European Union Mission in Armenia Marks First Anniversary

European Union Mission in Armenia Marks First Anniversary

European Union Mission in Armenia Head of Mission Markus Ritter speaking in Yerevan on 21 February to mark the deployment’s first anniversary © Onnik James Krikorian 2024

The European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) marked the first anniversary of its deployment on the country’s border with Azerbaijan last week. To celebrate the occasion, an event attended by Western Ambassadors, Armenian government officials including Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan, and some members of local civil society was held in a central Yerevan hotel. Thirty civilian unarmed mission monitors wearing blue mission vests were awarded Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Service medals by EUMA Head of Mission (HoM) Markus Ritter. The former German police chief reiterated the mission’s aim to contribute to the normalisation of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

Deployed on 20 February 2023, EUMA followed the much shorter term two-month European Union Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) that temporarily monitored the Armenia-Azerbaijan border from October 2022. Initially numbering “up to 100” staff when EUMA was first announced, that number has since risen to 138 and will reach 209. At the anniversary event, Ritter said that 48 of its current staff are actual monitors operating from bases in Goris, Ijevan, Jermuk, Kapan, Martuni, and Yeghegnadzor, also the mission’s headquarters. To date EUMA has conducted over 1,720 patrols.

 

“Reinforcing the Mission and increasing the number of staff enables us to conduct more patrols, contributing to overall security and stability in the region”, said Ritter. “We are conducting daily patrols to observe and report the situation on the ground. On this special day, I want to acknowledge the valuable work of the Mission’s personnel and thank the 23 EU Member States who are contributing staff to the mission”.

 

[…]

 

Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s Representative for Special Assignments Elchin Amirbayov also blamed  EUMA for making such incidents more likely. Baku has long accused EUMA of engaging in what it terms “binocular diplomacy”, taking European diplomats to the still problematic border to look at “Azerbaijani positions through binoculars, taking photos and then distributing this on different social media and claiming that it is because only of [the EU] that Azerbaijan is not attacking Armenia”. Last week, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed a new war was ‘very likely’.

 

Despite the controversies, however, EUMA’s presence is considered a much-needed confidence-building measure in Armenia, especially for communities situated on its border with Azerbaijan. “I am sure that the EU monitoring mission is bringing an important contribution to Armenia and the region, which symbolises the EU’s involvement for peace and stability”, CSDP commander Tomat said at the anniversary event. “I’m fully aware of the limits of what we can accomplish in such a delicate and complex environment”, noted Ritter.

The full article is here

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Pashinyan Reignites Constitutional Reform Debate Amid Declining Ratings

Pashinyan Reignites Constitutional Reform Debate Amid Declining Ratings

On January 18, six years after the street protests that brought him to power in 2018, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan raised the issue of reforming the country’s constitution during a meeting with the Armenian Ministry of Justice. The constitution was originally introduced under Levon Ter-Petrosyan in 1995 and controversially amended under his successors, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. Pashinyan stated that constitutional reforms are needed to make Armenia “more competitive in the new geopolitical environment.” The opposition claims that talk of constitutional reform comes under pressure from Azerbaijan in the stalled peace talks. Earlier, the Armenian premier claimed that constitutional reforms would give Yerevan a more stable position in negotiations with Baku.

Pashinyan’s initial efforts to hold a referendum to amend the constitution in April 2020 were indefinitely postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the declaration of a state of emergency in Armenia (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, March 16, 2020). As a result, a crucial amendment to strip constitutional court judges appointed under previous governments passed with a two-thirds majority in the Armenian National Assembly without a popular referendum (JAMnews, June 3, 2020). The opposition charged that the move was unconstitutional as the referendum could have been rescheduled to a later date.

  

The push for extensive constitutional reforms has remained a priority for the current Armenian government. After the canceled referendum, Pashinyan noted that the population did not trust the existing constitution in July 2020. He argued that a new constitution should be drafted and released for public discussion, with a referendum scheduled for the following year (Azatutyun.am, July 5, 2020). Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War in late 2020, however, postponed the referendum again in favor of snap parliamentary elections (Azatutyun.am, June 24, 2021).

 

[…]

 

At the heart of the matter is the inclusion of a preamble in successive constitutions directly referring to the 1990 Armenian Declaration of Independence. That document emphasizes the 1989 joint declaration on the “Reunification of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh” (Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, accessed January 24). It also refers to “achieving international recognition of the 1915 genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”

 

[…]

 

The extensive reforms to the Armenian Constitution come with key geopolitical implications. On the one hand, removing some of the territorial claims could facilitate real progress in peace talks. On the other hand, potentially doing so at the behest of Baku would do little to infuse public confidence in the new constitution. The reforms that Yerevan does agree on and the way they are implemented will undoubtedly have a significant impact on prospects for peace and stability in the South Caucasus.

The full piece can be read online here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Pashinyan’s Constitutional Gambit

Pashinyan’s Constitutional Gambit

Reforming the constitution of any nation is inherently challenging, but in Armenia it has always proven particularly controversial. Introduced by referendum in 1995 under then President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the current constitution has been amended twice by his successors – Robert Kocharyan in 2005 and Serzh Sargsyan in 2015. The second led to demonstrations in 2018 when provisions transforming Armenia from a presidential to parliamentary republic kicked in allowing Sargsyan to retain power past his second and final term in office. Leading the protestors was Nikol Pashinyan so it was not unexpected that he too would change the constitution once in office.

His attempt to do so four years ago was thwarted by the pandemic. Now he is trying again.

  

Speaking at the Ministry of Justice in January, Pashinyan not only emphasised the necessity of constitutional reform but even argued for a comprehensive overhaul rather than piecemeal amendments. The purpose, he said, in addition to possibly switching from majority to minority governmental system, was to make Armenia “more competitive and viable” in a new “geopolitical and regional situation.” The opposition instinctively interpreted those words as referring to his administration’s attempts to normalise relations with Azerbaijan.

 

At the heart of these claims is a belief that the preamble in the current constitution referring to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, itself based on the 1989 decision on the “Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh,” could be removed. The opposition claims that doing so would only be at the behest of Baku. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan has not categorically denied the claim but does confirm that Azerbaijan continues to raise this issue in negotiations, interpreting the preamble as indisputable claims on its territory.

 

[…]

 

Time will tell, but whatever happens next, an unprecedented debate on Armenia’s future and where the small land-locked country stands in the region could be on the near horizon, something that has arguably happened only once before. Forecasting future defeat unless compromise was reached, Ter-Petrosyan addressed the nation in an article simply entitled War or Peace? Time to get Serious.

The full opinion piece can be read online here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Roadblock to peace: the geopolitical quagmire of the “Zangezur Corridor”

Roadblock to peace: the geopolitical quagmire of the “Zangezur Corridor”

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the 1994 ceasefire agreement that put fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the Soviet-era mainly ethnic Armenian Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) on hold – or at least until it escalated into war in 2016 and more devastatingly in 2020. Despite the involvement of international mediators, peace remained elusive despite occasional claims to the contrary. The sides were said to have gotten close, but never enough to prevent tens of thousands dying in over three decades of conflict.

The terms of the 1994 ceasefire agreement, after all, were never implemented and despite hopes that the trilateral ceasefire statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia in 2020 could have been different, the time since has proven that it mostly wasn’t. The situation on the ground is now diametrically reversed, of course, and especially since last year’s exodus of Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population, but one thing has remained constant – the need to unblock regional economic and transport routes and particularly between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave­.

  

In October 1993, Chairman of the the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)’s Minsk Conference, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Mario Raffaelli, had proposed the restoration of the gas pipeline, the Ijevan-Gazakh railway, and then all other forms of communication. But as is the case now, stumbling blocks emerged. In particular, while Baku wanted restoration of the connection through Armenia to Nakhchivan­, Yerevan did not. By 1997, however, it was included as the “Baku­-Horadiz–Meghri–Ordubad–Nakhichevan­-Yerevan route” in the OSCE-proposed “package deal” and later as “direct and immediate land access for Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan” in the OSCE Minsk Group Madrid Principles.

 

Most recently, in the 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement, it was referred to as “unhindered […] transport communication [between the] western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic” as part of unblocking all “economic and transport links in the region […].” 

 

[…]

 

But more than three years since the November trilateral ceasefire statement, it is high time that these issues are finally resolved, something the European Union and the United States hope for. Yes, this should be with the concerns and interests of the main stakeholders in mind, but also without the geopolitics that could see the unblocking of regional communications again remain on paper.

The full opinion piece can be read online here.

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

Baku, Yerevan, and Moscow Clash Over Regional Transit

Baku, Yerevan, and Moscow Clash Over Regional Transit

In my first piece for The Jamestown Foundation, I again look at the continuing geopolitical impasse on attempts to restore economic and  transport links in the region following the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war as per the trilateral ceasefire statement that ended it.  This is a topic that I’ve covered consistently since the beginning of 2021 but it has particularly come to a head now as hopes for a framework agreement between Baku and Yerevan persist. 

On January 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed frustration about the endless delays in peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia during his annual press conference in Moscow (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 18). Despite hopes that an agreement to normalize relations could be within reach, progress remains stunted by several outstanding issues increasingly entangled in competing geopolitical interests (see EDM, December 18, 2022). This is most evident in the failure to unblock regional economic and transit ties following the Second Karabakh War in 2020. Harsh rhetoric from both Yerevan and Baku shows no sign of abating and threatens to derail the peace process (see EDM, January 24).

 

Key differences remain between Azerbaijan and Armenia on implementing the trilateral agreement ending the Second Karabakh War. According to the ninth point of the November 2020 ceasefire statement signed by Yerevan, Baku, and Moscow, “all economic and transport connections in the region” should be unblocked, including those between the “western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic” (Kremlin.ru, November 10, 2020). The agreement also states that the transit of people, vehicles, and cargo should be “unhindered,” while Russian border guards would be “responsible for overseeing the transport connections.” As Yerevan increasingly turns its gaze toward the West and the European Union and the United States seek to diminish Russia’s role in the South Caucasus, Armenia continues to show reluctance in fulfilling its commitments. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is growing increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress since 2020, specifically concerning the restoration of its Soviet-era connection via Armenian territory to the Nakhchivan exclave.

 

This is a far cry from more recent trilateral statements signed by the three countries in 2021. Those agreements initially reaffirmed a commitment to unblocking transit corridors, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan openly declaring that there was a “common understanding of how the routes will operate” (Kremlin.ru, November 26, 2021). Not one route, however, has been restored, and no reinstitution of the Soviet-era Nakhchivan line running through Armenia’s Syunik region (also known as Zangezur) has taken place.

 

[…]

 

Concrete details on unblocking regional transit routes could be omitted from any framework agreement to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The danger here, however, is that further delays could lead to future conflict if transportation issues are left unresolved. Azerbaijan hopes to complete its section of the Zangezur Corridor by the end of 2024. Baku has warned that, until the direct link to Nakhchivan is established, it will not unblock any other passages between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Trend, January 10).

The full analysis is available here

 

CONFLICT VOICES e-BOOKS

 

Conflict Voices – December 2010

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian

 

Conflict Voices – May 2011

Short essays on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Download in English | Russian