Gerard Libaridian 

Arguably one of the most independent and unique voices on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades, Gerard Jirair Libaridian has been particularly on point since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war. Not only was he among the few of us that foresaw a new conflict between the two breaking out in the days and weeks preceding hostilities, but Libaridian was particularly concerned about such an eventuality, though it has to be said that such fears had been growing with each passing year since 2011. 

Senior Advisor to the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, Libaridian has also held the position of director of the Armenian Studies Program at the University of Michigan, and most recently was the co-author of a white paper, The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies. In his recent online presentation for the Cambridge-Yerevan Sister City Association, Libaridian offered his opinion on where things stand and what lies ahead.

He starts the presentation, however, on a pessimistic note, having recently returned from a seven-week visit to Armenia earlier this year.

If you had told me in November of 2020 that there would be sadder days than November 9 when Armenia had to sign a very humiliating ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan after the second Karabakh war, I would not have believed it, but I think we are there now. 

Libaridian later explains that what he means by this is that there now what he terms an assault on democracy in Armenia, with opposition forces close to the former regimes of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan taking to the streets despite last year’s parliamentary elections that saw Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract retain power despite defeat in the 2020 war. Moving on, however, he identifies those questions that are now being asked today.

The first of those is with regards to responsibility for the the 2020 war and its aftermath? There are different answers to this, he says.

One belief is that Pashinyan is responsible and another is that Pashinyan and the previous 25 years of leadership and state-imposed mentality under the presidencies of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan are. These two answers, he says, can be combined by adding that Azerbaijan and Turkey are are responsible. “Any answer,” he says, alluding to the unfortunate tendency to scapegoat and overlook the mistakes of the past, “but me.”

Another question being asked in Armenia is what is the meaning of the 2020 war? There are three answers here, he says.

The first, and which might be held by a good part of the population, is that people are no longer interested and that it doesn’t matter. Then there is the opposition that spreads existential narratives involving Azerbaijan and Turkey while also pushing the idea that there is no point in negotiating with either. Some even go so far as t say that Armenia should move closer to Russia.

Opposing this, however, is another that recognizes that Azerbaijan had specific issues to resolve with Armenia related to Karabakh and that, after decades of registering no progress in negotiations, were resolved through war. Armenia lost and now has to face a new reality that includes the diminished capabilities of the army as well as the state and also the reality that the country was and remains alone. 

No-one helped us, and in fact Russia colluded with Azerbaijan, and therefore we have to think now of what we can save of what’s left our sovereignty and the state – that there is no alternative to negotiations and that we have to find ways to diminish the threat.

In his opinion, Libaridian believes that the newer generation in particular acknowledge that Armenia’s defeat after decades of nationalist narratives and thinking were probably to blame. Now, he says, the government is negotiating to secure Armenia’s sovereignty and borders, to achieve the best possible result for Karabakh, and to decrease any dangers and threats. 

 There is also the question of the role of Russia and the West. “We know the Minsk Group is finished,” says Libaridian. “In my opinion, it was in a coma for a long time, and now it is basically finished as Russia has said the West doesn’t want to work with them.” He also points to the change in titles for the three co-chairs, something that I have also pointed out in the past, including how they are prohibited from acting independently.

There are also questions in in people’s minds, says Libaridian, as to how much Armenia can rely on Russia. Some even hope that Europe and the US can act as counterbalances to Russia, though this isn’t, however, the majority of Armenians. Regardless, he says, another question then arises. What options does Armenia have? 

It is clear that the loss of the war has minimized the options Armenia has and these options have been narrowing down for the past 25 years. The longer we postponed the peaceful resolution, the less options we had, and the war made it clear that we had lost those options.

Armenia has little left to say on the future of Karabakh, he believes. Instead, it will primarily be Russia and Azerbaijan that decides what shape and form it will survive as in the future. Internationally, he says, the situation is obvious. “Karabakh was and is now more clearly recognized as part of Azerbaijan,” he says.

When Aliyev and Azerbaijan started the war and took one third of Karabakh I don’t know of one country that said, no, you can’t do that. And Putin, during and after the war, specified many times that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. Now, there may be other issues to resolve but that’s it – and neither the US, nor France, or anyone else has disagreed. 

Libaridian also turns his attention to the small opposition demonstrations occurring in Yerevan. The issue, he says, is less about Karabakh but more about who should rule and govern Armenia. The vast majority of Armenians remain unconvinced by those political forces linked to or directly representing the previous regimes. 

Personally, I think Pashinyan should have resigned, personally I don’t think he’s the best person to guide these new negotiations, but still the fact is that the whole question of his responsibility for the war, and for the loss, and for the unwise decisions, all of those questions were adjudicated by the 2021 elections. 

 

Well, the outcome is that those who voted for him voted to keep him and that means quite a bit. They preferred to keep a leader who lost the war, who made those very bad decisions, to keep him rather than to have Kocharyan, who represents other problems.   

The situation has, he admits, also been complicated by the war in Ukraine and the question of how Putin will behave depending on whether he wins or loses arises. Is he more dangerous in the first case or the second? Azerbaijan has also become a more significant player in the region because of Ukraine, but as it is likely there will be more limited options for the South Caucasus it remains unclear how that will play out. 

This has also brought up two painful questions in Armenia, he says.

That is, there is what seems to be an orchestrated campaign to dismiss the significance of sovereignty. It is as simple as that. That it is not so simple for Armenia to be independent, there are very significant players in Armenia who think that Armenia should simply become de facto a province of Russia. This is very real. I don’t think most people in Armenia agree, but there are powerful forces inside and outside Armenia that are working on this, that are talking about this, and one way of doing it is to exaggerate and abuse the question of genocide and to create and intensify fear of a new genocide when in fact the threat Armenia faces is not genocide, in my view, but the threat of not acting on the realities that surround it. 

This failure to adjust to the situation Armenia faces is perhaps best exemplified by the campaign to remove Pashinyan from power. An opposition that failed to come to power through elections is now saying that democracy is unnecessary and that a strong leader is required instead, he says. It even goes so far as to suggest that had a strong leader been in power during the war, then Armenia would not have lost.

There are also those who hide under cover of a call for national unity, he continues, and who argue that Pashinyan is not the person who can achieve this. These forces also propose removing Pashinyan through unconstitutional and undemocratic means if necessary. For now, however, says Libiridian, and whether one likes Pashinyan or not, he is the only legitimately elected leader of Armenia. 

Besides, he adds, there is not any opposition party or leader proposing any solution markedly different to what Pashinyan is doing. Ending his opening remarks, Libaridian describes the domestic political situation as one that is very dangerous for Armenia, and in the question and answer session that followed, he offered more of his impressions from his recent visit, including how those he met felt. 

They want to have hope, they feel that they are in a very difficult situation, and some of them see some hope in the negotiations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. That is, one thing is clear. They don’t want more wars and they think that the continuation of the hard line that was before the war, that made war inevitable, that that hard line is not helping and that is evident from the lack of full support of the opposition. 

 

That was evident with the parliamentary elections, it is evident now, even today when [the opposition] are trying to create a popular wave to bring down Pashinyan, I don’t see the numbers there, [people] are tired of the rhetoric, and they’re not buying the narrative. […]

 

[…]

 

They’re waiting to see, but they are supporting negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and I am quite sure that if Pashinyan and his government were not sure [about support] then they would not do it. Pashinyan is a populist [even though] he’s become much more serious since the war, unlike others who have learned no lessons. I can’t say he’s the best negotiator, but I can say he’s on the right path and he would not do it if he thought the majority of Armenians oppose him. 

 

I have no problem in understanding that we have fears, I have no problem in seeing a threat, but […] those who oppose negotiations, in my view, [rely on these fears] to ask people not to think specifically, strategically, and politically. 

In response to another question, Libaridian also referred to the issue of border tensions and past incursions by Azerbaijan. When Armenians consider the enemy they make the mistake of not viewing the situation from their perspective too. If there is an incorrect interpretation of any actions by Azerbaijan and why they are occuring, he believes, then Armenia will not be able to respond correctly. 

So we really have to understand, [Aliyev] was trying to put pressure on Armenia saying look, you signed the November 9 agreement but you haven’t really respected it fully. Now, if we decide that the enemy is whatever we want it to be, then we’re not merely debating, we’re not developing policy, [and] we are negotiating with ourselves. This is the problem. We need to negotiate with the other. We have to understand the other […], otherwise whatever policy we have will not be the right one.

 

We also don’t think about what we say and do [and how it] impacts the other. Now, when Karabakh leaders today say that we want independence or better yet, we want to be part of Russia […], shouldn’t we think about what that means to Aliyev and the Azerbaijani government and to the [Azerbaijani] people? We always talk about what Aliyev has done wrong, and he’s done so many things wrong, but we have to look if there’s anything that we could have said or done differently in order not to provoke, at least.

This is a fundamental flaw in how Armenia formulates its questions and responses, Libaridian believes, but also notes that the same can be said to be true for Azerbaijan as well.  
–

The white paper, The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies, co-authored by Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian, and Taline Papazian, can be read here. Libaridian’s Cambridge-Yerevan Sister City Association presentation can be viewed below.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Border © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

Today marks the 28th anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire agreement that temporarily halted fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. Coming into force at 12.01 am on 12 May 1994, its terms, as dictated by the 5 May Bishkek Protocol, were nonetheless left unimplemented for decades, ultimately leading to the 2020 second Karabakh war.  

Participants of the meeting held in May 4-5 in Bishkek on the initiative of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, Federal Congress and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation:  

 

-express determination to assist in all possible ways to the cessation of armed conflict in and around Nagorno Karabakh, which does not only cause irretrievable losses to Azerbaijani and Armenian people, but also significantly affects the interests of other countries in the region and seriously complicates the international situation;  

 

-supporting the April 15, 1994 Statement by the CIS Council of heads of states, express readiness to fully support the efforts by heads and representatives of executive power on cessation of the armed conflict and liquidation of its consequences by reaching an appropriate agreement as soon as possible;  

 

-advocate a naturally active role of the Commonwealth and Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in cessation of the conflict, in realization of thereupon principles, goals and the UN and OSCE certain decisions (first of all the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884);  

 

-call upon the conflicting sides to come to common senses: cease to fire at the midnight of May 8 to 9, guided by the February 18, 1994 Protocol (including the part on allocating observers), and work intensively to confirm this as soon as possible by signing a reliable, legally binding agreement envisaging a mechanism, ensuring the non-resumption of military and hostile activities, withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and restoration of communication, return of refugees;  

 

-agree to suggest Parliaments of the CIS member-states to discuss the initiative by Chairman of Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly V. Shumeyko and Head of the Assembly’s Peacemaking Group on Nagorno Karabakh M. Sherimkulov on creating a CIS peacemaking force; -consider appropriate to continue such meetings for peaceful resolution of the armed conflict;  

 

-express gratitude to the people and leadership of Kyrgyzstan for creating excellent working conditions, cordiality and hospitality.  

 

On behalf of the delegations:

A. Jalilov (signed by R. Guliyev)

K. Babouryan

B. Ararktsyan

V. Shumeyko

M. Sherimkulov

V. Kazimirov (Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, Head of the Russian Mediation Mission)

M. Krotov(Head of the Secretariat of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of CIS member-states)

Bishkek, 5 May 1994

As some of us warned, this failure to implement the 1994 ceasefire, and especially the return of any of the seven regions that surrounded the Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), and as demanded by the four UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above, made another war inevitable, after Levon Ter Petrosyan was forced to resign by the late Vazgen Sargsyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Serzh Sargsyan. 

Azerbaijani Prisoner of War, Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

Fast forward to today, 28 years after the 1994 ceasefire agreement, and a more genuine peace process appears to be in motion following trilateral meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials facilitated by Russia and bilateral meetings facilitated by the European Union. There is also another ceasefire agreement signed on 9 November 2020  that reflects a new reality after nearly three decades of previous negotiations failing to yield results.

We, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan I. H. Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia N. V. Pashinyan and President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin, declare the following:

 

1. A complete ceasefire and a cessation of all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict shall be introduced at 00:00 hours Moscow time on 10 November 2020. The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, shall stop at their current positions.

 

2. Aghdam district shall be returned to the Republic of Azerbaijan by 20 November 2020.

 

3. Along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor, a peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation shall be deployed in the amount of 1,960 military personnel with small arms, 90 armored personnel carriers, and 380 units of the automobile and special equipment.

 

4. The peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation shall be deployed in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces. The period of stay of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is 5 years and shall be automatically extended by a further five-year period if none of the Parties declares six months prior to the expiration of the period of its intention to terminate the application of this provision.

 

5. In order to increase the effectiveness of control over the implementation of the agreements by the Parties to the conflict, a peacekeeping center shall be deployed to exercise control over the ceasefire.

 

6.The Republic of Armenia shall return Kalbajar district to the Republic of Azerbaijan by 15 November 2020 and Lachin district by 1 December 2020. The Lachin corridor (5km wide), which shall provide a connection of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and shall not affect the city of Shusha, shall remain under the control of the Russian Federation’s peacekeeping contingent.

 

By agreement of the Parties, a plan for the construction of a new route along the Lachin corridor shall be determined in the next three years, providing communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, with the subsequent redeployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to protect this route.

 

The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the safety of citizens, vehicles and goods traveling along the Lachin corridor in both directions.

 

7. Internally displaced persons and refugees shall return to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent districts under the control of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

 

8. The exchange of prisoners of war and other detainees and bodies of the dead shall be carried out.

 

9. All economic and transport links in the region shall be restored. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the safety of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to organize an unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions. Control over transport shall be exercised by the bodies of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia.

By agreement of the Parties, the construction of new transport communications linking the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan shall be ensured.

 

10 November 2020

 

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

President of the Russian Federation

It should be noted that even the opposition led by those political forces supporting the former Kocharyan and Sargsyan regimes currently protesting in Yerevan, albeit in small numbers, have stated that if in power they would not renege on the 2020 November ceasefire agreement as well as any trilateral statements issues since. But, unlike the 1994 ceasefire agreement that was never implemented fully, there’s now even less time for this one.

Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

Today, 28 years after the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the ceasefire agreement signed on 9 November 2020 reflects a new reality after nearly three decades of maximalist position that led nowhere other than war. There is also the need to change societal attitudes towards a peace that, while inevitable, should be sought sooner rather than later, as some civil society activists and others in Armenia recently highlighted.

We believe that warmongering political parties no longer have a place in Armenia, because the harmful era when the Karabakh issue was misused as a means for regime change has ended. Therefore, there is nothing left for them to do but to seek to stoke a civil war as a final attempt to grab power from the people. It is absolutely clear that none of the self-declared “saviors of the nation” are ready to wage war against Azerbaijan, much less Turkey. Therefore, the only target that this new “Armenian vengeance” can seek is “the Turk within” meaning citizens of the Republic of Armenia just like us, people who have chosen not to die for the country, but to live for it, those that elect to live on the path of freedom, dignity, and happiness. We are breaking the silence of thousands of citizens that think like us and reject labels like “Turk” and “traitor to the nation” by demanding that the legitimate rulers of the Republic of Armenia stay true to their promise and resolve the Karabakh conflict through a peace treaty.

Sadly, the rest of civil society remains inactive in preparing the populations in both Armenia and Azerbaijan for this even though official rhetoric has changed. There are, however, some notable exceptions – Bright Garden Voices, Caucasus Edition, LINKS Europe, and the International Crisis Group. But the silence or apparent reluctance to endorse and support the current peace process from others is somewhat disgraceful given their funding to date.

Today, 28 years after the 1994 armistice and 15 years after the 2020 ceasefire agreement, this must change, as myself and others such as Caucasus Edition have articulated many times. In an uncertain world and an even more unpredictable region, time is running out for that to happen so, on this anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the lessons and failures of the past must be acknowledged and another disastrous path to a new war ruled out.

For once, there is a very real opportunity to finally do just that.

Me in Khramort, Nagorno Karabakh 1994

On 5 May 2022, Caucasus Edition, a publication of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation, held another Zoom webinar as part of its series of online and offline events facilitating Armenia-Azerbaijan dialogue, this time on the new context and challenges that both countries find themselves in after not only the 2020 Karabakh war but especially the more recent and further Russian invasion of Ukraine. It followed another, Rethinking Peacebuilding in the South Caucasus in Relation to the War in Ukraine, held in April.

The speakers were Phil Gamaghelyan, co-founder of Imagine and a co-editor at Caucasus Edition, as well as Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego Assistant Professor, and International Crisis Group analyst Zaur Shiryev. The event was moderated by Christina Soloyan, another co-editor of Caucasus Edition, who started the discussion off by saying that while Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations had been in deadlock for some time, there were no significant developments happening very quickly, especially over the past month.

The first question was simple and to the point. Why now?

Gamaghelyan, the first to respond, said there were three main reasons, the first being that for over 30 years both Armenia and Azerbaijan had seen each other as a main threat, but now, with the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, the perception of what is possible in world politics has changed. If a large country such as Ukraine can be effectively ‘colonized’ then so too can any former Soviet republic. Admitting that this mutual perception still remains, Gamaghelyan says that it is more manageable than  one coming from a great power.

The second reason is that the 2020 Karabakh war effectively pushed out the United States and European Union from the process, while Russia and Turkey’s position strengthened, so their involvement in what appears to be a move towards peace is an attempt to stage a comeback. Fortunately, he adds, not militarily but diplomatically. Finally, he notes that the third reason is that both the Armenian and Azerbaijani government have a degree of domestic strength, something that they lacked prior to the 2020 war.

This is especially true for Azerbaijan, that might now be able to make some concessions from a new position of strength that would have otherwise been domestically unacceptable in the past, but there is also a government in Armenia that has been democratically elected twice, most recently last year despite the vote coming so soon after a military defeat. That’s a big difference compared to previous decades, he said, and its electoral win affords it a popular mandate for a program that now includes normalisation and stabilisation.

Phil Gamaghelyan, Caucasus Edition Symposium, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2022

Shiriyev agrees, but adds that it should be noted that when the Russian invasion started there were also fears there would also be new clashes over Karabakh because the West and Russia would be more focused on Ukraine. However, that did not happen even though there was another consequence. At the Aliyev-Pashinyan-Putin meeting in Sochi, for example, there was an undertaking to work on border delimitation and demarcation between the two countries but this never occurred, probably highlighting Moscow’s preoccupation with Ukraine. 

The EU, however, became more proactive compared to its more passive involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Indeed, it even facilitated bilateral talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Brussels, something neither the OSCE Minsk Group or Russia had achieved. This is an important step, believes Shiriyev, because it can result in a greater degree of trust between the two sides. There are also signs that Baku genuinely believes it has received positive messages from Yerevan. 

With the five points that should form the basis for a future peace agreement submitted by Azerbaijan and already accepted by Armenia, Shiriyev says he is therefore cautiously optimistic about recent developments. 

Gamaghelyan explains, nonetheless, that even though Yerevan has accepted the five submitted points it has done so at the expense of relinquishing its own agency and responsibility for the war. This centers around the belief that the situation on the ground today in and around Karabakh because of the last fighting would have been the same in the event of a negotiated peace settlement prior to 2020. First of all, he says, this disrespects the memory of thousands that died in the second Karabakh war who would otherwise be alive today.

Secondly, Gamaghelyan believes this argument is flawed. During the OSCE Minsk Group process, especially in terms of the Madrid Principles, the blueprint for how a peace agreement had previously looked like, included provisions for a whole set of issues from the status of Karabakh to the demilitarisation of the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan that are now militarized. In order to move towards normalisation, the government needs to reclaim its agency and acknowledge it responsibility for its own actions before the war. 

And while the Pashinyan government has made a public shift away from the type of militaristic rhetoric that plagued both sides prior to the 2020 war, including by openly saying that it has lowered the bar on status and effectively accepting the de jure jurisdiction of Azerbaijan over Karabakh, the question is then what happens next? If it is to have an autonomous status, then what kind? This discussion is largely missing, says Gamaghelyan, but it should start because “we are talking about the lives of over 100,000 people.”

Shiriyev nonetheless adds that the submitted points by Azerbaijan should result in normalisation and prevent a new war. Yerevan and Baku are currently negotiating an extended variant, but even so, one of the most important issues that remains is the need to delimit and demarcate their mutual border. As this will likely take years it mustn’t or shouldn’t, however, hold up a peace agreement. Another pressing issue is the transport link between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan through Armenia as per the 2020 ceasefire agreement.

There is an agreement on the railway connection, says Shiriyev, but not on any highway. Azerbaijan is also now publicly making it known that it would prefer the Russian peacekeeping force not to remain for another five years when its first term expires in 2025. But if that is the case, and if Azerbaijan decides to request Moscow to remove its soldiers, what would replace it or what security guarantees would need to be in place? 

Zaur Shiriyev, Caucasus Edition Symposium, Tbilisi, Georgia
© Onnik James Krikorian 2022

There are, of course, potential spoilers ahead. One, says Shiriyev, is Russia given that it views its mediation in the November 2020 ceasefire agreement as a “success story in the post-Soviet space,” so other international actors should understand the necessity to keep Moscow on board with any and all developments. Indeed, he believes, the two EU and Russian parallel processes should be integrated. Other possible spoilers ahead could be escalations on the border that would disrupt the peace process and any instability in Armenia.

This issue was one particularly touched upon by Gamaghelyan. For now, given that the opposition protests are effectively led by the former governments of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, their appeal is limited. Nonetheless, they do have a stable base as demonstrated by their frequency and, at the time of the webinar, that they are still ongoing. Nevertheless, they also show that the level of support for Pashinyan, as well as the opposition, has not changed since last year’s election so it is unlikely that a popular uprising will occur.

On the other hand, he warns, it can not be discounted that there could be an attempt to stage a coup d’état or even the outbreak of civil war or violent clashes that would destabilize Armenia. Whatever your opinion of him is, says Gamaghelyan, Pashinyan was democratically elected, a first in 30 years of independence, so such an eventuality is a frightening proposition given that it would plunge the country into a situation that would be very difficult to emerge from.

Thus, says Shiriyev, it is essential that the peace process must be such the trust and confidence of both societies is earned. Accusatory tones in rhetoric from both sides should stop, there should be no military clashes, and gestures on the humanitarian front should be forthcoming. For Armenia this last point concerns the return of those soldiers still in detention in Azerbaijan while for Baku there is the long-standing issue of the fate of missing persons from the war of the early 1990s.

That is the minimum, he believes, but another important factor must be the widening of civil society involvement in the process so that it is more inclusive and not simply the preserve of a cadre of analysts and academics. There needs to be the participation of others such as musicians, actors, environmentalists, and the media, especially given the extent of misinformation and disinformation in circulation. Moreover, this inclusivity and involvement should be in place from the very beginning.

Perhaps, says Shiriyev, the example of civil society involvement in the Armenia-Turkey process could be a positive one here. This also included the private sector.

For now, however, civil society is almost completely missing from the current Armenia-Azerbaijan process, says Gamaghelyan. This is unfortunate, he explains, because the governments might not have the necessary experience of dealing with sentitive and important matters such as transitional justice or possess any familiarity of dealing with the complex topic of memory given 30 years of mutual enmity and mass violence. 

Moreover, in response to a comment by a member of the audience for the event, Murad Nasibov, himself formerly involved in Track II projects, Gamaghelyan nonetheless noted that civil society activities aimed at promoting democracy should be decoupled from conflict resolution. Before it was believed that human rights and democratisation would lead to peace, but that didn’t quite work out, he comments.

“Waiting for democracy to arrive so we can stop killing each other is quite a dangerous proposition,” Gamaghelyan remarked.

Finally, in response to a comment that I had submitted about the possibility of a Cyprus-like scenario emerging, though others might have sent the same too, Gamaghelyan noted the importance of it becoming more of a Cyprus+ situation. While that conflict transformed itself into one where violence is absent and where some kind of basic coexistence exists in terms of mutual visits and economic linkages, it is also in limbo.

I wholeheartedly agree with Gamaghelyan here and have believed the same since I first visited Northern Cyprus to train journalists from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as those from the disputed territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh, in 2011. More recently, I have also explained why I believe that a Cyprus-like situation for Karabakh is anyway unsustainable here and here.

In conclusion, I fully support Gamaghelyan’s point about Cyprus+ and also consider that a stagnant status quo setting in, something that was sadly the case for the twenty years from 1998 to 2018, must be prevented. This timely and relevant webinar is perhaps an important step in making that possible. You can view it in full below.