Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise

Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise

Photo: European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) 

On December 30, 2024, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards left Armenia’s Agarak border checkpoint with Iran at the end of December 2024 . This follows the FSB border guard’s withdrawal from Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport at the end of July 2024. The move had been anticipated by several pro-government activists in Armenia who had already called for their removal to cut off Russian access to the country’s Border Electronic Management Information System. This applies, however, only to the checkpoint and not the entire length of the Armenia-Iran border. Instead, FSB border guards will now be joined by an unknown number of Armenian National Security Service (NSS) border guards to jointly perform duties. Until now, the FSB guards have been solely responsible for guarding Armenia’s borders with Iran and Türkiye, as stipulated in a 1992 agreement between Yerevan and Moscow. Their withdrawal from the checkpoint represents a symbolic reduction in Armenia’s reliance on Russia for its security needs and a gradual diversification away from Moscow in general.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan can tout the development as a successful move in  exerting gradual control of its sovereign territory in a pre-election year, but another development relating to a different border could prove more difficult and perhaps even more sensitive. Following clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in September 2022, the European Union deployed a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) civilian observation mission to reduce tensions between the sides. That decision stemmed from the October 6, 2022 meeting between Pashinyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, alongside the presidents of the European Council and France, Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron, at the first-ever European Political Community (EPC) summit in Prague. The temporary mission was able to deploy quickly because it was made up of 40 monitors already in neighboring Georgia as part of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) on the Administrative Boundary Lines with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

 

[…] 

 

Responding to renewed demands from Baku that EUMA be withdrawn from the Armenian side of the shared border, Pashinyan said in November that he has instead offered to withdraw it only from those parts of the border that have been demarcated. It is implied, however, that this would include other parts once they are demarcated in the future.

 

[…] 

  

The demand for EUMA to withdraw is also just one of many conditions from Baku for an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, including on the constitution. Failure to agree on all demands might lead to continued deadlock throughout 2025. For now, Yerevan has not publicly stated whether it has officially requested EUMA extend its mission next month even though the European Union has offered to do so.

The full analysis is available here.

 

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From Key West to Key Failures – The Demise of the OSCE Minsk Group

From Key West to Key Failures – The Demise of the OSCE Minsk Group

When I moved to Yerevan in October 1998, it was rare to hear much positive conversation about the future of Armenia or Karabakh. That had also been the case when I visited the country on a research trip earlier that June. Many were already tired of the conflict and few seemed enthused with a new regime that had just come to power after the ousting the country’s first president earlier that year. Levon Ter-Petrosyan had chosen to resign following a palace coup staged by his inner circle opposed to a concessionary peace deal with Azerbaijan. They thought the deal proposed by a troika of France, Russia, and the United States was a betrayal. Ter-Petrosyan warned that it might well be the best Armenia could ever hope for.

Despite that failure, the same troika, better known as the OSCE Minsk Group, or to quote its full title on its mandate, the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE (Minsk Conference), mediated another variant in 1999 involving an exchange of territories. Weeks later, nationalist gunmen burst into the Armenian National Assembly and assassinated several high-level officials including newly elected Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, ironically one of those who had deposed Ter-Petrosyan in 1998. Nonetheless, the OSCE Minsk Group was back in business in Key West, Florida, in 2001.

 

[…]

 

“We stayed in five-star hotels […] usually assigned suites on the executive floor that gave us access to a private dining room and full bar at no additional expense, former U.S. co-chair Richard E. Hoagland wrote in 2021. “We always sought out the best restaurants in the cities we found ourselves. We lived well while we […] reminded Baku and Yerevan that the Minsk Group exists. But to be blunt, very, very little ever got accomplished.”

 

That is perhaps a little unfair. The OSCE Minsk Group did at times get close to resolving the conflict, but there was rarely the same political will to do so at the same time in Armenia or Azerbaijan. The then defacto authorities in Karabakh were also nearly always against any peace proposal, leading Hoagland to conclude that “only a war would finally settle the problem.” It was up to Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the conflict themselves, a situation not too dissimilar to today, now mainly through bilateral diplomatic means.

The full piece is available here.

 

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Interview on Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalisation

Interview on Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalisation

Refuelling close to the border with Azerbaijan en route between Yerevan and Khojali airport in Karabakh © Onnik James Krikorian 1994

Earlier this month I was briefly interviewed by Nazrin Babayeva from Report.Az. It was published in two parts so included below is the full text in whole.

How do you perceive the current trajectory of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalisation efforts?

It is difficult to say where Armenia and Azerbaijan are as the year draws to a close. After all, we’ve been in the exact same situation at the end of every year since late 2022. However, consensus among many analysts is that the two countries are the closest to an agreement than ever before.

What are the primary obstacles that both countries face in achieving sustainable peace?

Recently those obstacles were outlined by the AIR Centre’s Farid Shafiyev. That is, the need for Armenia to remove reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, the revocation of legal action pursued in international bodies, and the removal of international forces on Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.

They appear to have been implicitly confirmed by Pashinyan’s most recent press conference in late November.

The constitutional impasse is the most well known, of course, and despite criticising the 1990 Declaration of Independence many times since last year, Pashinyan still refuses to [remove the constitutional preamble] and instead now claims that Azerbaijan has territorial claims on Armenia referred to in its.

As for international forces, Pashinyan recently stated that he has offered Baku a solution by withdrawing the European Union Mission in Armenia from those parts of the shared border that are demarcated. For now that is only 12.7 km in total but it also implies that they would be removed in other later demarcated areas.

What compromises do you believe are necessary from both sides to reach a lasting agreement?

It is not for me to suggest what compromises are necessary. That is up to the leaders in their bilateral talks. However, I have been encouraged by some Azerbaijani analysts suggesting that reference to changing the constitution could be included in any agreement but with a deadline for doing so. This has been the case in other international examples of similar problems.

Pashinyan will anyway need to prepare the population and it would be good idea to have confidence and trust built up between the people before expecting them to vote on it.

What steps should be taken to rebuild trust between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities

People to people contact is absolutely vital. Yes, we do have meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani analysts, academics, and researchers, but often these are held in secret so not everyone knows they occur. Moreover, they do not represent the bulk of both societies. There are a few opportunities for youth to meet in Tbilisi but more need to be done in this area. This also means between Armenian and Azerbaijani musicians, artists, and writers, but especially farmers and businesspeople.

Maybe the newly demarcated part of the Tavush-Gazakh border can prove a relevant location to pilot projects designed to restore communication with close by adjacent but effectively distanced communities. At first this could perhaps happen in Georgia close to the Armenia-Azerbaijan borders but it is vital if you consider that at some point Azerbaijani IDP communities will return to their former homes adjacent to the Armenian border. There are many issues to resolve such as shared water resources but not only.

Do you think full normalization is achievable in the near future? If not, what timeline seems realistic to you?

Theoretically it is possible but a lot also depends on trust between the sides. Sadly that appears to be in short supply. However, full normalisation is not impossible if there is the political will. That said, there are some who believe that maybe a ‘cold peace’ will set in. There will be no fighting but communication and cooperation will be limited though eventually it will slowly improve. That could take a lot longer, however. For now the most important thing would even be partial normalisation.

On a personal note, however, I very much hope for it. I first started covering this conflict in 1994 when I first visited Karabakh. That was 30 years ago now so it is certainly well past time to resolve it. Sadly, however, I remember the words of then US Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group Steve Mann in 2005. When asked whether a peace deal would come soon he replied simply. “Either this year or within the next 100 years,” he said. Sadly, I am always reminded of that.

Again, there are many possibilities and we simply don’t know. This is especially true given that it seems both sides seem to be waiting for Donald Trump to move into the White House. Certainly, part of the reason why both Armenia and the Biden administration seem in a rush to get a peace deal signed by the end of the year is because soon Trump will be president. Nobody yet knows what his position might be or even if he will still see engagement on this necessary.

Perhaps when that is known we will have a much clearer picture. However, I do believe that Pashinyan needs an agreement by the time of the next elections due to be held no later than June 2026 in Armenia. There is also the issue of Pashinyan hoping to put a new constitution to a referendum most likely in 2027. If that referendum delays the process then I at least hope for some declaration to be signed next year by the two sides.

And if the talks still remain in deadlock then I hope that the 15 out of 17 points agreed so far can be initialled and even made public. It would certainly signal to the populations of both sides that an agreement is within reach. Moreover, when those points are kept secret it only encourages disinformation to spread which doesn’t help anyone or anything.

What is your perspective on the potential of the Zangezur Corridor in fostering economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and what challenges must be addressed to make this project mutually beneficial?

I don’t think there’s any doubt that open borders and mutual trade including acting as a transit route would be beneficial for both sides. Even in 2001, Pashinyan wrote in his newspaper that trade and transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan as well as by others wishing to use the route can only benefit Armenia.

For Pashinyan, however, the problem is control. As he seeks to diversify away, though not totally, from Russia, he doesn’t want Russian control. Nor too does the West as the US has openly stated. They also include China in this as well. Sadly, it has become a geopolitical football and that might continue for some time.

It should, however, be mentioned that it remains unclear what economic benefits it might bring. Nonetheless, even just the investment and jobs created to build the infrastructure would be something. That said, Baku sees importance and benefits in what it calls the Zangezur Corridor while Pashinyan appears to as well as part of his Crossroads of Peace initiative.

However, for Armenia, especially as it seeks to economically diversify away from Russia, it is an open border with Turkiye that it sees as most important. And that is probably why both Ankara and Baku consider both Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkiye normalisation as connected. Whatever it is called, the Zangezur Corridor will come at some point to complement the Aras Corridor.

 

 

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Pashinyan’s Fresh-Faced Populism Signals Start of Armenian Election Cycle

Pashinyan’s Fresh-Faced Populism Signals Start of Armenian Election Cycle

Central Train Station, Yerevan, Armenia © Onnik James Krikorian 2007

On November 14, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan lambasted the country’s 1990 Declaration of Independence, equating the historical document to the non-existence of the current Republic. The issue of the declaration, which contains claims to what is considered sovereign Azerbaijani territory in the form of the former Soviet-era “Mountainous Region of Karabakh,” then an autonomous district, has proven to be the main obstacle to Yerevan and Baku finally concluding a long-anticipated peace agreement . The outcry about these comments was significant but soon diminished, perhaps by design, when Pashinyan later the same evening posted a video on social media shaving off his now trademark beard. Although unshaven for his career prior to the 2018 street protests that brought him to power, Pashinyan has sported a beard ever since and created a new post-revolutionary image. While some media took a light-hearted approach to the change, others were more sarcastic, with one regional analyst asking if this was “the end of the revolution”.

Pashinyan has long been a populist ready to distract attention from controversial decisions. Adding to this speculation that political intent was behind the move, many noticed that Pashinyan appeared to wink at the camera at the end. In an interview aired on November 22, Pashinyan finally spoke about the new image, claiming it was done to celebrate one of his daughter’s birthdays). Nonetheless, his critics maintain that along with his regularly posted social media videos, including resuming bicycling at home and on official visits abroad, the real reason was “political puppetry” ahead of elections due to be held no later than June 2026.

 

[…]

 

Adding to the speculation, Pashinyan has further explained the dismissals and replacements as part of a new strategy to distinguish between officials who had served in the governments of his unpopular predecessors and those who took part in or eventually supported his much-touted 2018 revolution. Some, however, are refusing to leave their positions. According to press reports, two Civil Contract members of parliament initially ignored the message to resign their parliamentary mandates. One did so, while the other refused to. The Anti-Corruption Committee summoned the renegade deputy. The opposition claims that ideological differences could also be the reason for removing the deputies.

 

[…]

 

In one video discussion, two Armenian political commentators linked the shaving of his beard, the high-profile dismissals via resignation, and preparing for new elections. They further maintain that Pashinyan seeks assured control over power structures to prevent any challenge to his leadership within his own party structure. They also compare such a possibility to the palace coup that deposed Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, when he too was ready to sign a compromise peace agreement with Azerbaijan in 1998 amid a weak government, weaker opposition, and widespread public apathy and precarious legitimacy. Pashinyan’s recent actions point to a potential effort to consolidate power, bolster public confidence, and navigate the precarious road to potential re-election, all while balancing the delicate and contentious issue of peace with Azerbaijan.

The full piece is available here.

 

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Hope for breakthrough with Azerbaijan dims as Armenia a no-show

Hope for breakthrough with Azerbaijan dims as Armenia a no-show

Hopes that Armenia and Azerbaijan might take a step towards normalising relations at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 29) in Baku this month were dashed when Armenia failed to send a delegation to the event, despite receiving an official invitation.

The decision to host COP 29 in Baku was already controversial. Armenia had supported Azerbaijan’s bid to host the conference in a joint declaration last year, in exchange for the release of Armenian prisoners held by Azerbaijan and a promise of future dialogue. In return, Baku released 32 Armenian soldiers, while Yerevan freed two Azerbaijani soldiers. This gesture was seen as a sign that both sides might be moving towards greater cooperation.

However, despite not officially rejecting the invitation, Armenian National Assembly speaker Alen Simonyan made it clear days before the event that participation was morally wrong for him as long as Armenian prisoners remained imprisoned in Azerbaijan. Some pro-Armenian commentators also argued that Yerevan should only attend if Azerbaijan took concrete steps to release the detainees. Despite speculation that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan or Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan might attend, not even a small low-level delegation was sent.

[…]

Nonetheless, some positive news emerged from the conference when U.S. Ambassador to Baku Mark Libby unexpectedly announced that hydrologists and engineers from both Armenia and Azerbaijan were working together on integrated water management for trans-boundary rivers. While no details were provided, it at least demonstrated that, even amid bilateral tensions, there are areas where the two countries could still collaborate.

Azerbaijan has said that negotiations to normalise relations with Armenia will continue in December, and both countries have expressed cautious optimism that a formal peace agreement is still possible. Even so, the hope that the climate conference could serve as a platform for a breakthrough has been quashed, and the future of the peace process remains uncertain.

The full piece is available here.

 

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