On June 19, Armenian media revealed that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had signed an executive order on May 24 instructing the Council for Constitutional Reforms to “draft a new constitution from scratch” by January 2027. The announcement surprised many, as the council, established in 2022, had already finalized work on proposals for constitutional amendments earlier this year. While Pashinyan had previously considered replacing the constitution entirely, he has acknowledged a minimal need for changes in governance. The renewed focus on constitutional reforms comes as Azerbaijani officials have been calling for the removal of territorial claims within the Armenian Constitution against Azerbaijan and Türkiye, which has become a main point of contention in peace talks between Baku and Yerevan.

At the beginning of the year, the Armenian premier said that the country should have a constitution “adopted by the people of Armenia” with “results of a vote that do not give rise to doubts”. Pashinyan was referring to referenda held in 2005 and 2015 that were marred by opposition claims of voter fraud and low-voter turnout. In January, he concluded that Armenia would benefit from a constitution that makes the country “more competitive and viable in new geopolitical and regional conditions,” a comment many took as referring to normalizing relations with neighboring Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

 

Yerevan’s past plans for a referendum to amend the constitution were postponed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Second Karabakh War in 2020, and snap elections in June 2021. Last year, discussions also included proposals to replace state emblems and remove a controversial preamble asserting territorial claims within Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

 

Earlier this year, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated calls to remove references to Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence and the 1989 joint statement on the “Reunification of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh”. In early June, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan would not sign a normalization agreement with Armenia unless the preamble was removed. “The signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is simply impossible if the existing constitution of Armenia remains unchanged,” Aliyev declared. In response, the Armenian Foreign Ministry denounced Aliyev’s remarks as “blatant interference in the internal affairs of our country”.

 

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While Azerbaijan might have time to wait, Armenia arguably does not. Pashinyan will need to present an acceptable peace deal to the Armenian electorate as his Civil Contract party prepares for elections in 2026. Without one, the risk grows that the opposition can again claim that unilateral concessions made to Azerbaijan were unnecessary all along.

The full analysis is available here. 

Yerevan is entering its second month of protests against the border and delimitation process launched between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April. Relations between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the government have plummeted and may be irreconcilable. Although Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, Primate of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, has dominated the media since April, his mass rallies have failed to attract sufficient numbers to pose a serious threat to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In a household survey last month, only 12.8 percent of respondents said they would vote for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party if elections were held that week. Galstanyan’s name was second at 3.9 percent despite remaining ineligible. This division and lack of support for Pashinyan will likely result in further political strife in Armenia.

Most Armenians remain undecided or do not plan to participate in the upcoming elections. As a result, the combined support for the opposition now equals that of the embattled prime minister. Assuming the government does not benefit significantly from administrative resources when the vote occurs, the opposition may significantly prevent Pashinyan from maintaining his current majority government. Galstanyan insists that his “Tavush for the Motherland” movement is not coordinating with other political forces in the country and denies the involvement of former President Robert Kocharyan and Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II. The government alleges otherwise. Other commentators believe that Kocharyan and Karekin could simply be riding on Galstanyan’s coattails.

 

In May 2022, Galstanyan joined the political protests demanding Pashinyan’s resignation led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun; ARF-D) and with the full blessing of the Catholicos. The ARF-D is the main party in Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance faction in parliament. One of its deputies, Garnik Danielyan, has been by Galstanyan’s side since the beginning of the protests in Tavush. Other senior figures in Dashnaktsutyun, including party head Ishkhan Saghatelyan, attend some rallies but have tried to maintain a low profile. On May 25, Dashnaktsutyun convened a conference on the “Armenian Cause” in Yerevan, where Galstanyan and representatives of the Catholicos were in attendance.

 

The following day, a demonstration in the capital attracted 23,000 people. Although Galstanyan’s movement was waning, it had gained some lost momentum before the gathering by stating that a nomination to replace Pashinyan would be announced—that candidate being Galstanyan. He also announced that he had applied to the Armenian Apostolic Church to suspend his clerical duties so he could campaign against the current government. Yet, on May 21, Galstanyan has said publicly that he still meets with the Catholicos every two days.

 

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Meanwhile, despite failing to reach critical mass, Galstanyan continues to disrupt official events. His success in doing so without warning, including in Sardarapat, has put Pashinyan’s government on edge, eager to avoid any large clashes that the opposition could use against him. As the Armenian premier seeks to transform the country from “historical Armenia” to “real Armenia,” the conflict between the government and the church looks set to continue. As a sign of that, Civil Contract MP Arsen Torosyan proposed this week to stop financing Shoghakat TV, the broadcasting arm of the Armenian Apostolic Church, officially on air since 2002. Coincidentally intended personally or not, the station was established as an audio-visual studio by Karekin II before he became Catholicos in 1995.

The full analysis is available here.