karabakh’s reserves, while coupons will be available at service points in schools and a university in Stepanakert or in rural administrative centres. Such a move was not unexpected in the current situation and many residents had reportedly already called for such a system to avoid missing out on disappearing supplies in shops while the local authorities likely wanted to prevent a black market from emerging.

The rationing system, incidentally, is on top of humanitarian assistance coming via Lachin through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Russian peacekeeping mission as well as what other stocks or local supplies are available elsewhere. Karabakh, for example, is quite fertile and does have its own local capacity for certain goods such as wheat and flour while also having its own farms, including greenhouses. Nonetheless, in a recent interview, defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan warned that this was still insufficient.

“We will not starve, because there’s enough food,” Vardanyan told Reuters on 24 December. “But some products we cannot get on our internal market.”

Unfortunately, little reliable information is available on the full picture is in Karabakh, but the defacto authorities do at least present some to the public, as would be expected in order to avoid panic or desperation. There have also been social media posts showing that some restaurants and cafes are still operating while one young Karabakh Armenian has been updating her followers on TikTok as to the situation, including what food she is able to purchase in the shops.

This is not surprising given that keeping the economy afloat will be a key concern for Vardanyan and his team. Indeed, in a live Stepanakert-Yerevan bridge, Karabakh’s Minister of Economy, Hrant Safaryan, acknowledged this saying that, as I had speculated about in another post, there is an attempt to keep some eateries and other businesses dependent on various ingredients adequately supplied. Vardanyan had also already met with restaurant and cafe owners to discuss how the authorities could work with them and vice-versa. 

Despite this, however, the situation is changing. From what little is known, in the first few weeks of an effective blockade, the main shortage of goods in the shops were predictable – imported packaged goods from Armenia. It is also important to note that many residents had already likely stocked up for the New Year and Christmas season. However, as days passed by, shoppers were instead only able to buy limited amounts of locally produced goods and reportedly only if and when available.

The supply of vegetables and fruits were particularly hit.

On 15 January, however, video emerged, again on TikTok, of Russian peacekeeping troops handing out bags of oranges or mandarins and tomatoes and cucumbers to women outside a hospital in Stepanakert. Though it remains unclear to what extent the mission is helping, Vardanyan has said that 400 vehicles passed through despite the blockade. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has also been able to transfer medical supplies and other items such as infant formula from Armenia while also ferrying critically ill patients to Yerevan.

Even so, while 28 patients have reportedly been transported by the ICRC to Armenia, planned surgeries for 400 others have been suspended due to the lack of supplies or personnel.

Moreover, the situation is more complicated than that. On 10 January, electricity cables from Armenia to Karabakh were damaged, apparently by bad weather according to accounts from Stepanakert, and it has been impossible to pass through Lachin to repair the damage. Thus, Karabakh is also now experiencing a power shortage given that its locally hydro-electric power is far less than prior to the 2020 war when it controlled those seven regions of Azerbaijan since taken back or returned.

New blackouts of two hours will now be extended to four.

And there are other concerns as well. As I highlighted here, and as already mentioned above, the economy will be a matter of huge concern to the local authorities and today Karabakh’s Information Centre reported that 726 businesses, or 17.7 percent of the total number operating, have had to suspend their activities too. In human terms, that means 3,400 people, presumably including those from the mines ostensibly at the centre of the crisis that were recently closed,  are now unemployed.

The authorities did, however, prevent a run on the banks by limiting how much currency could be withdrawn from ATMs, advising residents to use cards.

Political intrigues this past weekend, however, have surprised many, though some had expected them given a recent warning from local activist Tigran Petrosyan after comments Vardanyan made about certain Karabakh residents using alleged connections to pass through Lachin and even to bring back food and fuel to sell. “Mr. Vardanyan, this is Karabakh. Be a little careful,” the activist, who was a main force behind the 27 December march on the Russian peacekeeping base to demand they open the Lachin Corridor, wrote.

The replacement of then Security Council Secretary Vitaly Balasanyan just days before on 7 January also irked some in Karabakh who alleged there had been a falling out with Vardanyan. But the real problems emerged when the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was criticised for comments made on 10 January directly implying that the international community does not consider the region to be anything other than an integral part of Azerbaijan. Vardanyan did not react calmly.

In response, on 12 January, Pashinyan urged Karabakh’s leadership to tone down such statements but also to negotiate directly with Baku,  something the opposition and other nationalist forces believe means Armenia had ‘washed its hands’ of the region. Rumours then emerged that Karabakh’s defacto president, Arayik Harutyunyan, might dismiss Vardanyan. Supporters of the State Minister accused him of working in cahoots with Pashinyan and some even alleged he had received offers of security and financial benefits from Baku.

Rumours also circulated that Harutyunyan might call early parliamentary and presidential elections, something that National Assembly Speaker Artur Tovmasyan did not rule out on 14 January. “Talking about elections and dismissal is treason and serving the enemy’s agenda,” Vardanyan advisor Mesrob Arakelyan wrote on Facebook in response. “I am not going to resign, especially in the existing situation,” Vardanyan also shared on social media, adding that early elections were also unacceptable. 

But in a late night meeting on Sunday, however, it was reported that some kind of compromise had been reached. Vardanyan would remain in his position but with the caveat that he would no longer make any further political statements unless in consultation with Harutyunyan. His focus would also be no more directed towards economic issues. Nonetheless, adding to the intrigue, Balasanyan’s replacement, Ararat Melkumyan, was also replaced earlier today as Security Council Secretary just nine days after being appointed. 

In the meantime, the impasse on the Lachin Corridor continues with no apparent end in sight and even though a peace deal after over three decades of an unsustainable and misperceived ‘status quo’ remains as pressing as ever.

Incidentally, for more on work on Lachin itself from 2001-2006 see here, here, here, and here.

Market, Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 2009

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Ration Coupon system to start operation in Karabakh on 20 January

Ration Coupon system to start operation in Karabakh on 20 January

Not unexpectedly, on 20 January, certain food products in Karabakh will only be available via a rationing coupon or voucher system. This had already been announced by defacto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan on 8 January before it was then announced yesterday that it would start operating on 20 January. This is something anyway anticipated when stocks in shops started to increasingly disappear or sell out quickly. 

Some residents had already been quoted by media calling for such a system as the effective siege of Karabakh on the Lachin Corridor enters its second month. The coupons will be distributed on 17 January.

According to reports, those items rationed will includes rice, pasta, buckwheat, sugar and vegetable oil which are reportedly from the state reserves. Vardanyan had also already warned businesses that price increases of more than 15 percent would be deprived of supply. A system of ‘service points’ will be set up in public schools and at the main university in Stepanakert while in the regions in district administrative buildings and community halls.

This post will be updated when more information is available.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) likely planned for February 2023

European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) likely planned for February 2023

On 4 January, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) posted a call for contributions to a new EU Mission to Armenia (EUMA) that would monitor the country’s fragile and sometimes volatile border with neighbouring Azerbaijan. Most positions for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian mission would be secondments from EU countries and 69 are currently being advertised with a deadline of 19 January.

However, in a post on LinkedIn, Tobias Pietz, Deputy Head of Analysis at the German Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), wrote that the mission could be as many as 100 and that a decision on its deployment was due to be made at a meeting of the EU’s Political and Security Council (PSC) on 10  January. The mission, he noted, would be “strongly supported” by the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia.

EUMM, incidentally, made up the temporary European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) that was deployed in Armenia for two months in October last year and which ended in December. Since the end of its mission there have been numerous calls for its extension or transformation into a dedicated mission along the lines of EUMM and a Transition Planning Assistance Team had already been dispatched to Armenia to prepare for this likelihood. 

An EU technical assessment team also arrived in Yerevan on 9 January for the same reason and met with Armenia’s Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, and Security Council Secretary, Armen Grigoryan. Also present at the meetings were the head of the EU Delegation to Armenia, Andrea Wictorin. “Mirzoyan lauded the role of the EU monitoring mission in bolstering stability in the region,” an official statement read. 

Azerbaijan, however, has not been so enthusiastic, with its Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Baramov, saying on 27 December that any new mission should first be discussed with Baku.

Indeed, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev also complained about any new mission in a press conference held yesterday, 10 January. “It will not increase security,” he stated, also alluding to Baku’s displeasure with France’s role in the process, “but on the contrary will undermine the format of negotiation [with Armenia]. […] France has in fact completely isolated itself from the process. Now there is only American and Russia.”

Though Armenia is free to choose what is deployed on its own soil, the situation becomes a little less clear given that its border with Azerbaijan has not been officially demarcated, something the EUMCAP was initially deployed to assist with. Whether there is still the need to have Azerbaijan on board, even if only reluctantly, as might well have the case with EUMCAP when the decision to send as part of talks held in Prague on 6 October, remains unclear.

And while, then Ambassador-designate of the Czech Republic to Yerevan shied away from naming those countries that might object to a proper EU monitoring mission to Armenia in one sentence, he preceded it with quite the opposite in a 20 December interview with Radio Free Europe. “Our mutual task […] is to try to show all sides involved that a mission like that would be useful,” he said.

“So let’s work with the Azerbaijanis, let’s work with the Russians as well, […] trying to show and prove that you are happy with the involvement of the European Union. […] I can just hint that not all parties involved were as happy with the mission, with the small observation mission as Armenia […] was. Let’s work with those who were not that positive about the EU mission and let’s try to prove that it can be helpful.”

Certainly, if EUMM in Georgia’s record is anything to go by, the EUMA mission would indeed help calm tensions on the border, although it cannot prevent incidents or slight geographic changes, as has been the case along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) for South Ossetia. Nonetheless, EUMA would presumably be able to work with Armenian border communities and perhaps even with journalists from across the dividing line as has been the case in Georgia.

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that by virtue of being deployed on the Armenian side only that an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) will be established given that EUMA will only operate in Armenia and there will be no mission deployed in Azerbaijan. Incidentally, when I put this issue to International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Zaur Shiryev on 27 September he said this was because Baku does not want an “internationalisation of the border.”

For now, however, it remains unclear if any of this will prevent a EUMA deployment, although it is quite possible that it will also require a decision from the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council as was also the case with the temporary EUMCAP mission. Indeed, on 5 January, Finland’s Crisis Management Centre advertised for personnel to be seconded while stressing that “no decision has yet been made on the establishment of the EUMA mission.”

“Also,” it noted, “the exact location of the possible operation or tasks, the security or accommodation arrangements, or the operation specifics of its service relationship remain unclear. According to the preliminary schedule, the establishment of the mission is to be decided at the end of January and for its operation to start at the end of February. If the mission is launched, departure for the tasks can take place to a quick schedule.”

Regardless, if such a mission does get a final go-ahead by the end of the month, some speculate that its duration will be for one year. Though this might sound short it should be pointed out that EUMM in Georgia currently works on a rotating two-year term pending further extension. This would presumably turn out to be the case for EUMA’s mission too.

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Ankara gives Green Light for Direct Armenia-Turkey Cargo Flights

Ankara gives Green Light for Direct Armenia-Turkey Cargo Flights

Turkish Airlines flight © Onnik James Krikorian 2019

Though it had been announced in early December that direct cargo flights would start between Armenia and Turkey by the end of last year, the apparent deadlock in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, as well as the impasse between Yerevan, Baku, and Stepanakert on the Lachin Corridor, hardly prepared anyone for such an eventuality. However, a news report published by the Andalou News Agency on 6 January 2023 confirmed that Ankara had indeed given the go-ahead for such flights starting 1 January.

The news follows that of the resumption of direct passenger flights between Yerevan and Istanbul in February last year, though not part of the slow but renewed attempt to normalise relations between the two countries following the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war.

The same day as the 6 January announcement, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that direct cargo flights could now operate while Turkish media reported that this came as a result of direct negotiations between the Armenian and Turkish Special Envoys, Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kilic. Armenian MFA spokesperson Vahan Hunanyan also said that Yerevan hoped that another decision taken by Yerevan and Ankara in December as part of the normalisation process would become reality.

We expect that the other agreement, ensuring the possibility of crossing the land border for citizens of third countries, will also be implemented as soon as possible,” he told media.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that while no air freight company has announced that it will operate the Armenia-Turkey route at time of writing, and it is still believed that further progress will be dependent on parallel developments in the Armenia-Azerbaijan process too, though it can only be hoped that they start sooner rather than later. Incidentally, it remains unclear whether Ankara’s decision indicates that some backdoor diplomacy between Yerevan and Baku has continued despite the standoff in Lachin.

At any rate, and reminiscent of the start of the last ill-fated normalisation process in 2009, it also comes just two and half months before the Armenian and Turkish national football teams are due to face each other in their first UEFA Euro 2024 qualifying match in late March 2023. Tons of old posts from the 2008-2009 Armenia-Turkey normalisation process to transfer here, but for now, another one, this time from the Margara crossing, close to Yerevan. 

 

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian